6e992cc0c5
- Rename 'three-pronged' folder to 'knowledge-layers' — prong metaphor
was misleading (implied parallel tines), replaced with epistemic layers
(deductive base, empirical middle, probabilistic oracle — vertical stack)
- Collapse 11 overlapping files into 3 coherent documents:
- knowledge-layers/_index.org: core framework (two engines + one store,
World Model formula, 0-14 layer table, provenance store design,
conflict resolution, cold-start, stage mapping)
- knowledge-layers/practical-implications.org: design-world-aware-of-
physics, 10 powers, Schafmeister existence proof, epistemic transparency
- knowledge-layers/neurological-empirical.org: neural networks in
provenance framework (kept intact)
- Relocate wolfram/mathematica and Schafmeister docs to ideas/viability/
- Integrate into main architecture _index.org:
- Gate: expanded from two vectors (ACL2+LLM) to three (deductive,
provenance/empirical, LLM oracle)
- Autodidactic loop: split into Track 1 (deductive hardening, fast)
and Track 2 (empirical validation, slow, experimental-feedback-driven)
- See also: added Knowledge Layers cross-reference
- Add all-lisp geometry engine note (ideas/lisp-geometry-engine.org) as
concrete illustration of the empirical layer's effect on design work
- Rebuild site: 148 files, 0 errors
1.4 KiB
Codex CLI
OpenAI's open-source coding agent. Rust, ~950K lines, sandboxed.
Architecture: ~116 crate Rust workspace with a protocol layer (SQ/EQ session types), sandbox manager (macOS Seatbelt, Linux nsjail), multi-provider support, configurable TUI.
Safety model: Most sophisticated safety system of any coding agent analyzed. Multi-layer: process hardening (macOS Seatbelt with 4 profile tiers), execution policy engine, sandboxing via nsjail/Seatbelt, Guardian module for tool permission gating. No prompt-based safety — all deterministic through policy definitions.
Data model: Protocol-defined session types. Structured request/response models. Config through TOML files with schema validation.
Self-modification: Protected by sandbox — the agent cannot escape to modify its own binary or config without explicit policy override.
Verification: None (no proof system).
Key gap vs Passepartout: No knowledge graph, no persistent memory model, no deterministic gate stack for agent behavior (only OS-level sandboxing), no ACL2/prover, no neurosymbolic architecture. Strongest sandbox but weakest cognitive architecture.
See the full competitive analysis for the landscape view and comparison.