* Federalist (Barnes & Noble Classics) - Alexander Hamilton
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:NOTER_DOCUMENT: ../../../library/books/Alexander Hamilton/Federalist (Barnes & Noble Classics) (2763)/Federalist (Barnes & Noble Classics) - Alexander Hamilton.epub
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** Unity is what makes the United States great
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:NOTER_PAGE: (11 . 3061)
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With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice, that Providence has been pleased to give this
one connected country, to one united people; a people descended from the same ancestors,
speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of
government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms
and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established their
general liberty and independence.
This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was
the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren,
united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous
and alien sovereignties.
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** How militaries came to rule over people
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:NOTER_PAGE: (17 . 8368)
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The army under such circumstances, though it may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a
small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection, will be utterly incompetent to the purpose
of enforcing encroachments against the united efforts of the great body of the people.
But in a country, where the perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always
prepared to repel it, her armies must be numerous enough for instant defence. The continual
necessity for his services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades
the condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants
of territories often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on
their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees, the people are
brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition
from this disposition to that of considering them as masters, is neither remote nor difficult: but it
is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold, or effectual
resistance, to usurpations supported by the military power.

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** The difference between a republic and a democracy and the benefits and shortcomings to each
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:NOTER_PAGE: (19 . 6929)
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No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his
judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay, with greater reason, a
body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties, at the same time; yet, what are many of the
most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning
the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? and what are
the different classes of legislators, but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine?
Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on
one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the
parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other
words, the most powerful faction, must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be
encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which
would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes; and probably by
neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes, on the
various descriptions of property, is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality ;
yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to
a predominant party, to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they
over-burden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

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** This has foreseen the American civil war on lines of slavery. For an African Federation, Federalist 16 here is relevant for Islamic law, on which Egypt is likely to be on the wrong side. Therefore, for a federation coming out of Egypt, the delay of this conflict until a large and industrial part of Afirca has joined the union is good for the cause of secularism
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:NOTER_PAGE: (25 . 3573)
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It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of government, in its application to us, would
even be capable of answering its end. If there should not be a large army, constantly at the
disposal of the national government, it would either not be able to employ force at all, or when
this could be done, it would amount to a war between different parts of the confederacy,
concerning the infractions of a league; in which the strongest combination would be most likely
to prevail, whether it consisted of those who supported, or of those who resisted, the general
authority. It would rarely happen that the delinquency to be redressed would be confined to a
single member, and if there were more than one, who had neglected their duty, similarity of
situation would induce them to unite for common defence. Independent of this motive of
sympathy, if a large and influential state should happen to be the aggressing member, it would
commonly have weight enough with its neighbours, to win over some of them as associates to its
cause. Specious arguments of danger to the general liberty could easily be contrived; plausible
excuses for the deficiencies of the party, could, without difficulty, be invented, to alarm the
apprehensions, inflame the passions, and conciliate the good will even of those states which
were not chargeable with any violation, or omission of duty. This would be the more likely to
take place, as the delinquencies of the larger members might be expected sometimes to proceed
from an ambitious premeditation in their rulers, with a view to getting rid of all external control
upon their designs of personal aggrandizement; the better to effect which, it is presumable they
would tamper beforehand with leading individuals in the adjacent states. If associates could not
be found at home, recourse would be had to the aid of foreign powers, who would seldom be
disinclined to encouraging the dissensions of a confederacy, from the firm union of which they
had so much to fear. When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men observe no bounds of
moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of irritated resentment, would
be apt to carry the states, against which the arms of the union were exerted, to any extremes
necessary to avenge the affront, or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this kind
would probably terminate in a dissolution of the union.

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** The most critical moment for the future of Europe turns out to be the three-way partition of Charlemagne's domain after his death. Had he managed a better move to federalism, the future of Europe and the world would have been utterly different
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:NOTER_PAGE: (28 . 2210)
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]]#+BEGIN_QUOTE
In the early ages of christianity, Germany was occupied by seven distinct nations, who had no
common chief. The Franks, one of the number, having conquered the Gauls, established the
kingdom which has taken its name from them. In the ninth century, Charlemagne, its warlike
monarch, carried his victorious arms in every direction; and Germany became a part of his vast
dominions. On the dismemberment, which took place under his sons, this part was erected into
a separate and independent empire. Charlemagne and his immediate descendants possessed the
reality, as well as the ensigns and dignity of imperial power. But the principal vassals, whose
fiefs had become hereditary, and who composed the national diets, which Charlemagne had not
abolished, gradually threw off the yoke, and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction and
independence. The force of imperial sovereignty was insufficient to restrain such powerful
dependants; or to preserve the unity and tranquillity of the empire. The most furious private
wars, accompanied with every species of calamity, were carried on between the different
princes and states. The imperial authority, unable to maintain the public order, declined by
degrees, till it was almost extinct in the anarchy, which agitated the long interval between the
death of the last emperor of the Suabian, and the accession of the first emperor of the Austrian
lines. In the eleventh century, the emperors enjoyed full sovereignty: in the fifteenth, they had
little more than the symbols and decorations of power.
Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the important features of a confederacy, has
grown the federal system, which constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a
diet representing the component members of the confederacy; in the emperor who is the
executive magistrate, with a negative on the decrees of the diet; and in the imperial chamber and
aulic council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in controversies which concern
the empire, or which happen among its members.

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** This is starting to make sense. Standing armies are a danger to liberty. Regulated militias susceptible to the control of the national government are an altrenative to national defense. The national government control the militia with government commissioned officers. Non-comissioned officers run the militia followin the orders of the commissioned officeres and otherwise
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:NOTER_PAGE: (38 . 2316)
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Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to this plan, there is none that
was so little to have been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this
particular provision has been attacked. If a well regulated militia be the most natural defence of
a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation, and at the disposal of that body,
which is constituted the guardian of the national security. If standing armies are dangerous to
liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the same body, ought, as far as possible, to take
away the inducement and the pretext, to such unfriendly institutions. If the federal government
can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies, which call for the military arm in
support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind
of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an
army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence, than a thousand
prohibitions upon paper.
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** With the posse comitatus in place, there can, and should, be a legal separation between the regulation of the militia and the emergency power of conscription. Militia training and upkeep is normal. Conscription in war or to face disruption is exceptional.
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:NOTER_PAGE: (38 . 3543)
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In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
union, it has been remarked, that there is no where any provision in the proposed constitution
for requiring the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his
duty; whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his only auxiliary.
There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have appeared, and sometimes even from
the same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a very favourable opinion of the sincerity or
fair dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath, that the powers of the
federal government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in the next, that it has not
authority sufficient even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as much
short of the truth, as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt, that a right to pass
all laws necessary and proper to execute its declared powers, would include that of requiring the
assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of those laws;
as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and
collection of taxes, would involve that of varying the rules of descent, and of the alienation of
landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore
evident, that the supposition of a want of power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is
entirely destitute of colour, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in
its application to the authority of the federal government over the militia, is as uncandid, as it is
illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument
of authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when necessary? What shall we
think of the motives which could induce men of sense to reason in this extraordinary manner?
How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and conviction?
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