395 lines
40 KiB
HTML
395 lines
40 KiB
HTML
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
|
||
<html>
|
||
<head>
|
||
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
|
||
<title>Properties as Objects of Knowledge</title>
|
||
<meta name="generator" content="LibreOffice 4.2.8.2 (Linux)">
|
||
<meta name="author" content="Amr Gharbeia">
|
||
<meta name="created" content="20010831;3300000000000">
|
||
<meta name="changed" content="20150721;231310955033778">
|
||
<style type="text/css">
|
||
<!--
|
||
@page { margin-right: 1.2cm; margin-top: 1.2cm; margin-bottom: 1.25cm }
|
||
p { text-indent: 1.27cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm; direction: rtl; color: #99ccff; line-height: 120%; text-align: right; widows: 2; orphans: 2 }
|
||
p.western { font-family: "Arial", sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; so-language: en-US }
|
||
p.cjk { font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 10pt }
|
||
p.ctl { font-family: "Simplified Arabic"; font-size: 10pt; so-language: ar-EG }
|
||
a:link { color: #0000ff }
|
||
-->
|
||
</style>
|
||
</head>
|
||
<body lang="en-GB" text="#99ccff" link="#0000ff" dir="ltr">
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font color="#800000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>P<img src="" name="OdhPAsOb_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="102" height="36" border="0">roperties
|
||
as Objects of Knowledge. </b></font></font>Ontological philosophy
|
||
explains properties as aspects of the substances it postulates. But
|
||
when philosophers begin their argument from the point of view of the
|
||
cognitive subject by reflecting on how they know, they see properties
|
||
as objects of knowledge, and that gives rise to philosophical
|
||
problems, including problems about the nature of properties. To take
|
||
properties as objects that are known in some way is, in effect, to
|
||
see them as more basic than substances, because the objects that have
|
||
them seem to be nothing but something that has properties of certain
|
||
kinds that are present to the subject and to which he can refer. This
|
||
is the source of the problem of mind. It can be seen that there is a
|
||
difference between two basic kinds of essential properties (which
|
||
ontological philosophy explains as the difference between intrinsic
|
||
and extrinsic essential properties), but epistemological philosophy
|
||
has no way to explain how they are related to one another because it
|
||
takes properties to be basic. In its contemporary form, as we shall
|
||
see, it infects materialism. But let us begin by seeing how the
|
||
problem of mind arises.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>T<img src="" name="OdhPProblem_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="81" height="33" border="0">he
|
||
Problem of mind. </b></font>The problem of mind arises when
|
||
naturalists discover that there is a basic difference between
|
||
properties which was not obvious at first. In our naive or natural
|
||
attitude toward the world, we take the natural world to be simply
|
||
what we perceive, as if the objects in space, including our own
|
||
bodies, were simply what they appear to be. This is a form of
|
||
realism, because it is to assume that those objects in space would
|
||
exist even if we were not perceiving them. But it is naive, because
|
||
it assumes that the objects being perceived actually have the
|
||
properties that they appear to have in perception, including not only
|
||
their locations, shapes, and dispositional properties (such as how
|
||
they move and interact), but also their colors, odors, sounds and
|
||
tactile properties, such as hot and cold, wet and dry. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
latter properties are distinctive, for they are qualitative
|
||
properties, or properties that are simply a quality of some kind that
|
||
is immediately present to the perceiver. When I perceive that a leaf
|
||
is green, for example, the surface of the leaf appears green, and the
|
||
greenness is an object of my immediate awareness. What I mean by
|
||
"green" is <i>that kind of quality </i>that seems to inhere
|
||
in the surface of the leaf, and I cannot define "green" any
|
||
more precisely than that, because what I mean is something that is
|
||
intrinsic to the object I am aware of. The quality is what makes it
|
||
the kind of object it is. Such qualitative properties are now often
|
||
called "qualia," and they are involved in everything we
|
||
perceive, including not only the colors that objects have to vision,
|
||
but also the odors they have to smell, the sounds they have to
|
||
hearing, and certain tactile properties they have to touch. Such
|
||
qualities, or qualia, also characterize one’s own body, but one’
|
||
own body has additional qualities that are perceived in a different
|
||
way, such as pains, tickles, itches, and the like, for they are not
|
||
perceivable by others.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
problem of mind arises when it is recognized that the qualia that are
|
||
immediately present to us in perception are not located in the
|
||
objects we perceive in the space in and around our bodies, but are
|
||
somehow part of us as subjects, most closely connected to our brains.
|
||
That is, the mind become a problem with the acceptance of critical
|
||
realism. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Naturalists
|
||
are forced to recognize that qualia are subjective in this sense when
|
||
they discover that perception is a physical process in which the
|
||
objects stimulate sensory organs and that somehow gives rise to the
|
||
qualia we have. In each sensory modality, what causes the experience
|
||
is a chain of causes and effects that starts in the object being
|
||
perceived, proceeds through the body, making events occur in the
|
||
brain, and the qualia come at the end of that causal chain. Thus,
|
||
qualia must somehow be part of one’s brain. And if we follow this
|
||
argument to its conclusion, naturalists also come to recognize that
|
||
the space in which sensory qualia seem to be located is itself also
|
||
merely phenomenal and, thus, distinct from the space in which the
|
||
physical objects actually exist. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This
|
||
discovery about perception is called "critical realism" (or
|
||
"representative realism"). It is realism, because it holds
|
||
that the objects being perceived really do exist in physical space as
|
||
the causes of the appearances we have in perceiving, including our
|
||
bodies. But it is critical, because it does not take the qualia that
|
||
make up those appearances to be properties in the objects that give
|
||
rise to them, but rather as parts of the subject, where their
|
||
function is apparently to represent those properties in the material
|
||
objects in real space to the subject. Likewise, it is critical
|
||
because it recognizes that the spatial relations that appear to hold
|
||
among the qualia in perception are different from the spatial
|
||
relations that hold among the material objects in real space. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus,
|
||
critical realism about perception makes it clear that objects with
|
||
physical properties in real space exist somehow "beyond"
|
||
the (complex) phenomenal properties we have. Since material objects
|
||
in real space have physical properties, it is to discover that we
|
||
must distinguish the qualia and their configurations in phenomenal
|
||
space from physical properties. They are what we call "phenomenal
|
||
properties."</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Critical
|
||
realism gives rise to the so-called problem of mind, for it seems
|
||
that the subject to whom the configurations of qualia appear is a
|
||
radically different kind of entity from the material objects in real
|
||
space. Material objects have physical properties, including not only
|
||
the physical dispositions that make them causes of the qualia that
|
||
appear in perception, but also relations in real space. But the
|
||
subject is radically different, because he is something to which
|
||
phenomenal properties appear. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">When we
|
||
reflect on the perceptual appearances we have as perceiving subjects,
|
||
furthermore, we recognize that they play distinctive roles in our
|
||
processes of knowing and doing. There are other appearances similar
|
||
to perceptual appearances, albeit fainter and less detailed, which
|
||
play other roles. Traditionally, the former are called "ideas of
|
||
perception," and the latter are called "ideas of memory and
|
||
imagination." But they, and perhaps other appearances that our
|
||
mental processes have to us in thinking and feeling emotions, are all
|
||
<i>phenomenal properties</i>. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To
|
||
acknowledge this fundamental difference from material objects, the
|
||
subject calls himself "mind" and contrasts it with his
|
||
body, which is just an object in space (albeit a special one, since
|
||
it is the one through which he acts). The mind-body is problem is how
|
||
the mind and body can be parts of the same world, that is, what are
|
||
their natures and how are they related to one another. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>T<img src="" name="OdhPTheories_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="80" height="33" border="0">heories
|
||
of mind. </b></font>This problem about the nature of mind is arguably
|
||
the source of all the problems encountered in modern philosophy, and
|
||
it arises in contemporary philosophy as the problem about the
|
||
relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. The question
|
||
is how to explain the natures of the two radically different kinds of
|
||
properties that are known from the point of view of the critical
|
||
realist as parts of the same world. There is not much of a problem
|
||
for ontological philosophy, and so let us consider why before we
|
||
derive the various positions on the nature of mind defended by
|
||
traditional, epistemological philosophy.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>O<img src="" name="OdhPOnto_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="94" height="24" border="0">ntological
|
||
theories of mind. </b></i>A solution to the problem of mind would pay
|
||
back one of the mortgages we took out on spatiomaterialism, for it
|
||
would explain how beings like us are conscious. And it can be found
|
||
in the differences among the basic properties that are entailed by
|
||
spatiomaterialism, or indeed, that are entailed by any materialism
|
||
that accepts our notion of substance and takes ontology to be
|
||
explanatory. Physical properties are different from phenomenal
|
||
properties as the extrinsic essential natures of bits of matter are
|
||
different from the intrinsic essential natures of matter.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Material
|
||
objects in space with their physical properties present no problem,
|
||
for they are precisely what a naturalistic ontology is intended to
|
||
explain, and though we will put off the detailed ontological
|
||
explanation of physical properties, we have already seen how they
|
||
will be explained as aspects of the extrinsic essential natures of
|
||
bits of matter in space. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">As
|
||
naturalists, we assume that the subjects who perceive the world are
|
||
themselves material objects in the world. And we have good reason to
|
||
believe that they are rather special material objects, for they are
|
||
animals with complex brains. Spatiomaterialism will throw much light
|
||
on how the brain is responsible for the behavior and cognitive
|
||
processes that we ordinarily believe take place in experiencing
|
||
subjects like ourselves. (See <font color="#0000ff"><u><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCbGeRRS06.htm" target="Lo"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">Change:
|
||
Evolutionary stage 6</font></a></u></font> and following.) But they
|
||
are basically explanations of how the brain is a machine that enables
|
||
subject to have the beliefs, desires, and behavior that we do, and
|
||
for now, let us take it for granted that there is such an
|
||
explanation.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Assuming,
|
||
therefore, that the brain can account for the behavior and cognitive
|
||
capacities of subjects like us in the natural world, all that is
|
||
needed to solve the problem about mind is an explanation of the
|
||
existence of phenomenal properties that shows how it is possible for
|
||
material objects to have them. The obvious explanation of the nature
|
||
of phenomenal properties, given the kinds of basic properties that
|
||
substances have, is that they are the intrinsic essential aspect of
|
||
the nature of some bits of matter that help make up the brain. That
|
||
would mean that phenomenal properties are related of physical
|
||
properties as the intrinsic essential nature is related to the
|
||
extrinsic essential nature of some bits of matter that help make up
|
||
the cognitive subject. Since bits of matter must have both kinds of
|
||
essential properties, this ontological explanation would imply that
|
||
there is an ontologically necessary relationship between physical and
|
||
phenomenal properties. That explanation of how the connection is
|
||
necessary is what solves the problem about mind that plagues
|
||
contemporary philosophy, as we shall see below: <font color="#0000ff"><u><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/OthPC.htm#32" target="Objects"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">Properties:
|
||
Ontological theory of the necessary connection</font></a></u></font>.)</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
|
||
is enough to show that consciousness is possible, if
|
||
spatiomaterialism is true, though it depends, of course, on showing
|
||
that there is a form of matter that helps to constitute the conscious
|
||
subject whose intrinsic essential nature can plausibly account for
|
||
all the phenomenal properties. Since they include not only sensory
|
||
qualia, but the complex configurations of them in phenomenal space,
|
||
there is more to the explanation of consciousness than this
|
||
ontological explanation of the basic properties of substances. To
|
||
explain those complex phenomenal properties is to explain what I will
|
||
call the "unity of consciousness." We cannot do that,
|
||
however, until we have considered the forms of matter entailed by
|
||
spatiomaterialism (as we shall in <font color="#0000ff"><u><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtkCaL07.htm" target="Lo"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">Change:
|
||
Contingent laws of physics</font></a></u></font>), and explained how
|
||
the brain works (in we shall in <font color="#0000ff"><u><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCbGeRRS06.htm"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">Change:
|
||
Evolutionary stage 6</font></a></u></font> and following). For the
|
||
spatiomaterialist explanation of the unity of mind, see <font color="#0000ff"><u><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCbGeRRS06Unity.htm" target="Lo"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">Change:
|
||
Unity of consciousness</font></a></u></font>.)</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In order to
|
||
suggest how such an explanation is plausible, however, let me just
|
||
say here without further defense that the relevant form of matter
|
||
will turn out to be the photons that are generated by the active
|
||
mammalian brain. That is, the firing of neurons involves the rapid
|
||
acceleration of charged objects (ions), and since in mammals, many
|
||
such neurons fire in a synchronized way (throughout the projection
|
||
from the thalamus to the neocortex), the whole brain is like a
|
||
complex antenna generating photons with a very complex structures in
|
||
space and time. The intrinsic essential aspect of the nature of those
|
||
bits of matter can explain phenomenal properties, including not only
|
||
the simple qualia but also how they appear to be configured in
|
||
phenomenal space, not to mention the differences between perception
|
||
and memory and imagination.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>E<img src="" name="EpistCmt" align="right" hspace="5" width="202" height="20" border="0">pistemological
|
||
theories of mind. </b></i>Epistemological philosophy does not attempt
|
||
to explain things ontologically, except as an afterthought to an
|
||
argument that attempts to justify knowledge of some kind, that is, as
|
||
realism about the objects of which it tries to show that we have
|
||
knowledge. Instead, it uses reflection on how we know to introduce a
|
||
theory about the nature of reason, and and starting with some kind of
|
||
knowledge that is taken as unproblematic by that theory, it tries to
|
||
justify knowledge of something else. Success is realism, but realism
|
||
leads to metaphysical dualism, that is, an ontology that postulates
|
||
kinds of substances that are so utterly different from one another
|
||
that it is not possible to explain how they are related to one
|
||
another at all. And the ontological problems of realism lead, as we
|
||
have noted, to anti-realism, the denial that we have the kind of
|
||
knowledge defended (which may entail it own distinctive metaphysics).
|
||
</font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Though
|
||
both modern and contemporary philosophy start by reflecting on how we
|
||
know, the problem of mind took different forms for each period,
|
||
because they had different explanations of how we know, that is,
|
||
different theories about the nature of reason. Modern philosophers
|
||
had a theory about the nature of reason that was based on reflecting
|
||
on how individual minds know, and so its realism led to mind-body
|
||
dualism. Contemporary philosophers had a theory about the nature of
|
||
reason that was based on reflecting on knowledge as an
|
||
intersubjective process, and so its realism led to property dualism
|
||
(and puzzles about the relationship between physical and phenomenal
|
||
properties). Let us consider each in turn.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">I
|
||
will give a brief account of the problem of mind in modern philosophy
|
||
in order to provide a context in which to understand the approach of
|
||
contemporary philosophy. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>M<img src="" name="OdhPModern_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="87" height="21" border="0">odern
|
||
philosophy. </i>Though the ancient atomists were critical realists,
|
||
naive realism otherwise dominated ancient and medieval philosophy. It
|
||
was the rise of modern science that led to the rediscovery of
|
||
critical realism. Modern science presupposed an ontology that
|
||
ascribed only physical properties to objects in nature, and it
|
||
implied that perception depends on a chain of causes and effects
|
||
starting in the object and ending somewhere in the brain. Though
|
||
modern scientists and philosophers alike recognized that sensory
|
||
qualia are parts of the subject, it was Descartes who first saw how
|
||
to use it to pursue a new form of epistemological philosophy.
|
||
Descartes so-called method of doubt was to deny everything that it
|
||
was possible to doubt. As a critical realist, that led him to doubt
|
||
the existence of his own body and the natural world in which it
|
||
exists. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">R<img src="" name="OdhPMindBody_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="59" height="40" border="0">ealism
|
||
about the external world: mind-body dualism. </font>Descartes could
|
||
not doubt that he was having ideas, and thus, he argued that he had
|
||
indubitable knowledge of his own existence. Descartes affirmed the
|
||
certainty of this knowledge by asserting, "I think, therefore I
|
||
am." From this foundation, Descartes introduced a theory about
|
||
the nature of reason that implied that any ideas that are equally
|
||
clear and distinct are true, and thus, he set out to show that we
|
||
could know both the existence and nature of the external world. Given
|
||
his goal, the success of modern realism was realism about the world
|
||
of material objects in space. Descartes' plan was to justify modern
|
||
science philosophically, that is, from a foundation that is prior to
|
||
what science learns about what happens in the natural world from
|
||
observation. But apart from other difficulties in his argument, his
|
||
project foundered on the problem of mind-body dualism.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
rational method he used was discussed in <font color="#0000ff"><u><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOteM.htm" target="Lo"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">Method</font></a></u></font>,
|
||
and the dualistic ontology to which it led was discussed in <font color="#0000ff"><u><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtdO.htm" target="Lo"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">Ontology</font></a></u></font>.
|
||
Descartes' dualism of mind and body was the problem of mind in modern
|
||
philosophy. Critical realism made it clear that physical properties
|
||
are fundamentally different from phenomenal properties, and that made
|
||
it seem that the objects with those properties were substances with
|
||
opposite kinds of essential natures, namely, mind and body. As
|
||
Descartes saw it, body is always divisible into smaller parts,
|
||
whereas mind has a unity that does not permit division, because all
|
||
the qualia that seem to be located in space have an appearance for
|
||
the subject at the same time. And whereas mind can think in this
|
||
sense, body cannot, for it has only the properties that physics
|
||
ascribes to it (which Descartes thought came down to extension, that
|
||
is, geometrical properties). The difference in their essential
|
||
natures left no plausible explanation of how they interact, and
|
||
attempts to solve it (such as Spinoza’s claim that substance can
|
||
have two opposite essential natures and Leibniz’s claim that
|
||
nothing exists but minds, or "monads," as he called them)
|
||
were embarrassing failures.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">A<img src="" name="OdhPIdealism_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="66" height="41" border="0">nti-realism
|
||
about the external world: idealism. </font>The inability to explain
|
||
how mind and body are related as parts of a single world doomed
|
||
attempts to justify knowledge of the natural world, and the British
|
||
empiricists (Locke, Berkeley and Hume) followed the skeptical
|
||
argument to its conclusion, doubting in the end that the natural
|
||
world is anything but perceptual ideas (or impressions of sensation,
|
||
as Hume put it). Locke did not recognize that the principle of
|
||
empiricism (that all our knowledge about the natural world comes from
|
||
experience) leads to skepticism about the existence of the natural
|
||
world, but Berkeley embraced this skeptical conclusion ontologically
|
||
and defended idealism explicitly. However, Hume and the subsequent
|
||
tradition of empiricism merely dismissed all attempts to explain the
|
||
natural world ontologically as meaningless metaphysics (though
|
||
idealism is all that empiricism has to offer to those who look for a
|
||
theory about what exists). </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
second phase of modern philosophy struggled with the problem of mind
|
||
in a different way. Kant held that science has knowledge only of the
|
||
phenomenal world, and thus, he was not a realist. But he was still a
|
||
dualist, because he believed that, in addition to mind, there are
|
||
things in themselves in addition to the phenomenal world. Hegel
|
||
sought to overcome Kant's dualism and defend the claim of reason to
|
||
know the real nature of what exists, but the only way he could do was
|
||
by defending absolute idealism (that is, by holding that everything,
|
||
including the natural world, can be reduced, dialectically, of
|
||
course, to an idea at the bottom).</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Spinoza
|
||
stands out among modern philosophers, because his way of denying
|
||
mind-body dualism was to deny that body is a different substance from
|
||
mind. He took mind and body to be related as two attributes of the
|
||
same substance. (That is close to the implication of ontological
|
||
philosophy, except that Spinoza believed that the world is a single
|
||
substance. He could not explain the relationship between the
|
||
attributes of thought and extension as the relationship between the
|
||
intrinsic and extrinsic essential aspects of substances, because
|
||
there are no relationships among substances in his view.) </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" dir="rtl" class="western" align="right" style="text-indent: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.42cm; line-height: 100%">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
</body>
|
||
</html> |