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921 lines
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<title>Contemporary philosophy</title>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>C<img src="" name="OdhPCont_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="88" height="22" border="0">ontemporary
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philosophy. </i>Naturalism is the attitude of contemporary
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philosophy. In the twentieth century, continuing advancement by
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science in explaining the natural world, discovering laws of nature
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and various mechanisms embodying them, made the abstruse and
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inconclusive arguments of philosophy of modern philosophy seem
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fundamentally misguided. Philosophers abandoned the Cartesian method
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and its metaphysical problems in favor of an explanation of how we
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know that derives from reflecting on knowledge as an intersubjective
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process, and that brought with it a commitment to naturalism. And
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contemporary philosophers accepted natural science, with some
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reservations, as the most adequate way of knowing we have. Thus, the
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problem that mind poses for contemporary philosophers can be seen as
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a question about <i>how a science of consciousness is possible</i>.
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Contemporary philosophers assume, as naturalists, that what modern
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philosophers called "mind" must somehow be part of the
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natural world, and though they could dismiss mind-body dualism, it
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was harder to deny the difference between physical and phenomenal
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properties. Those who affirm the existence of phenomenal properties
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as well as physical properties are called "property dualists."
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For naturalists, therefore, the question became how phenomenal
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properties can be included as something characterizing the natural
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world being explained by science, even though science refers only to
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physical properties. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">For present
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purposes, let us take "physical properties" to include
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functional properties, such as "being a clock" or
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"conveying signals." They may not be reducible to physical
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properties, but since no one denies that they "supervene,"
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at least, on physical properties, all the causal connections in
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particular cases come down to basic physical properties. And the
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issue is how phenomenal properties are related to physical or
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functional properties. </font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Contemporary
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philosophers have taken great care to show that phenomenal properties
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are different from physical properties, for example, in famous
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arguments by Thomas Nagel, Frank Jackson, and Saul Kripke. By asking
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what it is like to be a bat, </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Nagel"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Nagel</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">
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(1979, 1986) was pointing to a subjective aspect of experience that
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cannot be known by the "view from nowhere", that is, by
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natural science. </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Jackson"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Jackson</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">
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(1982) made it clear that phenomenal qualities, or qualia, are
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themselves objects of knowledge by pointing out that Mary, a
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neurophysiologist who studied the physical mechanism of color
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perception in a laboratory devoid of red objects, would come to know
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something more about the perception of red when she left the room and
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actually saw something red, namely, how red appears to the subject.
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And </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Kripke"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Kripke</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">
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(1980) showed that properties rigidly designated by how they appear
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to subjects cannot be identical to physical properties because the
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connection is not metaphysically necessary, as it would have to be,
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if they were identical. </span></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">For
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those who are inclined to take natural science as revealing the basic
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nature of the world, the problem of mind is how there can be a
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science of consciousness. It is most obviously problematic when
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science is understood as using a method that bases its conclusions on
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observation in one way or another. This reliance on observation is a
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basic tenet of its empirical method as traditionally understood, for
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example, by empiricists, logical positivists and most practicing
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scientists. (Though there are well known problems in the philosophy
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of science about the theory-ladenness of observation statements, it
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is agreed on all sides that observation depends on perception, that
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is, on the use of our sensory organs to discover the states of
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objects in space.) </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The reason
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that this tenet of the empirical method makes consciousness a problem
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for science is that phenomenal properties are apparently knowable
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only by reflection. We have seen how the difference between physical
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and phenomenal properties was discovered -- that is, by reflecting on
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the causal explanation of perception from the point of view of the
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perceiving subject. But it also seems that our <i>only </i>"evidence"
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that psychological states involve phenomenal properties comes from
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each of us reflecting on our own psychological states. The nature of
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simple qualia, for example, what red qualia are like, is not revealed
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to observation. They are private to each individual subject. </font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">There are
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ways of observing the brain in operation, and new ways are being
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developed. But no one has found a way of using such observations to
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demonstrate that brain states involve phenomenal properties. Indeed,
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neurophysiologists don’t expect their methods ever to show either
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the existence of phenomenal properties or how qualia appear. </font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To be sure,
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there is evidence for the existence of phenomenal properties in what
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people say about their psychological states. But that evidence
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depends on scientists interpreting the other’s talk of qualia and
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phenomenal properties as references to objects of the same sorts they
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each know privately by reflection on their own phenomenal properties.
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The verbal behavior itself does not seem to depend on anything but
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physical causes. </font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
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difference between reflection and perception makes it doubtful,
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therefore, that science will ever be able to know about phenomenal
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properties. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">A<img src="" name="OdhPElim_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="67" height="39" border="0">nti-realism
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about phenomenal properties: eliminative materialism. </font>One
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quick way of dealing with this problem is simply to deny there are
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any phenomenal properties. This is, in effect, anti-realism about
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phenomenal properties from the point of view of science, though it is
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usually called "eliminative materialism," by the kind of
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ontology it defends. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">In
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one version, eliminative materialism holds that the need for talk of
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phenomenal properties will eventually be eliminated, at least from
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science, as science explains all the phenomena relevant to psychology
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in its own terms. That would show that our traditional talk about
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phenomenal properties (and psychological states, such as perceptions,
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beliefs, desires, and the like) is just a mis-description of what
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really exists, which is fully described by physical properties. (See
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</span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Churchland"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Churchland</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">
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1995.) </span></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">It
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is also possible to argue that we are fooling ourselves to think that
|
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traditional talk about phenomenal properties is meaningful in the
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first place. (See </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Dennett"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Dennett</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">
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1991 and </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Rorty"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Rorty</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">
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1979.) </span></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">But
|
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eliminative materialism does not show how a science of consciousness
|
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is possible. Rather, it holds that a science of consciousness is not
|
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necessary because there is nothing to be explained. The problem of
|
||
mind arises only for those who are realists about phenomenal
|
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properties and believe that they exist in addition to physical
|
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properties.</font></font></font></p>
|
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">R<img src="" name="OdhPPropDual_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="61" height="40" border="0">ealism
|
||
about phenomenal properties: property dualism. </font>During most of
|
||
the century, empiricism in psychology took the form of behaviorism,
|
||
the attempt to explain human beings in terms of laws describing their
|
||
observable behavior. Consciousness was thereby banished from science.
|
||
But that is puzzling to contemporary naturalists, for they expect
|
||
natural science to explain <i>everything </i>in the natural world,
|
||
and they know, as reflective beings, that they themselves are
|
||
conscious. They are realists about phenomenal properties, and that
|
||
makes them property dualists, because they recognize the existence of
|
||
phenomenal as well as physical properties. And the problem of mind
|
||
can be seen at the attempt to show how science can study
|
||
consciousness, that is, how it can justify theories that refer to the
|
||
phenomenal properties of psychological states. There are several
|
||
possibilities.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><i>E<img src="" name="OdhPEmerg_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="115" height="18" border="0">mergentism.
|
||
</i></font>The most obvious way for science to include consciousness
|
||
would be to take mind to be an immaterial substance that is located
|
||
in space along with bits of matter. Or if we call everything located
|
||
in space "matter," it is to hold that some bits of matter
|
||
have phenomenal properties that play a causal role in the natural
|
||
world. If phenomenal properties of bits of matter did somehow make a
|
||
difference to what happens in nature, they would be not only effects
|
||
of physical causes, but they would themselves be efficient causes,
|
||
and their existence could be detected empirically. Science could know
|
||
about them in the same way it knows about other unobservable
|
||
entities, such as electrons and force fields. Bits of matter with
|
||
phenomenal properties would have to be mentioned by the best
|
||
explanations of what can be observed through perception alone.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
|
||
is conceivable, at least, that phenomenal properties would have to be
|
||
introduced by some branch of science, such as neurophysiology. The
|
||
mechanisms found in the brain might provide no way of explaining, for
|
||
example, why human beings say that they have phenomenal properties or
|
||
why they call certain sensations green and others red. If all
|
||
possible physical explanations were ruled out, the best explanation
|
||
might be to hold that reports about phenomenal properties depend
|
||
causally on how psychological states appear to the subject having
|
||
them, which would mean that phenomenal properties are efficient
|
||
causes. Phenomenal properties would then be unobservable entities of
|
||
neurophysiology. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Any
|
||
such neurophysiological discovery would, however, have serious
|
||
implications for physics. The grounds for believing that there are
|
||
phenomenal properties playing a causal role would be that no physical
|
||
mechanism can explain certain verbal behaviors, and that would imply
|
||
that there are efficient causes at work in brains that are not
|
||
physical properties. This would be shocking, for physics is thought
|
||
to be causally complete, in the sense that physical properties are
|
||
sufficient, in principle, to explain every kind of event that happens
|
||
to what is located in space. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It might be
|
||
argued that the reason physics has not noticed the causal role played
|
||
by phenomenal properties is that they are emergent and make a
|
||
difference only in highly complex physical objects, such as brains,
|
||
which evolve (or in complex functional systems generally). But in
|
||
order for phenomenal properties to be effective in brains,
|
||
neurophysiology would have to predict something different from what
|
||
physics would predict for the same situations on the basis of
|
||
physical properties. Thus, physics would have to come to believe that
|
||
some material objects have properties in addition to the physical
|
||
properties that it has already recognized and that these new
|
||
properties affect how physical entities move or interact in certain
|
||
situations. In other words, this kind of emergentism would be causal.
|
||
Such a discovery would contradict physics as we know it. At a
|
||
minimum, it would show that physics is not causally complete. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">A
|
||
science of consciousness could, therefore, be established by a
|
||
scientific discovery of the kind that even the most hidebound
|
||
defender of the traditional view of the empirical method could not
|
||
deny. That would be a scientific solution to what has heretofore
|
||
seemed to be a philosophical problem about mind. There is, however,
|
||
no evidence at present suggesting that phenomenal properties should
|
||
be introduced as unobservable (that is, not directly perceivable)
|
||
theoretical entities of neurophysiology. It seems quite unlikely to
|
||
contemporary naturalists, considering how radically physics would
|
||
have to be mistaken. And if phenomenal properties are, as ontological
|
||
philosophy suggests, the intrinsic essential properties of certain
|
||
kinds of matter involved in the function of the brain, they have no
|
||
causal role. All the causal roles are played by extrinsic essential
|
||
properties, that is, the physical properties already recognized by
|
||
science.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><i>E<img src="" name="OdhPEpiphen_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="115" height="19" border="0">piphenomenalism.
|
||
</i></font>Another way founding a science of consciousness would be
|
||
to accept reflection as a form of observation in science. Though
|
||
reflection has long been the province of philosophy, this avenue is
|
||
open to naturalists who think of philosophy as "continuous with"
|
||
science. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">This
|
||
trend in recent philosophy of science explicitly abandons
|
||
epistemology in the traditional sense of providing an </span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><i>a
|
||
priori</i></span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
foundation for the justification of science and its method (</span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Kitcher"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Kitcher</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
1992; </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Rosenberg"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Rosenberg</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
1994). Instead of "first philosophy," it proposes to use
|
||
the results of science itself to justify and improve the methods of
|
||
science, which has given it the name "naturalized epistemology"
|
||
(after </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Quine"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Quine</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
1969). For example, scientific discoveries about the mechanisms of
|
||
human cognition could be used to improve evidence gathering methods
|
||
in science as much as discoveries about the accuracy of any measuring
|
||
instrument. But those same human beings have a capacity for
|
||
reflection as well as perception, and thus their reflection on
|
||
phenomenal properties could be considered a way of gathering evidence
|
||
about the natural world which is just as legitimate as their
|
||
perception of physical properties. To naturalists of this kind,
|
||
therefore, it may seem there is no obstacle to a science of
|
||
consciousness. Indeed, these days, cognitive scientists often use
|
||
reports about reflection on phenomenal properties as evidence, a
|
||
practice recently defended by </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Goldman"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Goldman</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1997).</span></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">To
|
||
recognize reflection, including what can be known only by reflection,
|
||
as part of the data base of natural science is, however, a trivial
|
||
solution to the problem of mind. It overcomes the epistemological
|
||
obstacle to a science of consciousness by, in effect, redefining
|
||
"science" to include a form of knowledge that has
|
||
traditionally been taken as the foundation of by philosophy. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
|
||
will not be acceptable to naturalists who cleave to a more
|
||
traditional notion of empirical science as based on observation by
|
||
perception. They will dig in their heals from fear of opening the
|
||
door to other forms of private knowledge in science, such as the
|
||
intuitions by which rationalists justified their metaphysical
|
||
systems. And attempts to draw a new line of demarcation between
|
||
science and philosophy that will include reflection on phenomenal
|
||
properties but exclude the supposed certainty of clear and distinct
|
||
ideas would seem like mere gerrymandering.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Even
|
||
if there were no epistemological objections to reflection, however,
|
||
this avenue to a science of consciousness would lead to ontological
|
||
problems for science. It would complicate the scientific view of the
|
||
natural world in a way that is quite problematic, for it would be to
|
||
acknowledge the existence of properties that simply do not fit
|
||
together intelligibly with the properties already recognized by
|
||
science. The latter come down to properties mentioned by physics.
|
||
Specifically, physical (and functional) properties seem to be
|
||
responsible for all the behavior and internal processes found in
|
||
complex organisms like us. Thus, to acknowledge the existence of
|
||
phenomenal properties on the grounds that they can be "observed"
|
||
in nature through reflection on what experience is like would be to
|
||
recognize that some natural objects, human beings, at least, have
|
||
properties of a fundamentally different kind from those already
|
||
recognized by natural science. And if physicists are correct in
|
||
believing it to be possible, in principle, to explain everything that
|
||
happens in nature by the efficient causes picked out by physical
|
||
properties, two facts about these properties follow. One is that
|
||
phenomenal properties are somehow effects of the physical (or
|
||
functional) properties of such organisms. The other is that having
|
||
phenomenal properties cannot itself have any effect, in turn, on
|
||
physical or functional properties. In other words, phenomenal
|
||
properties would be <i>epiphenomenal </i>relative to physical (and
|
||
functional) properties. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Epiphenomenalism
|
||
is, at best, an inelegant ontology. It takes phenomenal properties to
|
||
be "nomological danglers," in </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Feigl"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Feigl</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">’s
|
||
(1958) famous terms. Epiphenomenalists can insist, of course, that
|
||
there is a causal necessity about the connection between physical
|
||
(and/or functional) properties and phenomenal properties. But it
|
||
would be just an assumption, for they have no explanation of why
|
||
physical (or functional) properties give rise to phenomenal
|
||
properties. Nor any explanation of why phenomenal properties should
|
||
be impotent. </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Thus,
|
||
if the goal of science is to discover all the most basic laws of
|
||
nature, epiphenomenalism would mean that those most fundamental laws
|
||
include not only the basic laws of physics, which describe
|
||
efficient-cause connections, but also psychophysical laws, which
|
||
describe a regular connection between physical (and/or functional)
|
||
properties and phenomenal properties. (For example, see </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Chalmers"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Chalmers</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">1996,
|
||
pp. 87, 170-1, 274-5.) </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Or,
|
||
to use </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Kripke2"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Kripke</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">’s
|
||
(1980, p. 153-5) famous metaphor, God, in creating such a world,
|
||
would have to go back, after creating all the physical objects and
|
||
putting them together as a natural world, and tack on the phenomenal
|
||
properties. The extra effort required belies their odd status. No one
|
||
finds epiphenomenalism satisfactory. (It repels even </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Chalmers"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Chalmers</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
1996, p. 160.)</span></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><i>N<img src="" name="OdhPNecCon_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="115" height="18" border="0">ecessary
|
||
connection between physical and phenomenal properties. </i></font>Ontological
|
||
philosophy provides, as we have seen, a way of avoiding the problem
|
||
of epiphenomenalism. Though it accepts property dualism, it reveals a
|
||
necessary connection between physical and phenomenal properties, and
|
||
that would found a science of consciousness, because it would show
|
||
that phenomenal properties are already part of what exists according
|
||
to science. Contemporary philosophers recognize that demonstrating a
|
||
necessary connection between physical and phenomenal properties would
|
||
solve the problem with epiphenomenalism (and thus, the most basic
|
||
aspect of the problem of mind), but they have not been able to take
|
||
this avenue all the way to a science of consciousness, because cannot
|
||
see how it is possible to show that phenomenal properties are
|
||
necessarily connected to something science already mentions in its
|
||
physical (and/or functional) descriptions. The obstacle they
|
||
encounter comes from the epistemological approach to philosophy,
|
||
which contemporary naturalists have inherited, for in this case,
|
||
ontology as mere realism makes it seem that properties are more basic
|
||
than substances. Let us see how they fail to find any way to
|
||
demonstrate a necessary connection between physical and phenomenal
|
||
properties before we compare epistemological to ontological
|
||
philosophy.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>N<img src="" name="OdhPOfEpist_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="74" height="20" border="0">ecessity
|
||
in Epistemological Philosophy. </i>Contemporary analytic philosophy
|
||
offers various ways in which a necessary connection might be
|
||
established. Let us consider them. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>A
|
||
priori necessity. </i>The original form of necessary truth in
|
||
contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophy was analytic truth,
|
||
or propositions that are true by virtue of the meanings of the terms
|
||
involved. That would bean <i>a priori</i> connection between physical
|
||
and phenomenal properties, but it is not a possible foundation for a
|
||
science of consciousness, for the inability to see an intelligible
|
||
connection between them is the very problem of consciousness. What we
|
||
mean by "phenomenal properties" is so different from what
|
||
we mean by "physical properties" (or by "functional
|
||
properties," for that matter) that it seems almost absurd even
|
||
to compare them. That makes it easy to conceive of possible worlds
|
||
that are physically like our own, but which lack phenomenal
|
||
properties altogether. That is, there could be a world of zombies, or
|
||
beings that are physically and functionally indistinguishable form us
|
||
except for not being conscious. It is also possible to conceive of
|
||
worlds with phenomenal properties but no physical properties, for
|
||
that is the view that was defended in modern philosophy as idealism.
|
||
Hence, no necessary connection can be established <i>a priori.</i> </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Causal
|
||
necessity. </i>Any necessary connection between physical and
|
||
phenomenal properties must, therefore, be <i>a posteriori. </i>It
|
||
must be something we can somehow <i>discover </i>about the world from
|
||
experience<i>.</i> But it cannot be a mere <i>causal necessity </i>of
|
||
the sort that laws of nature are supposed to have. That sort of
|
||
necessity would reduce either to causal emergentism or to
|
||
epiphenomenalism, depending on which causal connections phenomenal
|
||
properties were supposed to have (that is, being effects of physical
|
||
properties that are also causes of them, or else being effects that
|
||
are not causes). It is their inadequacy that forces naturalists to
|
||
look for a metaphysically necessary connection.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Theoretical
|
||
identification. </i>The more popular model for discovering necessary
|
||
connections is theoretical identification in science, such as the
|
||
discovery that water is identical to masses of H<sub>2</sub>O
|
||
molecules. Thus, just as the solidity of ice was discovered to be
|
||
identical to the stability of the crystal structure formed by weak
|
||
hydrogen bonds among adjacent H<sub>2</sub>O molecules when their
|
||
kinetic energy fall below a certain point, so phenomenal properties
|
||
might turn out to be identical to physical properties of some other
|
||
kind. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">However,
|
||
physical and phenomenal properties cannot be related in this way,
|
||
because theoretical identification is a necessary connection. As
|
||
</span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Kripke3"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Kripke</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">(1980)
|
||
showed, in order for two (rigidly designated) properties to be
|
||
identical, it must be impossible to conceive one without the other.
|
||
For example, if the solidity of ice is identical to a certain kind of
|
||
crystalline structure of H</span></font></font><font color="#000000"><sub><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">2</span></font></sub></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">O
|
||
in the actual world, then the identity must hold in any possible
|
||
world where either exists. It is not, however, impossible to conceive
|
||
of worlds in which beings physically and functionally like us lack
|
||
phenomenal properties altogether. No scientific theory can identify
|
||
the two kinds of properties, and so a world of zombies is still
|
||
possible. </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Supervenience.</i>
|
||
If the reduction involved in theoretical identification does not
|
||
provide an avenue to a science of consciousness, science does not
|
||
offer many other models for showing a necessary connection between
|
||
physical and phenomenal properties. One possibility is supervenience,
|
||
which is a weaker relation than the complete reduction involved in
|
||
the theoretical identification of apparently different physical
|
||
properties. What has forced philosophers to recognize supervenience
|
||
is the existence of functional properties. Though a functional
|
||
property may be identical to certain physical properties in
|
||
particular cases or classes of cases, there are many other ways that
|
||
the same functional property can be realized by physical properties
|
||
and, thus, no general identity between properties at the two levels.
|
||
For example, there are many kinds of physical mechanisms that can
|
||
function as clocks. And physical properties that do are said to
|
||
"realize" a clock. But supervenience cannot be how
|
||
phenomenal properties are related to physical properties, for that
|
||
would require phenomenal properties to be identical to physical
|
||
properties <i>in particular cases</i>, and that is what does not seem
|
||
to be the case. Thus, a zombie world still seems possible. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">A
|
||
process of elimination leads to the conclusions that, if there is a
|
||
metaphysically necessary connection between physical and phenomenal
|
||
properties that can be discovered by experience, it must a new kind
|
||
of relationship, not previously recognized by science. That is what
|
||
ontological philosophy offers, and though it is beyond the reach of
|
||
epistemological philosophy, David Charlmers comes close.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Chalmers2"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Chalmers
|
||
</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">(1996,
|
||
p. 135) considers the possibility that "there are properties
|
||
essential to the physical constitution of the world that are not
|
||
accessible to physical investigation." The existence of such
|
||
intrinsic properties is plausible to him, because all the properties
|
||
mentioned by physics are basically relational, characterizing
|
||
entities by their causal connections and other relations to one
|
||
another. Even physical properties that seem to be inherent in the
|
||
objects that have them, such as mass, energy, spin, and charge, are
|
||
measured by the causal relations they have to one another. Thus,
|
||
whatever has physical properties could also have an intrinsic nature.
|
||
</span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">However,
|
||
Chalmers has no way to understand how they might be related to
|
||
physical properties, because he does not think of substances as
|
||
anything more than the properties they have. That makes properties
|
||
ontologically basic, and so he tries to describe the relationship by
|
||
saying that intrinsic properties might " ‘realize’ the
|
||
extrinsic physical properties, and that the laws connecting them
|
||
might realize physical laws" (155). And describing the
|
||
significance of discovering some such relationship, he says that, if
|
||
intrinsic properties were "constitutive of physical properties"
|
||
(136), then even though a zombie world may seem to be physically
|
||
identical to ours, it would actually be different physically, for it
|
||
would lack some "inaccessible essential properties, which are
|
||
also the properties that guarantee consciousness" (135). This is
|
||
the view of phenomenal properties to which Chalmers himself inclines
|
||
(153-156), though it has also been suggested by others.<sup><a class="sdfootnoteanc" name="sdfootnote1anc" href="#sdfootnote1sym"><sup>1</sup></a></sup></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">As Chalmers
|
||
recognizes, however, to <i>suggest </i>that intrinsic properties are
|
||
a special kind of phenomenal (or proto-phenomenal) property underling
|
||
all physical (and functional) properties is not to show that there is
|
||
a <i>necessary </i>connection between intrinsic and physical
|
||
properties. It is merely to point to a possibility. Chalmers (135)
|
||
rightly calls it "speculative metaphysics." Though it may
|
||
be coherent, it is no more than speculation, because without the
|
||
concept of substance to explain the nature of properties, it is just
|
||
a vague possibility. And since nothing makes it inconceivable that a
|
||
world physically like our own would lack intrinsic properties, this
|
||
view reduces to property dualism — a point that Chalmers makes by
|
||
invoking Kripke’s metaphor: "After ensuring that a world
|
||
identical to ours from the standpoint of out physical theories, God
|
||
has to expend further effort to make that world identical to ours
|
||
across the board" (136). Zombies are still possible.<sup><a class="sdfootnoteanc" name="sdfootnote2anc" href="#sdfootnote2sym"><sup>2</sup></a></sup></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>M<img src="" name="OdhPOfOnto_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="72" height="20" border="0">etaphysical
|
||
Necessity in Ontological Philosophy. </i>What keeps epistemological
|
||
philosophy from discovering a necessary relationship between physical
|
||
and phenomenal properties that would found an empirical science of
|
||
consciousness is the implicit assumption that properties are basic.
|
||
What enables ontological philosophy to show that phenomenal
|
||
properties are an essential part of the natural world investigated by
|
||
science is reducing properties to substances. Physical properties, as
|
||
we have seen, characterize the extrinsic essential natures of all
|
||
forms of material substances, and if phenomenal properties
|
||
characterize the intrinsic essential nature of some form of matter
|
||
that helps constitute the conscious subject, phenomenal and physical
|
||
properties would be related as intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of the
|
||
essential natures of the substances constituting the world. That
|
||
relationship does seem to be metaphysically necessary in the sense
|
||
relevant in this debate, though in our terms it is an ontologically
|
||
necessary truth, since the necessity of its truth comes from its
|
||
being an implication of the ontology we have found to be true on
|
||
empirical grounds. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Metaphysically
|
||
necessary truths are understood as holding in every possible physical
|
||
world, and the connection proposed by ontological philosophy is
|
||
necessary in that sense, for it would hold <i>in any possible
|
||
physical world </i>in which the basic laws of physics are
|
||
descriptions of how elementary material substances move and interact.
|
||
Their basically relational nature indicates that physical properties
|
||
characterize the extrinsic essential natures of those substances. But
|
||
since substances cannot have such properties unless they have some
|
||
<i>way </i>of existing apart from the relations, they must also have
|
||
an intrinsic essential nature. Thus, Zombies would be impossible. Any
|
||
being with all the same physical (and functional) properties would
|
||
necessarily also have intrinsic properties. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">To
|
||
use </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Kripke4"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Kripke</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">’s
|
||
(1980, 153-4) vivid image, God would not have to go back and tack on
|
||
intrinsic properties after he had created the physical world, for if
|
||
God had created the world by combining many material substances in
|
||
the first place, those substances would already have intrinsic
|
||
natures of some kind or other. In fact, it would not be possible for
|
||
God to create a physical world out of multiple substance without
|
||
intrinsic properties, even if he wanted to. </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
|
||
is not to say, however, that there is no possible physical world
|
||
without intrinsic properties. It is possible for a world to have all
|
||
the same physical (and functional) properties as our own and yet to
|
||
lack intrinsic properties. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">That would
|
||
be the case, for example, in a physical world that is not constituted
|
||
by substances at all, as the empiricists’ so-called "bundle
|
||
theory" of substances would have it. (That is, however, just the
|
||
form of idealism that one finds when one looks in empiricism for a
|
||
theory of what exists.) </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Even if the
|
||
physical world must be constituted by substances of some kind in
|
||
order to exist independently, it could lack intrinsic properties, for
|
||
it could be constituted by substances that are mere substrata for
|
||
physical properties (assuming that it is coherent to suppose there
|
||
can be substances without any inherent properties at all). </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nor would
|
||
intrinsic properties be needed if the world were constituted by a
|
||
single substance in which particular properties have spatiotemporal
|
||
locations.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
necessity of the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic
|
||
properties depends, in other words, on an ontological assumption that
|
||
is not itself necessary, namely, that the world is constituted by
|
||
many particular substances existing together in some way. There was
|
||
no such condition on the kind of metaphysical necessity that Kripke
|
||
discussed, for he was considering only the possibility of properties
|
||
being identical. That is, if phenomenal and physical properties were
|
||
identical, there would be no possible physical world without
|
||
phenomenal properties. But the way in which ontological philosophy
|
||
demonstrates a metaphysically necessary connection does not come from
|
||
discovering the identity of two apparently different properties. It
|
||
comes from discovering that material substances must have two aspects
|
||
to the essential aspect of the nature as substances. That is, it
|
||
depends on a theory about the nature of the substances constituting
|
||
the world that can be justified empirically. (As we have seen, the
|
||
foundation of ontological philosophy is established by accepting
|
||
naturalism, taking ontology to be explanatory, and using the
|
||
empirical method to decide which possible ontological explanation is
|
||
true.) </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Kripke's
|
||
model for identifying properties with one another comes from
|
||
discoveries in science that physical properties picked out on the
|
||
macro-level (such as the solidity of ice) are identical to physical
|
||
properties picked out on the micro-level (such as the hydrogen bonds
|
||
among H<sub>2</sub>O molecules under certain temperature and pressure
|
||
conditions). </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Ontological
|
||
philosophy, by contrast, discovers how properties characterizing one
|
||
aspect of the essential nature of substances (their <i>extrinsic
|
||
</i>essential nature) are related to another aspect of the essential
|
||
nature that such substances must have (their <i>intrinsic </i>essential
|
||
nature). The nature of material substances is what connects them.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Moreover,
|
||
this ontological explanation of properties is what realists about
|
||
physics would have to accept, if they took up the ontological issue
|
||
about their nature at all, for the assumption that there are
|
||
substances whose aspects are properties is certainly more plausible
|
||
than any of the alternative theories about substances: the bundle
|
||
theory, the substratum theory, or the assumption that the whole world
|
||
is a single substance. And if physical properties are simply the
|
||
extrinsic essential aspects of the various material substances making
|
||
up the actual world, naturalists will come to recognize that every
|
||
possible physical world is made of multiple substances and, hence,
|
||
that material substances have intrinsic properties in every possible
|
||
physical world.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
|
||
ontological explanation of the necessary connection between physical
|
||
and phenomenal properties is not <i>a priori</i>, but <i>a
|
||
posteriori, </i>because it is discovered. As Kripke agues, that means
|
||
that it must be possible for it to appear that there are possible
|
||
world in which it does not hold. Kripke showed how such an appearance
|
||
of contingency is caused in the case of theoretical identification.
|
||
But it is also possible on this ontological explanation of phenomenal
|
||
properties to explain how it is possible for it to appear that there
|
||
are possible worlds in which this ontologically connection does not
|
||
hold. The illusion of contingency about their relationship comes from
|
||
failing to recognize that the physical world is constituted by
|
||
multiple substances and seeing how properties are reducible to them.
|
||
That is why Chalmers dismisses the belief in intrinsic properties as
|
||
mere speculation.<sup><a class="sdfootnoteanc" name="sdfootnote3anc" href="#sdfootnote3sym"><sup>3</sup></a></sup></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Relative
|
||
to a necessary connection established by the identity of properties,
|
||
the connection established by this ontological argument for its
|
||
necessity is limited. From the ontological necessity of the
|
||
connection between intrinsic and extrinsic essential natures of
|
||
substances it does <i>not </i>follow that there is a ontologically
|
||
necessary connection between phenomenal and physical properties, not
|
||
even if phenomenal properties are a kind of intrinsic essential
|
||
nature of certain substances in our world. Since intrinsic and
|
||
extrinsic properties characterize different aspects of the essential
|
||
aspect of substances, it is conceivable that in another possible
|
||
physical world made of multiple substances, substances would have the
|
||
same physical properties as ours, <i>and yet have different kinds of
|
||
intrinsic properties</i>. That is, different worlds could be
|
||
constituted by different kinds of material substances. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus,
|
||
beings that are physically similar to us in another world constituted
|
||
by multiple substances might have phenomenal properties with, for
|
||
example, an inverted spectrum of color qualia. Or they might have
|
||
more radically different kinds of intrinsic natures. All that is
|
||
ontologically necessary is that beings like us physically in any
|
||
possible world made of substances have intrinsic natures <i>of some
|
||
kind</i>. Though a zombie world is not ontologically possible, an
|
||
inverted spectrum world is. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Despite
|
||
this limit to what is necessarily true, however, it is still possible
|
||
to found a science of consciousness on this ontological explanation
|
||
of properties, for it implies that, in any possible physical world
|
||
made of <i>the same kinds of substances as those constituting our
|
||
world</i>, there are no beings physically and functionally like us
|
||
that do not also have phenomenal properties like ours. That is enough
|
||
to found a science of consciousness, because our science is about the
|
||
<i>actual world</i>. It would be gratuitous to hold that physically
|
||
indistinguishable material substances in the actual world are
|
||
different kinds of substances in this sense, especially since they
|
||
are convertible into one another. Thus, the kinds of phenomenal
|
||
properties on which one reflects will be the same as those on which
|
||
other subjects reflect, if the relevant physical properties in the
|
||
brain are the same.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">This
|
||
ontological explanation of phenomenal properties also explains how
|
||
they are objects of knowledge. It phenomenal properties are the
|
||
intrinsic essential nature of some form of matter making up conscious
|
||
subjects, we can explain why there is something more for </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Mary"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Mary</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
to learn about perception when she leaves the black and white
|
||
neurophysiology laboratory in which she has spent her life and
|
||
finally sees something red. When she sees something red, the process
|
||
she has been studying all her life is for the first time </span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><i>embodied
|
||
in her</i></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.
|
||
Some bit of matter that helps constitute Mary herself has an
|
||
intrinsic essential nature of a kind whose extrinsic essential nature
|
||
has been one of the objects of her study. Thus, Mary learns what it
|
||
is like to be a certain bit of the matter involved in that process. </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
property that Mary discovers is, however, an epiphenomenal property
|
||
on this theory. If phenomenal properties are kinds of intrinsic
|
||
properties, they are never the efficient cause of anything that
|
||
happens in the world. The efficient causes are all properties
|
||
characterizing the extrinsic essential natures of substances, and
|
||
since they determine what happens, they determine the kinds of bits
|
||
of matter that exist and, thereby, all the intrinsic properties in
|
||
the world. But phenomenal properties are not mere "nomological
|
||
danglers," because intrinsic properties earn their claim to
|
||
reality for natural science by being necessary aspects of the same
|
||
substances whose extrinsic essential natures are physical
|
||
properties.<sup><a class="sdfootnoteanc" name="sdfootnote4anc" href="#sdfootnote4sym"><sup>4</sup></a></sup></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">Finally,
|
||
this ontological reduction of properties also solves </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Mary"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Nagel’s
|
||
problem</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
about the relationship between the "view from nowhere" and
|
||
the subjective aspect of experience, or "what it is like."
|
||
By the "view from nowhere," Nagel means the scientific view
|
||
of the natural world, and if this ontological interpretation of
|
||
physics is correct, that is the view of the world as being made up of
|
||
material substances related spatially as parts of the same world. The
|
||
problem, as Nagel sees it, is that the scientific view leaves out the
|
||
subjective aspect of experience. </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">That
|
||
problem is solved, however, if the world is made up of substances in
|
||
the sense assumed here, for the subjective aspect of experience turns
|
||
out to be the intrinsic aspect of the essential nature of certain
|
||
elementary material substances making up the subject as an organism
|
||
in nature. What is left out of the "view from nowhere" is
|
||
not the <i>existence </i>of phenomenal properties, but only their
|
||
<i>nature</i>. To know their nature, it is necessary to <i>be </i>the
|
||
substances making up the subject, because what it is like for the
|
||
subject <i>is </i>the kind of intrinsic essential nature of the
|
||
relevant bit of matter. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">It
|
||
is still necessary, however, to explain another aspect of the nature
|
||
of consciousness, namely, its unity, or why so many different kinds
|
||
of qualia all appear to the same subject and that same time in
|
||
perception. That is explained in Change: </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtkCbGeRRS06Unity.htm"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Unity
|
||
of Consciousness</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.
|
||
But that depends on the implication of spatiomaterialism for science,
|
||
and before taking up science, we must explain why mathematics is
|
||
true. </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<div id="sdfootnote1">
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
|
||
<a class="sdfootnotesym" name="sdfootnote1sym" href="#sdfootnote1anc">1</a><span lang="en-US">Some
|
||
such view was also suggested by </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Russell"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Russell</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1927) as "neutral monism" and more recently by </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Lockwood"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Lockwood</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1989, pp. 156-171). It was also suggested by </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Feigl"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Feigl</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1958), </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Maxwell"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Maxwell</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1978), and </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Robinson"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Robinson</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1982).</span></p>
|
||
</div>
|
||
<div id="sdfootnote2">
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
|
||
<a class="sdfootnotesym" name="sdfootnote2sym" href="#sdfootnote2anc">2</a>Chalmers
|
||
considers another possibility, which he calls "strong
|
||
metaphysical necessity." It holds that there is a difference
|
||
between logical and metaphysical possibility, so that some of what
|
||
seems to be logically possible is not metaphysically possible. If
|
||
the range of metaphysically possible worlds is smaller than the
|
||
range of logically possible worlds, it may turn out that even though
|
||
there are logically possible worlds in which zombies exist, there is
|
||
no metaphysically possible world in which they exist.
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western"><a name="Loar"></a><a name="Chalmers97"></a>
|
||
<span lang="en-US">The obstacle to this approach is making the
|
||
premise about the range of metaphysically possible worlds more than
|
||
an </span><span lang="en-US"><i>ad hoc</i></span><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
dogmatic assertion. And Chalmers cannot see how that is possible.
|
||
Thus, in a subsequent response to his critics, </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Chalmers97"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Chalmers</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1997), uses </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Loar"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Loar</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1997) as an example of this strategy, and his refutation of Loar
|
||
belies the error both are making in taking properties to be basic.
|
||
He interprets Loar as taking the identity of physical and phenomenal
|
||
properties to be a metaphysical truth and then trying to explain why
|
||
this property seems to be two different properties by a difference
|
||
in the </span><span lang="en-US"><i>concepts</i></span><span lang="en-US">
|
||
we use to refer to it. The concept of physical properties involves
|
||
the use of theories and observational evidence for their
|
||
application, whereas we have a "recognitional concept" of
|
||
phenomenal properties (that is, our concept depends on how they
|
||
appear to us in reflection). But in order to make good on this view,
|
||
Loar must explain how such different concepts could be concepts of
|
||
the same properties, and Chalmers’ objection is that Loar does not
|
||
provide it. Ever since Kripke, the usual way of explaining how
|
||
concepts can refer to the same property and yet be cognitively
|
||
distinct is to show that one of the concepts picks out its property
|
||
by way of a contingent fact, such as its causal role. But that is
|
||
not what Loar does. On the contrary, Loar (p. 608) holds that the
|
||
recognitional concept of phenomenal properties "expresses"
|
||
the essential nature of phenomenal properties and that the concept
|
||
of physical properties "expresses" the essential nature of
|
||
physical properties. This undercuts the credibility of his claim
|
||
that that these concepts refer to the same property, for it is hard
|
||
to see how one and the same </span><span lang="en-US"><i>property
|
||
</i></span><span lang="en-US">could have </span><span lang="en-US"><i>two
|
||
different essences</i></span><span lang="en-US">. And to insist that
|
||
it does because it is metaphysically necessary is to beg the
|
||
question. It is to assert dogmatically that an identity is
|
||
metaphysically necessary.</span></p>
|
||
</div>
|
||
<div id="sdfootnote3">
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
|
||
<a class="sdfootnotesym" name="sdfootnote3sym" href="#sdfootnote3anc">3</a><span lang="en-US">Chalmers
|
||
(1996) takes the grounds of physical properties to be intrinsic
|
||
properties, rather than substances that also have intrinsic
|
||
properties. The omission of substance is also implicit in his
|
||
definition of "materialism" as "the doctrine that the
|
||
physical facts about the world exhaust all the facts, in that every
|
||
positive fact is entailed by the physical facts" (p. 124). The
|
||
same reason also keeps Russell and Lockwood from even suspecting
|
||
that the connection is necessary. </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Russell27"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Russell
|
||
</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">(1927) is explicitly
|
||
skeptical about the existence of substances, preferring to reduce
|
||
substances to sets of physical events located in spacetime. Thus, he
|
||
sees the intrinsic properties to which physical events are connected
|
||
as mental events with the same locations in spacetime, a view he
|
||
calls "neutral monism." </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Lockwood3"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Lockwood
|
||
</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">(1989) is a "causal
|
||
realist" who takes the physical properties to refer to
|
||
"whatever it is that occupies the relevant positions within a
|
||
certain causal structure" (160), and so the door is open for
|
||
him to hold that they are occupied by intrinsic properties.</span></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western"><span lang="en-US">The
|
||
connection between intrinsic and extrinsic properties can be seen as
|
||
an example of what </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Chalmers96B"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Chalmers
|
||
</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">(1996, 137) calls "</span><span lang="en-US"><i>strong
|
||
metaphysical necessity</i></span><span lang="en-US">" as
|
||
opposed to the "</span><span lang="en-US"><i>weak metaphysical
|
||
necessity </i></span><span lang="en-US">introduced by the Kripkean
|
||
framework," for it holds that there are "fewer
|
||
metaphysically possible worlds than logically possible worlds."
|
||
But it is not the dogmatic position that Chalmers assumes it must
|
||
be, for we are merely restricting possible physical worlds to those
|
||
in which the elementary bits of mass and energy described by physics
|
||
are substances. This is a far cry from insisting dogmatically that
|
||
phenomenal properties are metaphysically identical to physical
|
||
properties, as </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Chalmers97B"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Chalmers</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1997) accuses </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Loar5"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Loar</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1997) of doing. Loar’s way is mere "ontological
|
||
stipulation." But instead of holding that properties are
|
||
identical, we are reducing properties to the substances that
|
||
constitute the existence of the world and explaining the
|
||
relationship between physical and phenomenal properties as different
|
||
aspects that the essential natures of certain forms of material
|
||
substances must have.</span></p>
|
||
</div>
|
||
<div id="sdfootnote4">
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
|
||
<a class="sdfootnotesym" name="sdfootnote4sym" href="#sdfootnote4anc">4</a><span lang="en-US">Indeed,
|
||
if phenomenal properties are the intrinsic essential natures of the
|
||
photons generated by the active brain, as I will argue later, they
|
||
are epiphenomenal is a twofold sense, for in addition to being
|
||
intrinsic essential properties of matter, the bits of matter they
|
||
are intrinsic properties of are not themselves the efficient causes
|
||
of what happens in the brain. That depends on how the neurons affect
|
||
one another locally, not on the photons they generate jointly. For a
|
||
discussion of what this implies about the nature of out knowledge of
|
||
phenomenal properties, see the discussion in </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtkCbGeRRS06Unity.htm"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Unity of Consciousness</u></span></font></font></a><span lang="en-US">.</span></p>
|
||
</div>
|
||
</body>
|
||
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