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<title>The gradual evolution of mammals</title>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font color="#993366"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>T<img src="" name="TtsOtkCRS06_09" align="right" hspace="4" width="275" height="35" border="0">he
gradual evolution of mammals. </b></font></font>Though mammals are
named after their distinctive mammary glands, their neocortex is an
equally distinctive trait, and as suggested in discussing the
structure of the non-mammalian vertebrate brain, it comes from a
reorganization of the thalamus that transfers responsibility for all
three subfunctions of the animal behavior guidance system to the
forebrain. Since the neocortex derives from the reptilian DVR,
mammals could not evolve until reptiles had evolved. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
reorganization had be tried out soon after reptiles, however, rather
than later, for it is such a radical random variation that only the
most primitive reptiles could continue to function. By the time
reptiles had acquired as much power as possible for animals of their
kind, their DVR would have become so essential to so many different
kinds of behavior that such a radical random variation would probably
have been fatal. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This
obstacle is most obvious in the avian brain, where the DVR/striatum
is divided by well-defined laminas into many separate regions serving
special functions, such as controlling pecking and generating bird
songs. Each part of the telencephalon generates behavior separately,
by its influence on the midbrain and hindbrain. It is not that the
advantages of complete circuits through the forebrain are entirely
overlooked in birds. It does occur, but in a more limited way. As we
have seen, birds evolved a mammal-like memory; the &quot;visual
Wulst&quot; is part of a mechanism that resembles the mammalian
<i>memory</i> circuit.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote1anc" href="#sdendnote1sym"><sup>i</sup></a></sup>
But the avian brain lacks spatial imagination, because without a
<i>behavior generator </i>that operates on a somatotopic
representation of the body, it cannot acquire behavioral schemata
from experience with the structure of space, but must rely on
mechanisms supplied by the primary structure. Nor does avian memory
include any sensory modalities beyond vision. It appears that the
DVR-striatal circuit had become too complex by the time birds evolved
for the DVR to migrate to the dorsal cortex and become a neocortex.
Thus, birds have only a memory which is, at most, an advanced
telesensory memory, that is, using a one-dimensional series of
stimulus-response connections to get around in space as part of an
instinctive routine for controlling specific conditions. But the
visual Wulst is all birds need to record locomotor commands in
relation to visual images and calculate directions and distances to
unseen objects, for that enables them to find their way back to their
nest, patrol at territory, and migrate with the seasons using visible
landmarks. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Fossil
evidence shows that mammals did evolve from primitive reptiles as our
theory predicts. The last common ancestor of mammals and extant
reptiles was 300 million years ago, about the time that reptiles
first evolved. But there is still a problem with our explanation of
mammalian evolution, which accidentalists often use to argue that
mammals are not inherently superior, but merely different from,
non-mammalian vertebrates: if mammals are more powerful, why were
they dominated by dinosaurs for nearly 150 million years before the
radiation of mammals? It seems that there would never have been a
radiation of mammals, if it had not been for the impact of an
asteroid. To answer this objection, we must consider the course of
mammalian evolution. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Earth
was dominated by mammal-like reptiles before dinosaurs evolved (about
225 million years ago). Mammal-like reptiles (therapsids) had
tucked-in elbows and legs positioned more directly under their
bodies, so they were better able to scamper over land than reptiles
and probably fed on them. They used the energy, not only to stand
upright, but also to supply a warm-blooded metabolism. Although some
therapsids were as large as wolves, they were largely eclipsed by
two-legged predatory dinosaurs about 225 million years ago. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">But
mammals continued to evolve during the age of dinosaurs. About 190
million years ago, mammal-like reptiles gave rise to a branch of
primitive mammals (prototheria) which seem to have living
descendants, the monotremes: the duckbilled platypus and the spiny
anteater. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To judge by
them, primitive mammals were warm-blooded and hairy. Although the
platypus is still an egg-laying animals, it nurses its hatchlings and
cares for its young, which is a radical innovation, considering that
most reptiles have so little concern for their offspring that they
sometimes eat their hatchlings when they come across them hungry. And
monotremes have the mammalian neocortex (although it is not
differentiated into as many areas and lacks the corpus callosum, the
massive bundle of fibers that links the two hemispheres of neocortex
in true mammals). </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Later
during the age of dinosaurs (about 135 million years ago), marsupials
(metatheria) branched off from true mammals (eutheria), indicating
that mammals had evolved all the basic traits that distinguish them
from non-mammals during the reign of the dinosaurs, including live
birth. But that did not enable mammals to replace dinosaurs in their
energy-rich ecological niches, even though prototheria had about 55
million years and metatheria and eutheria had 70 million years to do
so. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
seems, therefore, that what finally brought the age of dinosaurs to
an end was not the inherently greater power of animals from a later
stage of evolution, but an accident — the impact of a giant meteor
or asteroid about 65 million years ago. The age of mammals might
never have begun, if it depended only on the greater power of a
higher level of part-whole complexity in the brain. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
accidentalist argument against the inherent superiority of mammals
can, however, be answered when evolution is explained by reproductive
causation. Incumbency in an ecological niche has an obvious
advantage, and to deny that evolution is merely a matter of tracking
changes in the environment is not to deny that catastrophic
environmental change shakes out the natural kinds best suited for the
more energy-rich ecological niches by forcing incumbent species from
earlier stages to compete on a more equal footing with inherently
more powerful kinds of living objects. This is the role of
environmental change in the case of mammalian evolution. Indeed, it
suggests that the question should be turned around. If mammals were
not inherently superior, then how did they manage to displace
dinosaurs when a catastrophic change did finally occur? </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
mammalian nervous system evolved during the age of dinosaurs, and the
more profound question is how mammals could evolve at all in
competition with the incumbent dinosaurs. The answer seems to be that
mammals occupied a more demanding ecological niche, where dinosaurs
could not compete. And what made that possible was an animal system
of representation with spatial imagination. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The first
mammals were small, rodent-like animals that apparently foraged (for
insects) at night, when dinosaurs could not see them or, perhaps,
were immobilized by the cold. Sight was not their major telesensory
modality, if we judge by the relative smallness of their eyes.
Instead, they had long snouts and external ears, which suggests they
had highly developed olfaction and hearing, both of which can be used
just as well in the dark. Since all the telesensory modalities
contribute in the same way to spatial <i>memory</i> in the subjective
animal system of representation,<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote2anc" href="#sdendnote2sym"><sup>ii</sup></a></sup>
mammals could get around in the dark at least as well as reptiles do
with light using only touch, hearing, and olfaction. Touch (including
whiskers) would enable them to detect nearby objects, and using their
map of the territory, they could get about well enough by keeping
track of how far they move in each direction. Their spatial
imagination would give them an experience of moving among salient
objects in their territory much like the &quot;virtual reality&quot;
generated by computers. Hearing (and olfaction) would tell them about
objects at a distance, both their location and kind. And olfaction
would enable them to recognize particular objects, confirming
locations in their map. Thus, mammals could get around in their
territory just as well when they could not see.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
subjective animal system of representation also explains parental
behavior, including nursing, by which mammals are named. We have seen
how the structural cause for various kinds of behavior, that is, the
behavior schemata for setting up and using both <i>local images </i>and
maps of the territory, are acquired from experience with the
structure of space in moving around among objects in 3-D space,
rather than from the biological behavior guidance system. Thus,
mammalian young are simply not able to acquire energy in the
ecological niches they inherit from their parents until they have
matured enough to construct <i>local images </i>and link them
together in their own maps of the relations of objects in space, that
is, as a World Image. Just as birds must care for their offspring
before they can fly and acquire energy for themselves, so mammals
must care for their offspring until experience in locomotion enables
them to develop a spatial imagination. Thus, mammillary glands (in
monotremes) and live birth (in marsupials) are probably just an
elaboration of the nurturing behavior required by the subjective
animal system of representation (as indicated by the early evolution
of the neocortex). </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">One
hundred fifty million years is surely long enough to make the
subjective animal system as effective as possible in representing the
world as a world of objects in space, and so, when the impact of an
asteroid caused clouds that changed the climate, destroying rain
forests and rich vegetation over much of Earth, mammals were better
able to adapt to the new conditions than dinosaurs. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">As
telesensory animals, dinosaurs had to rely on more or less complex
fixed action patterns that enabled them to construct maps, acquire
energy, and attain other goals in the previous, lush environment, and
reproductive causation was the only way to adapt those complex
instincts to radically new conditions. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Mammals,
however, had the advantage of spatial imagination; when a desire was
strong, they had the capacity to predict what would happen if they
moved their bodies in space before they acted, so that &quot;hypotheses
die[d] in their stead.&quot; And with a <i>behavior generator </i>that
operates on a <i>body image </i>to send separate motor commands to
all parts of the body, mammals were able to generate new kinds of
behavior by putting local motor commands together in new ways and,
thus, could learn new kinds of behavior by trial and error within a
single lifetime. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Hence,
mammals had a distinct advantage when the environmental catastrophe
put them on a more equal footing with dinosaurs. Dinosaurs were, of
course, already much larger animals, and so it is not surprising that
it took many generations before the mammalian population increase and
the adaptation of their bodies to the new ecological niches deprived
dinosaurs of their sources of energy. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Dinosaurs
may have continued to exist for thousands of years after the impact
of the asteroid, but that would not be long enough for them to evolve
the new instincts needed to exclude mammals from their high energy
ecological niches. Or to put it the other way, if there had been no
mammals, dinosaurs would not have had to compete for energy, and they
would probably have adapted to the new environment in the end. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Therefore,
although the “radiation” of mammals was occasioned by the
extinction of dinosaurs some 65 million years ago, the basic cause
was not that dinosaurs were selectively wiped out by an asteroid,
leaving mammals to inherit the earth. The asteroid merely changed all
the sources of usable energy tapped by animals of both kinds so
radically that mammals were able to replace dinosaurs in the new
ecological niches because of the inherent superiority of the
mammalian brain, with a neocortex, in which a <i>spatial imagination</i>
made them better able to acquire usable energy. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
may still seem that the evolution of mammals is not inevitable,
because evolution would not proceed through the whole series of
possible stages if it were not for such catastrophic events shaking
things up enough to make subsequent stages of inherently more
powerful primary structures inevitable. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">However,
it is not an accident that radical changes occur in all the
ecological niches at once. It is inevitable on planets like ours. For
example, if asteroid bombardment is a result of perturbations in an
Oort cloud of debris farther out from the star than where planets can
form, as has been suggested, it would probably happen on any planet
where life evolves at all. And there are other sources of asteroids.
Thus, catastrophic events are normal on planets that orbit stars, and
the dependence of evolution on them would not make the stages any
less inevitable. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Furthermore,
to assume that the overall course of evolution depends on occasional
catastrophes is not to suppose that natural selection is caused,
after all, by externally originating changes in the environment. What
makes it seem that evolution is merely tracking externally caused
changes in the environment is thinking of evolution as if only a
single species were involved. But when evolution is explained by its
ontological causes, we see that many species evolve during each stage
of evolution, and from that broader perspective, we can see that the
main effect of catastrophic changes in the overall course of
evolution is to shake things up so that inherently more powerful
organisms are not stymied by the accumulation of accidents. It makes
evolutionary stages inevitable. Catastrophes cause mass extinction of
species, and the “adaptations” that do take place are the
increasing power by which the gradual evolution of inherently
superior organisms taps usable energy in all parts of the
environment, such as the radiation of mammals after the extinction of
the dinosaurs.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
mammals higher level of neurological organization does, therefore,
account for their gradual evolution, both before and after the
catastrophe with which the Age of Mammals began some 65 million years
ago. They could occupy more demanding ecological niches alongside
dinosaurs before the catastrophic change, and then, once they could
compete on a more equal footing, there was a bush-like radiations of
mammals. After overcoming the dinosaur's advantage as incumbents in
ecological niches, reproductive causation would adapt mammals to
acquire free energy from all possible sources in all possible
habitats, from jungles and forests to meadows and deserts, and from
oceans and rivers to caves and polar ice caps. In short, from our
ontological foundation, we can predict not only the revolutionary
change with which the age of mammals began, but also the radiation of
mammals. It eventually occurs on any planet where life evolves at
all.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
is, however, a puzzle. If mammals are inherently more powerful, why
didnt they also displace the birds? Mammals can evolve the
capacity to fly. Bats are proof of that. But bird continue to occupy
almost all the other high-energy ecological niches open to flying
animals. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Are birds
incumbents in ecological niches that require a more severe
environmental catastrophe before they can be displaced? </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Or do
ecological niches that depend on flying require only a
one-dimensional visual memory for chains of stimulus-response
connections that are imbedded in instinctive routines? Since bats fly
at night and in caves, where birds usually cannot fly, are they
merely taking advantage of their subjective animal system of
representation to occupy an ecological niche that is not open to
birds? That is, does a vision-based memory without spatial
imagination make telesensory animals so powerful in ecological niches
that require locomotion by flying that animals with a multi-modal
<i>memory</i> and spatial imagination have no advantage — at least,
none great enough to compensate for the greater costs of developing a
nervous system with a higher level of part-whole complexity? </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#993366"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><b>T<img src="" name="TtsOtkCRS06_10" align="right" hspace="5" width="275" height="35" border="0">he
unity of consciousness. </b></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">In
</span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOthP.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Properties</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">,
the nature of consciousness, that is, the existence of phenomenal
properties, was explained by showing that material substances must
have an intrinsic aspect to their essential natures.
Spatiomaterialism implies that </span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><i>elementary
</i></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">bits
of matter have intrinsic natures. That is enough to explain simple
sensory qualia. But that is not a full explanation of the nature of
consciousness, because it does not show that intrinsic natures can
explain the </span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><i>kinds
</i></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">of
phenomenal properties we have (as we noted when explaining the nature
of the necessary connection that solves the contemporary naturalists
problem of mind in </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOthP32.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Properties:
Ontological explanation of the necessary connection between physical
and phenomenal properties</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">).
</span></font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">What
reflection (or introspection) reveals are complex phenomenal
properties with qualia of many different kinds all appearing to the
subject at once. But spatiomaterialism entails a kind of panpsychism,
in which only the most elementary bits of matter must have intrinsic
natures. Since the intrinsic natures of elemental bits of matter are
presumably only proto-phenomenal properties, it remains to explain
what Nagel calls the “unity of consciousness.” </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">But
how can the intrinsic natures of the most elementary physical objects
account for complex phenomenal properties? It cannot come from how
simpler physical objects are related spatially as parts of more
complex physical objects, for there is no reason to believe that a
composite physical object, like the brain, will have an intrinsic
nature as a whole. The parts of the brain are outside one another in
space, and the unity of the whole brain depends on the extrinsic
natures of the parts, since what holds the parts together and enables
them to interact are the forces that they exert on one another. Thus,
it may seem that spatiomaterialism cannot explain why the subject as
a whole has phenomenal properties in which qualia are combined in
such rich appearances as those that occur in perception.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif">The
nature of complex phenomenal properties.</font> There is one way that
spatiomaterialism can explain phenomenal properties (and only one
way, as far as I can see). In order to see how it works, we must take
into account both the basic nature of matter and the structure of the
mammalian brain. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>The
nature of matter.</b></i> Spatiomaterialism takes “matter” to
refer to all the forms of mass and energy whose quantities are
counted in the principle of the conservation of mass and energy,
including all the kinds of particular entities to which the basic
laws of physics refer. Quantum field theory distinguishes two
different kinds of basic particles, fermions and bosons. They have
opposite natures in a relevant way. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Fermions
and bosons have opposite relationships to other particles of the same
kind. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Particles
such as electrons, quarks, and nucleons are fermions. With “½
spin” (or a multiple of it), they exclude other objects of the same
kind from occupying the same location or quantum state (except for
one other particle with the opposite orientation of spin). </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Photons,
with a spin of 1, are the prime example of bosons (though bosons can
also have spins of 0 or 2). Bosons do not exclude one another from
occupying the same quantum states, and so there is no limit to the
number of bosons of any kind that can have the same location. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Fermions
and bosons have opposite relationships to space. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Fermions
(with mass) are most like ordinary physical objects, for they are
point-like particles (or spatial complexes of them) which are able to
be at rest is space. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Photons are
interacting electric and magnetic forces, and by contrast to
fermions, they seem to be spread out in space, for even though they
exist only as whole (quantum) units, they move through space at the
velocity of light. (A boson-like nature is also found in the electric
forces by which fermions interact with one another, but as we have
seen this form of matter is spread out as a field and the way it
coincides with space means that its quantity is included in the total
rest masses of the objects exerting the forces.) </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">According
to spatiomaterialism, all the simplest bits of matter mentioned by
physics must have intrinsic natures. But since bits of matter can
occupy more than just a single point in space, there is no reason to
deny that their intrinsic natures can have spatial structures. That
suggests that, since photons seem to be units spread out in space,
they could have intrinsic natures with complex spatial structures,
even if fermions do not. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The basic
nature of photons opens up, therefore, the possibility of an
explanation of complex phenomenal properties by intrinsic natures.
But we are still far from seeing how it works. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To be sure,
the photon-like nature of the electromagnetic forces binding
electrons to nuclei in atoms and atoms to one another in molecules
may also give each of them an intrinsic nature as a composite whole.
But their intrinsic natures extend only as far as the objects they
bind, and since that is not far enough to include whole brains, their
intrinsic natures can hardly account for phenomenal properties. To
see how it is possible, we must consider the structure of the brain. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>The
structure of the mammalian brain</b></i><i>.</i> The basic structure
of the mammalian forebrain involves a massive projection of neurons
from the thalamus to all parts of the neocortex (and back), and as we
have seen, the brains main functions are all served by its
massively parallel information processing. Different nuclei in the
thalamus project to distinct regions of neocortex, and there are
three complete circuits from the neocortex through other structures
back to the thalamus and neocortex. Information is being processed
within those circuits in two-dimensional arrays of neurons (as shown
by association fibers that connect them topographically). Many such
2-D arrays in the posterior neocortex are clearly processing sensory
information about the same objects in space at the same time, and
many other 2-D arrays in the anterior neocortex are processing both
sensory input from and motor output to the body at the same time.
Finally, a 40-75 hertz pattern of firing set up by the thalamus
apparently synchronizes activity in all areas of the neocortex,
integrating the three complete circuits.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Crick
and Koch (1990) defend the hypothesis that the 40-75 hertz
synchronization of the firing of thalamic neurons to the neocortex is
the foundation of consciousness. But they do not explain how it gives
rise to phenomenal properties. Given the spatiomaterialist
explanation of intrinsic natures, however, phenomenal properties
could be explained as the intrinsic natures of the electromagnetic
waves set up by the synchronized firing of neurons throughout the
thalamic projection to the neocortex. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Electromagnetic
waves are, of course, photons, one of the basic forms of matter
contained by space, and since they are generated by the acceleration
of charged particles, they are clearly being generated by brain
activity. A neuron carries signals from one place to another by an
“action potential” which propagates along its axon as ions of one
kind at each successive point rush into the neuron and then ions of
another kind flow back out. The acceleration of such ions makes the
synchronized firing of thalamic neurons act like an antenna,
generating a complex electromagnetic wave. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Since
electromagnetic waves, being composed of elemental photons, are a
form of matter whose spread-out nature could give their intrinsic
nature a spatial structure, there is an elemental bit of matter
generated by active brains whose intrinsic nature could have enough
spatial structure to account for complex phenomenal properties. It is
the electromagnetic energy being given off as a series of complex
photons by a human brain that is not asleep. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This is all
the more plausible when we consider that the brain, despite making up
only a few percent of body weight, accounts for nearly 20% of the
bodys total energy consumption.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
order to be sure that the intrinsic nature of the energy being given
off by the brain accounts for phenomenal properties, more would have
to be known about the complex geometrical structure of the photons
generated by the synchronized firing of neurons in the thalamic
projection to the neocortex. Indeed, it is likely that much more
remains to be discovered about the basic nature of light than
physicists suppose. But that is beyond the scope of this argument.
But for our purposes, it is enough to see how this ontological
explanation of the nature of properties, this ontological explanation
of the truth of physics, and this ontological explanation of the
structure of the subjective animal system of representation combine
to provide an explanation of the kinds of phenomenal properties that
beings like us have. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>Complex
phenomenal properties.</b></i> To make it plausible that what is
relevant is the energy being given off by the thalamic projection to
the neocortex, let me suggest how it would explain what Nagel called
the “unity of consciousness.” </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
unity of consciousness can be seen in perception, for at any moment,
many particular qualia from several sensory modalities all appear to
be located in and around ones body in what can only be called
phenomenal space. Objects with colored surfaces appear to have
locations around the body, and they often make noises that seem to
come from their locations. Color and tactile qualia also seem to be
located in the body, and as it moves, one can feel objects at certain
locations in space outside the body. The spatial coherence of the
perceptual appearance is so complete that many philosophers who are
otherwise critical realists still assume that the space in which
sensory qualia appear to be located is the same space in which the
objects (and body) they represent actually exist, that is, the the
qualia are somehow projected outside the brain. But since spatial
aspects of perception are just as much part of phenomenal properties
as the sensory qualia themselves, we must distinguish phenomenal from
real space.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
are at least three reasons to believe that complex phenomenal
properties like these can be explained by the intrinsic natures of
the photons generated by the thalamic projection to the cortex. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">First,
as the anatomy of the brain suggests, all the information processing
of sensory input leading to motor output that is going on in the
brain is registered in the firing of neurons in the thalamic
projection to the neocortex and, thus, in the electromagnetic waves
it generates. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">There are
three way in which the projection from the thalamus to the neocortex
projects back to the thalamus, completing a circuit. All areas of
neocortex have association fibers that project to the temporal lobe
near the hippocampus and thereby connect (via the fornix) with the
anterior nucleus, which projects back to the cingulate gyrus of the
neocortex. All areas of the neocortex also project to the corpus
striatum and thereby connect through the ventral anterior and ventral
lateral thalamic nuclei back to the frontal neocortex. Also located
in the temporal lobe is the amygdala which connects by way of the
dorsomedian nucleus of the thalamus back to the frontal regions of
the neocortex. The first circuit clearly mediates the formation of
long term memory; the second generates behavior in relation to
objects in space; and the third attaches desires to objects by
arousing disposition to behave toward them in certain ways. Thus, the
thalamo-cortical projection seems to mediate all the main brain
functions.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">But since
the neocortex is one of the mechanisms involved in all three complete
circuits which realize the subsystems of the subjective animal
behavior guidance system in mammals, its neurons (including
association fibers between 2-D regions of neocortex) may also
contribute to the photons whose intrinsic nature constitutes
phenomenal properties.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Second,
it seems possible to explain the spatial coherence of complex
phenomenal properties, at least, in principle. It is likely that
simple sensory qualia are parts of the electromagnetic wave generated
by thalamic neurons projecting sensory input to primary sensory areas
of neocortex, for when they fire, they fire at an unusually high
rate. The appearance of green at a certain location in the visual
field, for example, is presumably due to the rapid firing of certain
neurons in the 2-D array projecting from the lateral geniculate body
of the thalamus to the visual (striate) cortex. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Given how
colors vary with different combinations of the intensity of opponent
colors (red-green, blue-yellow, and black-white), the relevant wave
patterns presumably depend on the combination of neurons projecting
to each region of the visual cortex that originate at different
lamina of the lateral geniculate body and fire at different
synchronized rates.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Since all
the 2-D arrays processing visual input in the neocortex are connected
to one another topographically by association fibers, the neurons in
each that represent the same parts of an objects visual appearance
are presumably synchronized throughout the neocortex. That ties
higher-level processing to the corresponding neurons responsible for
sensory qualia and integrates <i>all </i>their effects on the
electromagnetic wave, so that its spatial structure could contain all
the information the brain uses for guiding behavior.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The same is
true of the various 2-D arrays representing the body, and given how
those body representations are connected with visual and other
sensory 2-D arrays, it is not implausible to suppose that the result
is a series of photons generated by the entire thalamo-cortical
projection whose intrinsic natures are spatially coherent. That could
be why sensory qualia seem to have locations in phenomenal space. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The fainter
qualia of all sensory modalities that occur in memory and imagination
could likewise be explained as due to centrally-generated firings of
neurons that otherwise occur only in later stages of the process of
sensory analysis. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Finally,
locating the phenomenal property in nature as the intrinsic nature of
the electromagnetic wave generated by the thalamic projection to the
neocortex would explain the phenomenon of blindsight. When the
projection from the thalamus to the visual cortex is damaged and
subjects claim not to have any visual experience, they are still able
to answer questions about the locations and shapes of objects and to
take them into account in their behavior. The lack of visual qualia
is what would be expected on this theory, since what is missing is
the relevant thalamo-cortical projection. And the residual visual
discrimination could be explained by the visual processing still
going on outside the forebrain in the superior colliculus (the
midbrain nucleus that was responsible for using visual input to guide
behavior in reptiles) and its limited projection to a region of the
thalamus (the pulvinar) that projects to secondary areas of the
visual neocortex. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ontological
philosophy offers, therefore, a plausible explanation of the unity of
consciousness. The physical properties of the photons generated by
the brain suggest that they are a form of matter whose intrinsic
natures could be the complex phenomenal properties we have. What
makes it possible to solve the explanatory problem that Nagel finds
in panpsychism is the recognition that space is a substance.
Coinciding with space explains not only why bits of matter have
spatial relations to one another, but also how they can coincide with
whole regions of space. Thus, it shows how their intrinsic natures
could have complex spatial structures, and that makes it possible to
see how photons can have a spatial structure that depends on activity
throughout the brain, accounting for the complex structure of the
phenomenal properties that we are calling &quot;consciousness.&quot;</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">An
attractive feature of this explanation is that it suggests a research
project. Complex phenomenal properties might be explained in detail
by working out precisely the geometry of the electromagnetic waves
generated by ions being accelerated in and out of cylindrical axons
of certain neurons in each of many 2-D arrays of the massive,
basically parallel projection from the thalamus to the neocortex as
they fire simultaneously 40-75 time each second. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Furthermore,
if the synchronization of firing cycles throughout the thalamus is
required for the coherence of the complex phenomenal property, it can
settle a question about the unity of consciousness in split-brain
patients. In split-brain patients, the massive corpus callosum which
connects the two hemispheres of the brain is cut (usually in order to
prevent epileptic seizures). Whether they have one or two minds, that
is, one or two unified appearances made of sensory qualia in
phenomena space, would depend on whether their thalamic nuclei are
still synchronizing the firings of neurons in both hemispheres. That
is something that could be determined empirically.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif">Implications.
</font>Even without carrying out those research projects, however,
this explanation of phenomenal properties, if true, has consequences
that are relevant to the positions mentioned in the discussion of
consciousness in <font face="Arial, sans-serif">Properties</font>. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>Epiphenomenalism.
</b></i>Thomas Huxley likened epiphenomenal properties to the whistle
or steam giving off by a steam locomotive, because they have no
causal role in propelling the train. If we take “epiphenomenal”
to mean being an effect of physical properties without having any
effects in turn on physical properties, the spatiomaterialist
explanation implies that phenomenal properties are epiphenomenal in
two different ways. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">First,
as we have seen, phenomenal properties are epiphenomenal relative to
physical properties as such, because they are kinds of intrinsic
natures that are caused to exist as a result of extrinsic natures of
the bits of matter involved. That is, the spatial structures of the
photons that account for the complexity of the relevant phenomenal
properties are also aspects of the extrinsic natures of those bits of
matter, because those spatial structures can in principle, be
explained by physics.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Second,
since the relevant bits of matter are the electromagnetic waves, they
are just a form of energy being dissipated by the brain as a
by-product of its activity, and so those bits of matter themselves
are epiphenomenal relative to the physical properties of the brain
itself. Those photons are effects of the brains activity that do
not, in turn, affect its states. (What happens in the brain is caused
by the synapses made by the neurons that fire, not by the photons
generated by their action potentials.) </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Thus,
phenomenal properties depend on two “causal” connections, the
efficient cause by which the brain activity causes electromagnetic
waves, and the ontological cause linking the extrinsic natures of the
electromagnetic waves to their intrinsic natures. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>Robot
consciousness. </b></i>Given that phenomenal properties are the
intrinsic natures of the brains electromagnetic waves, it is not
very likely that robots whose behavior is guided by computers made of
silicon chips will be conscious in the way we are. Though they will
also generate electromagnetic waves and will, therefore, have some
intrinsic nature or other, it is unlikely that their phenomenal
properties will be anything like our own. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Their
information processing is basically serial, rather than parallel, and
since silicon chips have, in any case, a completely different
geometry from brains, the rising and falling electric and magnetic
forces in the “wires” of silicon chips will generate photons with
a completely different geometry in space and time. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nor can
such robots experience sensory qualia as located in space, if what is
responsible for the unity of consciousness is, as suggested above,
the synchronized processing of representations of the same objects in
different, interconnected 2-D arrays of neurons projecting to the
neocortex. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">Ontological
philosophy also implies, therefore, that </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Chalmers"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Chalmers</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">
(1996, Chapter 7) was mistaken to believe that phenomenal properties
are caused by functional, rather than by physical properties. His
argument was the implausibility of qualia slowly “fading” out as
parts of the brain were replaced by functionally equivalent silicon
circuits, and the implausibility of color qualia “dancing” from
one kind to another (or to none at all) as the processing of part of
the visual array was switched between brain mechanisms and silicon
chips. Implausible though it may seem to Chalmers, that is what must
happen, if phenomenal properties are the intrinsic natures of
electromagnetic waves generated by the processing. But at this point,
his fading qualia and dancing qualia arguments show, not the
implausibility of phenomenal properties being caused by physical
properties, but rather the perils of giving up the empirical method
(as in empirical ontology) in favor of philosophical arguments from
plausibility (where functions and other properties seem more basic
than substances). </span></font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>Knowledge
of phenomenal properties. </b></i>Ontological philosophy makes
consciousness a part of natural science without abandoning the
empirical method in favor of the traditional epistemological approach
to philosophy. But since it implies that phenomenal properties are
epiphenomenal, they have no effects on what happens in the natural
world, and thus it may seem that phenomenal properties cannot be
known even privately. How can subjects know about their phenomenal
properties, if those properties are never causes of what they say
about them? </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">That
phenomenological properties do cause beliefs about them is apparently
what Descartes assumed in arguing, &quot;I think, therefore I am.&quot;
In order for thinking to show the subject that he exists, the subject
must know that he is thinking when he is thinking, and Descartes
seems to take it for granted that the subject knows that he is
thinking because the appearance of the ideas in the mind makes the
subject aware of what is happening in his mind. (That is the
&quot;illusion involved in reflection&quot; that Descartes still does
not see through after he sees through the &quot;illusion involved in
perception&quot; and becomes a critical realist.)</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nor would
this problem arise if phenomenal properties played the kind of causal
role mediating between sensory input and behavioral output that
Searle (1992, 1995, and 1997) ascribes to pain, that is, being an
effect of, say, a pinch, which in turn causes one to say “Ouch!”
In that case, phenomenal properties would be effects of sensory
input, and they would be the causes of reports about them. But causal
emergentism of that sort is incompatible with spatiomaterialism. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Given
this explanation of the mammalian brain and consciousness, however,
it is not necessary for phenomenal properties to be efficient causes
of behavior in order for them to be private objects of knowledge. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">First,
to see how we can <i>know that we have phenomenal properties</i>, we
need only recognize that such knowledge comes from (and arose
historically in modern philosophy from) accepting critical realism,
that is, distinguishing phenomenal properties from physical
properties. It is like something to be a human being, as we have
seen, because the functioning brain involves a bit of matter whose
intrinsic nature registers the activity of the entire brain. We
assume, as naive realists, that the world as it appears to us in
perception is the real world, with qualia located in objects that are
assumed to exist independently of us in space. But when we recognize
that perception is a physical process in which the objects stimulate
our sensory organs, thereby giving rise to brain states representing
them, we can come to see that our sensory qualia are parts of us, as
the subject who is perceiving, not parts of the independently
existing objects. And if we follow this argument to its conclusion,
we also come to recognize that the space in which sensory qualia seem
to be located is merely phenomenal and, thus, distinct from the space
in which the physical objects actually exist. Critical realism about
perception makes it clear that objects with physical properties in
real space exist somehow “beyond” the complex phenomenal
properties we have, so that we discover that we have phenomenal
properties by recognizing that physical properties do not appear to
us at all, except indirectly through phenomenal properties. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">These
spatial configurations of sensory qualia are not the only complex
phenomenal properties we have, but they are an important variety, and
the failure to give up naive realism <i>about space </i>in favor of
critical realism <i>about space </i>is the source of much confusion
about the nature of consciousness. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Thus,
second, there is no problem explaining how it is possible for
subjects to <i>pick out particular qualia </i>included in the
structures of their phenomenal properties. The phenomenal properties
involved in perception are configurations of sensory qualia in
phenomenal space, and particular qualia can be picked out in the same
way as the objects in real space that they represent, for once we
recognize the difference between physical and phenomenal properties,
it is one and the same brain capacity being understood in two
different ways. We can take our reference to the green apple on the
table to be a reference either to the physical object in real space
or to a part of the appearance that the world has to us as we
perceive the world.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Finally,
there is no problem explaining how we <i>know about the kinds of
particular sensory qualia that are picked out </i>that way, for once
again, it is just to make the same discrimination that we make in
describing the properties of physical objects in real space together
with the recognition that there is a difference between physical and
phenomenal properties. When I call the cup green, I am ordinarily
understood as referring to a physical property of the cup (its
disposition to cause a certain kind of experience in us). But when I
distinguish the phenomenal property from the physical property, I can
also identify the kind of qualia representing the physical property.
And there is a kind of incorrigibility to the belief about the kind
of particular sensory qualia that does not hold for the physical
property, for what is meant by the kind of sensory qualia is how it
appears to the subject and that is something that is known
ostensively in the phenomenal property. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ontological
philosophy, therefore, makes a natural science of consciousness
possible. Though we know about our own phenomenal properties in a
unique and private way, we can know that others have them. If other
brains generate the same kinds of electromagnetic waves as ours, we
can know from what experience is like for us, what it is like for
them. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">But
traditional epistemological philosophy will not survive this change,
for it makes even the starting point of modern philosophers, like
Descartes, part of the essential nature of a world that is explained
ontologically. That is, what will make a natural science of
consciousness possible is that there will no longer be any difference
between empirical science and philosophy when philosophy takes
empirical ontology as its foundation (and science recognizes ontology
as a more basic branch than physics). But this is to get ahead of
ourselves, for that is how ontological philosophy completes the tenth
stage of evolution.&nbsp;</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" dir="rtl" class="western" align="right" style="text-indent: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.42cm; line-height: 100%">
<br><br>
</p>
<div id="sdendnote1">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote1sym" href="#sdendnote1anc">i</a>
In the avian brain, the dorsal cortex contains a detailed visual
image called the &quot;visual Wulst&quot; which controls locomotion
by its own, direct motor output. It is part of a memory map that
uses visual input relayed by the thalamus directly from the retina
to the dorsal cortex. And as part of the dorsal cortex, the Wulst
connects through the medial cortex/hippocampus and fornix back to
the mammillary body in the hypothalamus. But instead of merely
influencing the midbrain and motor output, as in other non-mammals,
the mammillary body relays a signal, by way of the thalamus, back to
the Wulst in the telencephalon. This is a complete circuit,
resembling the mammalian memory mechanism, and it is apparently used
to construct a memory map for guiding locomotion. Assuming that it
works the same way as in mammals, the Wulst can use a
one-dimensional chain of stimulus-response connections as a map to
guide locomotion without involving the rest of the circuit
(hippocampus, fornix and mammillary body). But vision is the only
sensory modality involved, and judging by the neurological
mechanisms, it cannot use its memory map as a locomotor imagination.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote2">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote2sym" href="#sdendnote2anc">ii</a><span lang="en-US">
Although olfaction contributes to mammalian memory in the same way,
this telesensory input is still analyzed in the olfactory bulb,
rather than the neocortex, and thus, images of odors cannot be
called up in imagination in the same way as visual and auditory
images. </span>
</p>
</div>
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