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<title>Rational causation</title>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font color="#993366"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>R<img src="" name="OdkC34" align="right" width="73" height="32" border="0">ational
causation.</b></font></font> The remaining problems about the nature
of causation arise in the branches of science known as psychology and
social science. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Psychology
has to do with the explanation of individual behavior, and that is
problematic mainly because we know too much. As rational beings, we
have a special way of seeing into the minds of other rational beings
(and subjective animals generally). We ordinarily explain individual
behavior by the reasons that the individual has for it, that is, the
beliefs, intentions, desires and the like that are responsible for
it, or subjectivistic understanding, as we have been calling it.
There are two problems,</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">One problem
in this field is that rational explanations do not seem to be the
kind of explanation that a branch of natural science ought to be
seeking. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">But another
problem is that, even if they are, they do not seem to be reducible
to the kinds of explanation given in physics. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
social science have to do with the explanation of social phenomena,
or what has been explained here as the behavior of spiritual animals.
We know that human societies are different from other groups of
animals, because our capacity for subjectivistic understanding gives
us an “inside view,” so to speak, of the phenomena. However, that
view is not based on perception and, thus, is not from the vantage of
natural science. Thus, there is a problem about the nature of the
object that is being studied by the social sciences. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The problem
about reductionism in this case is just opposite to the other cases
considered here. Though there have been social scientists, like Comte
and Durkheim, who thought that societies are not reducible to the
individuals, that view is not common these days. Contemporary
naturalists tend to assume that social phenomena must somehow be
explained in terms of the individuals who make up human societies,
because they do not see how there could be any relevant causes that
arise from the nature of society as a whole.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The main
philosophical problems about the nature of causation in social
science has to do, therefore, with showing how social phenomena can
be explained as a result of the nature of the individuals, the
regularities in their behavior, and the situations in which they act.
The project of explaining social phenomena in that way is called
“methodological individualism,” and its most popular current form
is sociobiology, which bypasses individual psychology and tries to
explain social behavior by genes that have evolved in individuals.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
ontological explanation of the nature of change provides, however, a
solution in all of these cases. Though the laws of nature (or
regularities) discovered in psychology and social science may not be
reducible to the laws of physics, they are reducible to the
ontological causes recognized by spatiomaterialism in a world like
ours. Once again, the reason is the failure to recognize that the
global regularities are caused ontologically by the wholeness of
space and other substances contained by it, both basic and
derivative, like material structures and reproductive cycles. Indeed,
all the basic phenomena investigated by both psychology and social
science have already been explained in tracing the course of
evolution by reproductive causation. What follows here is just a
reminder of their relevance. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font color="#993366"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>P<img src="" name="OdkC35" align="right" width="75" height="30" border="0">sychology.</b></font></font>
In the first instance, psychology is based on our ordinary way of
understanding human beings. That is to explain individual behavior
and beliefs by the reason which are responsible for it, or what I
have been calling “rational explanation.” For decades now, it has
been is called “folk psychology” in epistemological philosophy of
science, because it is generally assumed that such explanations
depend on learning the relevant “laws of nature” as a normal part
of the process of growing up in human society. But it has been
explained here as subjectivistic understanding.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Subjectivistic
understanding is part of the cognitive capacity I have been calling
“reason,” for it is the use of rational imagination to think
about the causes of beliefs and behavior in subjective animals like
us. Reason has been explained here as a capacity that derives from
the use of psychological sentences, for that is what enables the
subject to represent and, thus, reflect on the psychological states
that are involved causally in the process by which their animal
behavior guidance system. That is the basis of the subjects
capacity to use the theoretical and practical reasoning that takes
place in his own brain to simulate the reasoning going on in the
brains of others, and thus, it is what enables the subject to see
into the minds of other subjects.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Naturalistic
understanding is another part of the capacity of reason. It is the
use of rational imagination to think about the causes and effects of
states of objects in space, or the kind of imagination that first
evolved in primitive spiritual animals, which had only the use of
natural sentences (with a subject-predicate grammar). The use of
natural sentences gives the subject the concept of a state of affairs
(or event) in nature, and since reason uses a faculty of imagination
that is built on the spatio-temporal imagination of mammals and the
structuro-temporal imagination of primates, it involves the ability
to understand efficient causes and their effects (both those that
depend on these basic aspects of the spatial structure of the world
and those that are learned from experience of other regularities in
the natural world). </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif">H<img src="" name="OdkC36" align="right" width="73" height="20" border="0">ermeneutics.
</font>By “hermeneutics,” I mean the belief that the best that
science can do in the way of explaining individual beliefs and
behavior is to give rational explanations. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
view is now most commonly defended in the philosophy of social
science. There seems to be no hope explaining social phenomena unless
the beliefs and behavior of individual can be explained. Even the
gathering of statistics about individuals, as in economics and
sociology, depends on being able to start with the ordinary
explanations of their beliefs and behavior. Thus, those who are eager
to have the social sciences recognized as a form of genuine knowledge
about the world seem forced to accept a hermeneutical understanding
of individual behavior.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Hermeneutics
is also the foundation of most social psychology and clinical
psychology for the same reason. But in psychology, there are attempts
to give a deeper explanation of individual behavior, which would make
it clear that psychology is a branch of natural science and, thus, no
less entitled to claim that its conclusions are science. They will be
considered next.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
main problem with simply accepting rational explanations as
scientific explanations is that the empirical method does not lead to
general agreement about what is true, at least not in a way that is
comparable to using the empirical method with efficient-cause
explanations. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
problem with the empirical method was discussed when the empirical
method was introduced (in <font face="Verdana, sans-serif">Method</font>).
The empirical method is the attempt to discover what is true by
inferring to the best explanation of what is observable in the
natural world, and as we noted, it is a method that can, in
principle, be used in conjunction with various kinds of explanation:
efficient-cause explanations, rational-cause explanations and
ontological-cause explanations. The way that it leads to agreement in
the case of efficient-cause explanations has made natural science a
spectacular success in the attempt to discover the true. Its use in
conjunction with ontological-cause explanations is the foundation of
ontological philosophy, where it may also lead to general agreement,
this time about the basic substance constituting the natural world.
But in the case of rational-cause explanations, it fails to lead to
agreement about what is true. Different rational subjects trying to
explain the same behavior (or the same beliefs) of some individual
often wind up with different conclusions, and no matter how much they
consider one anothers rational explanations, there does not seem
to be any way for them to reach agreement. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The problem
about reaching agreement on rational-cause explanations is sometimes
called the hermeneutical circle, because the attempt to resolve
disputes about what an individual intends or believes in a particular
case depends inferring to the best rational cause explanation. Since
one standard of the best explanation is explaining the widest range
of phenomena, the widest range in this case is the range of the
individuals behavior. But for other instances of the individuals
behavior to be relevant in judging which explanation is best, they
must also be explained rationally, and thus, the same problem arises
about explaining them. The rational explanation of one instance of
behavior depends on the rational explanation of the other, and that
instance on yet another, so that in the end, all the behavior has to
be interpreted. The rational explanation of the part thus depends on
the rational explanation of the whole, and as it happens, even when
all relevant behavior is included, there are still differences among
the subjective scientists. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The reason
for these disputes can be explained, as we did earlier, by the nature
of rational explanation. It comes down to disagreements among the
subjective scientists themselves in basic their beliefs about the
world, especially their most basic and general beliefs, such as moral
and religious beliefs. An inference to the best rational explanation
is an inference to the fewest and simplest psychological states that
will explain the widest range of behavior, but it depends on a
judgment about which alternative explanation is the most coherent,
that is, rational selection. And since rational explanation involves
using ones own process of practical and theoretical reasoning to
simulate the reasoning of others, the judgment about which
alternative set of psychological states is simplest and fewest
depends on using ones own desires and beliefs (including beliefs
about what is good) as the background in which they are compared.
Since that background varies from one subjective scientist to the
next, subjective scientists tend to disagree about which is the best
rational explanation. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Inferences
to the best efficient-cause explanations are not subject to this kind
of dispute, because naturalistic understanding involves only beliefs
about the natural world which are ultimately based on perception. No
judgments about what is good and bad, or what is meaningful, or how
one feels is relevant in natural science. But they are the stuff of
the subjective sciences.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Insofar
as such disagreements about the best rational-cause explanation are
not resolvable, it is apparent that the conclusions of subjective
science are not objective. The ontological explanation of the nature
of reason shows that there is a good deal of validity in rational
explanations, because the animal behavior guidance systems of
rational subjects do work in basically the same way. Thus, to some
extent, they can be used to discover the true, though the range in
which they are trustworthy may be limited to more immediate
intentions is rather well defined social situations. However,
rational explanations will lead to much greater agreement about the
reasons behind individual behavior when ontological philosophy
evolves in philosophical spiritual animals, because there will be a
great deal more agreement about background beliefs and values.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">However,
a genuine science of individual needs more than rational explanation,
because psychology must be integrated as a branch of natural science.
Thus, naturalists are on the right track in attempting to reduce
rational cause explanations to the kind that is used in natural
science. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif">N<img src="" name="OdkC37" align="right" width="73" height="20" border="0">aturalism.</font>
There have been various attempts to reduce rational-cause
explanations to efficient-cause explanations, and as a way of showing
the relevance of the ontological explanation of the nature of change
to issues about causation, let me mention the main varieties here. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><b>Behaviorism.</b>
The original attempt to turn psychology into science is behaviorism,
that is, the attempt to discover a law of nature describing the
regularities about individual behavior so that it would be possible,
in principle, to explain particular actions by efficient causes.
These first attempts tried to reduce behavior to what is now called
“respondent conditioning,” exemplified by Pavlovs dog, in
which behavior that is already triggered by some stimulus is
conditioned so that it comes to be triggered by another stimulus. It
was followed by the theory of operant conditioning, developed mainly
by B. F. Skinner. Operant conditioning is based on the law of effect.
When kinds of behavior that are generated spontaneously or randomly
are reinforced, they are more likely to generated again, especially
under similar stimulus conditions. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><b>Functionalism.</b>
Behaviorism has been replaced in psychology by cognitive psychology.
It departs from its predecessor by recognizing that behavior is
mediated by internal states, and thus, it takes the project of
psychology to be to discover the internal states that are
responsible. But cognitive psychology does not attempt to discover
the physical properties of internal states. Instead, it attempt to
discover them in terms of their causal connections to input states
and output states of the organism. That leads to what is called
“functionalism.”</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><b>Neurophysiology.
</b>The other thriving trend in psychology is the attempt to reduce
rational explanations to neurophysiology, that is, to the states of
the brain. (Though brain states may still be defined functionally,
the functions are physiological functions, and thus, involve
descriptions that are more closely tied to physics.) </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
significance of ontological philosophy for each of these projects is
implicit in what has been said in tracing the course of evolution as
a global regularity caused by reproductive cycles and the wholeness
of space.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><b>Neurophysiology.</b>
The problems of neurophysiology have been addressed by this
ontological explanation of the course of evolution by tracing the
stages of animal evolution from somatosensory through manipulative
animals to rational subjects (stages 4-9). The nervous system was
explained as an animal behavior guidance system, but the biggest
departure from received neurophysiology comes from the recognition of
levels of neurological organization and what each contributes to the
animal system of representation. That functional explanation shows
how structures in the nervous system serve as a faculty of
imagination, that is, a mechanism in which covert behavior calls up
sequences of images from memory in the sensory input system to
represent the effects of motion on the relations of objects in space,
of manipulation on the geometrical structures of objects in space,
the causal relations among states of objects in space, and the causal
relations among psychological states. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This is a
different kind of neurophysiological explanation of behavior than is
expected by the current defenders of neurophysiology, such as Paul
and Patricia Churchland, for they are eliminative materialists, who
expect rational explanations (or “folk psychology,” as they call
it) to be replaced by neurophysiology. By contrast, this explanation
of how the brain works explains the validity of rational explanation
by showing not only how they are valid explanations, but also by
explaining how it is possible for rational subject to give such
explanations of beliefs and behavior. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">As a
functional explanation of those structures in the brain, however, it
leaves a great deal yet to be explained. Indeed, all the detailed
mechanisms that are required to serve these functions remain to be
explained. But those nervous mechanisms are quickly yielding to the
astonishing progress of empirical neurophysiology. Since they are
coming at it from opposite directions, what ontological philosophy
implies and what empirical neurophysiology is disclosing should
converge on a single, complete explanation of how the brain works
before long. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><b>Behaviorism.</b>
What made it possible to explain the stages of neurological
organization by reproductive causation was the recognition that the
faculty of imagination does not require the mechanism of
embryological development (that is, the multicellular biological
behavior guidance system) to provide the detailed structure of the
brain. It needs to provide only the basic systems of the faculty of
imagination, because its structure makes possible a contained form of
reproductive causation in which the behavioral schemata behind covert
behavior can evolved by reinforcement selection. That is, given that
there are random variations on behavioral schemata, the learning of
new ways of behaving and thinking can be explained by a memory
circuit that strengthens the synapses of neurons involved in
generating behavior of that kind when they are successful by
genetically determined criteria (such as success in getting around in
space or success in social relations mediated by linguistic
behavior). Thus, the brain has a built-in structure that internalizes
structures of the world, from the spatial structure of the natural
world to language and the capacity for reflection. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This is an
explanation of the validity of operant conditioning, at least, in
mammals and beyond. The law of effect is true, on this functional
explanation of the faculty of imagination, because the regularity it
describes is the evolution of behavioral schemata by reinforcement
selection within the mammalian brain. (The memory circuit works in a
similar, but far more limited way in non-mammalian vertebrates, and
thus, the learning in pigeons was limited enough to stand out in the
kinds of experiments that Skinner conducted.) </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">But this
neurophysiological explanation of operant conditioning reveals that
it is not as open ended and unstructured as Skinner believed, because
it is the evolution of behavior schemata that operate as various
faculties of imagination (spatio-temporal, structuro-temporal,
naturalistic and subjectivist imagination). That is, behind the overt
operant behavior, including verbal behavior) is a covert operant that
calls up sequences of images of a certain kind, and thus, from the
point of view of the subject, the behavior is generated in world from
an understanding of the world that sees the actual against the
background of the possible. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><b>Functionalism.
</b>The neurophysiological structures in the nervous system have been
explained by the functions of various systems at a series of level of
neurological organization. That is a functional explanation in the
strong sense that is entailed by reproductive causation and the
recognition that evolution is progressive, increasingly sophisticated
ways of serving as an animal system of representation are what causes
each higher level of neurological organization. And these functional
explanations of the levels of neurological organization include
functional explanations of various nervous structures in the brain,
such as the <i>behavior generator</i>, the <i>local image</i>, the
<i>object image</i>, and the like. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">These
functionally described states are not quite what cognitive psychology
is looking for. In the first place, they are tied certain
neurophysiological structures in the brain, and thus, internal states
are no explained exclusively in terms of their causal connections to
(sensory) input and (behavioral) output. Secondly, the functions that
are ascribed to internal states are not merely that of representing
aspects of the world, but as representing objects, representing them
as being located in space, as having geometrical structures, as being
efficient causes, and even as having reasons. And the functions of
such states depend on them being parts of a faculty of imagination. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This
departure from received functionalism in psychology solves the
problems that have been encountered, and by considering them more
closely, those who are interested can see how. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif">Intentionality.
</font>The philosophical problems about the nature of mind arise from
certain aspects that seem to be incapable of explanation by the basic
laws of physics. One of those problems is consciousness, or the
subjective aspect of experience, such as the phenomena appearance of
the natural world in perception. The foundations for the ontological
explanation of consciousness were discovered in Properties, and the
way in which it explains the unity of mind, or the fact that many
qualia appear to the subject at the same time, was explained as part
of the discussion of the mammalian brain (Stage 6). The other main
problem, which will be discussed here, has to do with intentionality.<sup>
<a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote1anc" href="#sdendnote1sym"><sup>i</sup></a></sup></font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
problem about <i>intentionality</i> is how there can be psychological
states that are <i>about</i> the world. We know there are
psychological states about the world, because they are what we use to
give rational explanations of behavior (and beliefs) of rational
subjects (and other subjective animals). Though the mind obviously
depends in some way on the nature of the brain, it does not seem that
that the <i>aboutness</i> of psychological states can be explained by
the basic laws of physics. Functionalists believe, however, that they
can be explained as functional states. No one denies that it is
plausible to suppose that the intentionality of psychological states
involves a system of representation built into the brain. But how can
states of the brain be representations? How can they be about the
world?</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Intentionality
cannot be explained as something we <i>read into</i> the phenomena,
as if it were just a useful way of describing or summing up what
happens in nature.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote2anc" href="#sdendnote2sym"><sup>ii</sup></a></sup>
That would be to deny the reality of the phenomenon, at least as part
of the natural world. And it is hard to see how even that is possible
without contradicting oneself, because no one who holds that we are
reading things into nature (or describing them in certain ways) can
deny there are intentional states in the world. Those very
interpretations are <i>about </i>objects in the natural world. The
only way to avoid self-contradiction, therefore, is to hold that
ones own mental states are not part of the natural world, and that
is, ontologically speaking, a form of mind-body dualism. It implies
that there are two basically different kinds of substances in the
world: natural entities without real intentional states, and beings
like us, who must have them, since we do refer to other objects and
ascribe intentional states to them. This is a disastrous kind of
dualism, for there is no way to explain how substances whose natures
differ as mind and body are related to one another as a single world.
And even if there were, it would be to give up naturalism and, thus,
ontological philosophy.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote3anc" href="#sdendnote3sym"><sup>iii</sup></a></sup></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Though
it is generally agreed among naturalists that intentionality is to be
explained functionally, there is little agreement about what such a
functional explanation would involve. There are two main schools of
thought about the nature of &quot;functionalist theories&quot; of
psychological states, and both would explain intentionality in terms
of representations in the brain. One theory holds that the most
science can do is give functional <i>descriptions</i> of the brain.
The other holds that natural science can give functional <i>explanations
</i>of the brain, although it is based on an analysis of functional
explanations (the etiological theory) that precludes their reduction
to the ontology of naturalism. A brief account of these theories will
provide a sense of the obstacles that intentionality poses for a
naturalistic metaphysics. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><b>Intentional
states as functional states. </b>The still dominant view of
psychological states is called &quot;functionalism,” a philosophy
of psychology inspired by the analogy between minds and computers a
quarter century ago.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote4anc" href="#sdendnote4sym"><sup>iv</sup></a></sup>
The idea is that psychological states can be understood as internal
states in a complex system whose kinds can be distinguished in terms
of the causal roles those states play in mediating between input and
output, much as internal states of computers explain its output in
response to certain kinds of input because of how internal states are
related by the program. Thus, the goal of psychology is supposed to
be giving a functional description of the mind/brain, much as one
would a computer, that is, by describing a system of interconnected
internal states that tells how all possible inputs would affect
output. Two points about functionalism of this kind should be
noticed, </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">First,
it denies the possibility of reducing functional systems to the kinds
of physical processes that realize them. According to the
deductive-nomological model of explanation, the reduction of one
theory to another depends on establishing a necessary connection
between the terms used by one theory and the terms used by the other,
and functionalists deny that there is any such type-type identity
between functional states and their physical realizations in the
brain.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote5anc" href="#sdendnote5sym"><sup>v</sup></a></sup>
That is, the functional properties of a system are thought to
&quot;supervene&quot; on its physical properties. One of the deepest
convictions functionalists have is that, just as physically different
kind of computers can perform the same computations, so physically
different kinds of brains or brain states can realize the same
psychological states. Functionalists are quick to point out that they
are not denying materialism (or physicalism). They need not believe
in the existence of anything but entities of the kind mentioned by
the basic laws of physics. They admit that functionally defined
states <i>are </i>identical to the physically defined states that
realize them in each specific case. The agree that if a physical
system of some kind realizes a functional system, then another
physical system of the same (relevant) kind must also realize it. But
they believe that there is only a token-token identity between
functional and physical properties. They deny there is any necessary
connections between the types of these tokens, because they believe
that indefinitely many different kinds of physical systems can
realize a functional system. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Second,
the very form of functionalist psychology precludes any explanation
of intentional states in terms of representations of the world.
Psychological states are ordinarily classified not only by the
propositional attitudes involved (that is, depending on whether they
function as beliefs, desires, intentions or the like), but also
according to content (or what they are about, beliefs <i>about water</i>,
say, being different from beliefs <i>about alcohol</i>). Though the
former kinds are plausibly explained by their casual role in
mediating between input and output, the latter cannot be, for any
correspondence to objects/states in the world would lie outside the
functional system. The only way of distinguishing psychological
states according to their content within the functional system is by
differences in the representations themselves, that is, by the
so-called formal aspects of the states (which are analogous to
syntax, as opposed to semantics, in linguistic analysis). They have,
in the jargon of this field, &quot;narrow content,” but not &quot;wide
content.” They cannot have a content that depends on a relationship
to objects/states in the rest of the world, because the only
relationship of the system's internal states to the rest of the world
is by way of its input and output, and functional theories abstract
from how input and output connect to the rest of the world. Thus,
since functionalist theory cannot connect the mind with real
objects/states in the world, it cannot explain the intentionality of
psychological states — that is, explain <i>how </i>and <i>why </i>they
are <i>about </i>the world. It cannot, for example, say which beliefs
are true. It cannot even explain what makes true beliefs true.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
leading proponent of functionalism, Jerry Fodor, argues that these
two points are connected. He argues that psychology cannot explain
psychological states by how physical states correspond to
objects/states in the rest of the world, because functionally
described states supervene on physically described states and the
physical states on which they supervene are <i>in </i>the brain. This
doctrine he calls &quot;individualism.”<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote6anc" href="#sdendnote6sym"><sup>vi</sup></a></sup>
</font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Fodor
does not, of course, deny that the internal states of functional
systems do sometimes refer to objects/states in the world. But he
proposes to account for the &quot;wide-content&quot; of our ordinary
psychological explanations by supplementing his functionalist theory
of mind with a &quot;causal theory of reference.” The referents
would be picked out as certain more or less remote causes of input to
the functional system that are regularly related to the internal
states. That is supposed to account for the intentionality of
psychological states, but even Fodor recognizes that such a causal
theory of reference has trouble accounting for some kinds of
references.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote7anc" href="#sdendnote7sym"><sup>vii</sup></a></sup>
And there are more basic philosophical objections to such a theory,
which Fodor does not acknowledge.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote8anc" href="#sdendnote8sym"><sup>viii</sup></a></sup>
However, neither class of problems is relevant here. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">For
our purposes, the problem is that, if the intentional content of
psychological states can be explained only by <i>tacking </i>a causal
theory of reference <i>onto </i>a functionalist theory, then far from
explaining intentional states in terms of the ontology of naturalism,
functionalist psychology actually makes intentionality more puzzling.
Even if all the references we take psychological states to be making
did turn out to have causal relations to the world, it would show, at
most, that there is an objective regularity about our ascriptions of
references to psychological states. But it would not explain why
psychological states are about the world. need to tack a causal
theory of reference onto a functionalist theory of mind would still
suggest that the intentionality of psychological states is something
accidental. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">What
Fodors functionalism is leaving out can be seen with the help of
our ontological explanation of the function of the animal behavior
guidance system. Because animals acquire their free energy by
ingesting other objects in space, they need, in addition to their
biological behavior guidance system, a system to guide behavior that
acts on other objects in space. Thus, animal behavior is different
from biological behavior, because it must direct behavior at other
objects in space, rather than just at the world as a whole (or merely
oriented in a gravitational or electromagnetic field). Thus, what
makes animal behavior guidance systems more powerful is the evolution
of a subsystem, the animal system of representation, which uses an
interaction between sensory input and behavioral output to represent
the objects toward which its behavior is directed. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Behavior
is generated by the structure of the organism as an irreversible
structural global regularity, but as animal behavior, it can make
events occur regularly in its territory that are otherwise quite
improbable only by acting other objects in the region. That is, what
coincides with the geometrical structures of regions
thermo&shy;dynamics flow of matter toward evenly distributed heat to
do work is not an unchanging material structure, like a region-wide
machine, but rather animal behavior, that is, behavior in which,
typically, the animal moves around in the region and acts on other
objects (as in chasing prey and ingesting them). But that requires
animal behavior to be guided in relation to objects in space, and
thus, a system evolves in the animal behavior guidance system to
represent the object, or what we have called the animal system of
representation. The animal stages of evolution are all increases in
animal power that comes from the animal system of representation
representing the nature of the world in which its behavior must act
more completely. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
animal system of representation evolves first in telesensory animals.
(The somatosensory animal has only an implicit representation of the
object, because it uses the location of the sensory input in the body
to locate the object for purposes of directing behavior at it, for
example, as the hydras tentacles sting prey that touch it and
contract to draw the prey into its gastrovascular cavity.)
Embryological development constructs a nervous system in telesensory
animals that uses the regular changes in sensory input as a function
of behavioral output to represent the object in such a way that it
can guide locomotion in relation to the object. The function of this
brain structure depends on how the animal interact with other objects
in space, and that is the basis of the relationship of representation
between the states of the animal system of representation and the
objects in space. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Functionalism
abstracts from this functional explanation. To insist that such
internal states be defined strictly in terms of the internal causal
relations by which they mediate between sensory input and behavioral
output is to cut off from consideration all the structural effects
outside the body that are involved in doing the non-reproductive work
of controlling relevant conditions. The culprit here is the computer
analogy, and there are two ways in which it cuts psychological states
off from any deeper explanation. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">First,
on the computer model, the only context that is relevant in a
functional system is the input to the system and its output, and
thus, functionalism abstracts from the part of the structural effects
outside the organism. That cuts the animal behavior guidance system
off from any coincidence with the thermo&shy;dynamic flow outside the
organism, including any relevant conditions the behavior it is
generating might be controlling.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote9anc" href="#sdendnote9sym"><sup>ix</sup></a></sup>
</font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Second,
on the computer model, the internal states of a functional system are
defined only in terms of the causal relations among them that are
responsible for mediating between input and output, and thus,
functionalism also abstracts from the structural global regularities
that occur within the animal behavior guidance system. When
functionalists abstract from the &quot;physical realization&quot; of
the functional system, they are abstracting from the material
structures that channel the flow of free energy in the animal
behavior guidance system. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This
abstraction is necessary, functionalists would insist, because there
are different kinds of structural causes that could generate the same
kind of structured thermodynamic order. That may be true of
computers, but it is not true of biological mechanisms, because in
products of reproductive causation, there is a necessary connection
between functions and traits. The kind of structural effects that
serve any function are determined by that function, because they are
the most powerful way of controlling that relevant condition that is
possible for organisms of their kind when they evolved. That
necessary connection makes a type-type reduction to naturalist
ontology possible. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Both
kinds of abstraction are appropriate for computers, because their
input and output is strictly linguistic (or digital), and many
different machines can be built that manipulate the syntax of
linguistic or mathematical representations. But animal behavior
guidance systems are structural causes that have evolved by
reproductive causation to guide behavior in a world of objects in
space, not just syntax manipulators designed by human ingenuity to
work in a linguistic environment. Given our definition of
&quot;functions,” therefore, neither kind of abstraction —
neither from the objects in space outside the brain nor from the
physical nature of the brain itself — is appropriate. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><b>Functional
explanations of intentional states.</b> This brings us to the other
received theory of the intentional content of psychological states,
the one that would <i>explain </i>representations by their function,
rather than just describe them by their causal roles as internal
states in a functionalist system. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ruth
Millikan (1989, p 282) rightly challenges Fodor's assumption that the
status of an inner state &quot;<i>as</i> a representation is
determined by the functional organization of the part of the system
that uses it,” pointing out that there is no such a thing &quot;as
behaving as a representation without behaving like a representation
of anything in particular.” The relationship to objects/states in
the world is essential, she insists, to any explanation of
intentional states in terms of representations. She is also correct
to insist that such a system can be <i>explained </i>functionally,
and not merely <i>described </i>functionally. But her theory fails to
reduce psychological states to naturalist ontology, because she
accepts a theory of functional explanations, the &quot;etiological
theory,” that takes accidentalism for granted. And as a result, she
overlooks an essential ingredient in any adequate explanation of the
nature of psychological states.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Let
us call Millikan's kind of explanation the &quot;teleological theory&quot;
of representations. It holds that what makes an inner state a
representation is that its function is to represent.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote10anc" href="#sdendnote10sym"><sup>x</sup></a></sup>
According to the etiological analysis, representations are states of
an organism that correspond to certain objects/states of the world
and that were selected to be parts of the organism <i>because they
correspond </i>to those objects/states in the world. That makes the
correspondence part of the explanation of the intentional state
something more than what happens to be true of it or what we read
into it, because the state's correspondence to the world is
responsible for the organism having been able to do something that
was (and perhaps still is) required for its success in reproduction. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
are, for example, bacteria that use tiny magnets (magnetosomes) to
guide their locomotion. What they represent is not, however, the
direction of magnetic north, which causes their orientation, but
rather the direction of oxygen-free water, because magnetosomes were
selected for their correspondence to oxygen-poor water. That
correspondence causes their reproductive success by enabling them to
avoid the toxic, oxygen-rich water near the surface, and thus, the
magnetosomes have the function of representing oxygen free water.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote11anc" href="#sdendnote11sym"><sup>xi</sup></a></sup></font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
teleological theory of psychological states is closer than Fodor's
functionalism to the explanation entailed by this ontological
explanation of the course of evolution, because instead of tacking a
causal theory of reference onto a functional system, it gives a
functional explanation of the correspondence between inner
representations and objects/states in the world. But the teleological
theory of representations nevertheless agrees, in effect, with the
other abstraction involved in functionalism, for it still assumes
that there is no necessary connection between intentional states and
the physical states that realize them. The accidentalist assumptions
of the contemporary Darwinist explanation of about the course of
evolution lead to the etiological analysis of functional
explanations, and since that precludes explaining course of evolution
by the functions that are possible, it does not seem possible to
explaining psychological states ontologically. Both assumptions of
accidentalism are relevant. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">First,
though inner states of an animal may have the function of
representing something, what they represent is contingent. Since
natural selection is imposed by changes in the environment, what
inner states correspond to depends on environmental changes or
conditions that could be different. There may be a historical
explanation of the natural selection of intentional states, but since
what is represented is contingent, no ontological reduction of
psychological states is possible. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Furthermore,
even if the selection pressure responsible for psychological states
were given and the nature of the correspondence were determined,
psychological states would still not be reducible to the ontology of
naturalism, because the etiological theory has nothing to say about
the mechanisms that would serve that function. The kinds of inner
states and how they are made to have the required correspondence
would depend on which random variations happened to be available at
the time the selection pressure was imposed. Thus, the teleological
theory of representations does not offer an account of intentionality
that reduces psychological states to the ontology of naturalism. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
examples used to illustrate states with representational functions,
such as the magnetosomes in bacteria mentioned above, seem to confirm
accidentalism. Though they might guide some bacteria to oxygen free
water, they might guide other animals in seasonal migrations. But
such examples are misleading, because they implicitly assume that the
representational functions of inner states are tied directly to the
control of rather specific conditions. And this may be true in
somatosensory animals and simpler animals, since they do not have
animal systems of representation. And since the accidentalists
assumptions of contemporary Darwinism keep teleological theorists
from trying to trace the course of evolution, they do not notice that
the evolution of greater power in higher animals comes from serving a
more universal function in behavior guidance, namely, the
representation of objects for the purpose of adapting behavior to the
spatial aspects of the world. That is, they overlook the
inevitability of the evolution of the animal system of representation
in multicellular animals.<sup> <a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote12anc" href="#sdendnote12sym"><sup>xii</sup></a></sup>
</font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
animal system of representation has a necessary neurological
structure in telesensory animals because of how behavioral output
must be combined with sensory input to locate objects in space for
purposes of guiding behavior. There are, of course, different ways of
serving this function, as we have seen, with the greatest differences
arising from the fundamental difference between proterostome and
deuterostome embryological development. But the inevitability of the
neurological structure of the system for representing the objects of
animal behavior at later stages of evolution, because they use higher
levels of neurological organization to represent additional aspects
of the spatial structure of the world. Spatio-temporal and
structuro-temporal imagination give the animal subject internal
states that correspond to the world in a way that does not depend on
the selection pressure that happen to have been imposed on the
animal. It evolves because evolution is progressive. In order for
animal to have more power to control relevant conditions, their
behavior guidance systems must have animal systems of representation
that represent objects as being located in space and as having
geometrical structures. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">These
forms of imagination in animals are the foundation, as we have seen,
for the evolution of naturalistic and subjectivistic imagination in
primates with the use of language. But those forms of imagination are
also inevitable, and they involve a correspondence between brain
states and the states in the world, including other subjects, that is
also necessary. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
solves a problem that functionalist explanations encounter when they
try to explain correspondence with nothing but causal connections
between input and output within the organism. The correspondence is
not just a constant conjunction between telesensory input and the
object in space that is involved in reference, as Fodor seems to mean
by calling it a casual connection, but an isomorphism between
geometrical structures in the brain and the geometrical structures of
the locations of objects in the space around the telesensory animal. </font></font></font>
</p>
<div id="sdendnote1">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote1sym" href="#sdendnote1anc">i</a>
Franz Brentano originally proposed intentionality as the distinctive
mark of the mental. He focused on what he called &quot;intentional
inexistence&quot;, by which he meant that a mental state could be
about something even if that something did not really exist. That
rules out explaining the content of a mental state as an actual
relationship to what it is about, but the content can be explained
by a theory that holds that particular representations are part of a
system. (Brentano did <i>not </i>require that <i>all </i>psychological
states are about things that do not exist). If there is a systematic
or normal relationship between representations of all types and
kinds of objects/states in the world, then tokens of those types can
stand for objects or states that do not exist.
</p>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote2">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote2sym" href="#sdendnote2anc">ii</a>
This is the position long defended by D. C. Dennett (1971, reprinted
in 1978). Not only does he take psychological states to be something
that we ascribe to objects from the &quot;intentional stance&quot;,
but he also takes functions to be something we ascribe from the
&quot;design stance&quot; and mechanisms to be something that we
ascribe from the &quot;physical stance&quot;. Dennett can be happy
with such a position, because he is still basically an
subjectivistic epistemologist, who is content to explain nature in
terms of our ways of knowing about it, rather than ontologically.
</p>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote3">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote3sym" href="#sdendnote3anc">iii</a>
It does not help to say that there are no intentional psychological
states, only words and sentences that refer to the natural world,
because the same problem then arises about language. See the
discussion of the problems of cotemporary analytic philosophy in
Stage 10 on philosophical spiritual animals.
</p>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote4">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote4sym" href="#sdendnote4anc">iv</a>
See Putnam's (1975) 1960's papers on psychology and Fodor (1975).</p>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote5">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote5sym" href="#sdendnote5anc">v</a>
Fodor (1975) was among the first to distinguish token-token
reductions from type-type reductions.
</p>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote6">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote6sym" href="#sdendnote6anc">vi</a>
See &quot;Individualism and Supervenience&quot; in Fodor (1988) and
Fodor (1991).
</p>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote7">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote7sym" href="#sdendnote7anc">vii</a>
Such a causal theory of reference is defended in Fodor 1988, Chapter
4.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote8">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote8sym" href="#sdendnote8anc">viii</a>
For example, Putnam points out in &quot;Why There Isn't a Ready-Made
World&quot; (1983, pp. 205-228) and (1981) that the kind of causal
relation Fodor uses to explain references to objects/states cannot
be explained by internal realism in terms of materialism. See the
discussion of contemporary analytic philosophy in Stage 10.
</p>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote9">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote9sym" href="#sdendnote9anc">ix</a>
Fodor dismisses the possibility &quot;that brain states should be
relationally individuated&quot; as &quot;plain silly.&quot;</p>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote10">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote10sym" href="#sdendnote10anc">x</a>
Millikan (1989, p. 283) holds that what is required to &quot;fly a
naturalist theory of content&quot; is an &quot;appeal to teleology&quot;
in which &quot;what makes a thing into an inner representation is,
near enough, that its function is to represent&quot;. Millikan uses
an etiological analysis of functional explanations, and I have
simplified her analysis somewhat, because we are interested only in
representations that were naturally selected in the course of
evolution. We will take up language in the next part. Van Gulick
(1980) is an earlier attempt to formulate a teleological theory of
representation.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote11">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote11sym" href="#sdendnote11anc">xi</a>
Millikan (1989, pp. 290-91) uses this example from Dretske (1990) to
illustrate her theory.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote12">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote12sym" href="#sdendnote12anc">xii</a>
In arguing against the causal theory of reference, Matthen (1988)
uses, in effect, the input function of a behavior guidance system to
illustrate functional explanations of the correspondence to external
conditions, but he focuses on representations of color rather than
the representations of objects in space on which such perception
depends.</p>
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