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<font color="#000000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><font size="4" style="font-size: 16pt"><b>What
Ought To Be</b></font></font></font></p>
<img src="" name="OdaWOught_up" align="left" hspace="5" width="82" height="30" border="0"><br clear="left">
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
implications of spatiomaterialism are ontologically necessary truths,
but there are two kinds of necessary truths. They are all
ontologically necessary <i>for reason</i>, because ontological
philosophy is an <i>argument </i>about the world directed toward
rational beings. But in addition to its theoretical function, reason
has a practical function, and since its practical function cannot be
entirely reduced to its theoretical function, there are necessary
truths about what ought to be, as far as reason is concerned, that
are not just truths about what is. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ontological
philosophy is a two step argument. First, it argues that
spatiomaterialism is the best ontological explanation of the world,
and then it uses spatiomaterialism to show what must be true in a
spatiomaterial world. Such implications are ontologically necessary,
but many are conditional, because they also depend on space and
matter having the more specific essential natures that makes the
basic laws of physics true and that give the universe a large scale
structure of the kind it actually has. Conditionally necessary truths
hold only in spatiomaterial worlds <i>like ours</i>. There are, as we
have seen, many such truths about what is, most relevantly at this
point, including all those about progressive evolution. On suitable
planets, there is an evolutionary change that proceeds through a
series of stage in the direction of natural perfection, with each
stage being a gradual change in the direction of the natural
perfection of organisms (or primary structures) of its kind. And
since it is a (conditionally) necessary truth, evolution would unfold
in basically the same way in any spatiomaterial world like ours.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Reason
itself is, however, something that comes to exist in that grand
process. A series of inevitable stages of biological evolution (by
natural selection) leads to rational beings, and since spiritual
animals contain within themselves cultural evolution (by rational
selection), which eventually includes progress in natural science
(sponsored, in part, by economic evolution through capitalist
selection), reason eventually comes to understand how the world is
whole. That is, as we have seen, what ontological philosophy
contributes to cultural evolution at the philosophical stage in the
wake of the failure of epistemological philosophy. Ontological
philosophy is an argument about the wholeness of the world that is
made to beings that exist necessarily in that world. Thus, rational
beings eventually come to recognize their own nature and their place
in the world, and since that self-understanding is itself part of the
wholeness of the world, it plays a role in what happens in the world.
“Ontological reason,” as I will call it, has work to do. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">What
reason comes to know about its nature, with the evolution of
ontological philosophy, includes recognizing its own function as a
behavior guidance system. Guiding behavior is the basic function of
what evolves at every stage of biological evolution, and reason
guides the behavior not only of individual subjects, but also of
spiritual animals, the social level animals of which rational
subjects are the parts. Its function as a behavior guidance system
explains, as have seen, the difference between theoretical and
practical reason. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Practical
reason is as basic as theoretical reason. Indeed, the original
function of arguments about the true is to enable reason to discover
the good. Reason would not have evolved by natural selection if the
cultural evolution of theoretical arguments by rational selection did
not make it possible for reason to discover what is good for rational
beings (that is, what contributes to their maximum holistic power, or
natural perfection). Thus, in addition to its theoretical role,
reason has a practical employment. Reason is something that acts in
the world. That is why there is a difference between conclusions
about what is and what ought to be among the necessary truths proved
by ontological philosophy. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">With
the evolution of ontological philosophy, therefore, reason
understands its own nature as a behavior guidance system that evolves
by reproductive causation, and it recognizes its place in the world.
The function of reason is to guide the behavior of the most powerful
organisms that come to exist in evolution, and so ontological reason
comes to recognize itself as the most powerful being in the world.
This self-understanding might even be called the <i>outcome </i>of
evolution in a spatiomaterial world like ours, at least, so far,
since it happens at the end of a series of inevitable evolutionary
stages. But the advent of ontological philosophy is not the end of
evolution. Its explanation of the wholeness of the world is merely
the point at which reason discovers its own real nature and begins to
assume its full power. And since reason has a practical, as well as a
theoretical, function, it can be described as the point at which
ontological reason (still evolving by rational selection) takes over
from biological evolution and controls the course evolution. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, the
wholeness of the world is not merely that everything in the world and
everything about the world is constituted by space and matter. Nor is
it merely that its essential nature entails that a part of any
spatiomaterial world like ours inevitably comes to understand its
wholeness. It also includes how that understanding of its wholeness
leads reason to act in a way that ultimately <i>makes </i>the world
more &quot;whole.&quot; That is the <i>work </i>of ontological
reason.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Predicting
the future of evolution.</i> It might seem that what ontological
reason does in the world ought to be counted among the necessary
truths about what is, because cultural evolution, including its
evolution, is a global regularity like the rest of evolution and,
thus, can be predicted. As a behavior guidance system, reason pursues
the good, and since goodness is contributing to natural perfection,
what is good is a fact about the world. Thus, what reason does in the
world can be predicted. That means that it is one of the necessary
truths about <i>what is </i>in the world that reason discovers, which
suggests that there is no need to distinguish from <i>what is</i> a
set of necessary truths about <i>what ought to be</i>. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In a sense,
it is true that what ontological reason does can be predicted, for it
is inevitable. But it is not merely an ontologically necessary truth
about what is in a spatiomaterial world like ours, because unlike
earlier stages of evolution, what happens depends on ontologically
necessary truths about what ought to be. That is, what makes those
predictions about the future after the advent of ontological reason
turn out to be true is that rational being do what is good, and so
the only way to predict what will happen is to work out what
ontological reason discovers about what ought to exist. That is not
something that can be predicted by knowing what is good for rational
beings in the sense of contributing to their natural perfection as
rational beings. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">After
recapping the ontological explanation of the nature of goodness and
considering more carefully why it seems that practical reason can be
reduced to theoretical reason, I will explain why necessary truths
about <i>what ought to be </i>are not entirely reducible to necessary
truths about <i>what is. </i>Then I will take up the implications of
spatiomaterialism about the goals that reason ought to pursue (in its
individual self interest, its spiritual self interest, and its
religious self interest). </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>Goodness.</b></i>
The nature of goodness is explained, as we have seen, by the
progressiveness of evolution by reproductive causation. Not only does
evolution have an inevitable beginning in a spatiomaterial world like
ours, but it also involves change in the direction of natural
perfection. And natural perfection has a structure that determines
what is good. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Natural
perfection.</i> Setting reason aside for the moment, reproductive
causation generates four different forms of natural perfection: the
natural perfection of the <i>organism</i>, of the <i>ecology</i>, of
<i>life </i>and of <i>change </i>itself. That is, they follow from
the two main reproductive global regularities, gradual and
revolutionary evolution.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Organism.</i>
At each stage of evolution, there are reproducing organisms (or
primary structures) that start off simple, uniform and weak, and
during the stage, they gradually become more complex, diverse and
powerful, until each kind of organism is as powerful at controlling
all the conditions that affect its reproduction as possible for
primary structures of its kind. Such maximum holistic power is the
natural perfection for organisms. It is an optimal part-whole
relation in which no possible change in the parts will make the whole
more powerful, though this maximum may be approached only
asymptotically. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Ecology.</i>
But since maximum holistic power for organisms (i.e., primary
structures) also involves their becoming more diverse, the direction
of gradual change is also toward maximum holistic power for the
ecology. It is a holistic power, because it is the power of all the
organisms in the region. But the appropriate measure of the power
that is maximized at the ecological level is different. As the
organisms all become naturally perfect, the right kinds and varieties
of organisms exist to consume as much of the available free energy to
fuel reproductive cycles as possible. Making maximum use of the
ultimate source of the power to do work in the region is the natural
perfection for the ecology. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Life.</i>
But one stage of evolution can make another stage inevitable. When
the organisms evolving at one stage have structures that can be
organized as the several parts of an organism on higher levels of
organization (that is, whose primary structures have higher levels of
part-whole complexity), and when that makes it possible for the whole
to control a range of relevant conditions that were previously out of
reach, such a radical random variation begins a new stage of gradual
evolution during which those organisms and the ecology they help make
up (along with organisms from previous stages) become naturally
perfect for their kinds. The succession of evolutionary stages uses
the part-whole relation in space to expand the power of organisms, as
primary structures generating reproductive cycles, to control what
happens in the world, step by step, increasing the level of
organization of the natural perfection involved. Hence, revolutionary
evolution is in the direction of the natural perfection of life
itself, or the very enterprise of controlling conditions in the
world. Reproductive causation makes the most of the spatial structure
of the world by using the part-whole relation in space to increase
the holistic power of organisms of all kinds to control what happens
in the world.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Change.</i>
Finally, since evolution is progressive, there is even a natural
perfection about the kind of change that is involved in evolution.
Since evolution is a global regularity caused by how reproductive
cycles add up in space <i>as time passes</i>, each moment during each
stage of gradual evolution makes a necessary contribution to the
increasing power of the organisms and the ecology at that stage. And
since evolutionary stages are caused by levels of part-whole
complexity in evolving structures, each stage makes an necessary
contribution to the increasing power of life. Thus, by using each
moment in the existence of the substances involved to increase the
power of material structures to do work, reproductive causation gives
change itself a kind of natural perfection. It makes the most out of
the temporal nature of the world by using the succession of moments
in which substances exist to increase the power of organisms to
control what happens in the world. No moment is redundant or
superfluous.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>The
nature of goodness.</i> Natural perfection is an explanation of the
nature of goodness, because natural perfection is an optimal
part-whole relation. Though the part-whole relation is somewhat
different in each form of natural perfection, in each case, parts of
certain kinds are combined in certain ways and numbers to make the
most out of the least. &quot;The most&quot; always has to do with the
power of the whole to use free energy to control what happens in the
world, and &quot;the least&quot; has to do with the number and
simplicity of the parts. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Natural
perfection is a property of the whole, and the corresponding property
of the parts of such wholeness is goodness. Goodness is the property
of contributing to the natural perfection of the whole of which it is
part. But since there are different forms of natural perfection,
there are different ways that that things can be good.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Organism.</i>
In the case of the organism, the parts are the structural causes that
are bundled together to go through reproductive cycles as a whole,
and things are good for the organism when they are involved in
generating the non-reproductive structural effects that help give it
the maximum power to control the conditions that affect its
reproduction. Thus, certain kinds of traits are good for the organism
because of their functions, that is, because of which relevant
conditions they control. And certain kinds of behavior are good for
the organism because of its goals, including, in the case of animals,
animal behavior, whose goals involve behavior directed at other
objects in space in order to control relevant conditions. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Ecology.</i>
In the case of the ecology, the parts are the organisms in the
region, and things are good for the ecology when they help the
organisms jointly consume as much as possible of the free energy
available in the region as fuel for reproductive cycles. Each kind of
organisms is good for the ecology because of the form of free energy
it taps or the way in which it does so. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Life.</i>
In the case of life, the parts are the successive levels of
part-whole complexity in the reproducing organisms that evolve at
each stage of evolution, and things are good for life itself because
they are involved in the evolution of another level of organization
that helps life control as much as possible what happens in the
world. Thus, certain levels of biological, neurological and forensic
organization in evolving structures are good for life because each is
necessary for life to evolve another range of powers and, thus, step
by step, as much power to control conditions affecting reproduction
as possible for living organisms. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Change.</i>
In the case of change itself, the parts are particular stages in the
overall course of evolution and particular moments during each stage,
and things are good for change itself when events unfold in a way
that helps bring about the natural perfection organisms, ecology and
life. Thus, even such events as organisms failing to reproduce
because of scarcity and species becoming extinct because other
species displace them from their ecological niche are good because
that is how reproductive causation makes evolution progressive. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>The
unity of goodness. </i>Though things are good in various ways,
ultimately, they are all good in the same way, because there is a
necessary overall structure to the various kinds of natural
perfection to which they all contribute. Naturally perfect organisms
are essential parts of naturally perfect ecologies, and stages of
gradual evolution in the direction of such natural perfection are
essential to the overall evolutionary change in the direction of the
natural perfection of life. And all the events that occur in the
course of evolution are essential to the natural perfection of
change, since that is what makes evolution progressive. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is true
that what is good for one organism might be bad for another. The
predator <i>is </i>bad for the prey. But since the natural perfection
to which they both contribute is a single spatiotemporal whole with
an overall structure, there is no ultimate conflict about whether
something is good or bad. Everything good is good because it
contributes to some form of natural perfection that is part of that
overall structure. Thus, what is bad for the prey is good not only
for the predator, but also for the ecology, and it is by contributing
to the natural perfection of the ecology that the prey is good (and
that what contributes to the natural perfection of the prey is good).
There is no context in which contributing to natural perfection, or
natural perfection itself, could turn out to be bad.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>The
apparent reducibility of practical to theoretical reason.</b></i>
Since what is good is a fact about the world, or an aspect of what
is, it is something that theoretical reason knows at the ontological
philosophical stage, for that includes knowledge of the nature of
goodness. And since reason gives rational beings the autonomy to do
the good because they believe that it is good, it should be possible
to predict what ontological reason will ultimately do in the world. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">To
know the course of evolution, it is not necessary to know all the
details about how it will happen, because it is a global regularity
about what happens in whole regions of space. This holds for cultural
evolution by rational selection as well. It is possible to know how
culture will evolve without predicting all the details. That is,
after all, how we know that the evolution of ontological philosophy
is inevitable. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Even before
reason discovers the nature of goodness, it is sometimes able to tell
what is good, because rational imagination enables rational subjects
to discern what is naturally perfect. Reason can see the uniqueness
of the naturally perfect, because it stands out against the
background of what all is possible. Thus, reason can tell, in
principle, what is good for any organism, for the ecology, and for
life itself. Even in the case of individual subjects and spiritual
animals, where inherited desires have the function of picking out
goals to be pursued, reason judges which actions are good by their
contribution to the natural perfection of the whole of which they are
part. Thus, it is possible to predict what reason will wind up
believing and doing. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, when
reason discovers how the world is whole and comes to understand its
own nature and its own place in evolution, it will use its
understanding of the nature of goodness to sharpen its perception of
what is naturally perfect and, thereby, discover more accurately and
completely what is good. Though it will still be a result of cultural
evolution by rational selection, rational subjects will be better
able to judge which arguments make their world view more coherent,
because they will understand how everything in the world fits
together as a whole and that will constrain their views on particular
normative issues in ways that previously seemed impossible. The
completeness of their understanding of the nature of the world is
what enables reason to see which truths are necessary, including
necessary truths about what is good. And since reason will recognize
itself as having, in its practical employment as behavior guidance
system, the function of doing what is good for rational beings, it
will do whatever it discovers to be good for itself. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Thus,
it seems that there is no basic difference between the implications
of spatiomaterialism about <i>what exists</i> and <i>what ought to
exist</i>. What ontological reason will do in the world is
inevitable, like any stage of evolution, and thus, it is something
that can be known by theoretical reason alone. Since practical reason
does not play an essential role in explaining what reason ought to
do, necessary truths about <i>what ought to be </i>can be reduced to
necessary truths about <i>what is</i>. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>The
irreducibility of practical reason.</b></i> Contrary to this
impression, however, the necessary truths of practical reason about
what ought to be cannot be eliminated in favor of necessary truths of
theoretical reason about what is. There are two reasons, one
superficial and the other more profound. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">First,
some of the goals that reason will pursue are optional. Reason gives
subjects the capacity to do what is good because it is good, that is,
simply because they believe that it is good, and as we have seen,
that means that rational subjects can pursue goals in addition to
those that control relevant conditions (that is, in addition to
conditions that affect their own reproduction). These “optional
goals” must already be good (by contributing to natural or
artificial perfection in some way), but there is such a wide range of
goals to choose from that it is not possible to predict which ones
will be chosen. And since choosing them is what makes them <i>good
for the rational subject</i>, it is not possible to predict all of
the goals that rational beings will pursue. It is also possible for
spiritual animals to pursue optional goals. Thus, the future course
of evolution is, in principle, not predictable. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Optional
goals for rational beings are like aspects of biological evolution
that are contingent. It is not possible to predict contingent aspects
of evolution, because they are not essential to the global regularity
caused ontologically by reproductive cycles and space. Indeed, it is
not always easy to see, even in retrospect, what is inevitable about
the course of biological evolution and what is not. Since optional
goals are contingent, what reason does in pursuit of them is not
predicable. Thus, if optional goals are as big a part of what
ontological reason does as its power would suggest, much of the
future course of evolution is not predictable, at least not on
ontological grounds.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The pursuit
of optional goals means that what reason does in the world is more
like the creation of something beautiful, like a work of art, rather
than something it discovers, like a truth about the world. There will
be a perfection about it, but since it is an expression of a unique
form of life, it will be a unique form of beauty. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Though
ontological philosophy includes everything that reason can know about
the nature of the world, the future course of evolution will depend
on the optional goals it chooses to pursue, and thus, reason stands
to its work in the world like each rational subject stands to his or
her own Self. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Insofar as
the future course of evolution is not predictable, it cannot be among
the necessary truths of ontological philosophy about what is, and
thus, practical reason cannot be reduced to theoretical reason. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Second,
there is a more profound reason why practical reason cannot be
reduced to theoretical reason. That is because reasoning about what
ought to be may make the pursuit of certain goals inevitable for
ontological reason, even though they cannot be predicted from what is
good for reason as a behavior guidance system for individuals and
spiritual animals. Doing what is good for the world as a whole is
such a goal, and it may be a necessary truth about <i>what is </i>in
a spatiomaterial world like ours that they are pursued. But it is an
ontologically necessary truth about <i>what is </i>that can be known
only by reasoning about <i>what rational beings ought to do</i>.
Thus, we cannot know whether there are any such goals without
following out all the practical implications of our ontological
foundation. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Goals that
would be of this kind are ordinarily called “religious,” because
they come from the recognition that there is something that is worthy
of worship. Such a religious interest may not be reducible to the
individual or spiritual interest of rational beings, because it could
depend on recognizing the existence of God. And if God is not
necessarily a transcendent being, naturalism does not rule out the
possibility of God's existence.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Though
religious goals are pursued before the evolution of ontological
philosophy, that earlier pursuit of religious goals is among the
necessary truths of theoretical reason (about what is), because
religious goals (and the beliefs about God on which they are
predicated) can be predicted, as we have seen, by the function of
religion at the rational spiritual stage (that is, as the attempt to
provide an ultimate justification of the principles of practical
arguments, including morality and submission to the group, which are
part of rational culture). But that function does not require belief
in God after ontological philosophy evolves, because its ontology
entails, by way of the reproductive global regularities, an
explanation of the nature of goodness that explains why rational
subjects ought to be moral. Moral beliefs do not depend on God for
their justification.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Similarly,
at the philosophical spiritual stage, religious goals pursued as a
result of the belief in a transcendent God (as part of
epistemological philosophy) are necessary truths of theoretical
reason, because they are a predictable part of its attempt to
overcome the dichotomy between theoretical and practical reason. But
ontological philosophy explains the nature of reason in a way that
entails that dichotomy, and thus, it does not need God to overcome
the dichotomy of facts and values. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Neither
belief in God nor religious goals can be predicted by theoretical
reason alone after ontological philosophy evolves, because they do
not help maximize the power of reason to control <i>relevant
conditions</i>. But it is nonetheless possible that its pursuit of
religious goals is inevitable, because given what ontological reason
knows about the world, it may realize that there is something that is
worthy of worship and, thereby, know that it ought to pursue such
goals. If so, those goals would be good for reason, and the pursuit
of those goals would be the <i>work </i>of ontological reason in the
world. That is how the wholeness of the world may include how reason
<i>makes </i>the world more &quot;whole&quot;it would be otherwise. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Though this
conclusion of practical reason would depend on what ontological
philosophy implies about what is, it would be practical reason that
leads ontological reason to take up this work in the world. To show
the inevitability of the pursuit of religious goals, we would have to
follow practical reason to its conclusions, and so practical reason
could not be reduced to theoretical reason. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">That is the
sense in which reason is not merely the knower of what is, but also
an agent that helps determine the future course of evolution. What it
does would not be not determined in the way that everything is caused
prior to the evolution of ontological philosophy, but would be an act
of free will. And it would be a truly creative act. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The pursuit
of religious goals, if they are pursued by ontological reason, are
ontologically necessary in the end, and thus, they are indeed a
necessary aspect of a spatiomaterial world like ours. But the way
that ontological philosophy knows them is different from all the
other necessary truths, because this necessary truth cannot be known
without <i>using </i>practical reason at the ontological stage. But
once it is known by way of practical reasoning, it is also known by
theoretical reason. It is part of <i>what is </i>as well as <i>what
ought to be</i>. It is just that theoretical reason is essentially
reflective in the end, knowing about its own role as an agent in the
world. This is, as we shall see, God's knowledge of himself as a
person.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
order to discover whether reason has such a religious interest,
therefore, we shall consider all the goals that reason ought to
pursue in three steps, by considering the three practical interests
that reason has (or may have) because of the nature of the beings
that are rational. The first is the <i>individual interest</i>, which
reason has because of its responsibility for pursuing the good of the
individual as such. It is usually called “self interest.” The
second is the <i>spiritual interest</i>, which comes from reasons
responsibility for guiding the behavior of the spiritual animal. And
the third is the <i>religious interest,</i> because that is the
traditional name for the interest that reason has when it pursues in
the belief that there is something that is worthy of worship, that
is, something of such exalted glory that reason ought to revere it
and serve it, even beyond its own individual and spiritual interest. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">These
are interests that reason has in addition to its interest, as reason,
in knowing the good, the true and the beautiful. The latter are
<i>rational interests</i>, which contribute to the natural perfection
of culture as a result of cultural evolution by rational selection.
But the interests to be discussed here are <i>practical interests</i>,
because they have to do with how reason guides the behavior of the
beings whose behavior it controls. Which goals rational beings pursue
depends on what is good <i>for them</i>, and that makes it a matter
of practical reason. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ultimately,
they are all, of course, interests of the individual rational
subject, if they are interests at all, because the subject, as an
individual mind, is the ultimate agent of reason in its function of
guiding behavior. The individual is the being who must ultimately
judge what is good, true, and beautiful and, indeed, who must
ultimately do what is good. Thus, they are all forms of <i>&quot;self
interest</i>,&quot; where the Self is understood as the four
dimensional object that one constructs by how one leads ones life,
for they are interests that rational subjects must pursue as part of
such a life. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">With
the evolution of ontological philosophy, therefore, reason recognizes
itself as the inevitable outcome of evolutionary change in a
spatiomaterial world like ours. Ontological reason recognizes itself
as the most powerful being in the world. And reason recognizes itself
as having the function of doing what is good for rational beings.
Thus, the main question for practical reason is, “What are those
goals?” It can be answered by determining what contributes to the
natural perfection of rational beings. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0; page-break-before: always">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">B<img src="" name="OdlS_1" align="right" hspace="5" width="151" height="52" border="0">y
“self interest” I mean, in this case, “individual self
interest,” or the interest that the rational subject has as an
individual. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">Since
in our terms, the “Self” refers to the life of the rational
subject, all the practical interests of the rational subject can be
can be called forms of self interest. Thus, given that the rational
subject also has a spiritual and religious interest, their
corresponding names would be her “spiritual self interest” and
her “religious self interest,” respectively. (See discussion of
these forms of self interest in </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCbGeRRS09Si.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
Dichotomies of rational level culture</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.)</span></font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Individual
self interest includes, as we have seen, two kinds of goals,
necessary goals and optional goals. The necessary goals are the goals
that are good for the individual because they control conditions that
affect her reproduction as an individual. Optional goals are goals
that are good for the individual because they are good in some other
way and the individual chooses to pursue them, making them good for
herself. These two kinds of goals are good in different ways, and
since there are correspondingly different reasons why they are what
ought to exist as far as reason is concerned, let us consider them
separately. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdlS_2" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="142" height="45" border="0">he
individual subject is a multicellular animal, and like any animal,
there are certain conditions that the rational subject must control
because they affect her reproduction. These are the necessary goals
of individual self interest. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdlS_3" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="121" height="48" border="0">hey
include all the goals implicit in animal nature, such as obtaining
food, shelter and other necessary resources. But they also include
goals implicit in the nature of the animals that are parts of
spiritual animal, that is, the social goals, such as maintaining
family relations, having friends, and other social relations that are
normal for members of ones spiritual animal. To a certain extent,
therefore, they are relative to the technology and style of life that
prevails in the spiritual animal in which one lives. However, they do
not include animal goals that are incompatible with being a member of
a spiritual animal, such as avoiding the risk of losing one's life
fighting wars, since that is a necessary aspect of the ecological
niche that individuals occupy </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
should be kept in mind, however, that necessary goals do not include
reproduction itself. Reproduction is not one of the conditions that
affect reproduction, but, rather, what determines which conditions
are relevant to control, which is the criterion for necessary goals.
By controlling relevant conditions, the subject is in a position to
reproduce, if she chooses. But reproduction itself is an optional
goal (unless, perhaps, reproduction must be controlled because of
necessary goals pursued by the spiritual animal). Reproduction is
good for the subject, if she chooses to reproduce, and it brings with
it all of the other goals that having children entails. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Necessary
goals are normally picked out by desires that are inherited as part
of biological nature, which include social goals. From hunger to the
need for companionship and love, the goal selection system built into
individual subjects by the biological behavior guidance system guides
behavior toward goals that control conditions that are relevant in
the sense of affecting individual reproduction. But what makes the
goals good is not that they satisfy desire, as hedonism mistakenly
assumed. Rather, as evolution by reproductive causation implies, they
satisfy desires because they are good in the sense of contributing to
ones maximum holistic power as an organism, that is, of
contributing to the natural perfection of the individual as an
organism.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
function of the desires that motivate the pursuit of necessary goals
is the same as in other animal organisms, namely, that they control
some condition that must be controlled in order maximize ones
power to control relevant conditions over ones entire reproductive
cycle. In other words, they contribute to the natural perfection of
the individual in the same way as the goals pursued by non-rational
animals. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Even the
hedonistic rational subject, before ontological philosophy evolves,
is more powerful than non-rational animals, because when she chooses
to behave in the current situation in ways that will maximize the
satisfaction of her desires over her lifetime, she also tends to be
choosing ways of behaving that control the relevant conditions more
efficiently and reliably.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">But when
the rational subject gives up hedonism in favor of a functional
explanation of desires and recognizes that the control of relevant
conditions, rather than the desire, is what makes the object of
desire good, she is even more powerful over her whole life than the
hedonist. The desires built into the brain as part of its goal
selection system are a crude indication of the kinds of goals that
will give the individual the maximum holistic power of an organism.
She is better able to see the relative importance of such goals and
how they can be attained as efficiently as possible by considering
their role in controlling relevant conditions than by the amount of
pleasure they give. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<img src="" name="OdlS_4" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="121" height="46" border="0"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Our
ontological explanation of the nature of goodness implies, therefore,
that necessary goals are good for the rational subject as an
individual because they contribute to her natural perfection as an
individual organism. And since they are good for the rational
subject, we infer that the rational subject ought to pursue them.
That is the form of the argument that will be used to show that goals
are good for reason in each of the cases below. But it is commonly
assumed that the difference between facts and values makes any such
proof impossible, that is, that values cannot be reduced to facts.
Indeed, there is a famous philosophical argument against this kind of
explanation of what ought to exist, and it will be answered here,
though it works the same way for all the goals that determine what
ought to exist for reason. What is at issue is whether there is a
naturalistic fallacy. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">I<img src="" name="OdlS_5" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="74" height="34" border="0">t
seems that there is reason to doubt that this argument about the
goals that rational subjects ought to pursue is valid. For it can be
argued that, from the premise that a goal is good for a rational
subject in the sense of contributing to her natural perfection as an
individual organism, it does not follow that she ought to pursue it.
Indeed, the belief that any such implication holds is called the
“naturalistic fallacy.” </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ontological
philosophy does give a naturalistic definition of “good,” because
it defines “good” as contributing the natural perfection and that
is a property that can be known by theoretical reason alone in
explaining the nature of evolution (as reproductive global
regularities). But according to G. E. Moore, goodness cannot be
explained naturalistically. Indeed, he would insist that it commits a
logical fallacy which he called the “naturalistic fallacy.” </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Moores
own positive view is that goodness is a simple, non-natural property
that supervenes on natural properties (where that means that if one
thing has it, then anything else with a relevantly similar physical
nature also has it). Its simplicity keeps goodness from being
explained in terms of simpler properties, and its non-naturalness is
supposed to explain its normative meaning, that is, that what has the
property, goodness, ought to exist. But what is relevant here is the
problem to which Moore was pointing, which is better known as the
difference between fact and value. Can values be reduced to facts, or
is there something inherently irreducible about them. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The most
compelling argument that G. E. Moore gives for believing that there
is a naturalistic fallacy is the so-called “open question
argument.” Moore argues that, given any naturalistic definition of
“good,” it is possible to ask meaningfully of something that is
good according to that definition, “But is it good?” For example,
if “good” is defined as being pleasurable, it makes sense to ask
of something that is pleasurable,” But is it good?” because it
might be bad, for example, because of its later consequences or
because it is morally wrong. It is an open question whether something
satisfying that naturalistic definition is actually good and ought to
be chosen. Moore insists that the same holds of any naturalistic
definition of “good.” If any such naturalistic definition of
“good” were correct, Moores question should be as
insignificant as asking, “But is the good good?” or “Is the
good what ought to be chosen?” Thus, the fact that Moores
question can be asked significantly with respect to any naturalistic
definition of “good” shows that there is a naturalistic fallacy.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">A. J. Ayer
argued in a similar way against naturalism, albeit is as a logical
positivist. He argued that if a naturalistic definition of &quot;good&quot;
were correct, it would be self contradictory to hold that something
that satisfies the definition is not good. Thus, the fact that no
such proposition is self contradictory would also suggest that
naturalism rest on a fallacy. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">However,
it is not possible to know in advance that Moores question will be
significant with respect to every naturalistic definition of “good.”
Thus, it can be argued that Moore simply had not tried the right
naturalistic definition. And that is the way to refute Moores open
question argument without denying its validity as a test for
fallaciousness. (Likewise for Ayer's way of challenging the truth of
naturalistic definitions of &quot;good.&quot;)</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Let
us, therefore, apply Moores open-question argument to our
ontological explanation of the nature of goodness. The issue is,
then, whether it can be asked with significance, Is what contributes
to natural perfection good? Or since we are talking about what is
good for reason, the questions is, Is what contributes to the natural
perfection of a rational being good for that rational being? </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">There is a
way in which Moores question might seem significant, though it is
not relevant here. It might seem significant, because one does not
understand what it means to say that something contributes to natural
perfection. In order to understand the question, it is necessary to
understand this ontological explanation of the nature of goodness,
and that means understanding its explanation of the cause of
evolution and seeing how it involves an inevitable series of stages
leading up to rational subjects like us. Let us assume, therefore,
that the question is being asked by someone who understands the
conclusions of theoretical reason about what is and recognizes
herself as a rational subject of the kind they entail. That is, let
us assume that it is being asked by someone at the stage of
ontological philosophical spirit, that is, by ontological reason. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In that
case, the answer to Moores open-question argument will be that it
is not significant, at least, not in any way that is relevant to
showing that some mistake is being made. Let us focus on the case at
issue, about the goodness of the necessary goals of individual
interest. The theory implies that such goals are good because they
contribute in essential way to ones natural perfection as an
individual organism. To ask, But are these necessary goals good? is
to ask whether one has sufficient reason to pursue them. But rational
subjects do have sufficient reason to pursue goals that are good in
this sense, because pursuing goals of that kind is part of their
nature as rational subjects. When the rational subject recognizes
that she is a being of the kind that comes to exist as a result of
evolution by reproductive causation, that she is able to ask this
question about whether she ought to pursue necessary goals because
she is rational in the way implied by this theory, and (as we shall
see) that <i>all </i>the goals she already takes to be good as a
rational being are shown to be good by their contribution to ones
natural perfection as a rational subject, it simply does not make
sense to ask if what contributes to ones natural perfection is
good. That is simply what reason does: it pursues the good in that
sense. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This point
can also be put from the outside, so to speak, because Moores
question is closed by the ontological explanation of the dichotomy
between theoretical and practical reason. The difference between
facts and values is one of the dichotomies among arguments at the
rational spiritual stage of evolution. Facts are conclusions of
theoretical reason, and values are conclusions of practical reason.
Ontological philosophy overcomes this dichotomy, as we have seen, by
deriving the nature of reason as part of the course of evolution by
reproductive causation, for that reveals that reason is a behavior
guidance system that uses knowledge of the true to discover what is
good. “Good” in that sense is defined as contributing to natural
perfection, which is a naturalistic definition. But when we recognize
that we are rational beings in that sense, then that is also what <i>we
</i>mean by the word, “good.” To ask whether what contributes to
ones own natural perfection is good, when one accepts ontological
philosophy, is as senseless as asking, But is the good good? </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Likewise
for Ayer's argument against a naturalistic definition of &quot;good.&quot;
For someone with ontological reason, it is self contradictory to deny
that something that contributes to natural perfection is good, for
that is what &quot;good&quot; refers to in a spatiomaterial world
like our own. There simply is no other meaning that &quot;good&quot;
could have in such a world.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdlS_6" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="74" height="34" border="0">he
more profound refutation of the naturalistic fallacy is ontological
philosophy's response to Moore, because its way of closing Moores
open question also provides the kind of wisdom that Socrates was
seeking in the name of philosophy, as love of wisdom. I am assuming
that what Socrates was seeking is an explanation of the nature of
goodness that would make any rational subject who understood it
virtuous. That is my interpretation of the meaning of the Socratic
principle: knowledge is virtue. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This is a
plausible interpretation of Socrates argument in the <i>Apology.</i>
When the oracle at Delphi says that Socrates is the wisest man in
Athens, Socrates insists that he does not have the kind of wisdom
that he takes the sophists to be claiming to have when they offer to
teach virtue for a fee. In order to find out what the oracle meant,
Socrates explains, he went about cross examining various kinds of
respected figures in Athens about the nature of wisdom, and he found
in each case that they did not have the wisdom that they claimed to
have. How he showed this might be called “Socrates open-question
argument,” because when they explained their wisdom about goodness,
he was always able to point out that there was some question about
whether it was really good. In the end, the only wisdom that Socrates
admits to having is knowing that he does not have knowledge. But in
the context of the <i>Apology,</i> it is clear that what he means is
a knowledge about the nature of goodness that would make one
virtuous, that is, the kind of wisdom that the sophists claimed to
have by promising to teach virtue. Thus, the merely human wisdom that
Socrates does have, which he describes by saying that he knows he
does not have knowledge, can be expressed more positively as
knowledge about what wisdom is, namely, that it is knowledge about
the nature of goodness that would make one virtuous. That is the kind
of wisdom that Socrates takes philosophy to be the love of. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Our way of
closing Moores question is also, therefore, a way of giving
Socrates the wisdom that he sought as a philosopher, or lover of
wisdom. It explains not only what is good for the rational subject,
but it also explains why it is good and, thus, gives the rational
being a sufficient reason to choose it. The good is <i>what
</i>contributes to ones own natural perfection as a rational
subject, and what makes the good good is <i>that </i>it contributes
to ones own natural perfection. The answer that Socrates was
seeking is the same answer that Moore was denying was possible,
namely, a self-understanding by reason that reveals how reason is
related to a kind of perfection that is appropriate to the nature of
what exists (including himself) in a spatiomaterial world like ours. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, since
ontological philosophy can explain the goodness of all the goals that
we believe that rational beings pursue, it succeeds in doing what
Plato tried to do for Socrates by taking an epistemological approach
to philosophy. It vindicates Socrates merely human wisdom by
showing that there is, indeed, a kind of goodness the knowledge of
whose nature would make a rational being virtuous. But instead of
being The Good Itself (the source of the other Forms in the realm of
Being, according to Plato) what makes things good is the natural
perfection that is entailed by progressive evolution, when evolution
is explained as a global regularity caused ontologically by
reproductive cycles and space. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">W<img src="" name="OdlS_7" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="74" height="34" border="0">ithin
this ontological theory, however, let me mention a way in which it
might seem that Moores question is still open and significant (and
Socrates quest is not fulfilled), though it comes from failing to
recognize the nature of natural perfection. What generally makes
Moores question significant when asked about other naturalistic
definitions of “good” is that there are always ways that it could
turn out that something that satisfies the naturalistic definition is
not good because of some larger context in which it occurs where it
is bad. That is, I assume, how Socrates was able to cast doubt on the
wisdom about virtue that other Athenians claimed to have. But that is
not possible, because of the way in which &quot;good&quot; is defined
by ontological philosophy, that is, how it explains the nature of
goodness ontologically. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In the case
of hedonism, for example, Moore points out that, although defining
“good” as pleasure seems plausible at first, we discover that the
definition is faulty when we see that it makes sense to ask, But is
pleasure good? That question makes sense because we know there are
situations in which pleasure is bad. (Socrates uses this argument as
well.) </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">But Moores
question cannot be significant in an analogous way when applied to
our definition of “good,” because there is no larger context in
which what contributes to natural perfection can turn out to be bad.
All the forms of natural perfection fit together as parts of the
overall structure of natural perfection as a single, spatio-temporal
whole, and thus, whatever is good by virtue of contributing to some
form of natural perfection is good by virtue of contributing to the
natural perfection of the whole. That is the unity of goodness on
this theory. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is true
that what is good for one organism can be bad for another, as we have
seen in the case of the predator and its prey. Eating another animal
is good for the predator and bad for the prey. But this is not an
ultimate conflict, because the predator catching the prey is good for
the ecology, that is, contributes to the natural perfection of the
ecology (not to mention how it contributes to the natural perfection
of life or to the natural perfection of change). </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nor does
Moores question become significant by wondering whether the
natural perfection within which everything else is good might turn
out to be bad in a still larger context, like a perfect murder or
perfect tyranny. The overall structure of natural perfection includes
spatially a whole planet or, perhaps eventually, a whole planetary
system, and temporally, the whole course of evolution. Its larger
context is the rest of the universe, with all its other stars and
galaxies. But there is nothing about the large scale structure of the
universe that could possibly make natural perfection bad. What we
know about the rest of the universe is that evolution will follow the
same course on any other suitable planet, and that can hardly make
evolution in our planetary system bad. On the contrary, given the
vast reaches of space separating planetary systems, the rest of the
universe seems, at worst, to be indifferent to what happens on any
one planet (or planetary system). It is meaningless to suggest there
is some larger context in which natural perfection is bad.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
is, however, a way in which it does make sense to ask, Is what
contributes to natural perfection good? But it is not a way that
supports belief in a naturalistic fallacy. One could be asking if
there isnt something more to goodness, some further story to be
told about its nature that is not included in the definition. That
surely makes sense. What is good by our definition could be good for
other reasons as well. I suggest something like that below. But what
is relevant here is that the possibility of such a deeper explanation
of the nature of goodness does not supply any reason to doubt that
what contributes to our natural perfection is good. It merely adds to
the story about why the good, so defined, is good. And far from
supporting the claim that there is a logical fallacy about defining
“good” naturalistically, it presupposes the possibility of such a
naturalistic explanation.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
is, therefore, no naturalistic fallacy. G. E. Moores mistake was
to infer from his own inability to find a naturalistic definition of
“good” that would close his “open question” to the conclusion
that there <i>can </i>be none. He promoted his inability to think of
a naturalistic definition into a logical fallacy. But as we have
seen, there is a naturalistic property to which “good” might be
referring that does close his question, at least, if evolution is
caused by reproduction. (The same holds for Ayer.)</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In fact,
the nature of the property, goodness, may also explain why Moore saw
“good” as referring to a simple, non-natural property. Goodness
may seem to be a simple property, for the goodness of anything
actually depends on how it is part of a unique kind of structure that
is as large as the planet, at least. That is why “good” cannot be
defined by any set of physical properties that characterize the local
objects, events and conditions that are said to be good.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote1anc" href="#sdendnote1sym"><sup>i</sup></a></sup>
And goodness seems to be non-natural, since to be good means that it
ought to exist, and unless one understands the nature of the natural
perfection in the world and recognizes oneself to be part of it, it
is hard to see how any naturalistic property could call for things
that have it to exist. Thus, by closing his open question, not only
does this view of goodness show, on Moores own turf, that there is
no naturalistic fallacy, but it also explains why Moore takes it to
be a simple, non-natural property. It seems to be a simple,
non-natural property because it is actually the most complex, natural
property. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdlS_8" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="142" height="45" border="0">he
autonomy of reason, as we have seen, makes the subjects who have the
power of reason basically different from all other multicellular
animals. It enables them to do what is good because they believe that
it is good, and thus, in addition to goals that control conditions
that affect their own reproduction as individuals, they can pursue
goals that are good in virtue of contributing to the natural
perfection of other evolving things or to artificial perfection, such
as works of art. And since rational subjects will inevitably choose
to pursue them, we have assumed that such goals are good for the
rational subject when she chooses to pursue them. That is how we
introduced the notion of optional goals for rational beings. But now
that the issue arises for practical reason, it might be asked whether
rational subjects <i>ought </i>to pursue optional goals. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">R<img src="" name="OdlS_9" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="116" height="48" border="0">eason
is autonomous, because it is the new, language-based behavior
guidance system that takes over control of animal behavior as
primitive spiritual animals evolve into rational spiritual animals.
The animal desire to submit to the leaders instructions becomes
the desire to submit to the conclusions of practical reason, and
thus, reason wrests control of behavior from (other) animal desires
(that is, from control by the goal selection system of the
multicellular animal behavior guidance system). That is, as we have
seen, what makes it possible for the rational subject to puruse what
she believes are necessary goals of individual self interest, even
when it is opposed by strong immediate desires. But since reason
works by enabling the subject to intend and actually do what she
<i>believes </i>is good, it also enables her to pursue goals beyond
those that control conditions that affect her individual
reproduction, or optional goals.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Optional
goals include all goals that are good for other reproducing
structures, the ecology, life, or change because of how they
contribute to their natural perfection, as well as what is good in
virtue of contributing to artificial perfection. They include, for
example, doing good for other individual rational beings (beyond what
is required by morality, that is, as supererogation), making
contributions to culture (beyond the normal rational interest in
knowing the good, the true and the beautiful), serving the interest
of ones spiritual animal (beyond duty), doing good for other
spiritual animals, for the ecology, for life, or for evolution
generally. And optional goals include creating or enjoying works of
art, including not only works of fine art, but also the aesthetic
aspect of ones daily life.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is good
to pursue optional goals, however, only insofar as necessary goals
are already being attained. Necessary goals take priority over
optional goals. But the power of reason is so great that rational
beings are often in situations where they are able to control more
conditions in the world than what affects their individual
reproduction, and they spend their extra rational action on optional
goals. The choice of such goals is what makes them good for the
rational subject. But as rational subjects, they cannot choose to
pursue any goal unless they believe (correctly or mistakenly) that it
is already good in some way, that is, by contributing to the natural
or artificial perfection of something. The autonomy of reason is the
power to do what they believe is good, not the power to act
arbitrarily or capriciously. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
natural (or artificial) perfection of other things in the world is
often something that rational subjects can detect, because rational
imagination enables rational subjects to see the actual against the
background of the possible and that can reveal ways in which the
whole is an optimal part-whole relation. The rational interest in
beauty is also what enables rational subjects to see how best to
control all the conditions that affect their individual reproduction,
not to mention what enables them to judge what is true. It plays the
same role in the choice of optional goals and pursuing them.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">When a
rational subject pursues an optional goal, she is guided by the
perception of what is good for something other than herself, that is,
by her perception of how it contributes to some other natural
perfection. The judgment of what it is good to do is disinterested,
because it depends of her belief about what is good for it. This is
true even in the case of a work of art. What is good for the work of
art is not what contributes to the natural perfection of something
that is already evolving, because it does not even exist until the
artist chooses to create it. But it does have an optimal part-whole
relation, which is called beauty, and thus, it is like natural
perfection and recognized by rational imagination in the same way.
Artists testify that, as the work of art grows, it “calls for”
certain additions so that the artist is merely ministering to its
needs. That is the sense in which works of art imitate nature: the
beauty of art is the imitation of the natural perfection found in
nature. It is artificial perfection.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">To
say that rational subjects can choose to do what is good because they
believe that it is good, even when it does not control relevant
conditions, is not to deny that they may also have a desire to pursue
that goal. It is only to say that the desire to pursue the goal is
not what makes it good. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Desire may
prompt the choice of one optional goal over another, for example,
when the desire to listen to music leads one to become a musician or
even just to listen to music. But that is not what makes the goal
good. What makes it good is that what one is listening to or adding
to the whole makes an essential contribution to the optimal
part-whole relation of the work of art itself. Likewise, a benevolent
desire may prompt her to take an interest in the good of someone
else, but what makes the rational subjects actions in pursuit of
it good is not how it satisfies that benevolent desire, but how it
contributes to the others natural perfection and, by doing so,
contributes to her own natural perfection. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Moreover,
once one has chosen music, say, as an optional goal, the desire that
is the source of the enjoyment one gets from pursuing it is not
merely the desire that prompted the choice in the first place. What
the rational subject learns about its natural perfection in pursuing
the optional goal transforms that desire. Not only does she come to
enjoy new aspects of music, or whatever the object, but she also
enjoys them for other reasons, having to do with how they contribute
to the natural perfection of the whole. The desire that is being
satisfied is ultimately the desire to submit to reason, though given
how reason grows and matures with the rational pursuit of optional
goals, it might be better called the desire to enjoy the power of
reason. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is the
nature of rational imagination that leads us, as we have seen, to
appreciate aesthetic goodness. The perception of beauty is implicitly
the recognition of perfection, and that is what accounts for our
response to it. In perceiving that nothing can be done to make it
better, reason would have us leave it as it is and simply enjoy it. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">However,
if goals are not good because they satisfy desire, but rather because
of the relevant conditions they control, as our ontological
explanation of goodness and our functional explanation of desire
imply, one might doubt that optional goals are good at all. Since
they do not control conditions that affect the rational subjects
reproduction as an individual, what makes them good?</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is clear
that optional goals are not good for rational subjects in the same
way that the goals of behavior in other multicellular animals are
good for them, because the attainment of optional goals does not
control “relevant conditions” in the sense of conditions that
affect the rational subjects reproduction as an individual.
Controlling them does not necessarily make the individual better able
to reproduce. Thus, ontological philosophy cannot explain why
optional goals are good for the individual in exactly the same way as
it does necessary goals.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">O<a href="#10"><img src="" name="OdlS_10" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="115" height="46" border="0"></a>ntological
philosophy does, however, imply that it is good for rational beings
to pursue optional goals, because it explains the nature of goodness
as contributing to natural perfection, not necessarily as
contributing to its own maximum power to control conditions that
affect its own reproduction. The latter is merely how the power to
contribute to natural perfection is usually brought into being in a
spatiomaterial world like ours.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The power
of reason makes rational subjects essentially different from other
multicellular animals, indeed, from all other organisms (except
spiritual animals), and that means that their natural perfection is
different from other animals. Though other organisms can only evolve
behavior (and other structural effects) that control conditions that
affect their own reproduction, that limitation is lifted in the case
of rational beings, because reason guides behavior as a result of a
cultural evolution of arguments that discover the true, the good and
the beautiful. It is a behavior guidance system that is able to tell
what is good more generally than by pursuing goals dictated by the
biological behavior guidance system and what can evolve biologically
by natural selection. It enables rational subjects to do what is good
simply because they believe that it is good. Furthermore, since
reason often gives rational beings more power than they need to
control relevant conditions, the natural perfection of rational
beings is not just the maximum power to control all conditions that
affect individual reproduction. It is the maximum power to control
conditions generally that are good.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In other
words, the fact that a power to contribute to natural perfection does
not evolve by making the organism better able to complete its own
reproductive cycle does not imply that it is not good. Reproductive
causation is merely what is usually responsible for the existence of
such powers in the world. And if at later stakes in evolution,
organisms acquire powers of that kind without being naturally
selected for having them, that does not mean that they are not good.
Given the nature of goodness, any contribution to the natural
perfection of the whole of which something is part is good,
regardless how it comes to exist in the world. That is something that
reason enables the rational subject to recognize, though that is not
why reason evolved in the first place. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Perfection
is an optimal part-whole relation in which the whole does the most
with the least, and in the case of natural perfection, it is an
optimal part-whole relation in which the whole has as much power to
use free energy to control what happens in the world with the fewest
and simplest structural causes as possible. In the case of reason,
the structural causes are the sources of rational action, that is,
the use of practical arguments to guide ones behavior toward the
good. Thus, the optimum cannot be a matter of using the fewest and
simplest structural causes to attain some given ends, for there is a
fixed supply of structural causes, namely, all the behavior of a
rational subject over her lifetime. In this case, the part-whole
relation does more with less by using the structural causes already
available to do more, that is, to control more of what happens in the
world. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nor is
there any question about what counts as more or less control of what
happens in the world, because optional goals are goals that control
conditions that contribute to natural (or artificial) perfection in
some way or other. Though they may not control conditions that affect
ones own reproduction, optional goals are not arbitrary or random
changes in the world. They are not chosen by reason unless they are
seen as contributing to the natural perfection of some other
organism, to some other form of natural perfection, such as the
ecology or evolution, or to an artificial perfection that imitates
natural perfection, such as works of art. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, the
natural perfection of rational beings is more like the natural
perfection of life than the natural perfection of organisms. New
levels of part-whole complexity in the structures of reproducing
organisms contribute to the natural perfection of life not because
they control conditions that are already relevant to reproduction,
but rather because their higher level of organization makes new
conditions relevant and brings new conditions under control,
extending the power of life as such to control what happens in the
world. Likewise, what contributes to the natural perfection of reason
is what increases the power to control what happens in the world, not
to control conditions that are relevant to its own reproduction. In
both cases, however, the new conditions brought under control are not
arbitrary, but are good because they contribute to natural (or
artificial) perfection in some way. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Rational
subjects ought, therefore, to choose optional goals and pursue them.
Though the optional goals themselves are not necessary, it is a
necessary goal of rational subjects to pursue some optional goals or
others, if they have the extra power to do so. It contributes to
their natural perfection as rational subjects, even though those
goals do not control conditions that are relevant to their own
reproduction. The pursuit of optional goals is, therefore, good for
rational subjects. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, it is
possible for ontological philosophy to answer G. E. Moores doubts
about the possibility of any such naturalistic explanation of the
goodness of optional goals in the same way as it did necessary goals.
To a rational subject who understands her nature as a rational
subject and her place in the natural world, it simply does not make
sense to ask, But is contributing to ones own natural perfection
good?</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
pursuit of optional goals is also part of the wisdom that Socrates
was seeking, because this ontological explanation of the nature of
goodness explains why optional goals are good for the rational
subject. And the pursuit of any optional goal that one has chosen is
good, because the pursuit of optional goals is good for rational
beings and this goal is the one that the rational subject has chosen.
</font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0; page-break-before: always">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">R<img src="" name="OdmE_1" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="117" height="52" border="0">eason
has another practical interest, in addition to the individual
interest of each subject, because it also has the function of guiding
the behavior of the spiritual animal as a whole. The goals of the
spiritual animal are good for rational beings in the same way as the
goals of individual rational subjects, and there is also a difference
in the goals pursued by spiritual animals between necessary and
optional goals. But since all these goals, necessary and optional for
both individual subjects and spiritual animals, are goals pursued by
rational subjects according to arguments that evolve by rational
selection, there must be priorities among them. Those priorities are
set by rules of morality and rules of justice, and both sets of rules
are good for reason in the same way, that is, by contributing to the
natural perfection of reason. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">W<img src="" name="OdmE_2" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="105" height="43" border="0">hat
is good for spiritual animals is not necessarily the same as what is
good for rational subjects, because spiritual animals evolve by
reproductive causation on the social level of biological organization
at the same time that rational subjects evolve by reproductive
causation on the individual (or multicellular) level of biological
organization. Though they depend on one another for their existence,
each approaches the natural perfection for organisms of its own kind.
At the same time that spiritual animal are becoming naturally perfect
as social level animals made of rational subjects as parts, rational
subjects become naturally perfect as multicellular level animals that
live as parts of spiritual animals. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">As
a higher level of biological organization, spiritual animals depend
for their existence on the coordination of rational subjects as lower
level organisms. But the part-whole relation that holds between the
spiritual animal and its members is, as we have seen, different from
that between the multicellular animal and the cells that are it
parts. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In both
cases, what is good for the whole is usually good for the parts
(because they are parts of the whole), but it can sometimes be bad
for the parts as well. For example, the good of the whole sometimes
requires the sacrifice of some of its parts. In spiritual animals,
this happens in warfare, when some individuals must die, and in
multicellular animals, the death of cells is a normal part of the
process of development, for example, in the nervous system. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">But there
is a difference in how the good for the parts is related to the good
of the whole. In both cases, it is generally true that what is good
for the parts is also good for the whole, because the whole is made
up of the parts and depends on them for its own existence. Indeed, in
multicellular animals, what is good for the cell is never bad for the
whole, because the only way that goals can be naturally selected for
a cell is by the success of the multicellular whole in reproducing,
that is, by natural selection at the higher level of biological
organization. The cells cannot complete reproductive cycles on their
own, independently of the multicellular reproductive cycle. In
spiritual animals, however, what is good for the rational subject may
be bad for the spiritual animal of which it is part, because its
goals are naturally selected for the rational subject by how they
contribute to individual reproduction, not just the reproduction of
the spiritual animal as a whole. That is, individuals do reproduce
independently of the reproduction of their spiritual animal. Thus,
for example, some of the goals that rational subjects pursue because
they contribute to their individual interest may be immoral or
treacherous and, thus, harmful to the spiritual animal. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Instead
of subordinating the good of the part to the good of the whole,
therefore, the good for the individual and the good for spiritual
animal are on a par. They are good for the same kinds of reasons,
though on different levels of biological organization. And they are
both good for the rational subject, for he is the agent of rational
beings generally (that is, for the individual, the spiritual animal,
and as we shall see, even for the world as a whole). Thus, individual
and spiritual goals are both goals of the self, as the
four-dimensional being that one constructs by his rational actions
over a lifetime, and conflicts between individual and spiritual self
interest must be resolved, or else reason will not be able to serve
its function. They are resolved, as we shall see, by a symmetrical
subordination of the good of each for the good of the other. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Spiritual
animals pursue goals by way of institutions that generate social
level behavior. (Institutions are patterns of interaction among
members guided by low-level practical arguments about social roles
and their duties, prerogatives and interrelationships, and their
functions are the social level behavior they generate.) When choices
must be made among social level goals, it is the function of
political institutions, or government, to make the choice for the
spiritual animal. And parallel to rational subjects, there is a
difference between goals that are necessary and goals that are
optional. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">S<img src="" name="OdmE_3" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="89" height="44" border="0">piritual
animals have necessary goals. Goals that control conditions that
affect the reproduction of the spiritual animal as a whole are
necessary goals. Though spiritual animals, unlike multicellular
animals, can continue to exist indefinitely without reproducing,
there are nonetheless relevant conditions to be controlled. They must
be <i>able </i>to reproduce, if the occasion arises, in order to be
naturally perfect. Though reproduction is not a necessary goal of
spiritual animals, it is the criterion of which other goals are
necessary. And among their necessary goals, two kinds can be
distinguished, because the social level behavior in pursuit of goals
can be directed either at objects external to the spiritual animal or
at its own members. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">E<img src="" name="OdmE_4" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="74" height="34" border="0">xternal
necessary goals of spiritual animals are analogous to those of
multicellular animals, except for warfare, the new kind of behavior
that spiritual animals have toward one another. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Like
multicellular animals, spiritual animals must acquire from nature the
free energy and other resources they need to fuel their reproductive
cycles (This aspect of the economic institution corresponds to
feeding in other animals.) Spiritual animals must also protect
themselves from natural hazards such as predators, storms and other
disasters. And just as multicellular animals must mate, nomadic
spiritual animals, at least, must maintain relations to other
spiritual animals (such as membership in tribes) by which its members
can mate outside their own spiritual animal. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
non-analogous goals arise from group-level natural selection of
spiritual animals by war. The overriding goal of a spiritual animal
in dealing with other spiritual animals is to wining at war with
them, which involves making the best choice about whether (and how)
to live peacefully or to engage in war relative to other spiritual
animals with which it interacts. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">I<img src="" name="OdmE_5" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="76" height="36" border="0">nternal
goals of animal behavior are unique to spiritual animals, because in
spiritual animals, the animal behavior guidance system also serves as
the biological behavior guidance system, that is, as the mechanism
that coordinates the behavior of the lower level organisms of which
it is composed. Thus, social level animal behavior must serve many of
the same functions as the biological behavior guidance system in
multicellular animals. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
economic institution also includes internal functions, such as
coordinating the productive behavior of members and distributing the
products, just as acquiring energy requires digestion and circulation
in multicellular animals. Likewise, the government includes executive
institutions that administer regulations, just as the brain has
nervous connections to the rest of the body. But it also includes an
institution for enforcing laws by punishment, which is analogous to
the immune system in multicellular animals. The kinship system gives
individuals locations in the spiritual body, corresponding to a
process of embryological development for determining cells to certain
parts of the body. Educational and religious institutions acculturate
the members to the arguments that will guide their behavior, just as
the endocrine system and parasympathetic nervous system guide the
behavior of individual cells. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Some goals
of internal behavior have no analogue in multicellular animals. For
example, spiritual animals may have institutions that mediate the
exchange of arguments and promote cultural evolution, such as
academic, scholarly, and research institutions. Nothing like cultural
evolution takes place in multicellular animals. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Some
internal goals of social level behavior are especially relevant to
practical reason because they have to do with controlling the pursuit
of individual goals. The health of the spiritual animal requires that
its members observe moral rules that limit the pursuit of the
individual interests, for unless they are observed, members will not
be willing and able to cooperate in generating social level behavior.
</font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The content
of moral rules is determined as the conclusions of practical
arguments about how individuals should behave in situations that
affect others or the spiritual animal as a whole. As we have seen,
they include rules that require everyone to cooperate in generating
social level behavior (including prohibition of treason and other
crimes against the spiritual animal).They also include rules that
prevent members from harming one another, rules that enable members
to cooperate with one another (such as the duty of fidelity in
promises and contracts) and facilitate cooperative attitudes (such as
the duty of reciprocity in gift giving and civility. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Because
practical arguments evolve when they are rationally selected by
everyone, as we have seen, the rules tend to be the rules that
maximize the good of the whole (as the utilitarians hold), that
maximize the freedom of everyone (that is, minimize the limits they
impose on the pursuit of individual goals, as the contractarians
hold), and treat members equally (as Kantians insist). </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
spiritual animal must act as a whole on its members to ensure that
moral rules are followed. Violations of moral rules arouse anger in
those who are hurt, and the motives selected for fighting wars tend
to take the form of revenge and vendettas within spiritual animals,
unless measures are taken to restore the moral equilibrium. The
institutions that have traditionally served this function are the
religious institutions, which publicly affirm and defend the
principles on which other practical arguments are based, and the
justice system (including the police and judicial system), which
punish wrongdoing. (The former is part of the educational systems,
analogous to the endocrine and parasympathetic nervous system in
multicellular animals, whereas the justice system corresponds to the
immune system, which kills mis-functioning cells in the body as well
as invaders.) </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Though many
violations of moral rules are naturally sanctioned by the disapproval
of other members, some violations of moral rules are so harmful and
cause so much warlike antagonism that they are prohibited by laws,
and retributive justice is reserved for them. Punishment of crime is
a necessary goal of spiritual animals, if only because taking revenge
on the individual level leads to civil war. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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" name="FunctAnalogy" align="bottom" width="460" height="330" border="0"></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Rational
subjects, therefore, insofar as they are responsible for selecting
and generating social level behavior, ought to choose to pursue these
goals. The attainment of these goals contributes to the natural
perfection of the spiritual animal, because it controls the
conditions that affect its reproduction as a whole. These goals are,
therefore, good for reason in its function of guiding the behavior of
the spiritual animal. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In response
to Moores open question argument, therefore, it will not make
sense for rational beings who understand the nature of reason and its
place in the natural world to ask, But is what contributes to the
natural perfection of spiritual animals good? </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The pursuit
of these necessary goals is also part of the wisdom that Socrates was
seeking, because this ontological explanation of the nature of
goodness explains why necessary goals are good for the spiritual
animal. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdmE_6" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="89" height="44" border="0">here
are optional goals of spiritual interest. Just as individuals can
pursue goals because they are good even when they do not control
conditions that affect individual reproduction, so spiritual animals
can pursue goals that are good when they do not control conditions
that affect its social level reproduction. Though in both cases the
goal must already be good in some way (by contributing to the natural
perfection of something, including artifacts), the goal becomes good
for reason because it is chosen.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">For
the spiritual animal to pursue optional goals, a general consensus
about them is normally required, because they are not necessary and
pursuing them will involve the cost of generating social level
behavior. But since there are goals that it would be good for
spiritual animals to pursue, it is possible to make them good for
spiritual animals by choosing them.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Though it
is a necessary goal of spiritual animals to protect the environment
from the damage of its own economic activity enough to survive
indefinitely into the future, an optional goal might be to preserve
as many species and ancient ecologies as possible in order to insure
the diversity of life on earth.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is a
necessary goal of spiritual animals to make sure that they will win
any wars they may fight, since that is a condition that affects their
reproduction as a whole. But an optional goal would be to work
together with other spiritual animals to end group level natural
selection by war. That would require the control of population growth
everywhere on the planet, including perhaps even decreasing it, since
that is the basic cause of war and would eventually lead to war,
unless it is controlled. Under such conditions it might be possible
for spiritual animals to end war by cooperating in an international
military force to protect national boundaries and prevent spiritual
animals from harming one another. (Insofar as there are traits that
spiritual animals would otherwise evolve by such group level natural
selection which make them more perfect, it might also be necessary
for spiritual animals to assume responsibility for giving spiritual
animals those powers by other means.) </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Natural
selection at the individual level continues after a fashion within
spiritual animals by success in individual reproduction, but it is
significantly curtailed by modern medicine and where it is still at
work, it involves much suffering. Thus, an optional goal for
spiritual animals would be to replace natural selection with germ
line intervention in order to eliminate genetic diseases and to
enhance the powers that enable rational subjects to attain the goals
they ought to pursue. For example, each couple could be given the
option of adding or deleting certain genes from their offspring, and
since they would choose what is best for their children, it would be
decentralized process much like natural selection in which rational
subjects could be expected to evolve further in the direction of
natural perfection for organisms of their kind. It would be to
replace natural selection at the individual level with rational
selection. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Traditional
optional goals have included building monuments. But a more up to
date goal that may be optional for spiritual animals is space
exploration and colonizing the rest of the planetary system. But
there are other possible goals. In each case, it is not clear at this
point in evolution whether these goals are optional or necessary.
That is why the future course of evolution is not just a conclusion
of theoretical reason, but with the evolution of reasons
ontological self-understanding, depends on where practical reasoning
leads reason in the situations that arise.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdmE_7" align="right" hspace="5" width="153" height="66" border="0">he
pursuit of goals of the spiritual animal may conflict with the
rational subjects pursuit of individual goals, and since they are
both goals of rational beings, there is a conflict among goals that
needs to be resolved. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
individual interest and the spiritual interest are equal, because
they are good in parallel ways, that is, each by contributing to the
natural perfection of the organism (or primary structure) on its own
level of biological organization, and ontological philosophy provides
no grounds for preferring one over the other. Both are equally the
responsibility of reason, or goals pursued by reflective subjects as
the agents of reason, and thus, it is a conflict between one's
individual self interest and one's spiritual self interest. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">When
individual and spiritual goals conflict, what ought to exist for
reason is what contributes to the natural perfection of reason as the
behavior guidance system for both biological levels, that is, for the
rational subject as a rational being. But what are those priorities. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">M<img src="" name="OdmE_8" align="right" hspace="5" width="133" height="83" border="0">oral
rules are generally assumed to take priority over the pursuit of
individual goals. Indeed, that is their function: moral rules are
meant to limit the pursuit of individual self interest. The general
observance of moral rules is, as we have seen, a necessary goal of
spiritual animals, for spiritual animals cannot pursue social level
goals except by coordinating the behavior of its members and their
ability to cooperate in pursuit of such goals depends on the members
being moral in their relations to one another. But when moral rules
do conflict with the pursuit of individual self interest, why should
the rational subject be moral? </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Let
us recall the answers to this question at earlier points in
evolution. Answers at the stage of rational spiritual animals are
based on religion, but the answers given by epistemological
philosophy are no more adequate. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Rational
culture evolves arguments to justify the principles on which its
practical arguments are based, and they generally have to do with
explanations of the origin of the world, the place of rational beings
in it, and the purpose in their existence. These arguments serve the
function of mutually acknowledging the validity of the culture of
ones spiritual animal, but they are not rationally compelling.
Religious beliefs are typically about gods or superior beings of some
kind, which may be interpreted as representations of the spiritual
animal and its interest. But in order to justify being moral, rather
than pursuing their individual interest (or acting on emotion), they
merely assert the priority of spiritual interest over individual
interest. Though it may be obvious that being moral is in the
spiritual interest, that is, good for the group as a whole, religion
does not explain why the spiritual interest is prior to the
individual interest. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Philosophical
culture has attempted to give a deeper justification of moral rules.
In the ancient and medieval period and continuing long into the
modern period, the belief was that the reason for being moral, as
well as the content of moral rules, has to do with something about
the nature of goodness and, thus, is objective. Plato thought that
the nature of goodness is explained by the existence of The Good
Itself as the source of the other Forms — and, thus, of the
goodness of visible objects that participate in the Forms as well.
That was meant to explain why rational subjects ought to be moral in
a way that would satisfy Socrates, that is, by making rational
subjects virtuous. But Plato could never explain the nature of The
Good Itself in a way that showed how it made other Forms good, much
less why rational subjects should be moral.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It was
possible to preserve Platos belief in the objective nature of
goodness in the medieval period (and the early modern period) despite
the inability to give an adequate explanation of the nature of
goodness. The Christian view, in its most mature form, holds that it
is God who understands the nature of goodness, whereas finite
rational beings like us cannot. That is, God's ultimate purposes are
said to be inscrutable. Insofar as we do not understand why we ought
to be moral, therefore, we must so as a matter of faith. Though it is
a faith that there is something about the nature of goodness from a
Gods Eye point of view that makes morality prior to individual
interest, it is still not reason that explains why we ought to be
moral. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In the
modern period, attempts to give a naturalistic explanation of the
goodness of morality that would explain why we ought to be moral were
ultimately failures. Hobbes, as a social contractarian, attempted to
explain the content of moral rules as the result of a contract in
which every rational subject gives up only as much freedom as is
required to protect individuals generally from harming one another
and enabling them to cooperate. But since that did not explain why
the individual should not be immoral in pursuing his individual
interest after the social contrast was signed and he could avoid
being punished, it did not explain adequately why the morally good is
good. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Kant
attempted to explain the content of moral rules as what is required
by universalizability, that is, his categorical imperative (that we
should act only on those maxims that we can will to be a universal
law of nature). But that left Kant with no way to show that
individuals ought to be moral, because it did not give the individual
any reason for choosing not to be rational in that sense, and being
rational only in the sense of pursuing is rational individual
interest. Kant suggested that the reason stems from something
uniquely valuable about rational subjects, that is, as ends in
themselves, but he was never able to explain what that was, except to
suggest that is has something to do with the unknown (noumenal)
nature of rational subjects and to suggest that freedom from pursuing
goals set by ones desires, or what he called “autonomy,” is
somehow better. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Utilitarians,
such as Bentham and Mill, explained the content of moral rules as
what promotes the general happiness, but they too failed to explain
why the rational subject should be moral. They assumed that the
individual subject cannot help but pursue his individual happiness,
but they were never able to explain why the individual should prefer
the general happiness to his own happiness when they came into
conflict. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ontological
philosophy does, however, explain why we should be moral. Its
explanation of the nature of rational beings and the nature of
goodness explains not only the content of moral rules, as we have
seen, but also why the individual rational subject should take moral
rules as prior to individual interest. The foundation of the priority
of moral rules is that the spiritual interest is one of the basic
interests of the rational subject. Because of the nature of reason
and the way in which it works, the individual has, as a rational
being, responsibility for guiding the behavior of the spiritual
animal as well as his own individual behavior. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Reason
evolved originally, as we have seen, with the function of guiding the
behavior of spiritual animals to make reliable choices about war and
peace. But since it works by the exchange of practical arguments
among members and their rational selection by individual rational
subjects (that is, the selection of arguments from among the
alternatives that make their world views maximally coherent), it
could also be used to guide individual behavior. In the case of
guiding the behavior of the spiritual animal, however, not only the
discovery of what is good, but also the selection and generation of
social level behavior depends on the members coming to agree about
what the spiritual animal ought to do (though, in practice, social
level behavior may be guided by political institutions that are
maintained by mutual agreement about the practical arguments that
generate them). Given the way that reason functions as a behavior
guidance system for the spiritual animal, therefore, the rational
subject has, as a rational being, an interest in pursuing the goals
of the spiritual animal. The rational subject is responsible for
social level behavior and they contribute to the natural perfection
of the whole of which he is part. And being moral is the most basic
way that the individual contributes to the natural perfection of his
spiritual animal.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It should
be emphasized that the spiritual interest of the rational subject is
different from his individual self interest in the spiritual animal
because of how he depends on it as the means to pursuing his
individual goals. First of all, the spiritual animal is the whole of
which he is part, the context of all his activity, and thus, his
welfare depends on its welfare. But furthermore, most of the goals he
pursues depend on having the use of a spiritual body, as well as a
physical body (in the sense that the means involve the cooperation of
other members of his spiritual animal). Since his spiritual body is a
most powerful means to attaining goals that are good for him as an
individual, the individual has another interest in the good of the
spiritual animal. But this is not his spiritual self interest. It is
his individual self interest in his spiritual animal as the whole of
which he is part and his individual self interest in having the use
of a spiritual body.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, the
subject has necessarily, as a rational being, a spiritual self
interest distinct from his individual self interest. And being moral
is in his spiritual interest. But it may seem that it is not possible
for ontological philosophy to explain why the rational subject ought
to be moral, because when moral rules require limiting the pursuit of
individual goals, there is a conflict between his two basic
interests. They are equal interests, according to ontological
philosophy, because they both arise in the same way (by contributing
to the natural perfection of the organism on its level of biological
organization) and the rational subject is responsible for both. They
do come into conflict, because moral rules are meant to limit the
pursuit of individual goals. It may seem, therefore, that ontological
philosophy is inherently unable to explain why he ought prefer on to
the other. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
is, however, a sufficient reason for being moral, because there is a
simple and straightforward optimal resolution of this conflict which
comes from recognizing the difference between necessary and optional
goals of individual self interest. That is, submitting to moral rules
is good for the rational subject because it contributes to the
natural perfection of the whole of which the rational subject. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is a
necessary goal of the spiritual animal that its members observe moral
rules, because that is a condition that affects its reproduction as a
whole. The spiritual animal cannot act at all unless morality
prevails, because that relationship among its parts is essential to
its health. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">On the
other side, it is not a necessary goal for the individual to act
contrary to moral rules. Moral rules limit the <i>means </i>the
individual uses to attain individual goals, but they do not prevent
him from attaining his necessary goals, at least, not in a healthy
spiritual animal. In healthy spiritual animals, individuals are able
to attain their necessary goals by moral means, if they make a
reasonable effort. Thus, <i>necessary </i>individual goals never
conflict with the necessary spiritual goal of being moral. Though
moral rules may limit <i>how </i>the individual pursues necessary
individual goals, that is merely to constrain his pursuit of his
optional individual goals, for there are other ways to attain them
and one way is good for the individual only because he chooses it. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To be sure,
moral rules may make it impossible to pursue some optional goals at
all. But since optional goals are good for the individual only
because he chooses them, the individual can contribute to the natural
perfection of the whole of which he is part by constraining his
choices of optional goals in such a way that his pursuit of them does
not involve the violation of moral rules. That is not a severe
limitation on individual interest, because there are so many good
goals to choose from in making goals good for himself. Thus, there is
obviously a best way to maximize the attainment of the goals that are
good for rational subjects, including both his individual and his
spiritual self interest, and it involves being moral. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This
implies, however, that in situations where following moral rules
would make it impossible to attain the necessary goals of individual
interest with a reasonable effort, it is not wrong to violate moral
rules. But that is not surprising, because when the spiritual animal
is not healthy enough to continue to exist, it does not contribute to
the natural perfection of the whole of which the individual is part
to pursue the goals that are necessary for the spiritual animal. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Rational
subjects ought, therefore, to observe moral limits on their pursuit
of individual goals, because it contributes to the natural perfection
of the whole of which the rational subject is part. In this case,
however, the whole is a unique combination of animals (or primary
structures) at two different levels of biological organization,
because the rational subject, as the agent of reason, is responsible
for both. The priority of morality is a necessary goal of the
spiritual animal (in virtue of controlling a condition that affects
its reproduction as a whole), and since it does not conflict with any
necessary goal of individual interest, being moral is what
contributes to the natural perfection of their combination. Thus, it
is good for rational subjects to take morality as prior to their
individual interest. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In response
to Moores open question argument, once again, it will not make
sense for rational beings who understand the nature of reason and its
place in the natural world to ask, But is what contributes to the
natural perfection of both spiritual animals and their members good? </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This reason
for being moral is also part of the wisdom that Socrates was seeking,
because this ontological explanation of the nature of goodness
explains why the priority of moral rules is good for the rational
subject. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">W<img src="" name="OdmE_9" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="133" height="83" border="0">hat
makes this an adequate explanation of why it is good for the rational
subject to be moral is the assumption that moral rules do not
conflict with the attainment of necessary goals of his individual
self interest. But morality is not the only way that his spiritual
interest can conflict with his individual interest. The pursuit of
optional goals of the spiritual animal may conflict with the rational
subjects pursuit of necessary goals of individual interest, and
thus, there is another conflict among goals that needs to be
resolved. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Conflicts
clearly do occur between goals of the spiritual animal and the
necessary goals of the individual. Spiritual animals often find it
useful to sacrifice some of its members in pursuing its social level
goals, especially in civilized societies, where a class structure
gives some members enormous power over other members, and in mass
societies, where subgroups are historically antagonistic with one
another. The history of oppression shows that this possibility has
been actualized far too often. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">One kind of
conflict between spiritual and individual goals is so basic to the
existence of both, however, that its burden on individuals cannot be
counted as contrary to the necessary goals of individual self
interest. That is the need of individual members to risk their lives
in war. War is the inevitable form of group level natural selection
that is responsible for the evolution of rational spiritual animals,
and thus, neither spiritual animals nor rational beings can exist
without accepting the burdens of fighting. The sacrifice of
individuals in war does not, therefore, conflict with the attainment
of necessary goals of individual self interest in the relevant sense.
</font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The same
may be said about dealing with natural disasters, insofar as group
level action that sacrifices individual members is required to
control conditions that affect the reproduction of the spiritual
animal as a whole. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
rules of justice are meant to limit spiritual animals in the pursuit
of its social goals in order to protect the rights of individuals.
They are generally formulated in terms of inviolable individual
rights because they are meant to protect individual rational subjects
from being sacrificed unnecessarily in the pursuit of spiritual
goals. Such rights include the most basic means by which rational
subjects pursue goals of individual interest, both necessary and
optional. Such rights include all the means the rational subject must
have in order to attain necessary goals of their individual interest,
and there are two general classes of them: basic liberties and
distributive justice. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Basic
liberties. </i>Rational subjects must have the basic means required
to attain necessary goals and lead a normal life, including the right
to lead ones life free from unreasonable arrest or other
unnecessary restrictions, the right to speak, associate and contract
with other people in public, the right to hold the beliefs that one
takes to be true, the right to an equal opportunity to pursue
optional goals and the like. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Distributive
justice</i>. Rational subjects must have enough economic power to be
able, with a reasonable effort, to provide the material conditions of
life, including the means for attaining necessary goals, such as
food, shelter, medicine, and the capacity to have a normal social
life. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">But
when spiritual goals do conflict with necessary goals of individual
self interest, why should the spiritual animal observe rules of
justice? This is the mirror image of the issue about the priority of
moral rules over the pursuit of goals of individual interest. We are
asking why the rules of justice are prior to the pursuit of goals of
spiritual self interest? </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">All the
goals are goals for reason, that is, for rational subjects acting in
their capacity as the behavior guidance system for both the
individual and spiritual animal, and what ought to exist depends on
what contributes to the natural perfection of the whole, including
both the spiritual animal and its members. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
individual self interest and the spiritual self interest are equal,
because they are good in parallel ways, that is, each by contributing
to the natural perfection of the organism (or primary structure) on
its level of biological organization, and ontological philosophy
provides no grounds for preferring one over the other. Both are
equally the responsibility of reason. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">When
individual and spiritual goals conflict, what ought to exist for
reason is what contributes to the natural perfection of reason as the
behavior guidance system for both biological levels, that is, for the
rational subject as a rational being. But what are the priorities? </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">What
makes an optimal balance of individual and spiritual interests
possible is that the necessary goals of individual and spiritual self
interest can both normally be attained without conflict. After all,
spiritual animals are viable organisms. They could not have evolved
in the first place unless groups of multicellular animals with
coordinated behavior were better able to control the conditions
affecting both reproduction on both the individual and social level. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
compatibility of their necessary goals means that only optional goals
need to be restricted for the good of necessary goals. We have
assumed all along that necessary goals at each biological level take
priority over the optional goals at that level. And we have just seen
that the necessary goals of spiritual interest take precedence over
the optional goals of individual interest. Thus, to see the optimal
resolution in this case, we need only consider how necessary goals of
individual interest take precedence, in the same way, over optional
goals of spiritual interest. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
resolution of this conflict between individual and spiritual interest
is the mirror image of the resolution that explained why <i>moral
rules </i>takes priority over the pursuit of goals in ones
individual interest. In this case, it explain why <i>rules of justice
</i>take priority over the pursuit of goals in ones spiritual
interest. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
both cases, the necessary goals of one biological level take
precedence over the optional goals of the other level. That is a
symmetrical relationship. And in both cases, that priority determines
what is good for reason because it is what contributes to the natural
perfection of the whole of which rational subjects are part, that is,
the unique combination of reproducing organisms (or primary
structures) that have evolved by reproductive causation at two levels
of biological at once. (The priorities are depicted in the diagram of
the symmetry of individual and spiritual interests).</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="center" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><img 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" name="SymSiS" align="bottom" width="513" height="271" border="0"></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Rules
of justice limit the pursuit of goals of spiritual interest in the
same way that rules of morality limits the pursuit of goals of
individual interest. In both cases, the necessary goals of one
interest are the foundation for limits on the pursuit of goals of the
other interest. But they limit the pursuit of necessary goals in a
different way from how they limit the pursuit of optional goals. They
limit only the <i>means </i>to the attainment of necessary goals, but
they can limit the pursuit of certain <i>kinds </i>of optional goals.
</font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
necessary goals of individual interest limit <i>how </i>the spiritual
animal pursues its necessary social level goals (just as moral rules
limit how the rational subject pursues its necessary individual
goals). Though there are certain goals that spiritual animals must
attain, there are ways of attaining them that do not keep individual
from pursuing their necessary individual goals. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This is not
to say that the spiritual animal cannot sacrifice the property and
even the lives of individual members in pursuit of necessary goals,
such as victory at war and protecting against natural disasters. But
those exceptions are already included. Avoiding the risk of war or
avoiding mutual defense against natural disasters is not a <i>possible
</i>means of controlling conditions affecting individual reproduction
for members of spiritual animals, and thus, they are not necessary
goals of individual self interest in the first place. Mutual
protection from predators (and other natural disasters) and fighting
wars have been necessary to the existence of the spiritual animal
from the beginning. But individual rights protect the means that
spiritual animals use to attain such necessary individual goals
within the limits of morality, and no infringement on the rights of
individual is justified.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Rules
of justice would limit the optional goals that the spiritual animal
can choose (just as moral rules limit the optional goals that
rational subjects can choose). There may be optional spiritual goals
that the spiritual animal is not permitted to pursue because they
would conflict with individuals pursuing their necessary individual
goals. But that is not a severe limitation on spiritual animals since
optional goals are good for spiritual animals only because they are
chosen and there are plenty of other optional spiritual goals on
which spiritual animals may spend their extra power of rational
coordinated action. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">For
example, the spiritual animal would not be justified in sacrificing
the life of one member to use various of his organs to save the lives
of several other rational subjects, even though that may maximize the
total happiness, because maximizing happiness is an optional goal and
it would violate his right to life. (Individuals may, of course,
contract with others to set up such an arrangement, and the spiritual
animal might be in the position of having to enforce the contract.
But what makes the arrangement good is that it serves the individual
interests of the participants, and what makes it good for the
spiritual animal to enforce it, if it is, is that it is good to keep
the contracts one makes.)</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
may be conflicts between optional spiritual goals and optional
individual goals. They will be limited if spiritual animals pursue
optional goals only when there is a consensus about them, because the
individuals would all contract, in effect, to cooperate in some
social level goal. But if there are conflicts between optional goals
on the individual and social biological levels, they do not pose any
basic problem about what contributes to the natural perfection of the
whole, that is, both the spiritual animal and its members, because
optional goals are good <i>for reason </i>only because they are
chosen and no matter how much extra power rational beings may have,
there are plenty of optional goals to choose from. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
symmetry between the individual and spiritual interests of rational
beings makes it clear, therefore, which goals contribute to the
natural perfection of the whole of which reason is part, including
both the spiritual animal and its members. Rational subjects acting
in their individual self interest ought to observe moral rules, and
rational subjects acting in their spiritual self interest (that is,
in guiding social level behavior) ought to observe rules of justice,
including both basic liberties and distributive justice (the economic
means to attain necessary individual goals). This is the way to
maximize the attainment of all the goals being pursued by rational
beings, for by including the attainment of necessary goals on both
levels, it makes it possible to pursue optional goals on both level
of biological organization. Thus, it is the set of priorities that
contributes to the natural perfection of rational beings. Thus, it is
good to be moral and to be just. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
response to Moores open question argument, once again, it will not
make sense for rational beings who understand the nature of reason
and its place in the natural world to ask, But is what contributes to
the natural perfection of both spiritual animals and their members
good? </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
reason for being moral is also part of the wisdom that Socrates was
seeking, because this ontological explanation of the nature of
goodness explains why the priority of moral rules is good for the
rational subject. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0; page-break-before: always">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdnR_1" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="117" height="52" border="0">he
one remaining question is whether there is any other practical
interest of reason. The traditional answer is that there is a kind of
goal that is higher than both individual and spiritual interest,
namely, religious interest, or the recognition of something that is
worthy of worship. Is there anything holy in a spatiomaterial world
like ours?</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">To
assert that reason also has a religious interest is to hold that
there is something worthy of its worship, that is, something that
reason ought to recognize as holy or sacred and, thus, hold in
reverence. Such an object would have to be of such exalted glory that
it would inspire reason to adore it and act in a way befitting it.
Such an object would be the source of a new kind of goal for reason,
a goal which serves the religious interest of rational beings. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">God”
is the name traditionally given for the object of the religious
attitude, and the philosophical defense of religion has traditionally
(in the West) been an argument for the existence of God. God is
supposed to be a being of such surpassing perfection that He is
worthy of our worship. But the belief in the existence of a being
outside of space and time who is responsible for the natural world is
supernaturalism, indeed, supernaturalism in its most familiar form,
and that is what ontological philosophy gives up with its basic
assumption of naturalism. Thus, if the existence of a transcendent
God were what is required for reason to have a religious interest,
then ontological philosophy would have to deny that reason has any
such interest.</span></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
repudiation of belief in a transcendent God has led naturalists to
see religion in terms of its traditional function of justifying
morality, and thus, it might be argued that ontological philosophy
has already explained the religious interest by the spiritual
interest of reason, as part of necessary truths of theoretical reason
about what is. But if that is all there is to be said about religion,
God is an illusion, and there are no religious goals for ontological
reason to pursue, because ontological philosophy explains religion
away. Ontological philosophy reveals that the reason for being moral
derives from our spiritual interest, that is, from the function of
reason as the behavior guidance system for both the spiritual animal
and the individual. It would follow, then, that reason did not pursue
religious goals because there is actually something worthy of
worship, but simply because such beliefs were the most efficient way
of guiding behavior to contribute to the natural perfection of
rational beings, both individual and spiritual. It would debunk
religion, because once ontological reason saw through its function,
religion would no longer be needed to justify morality or to justify
submitting to the group. Nor would reason be able to believe in
anything like God, except, of course, as their own spiritual animal.
But to hold that the interest of their own spiritual animal is what
is served by the pursuit of religious goals would be to reduce
religion to tribalism. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">If this is
how ontological philosophy must treat religion, people with a
religious sensibility would surely use it as a weapon against
ontological philosophy. It is ontological philosophy that believes in
tribalism, for it makes the spiritual animal the source of highest
goods that reason pursues. By contrast, traditional religions,
despite their troubled histories, have usually thought of their goals
as something more than mere tribalism, especially Christianity and
Islam, with their universalistic claims. Thus, if ontological
philosophy must simply dismiss religion, as most contemporary
naturalists do, there are many people who will be disillusioned, if
they accept it, and regret the absence of anything of truly ultimate
value. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
issue is, therefore, whether there is anything in a spatiomaterial
world like ours that is worthy of worship by rational beings, that
is, anything that rational beings would submit to from sheer
knowledge of its exalted nature. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">None of the
goals of reason explained thus far by ontological philosophy can be
considered religious, because they are not pursued from awe at the
prospect of something of extraordinary perfection and glory.
Necessary goals of reason are pursued because they control conditions
that affect the reproduction of the individuals or spiritual animals
whose behavior reason guides. To be sure, optional goals are good for
contributing to the natural (or artificial) perfection of something
other than rational beings, but they are good for rational beings
only because they are chosen. If ontological reason has a religious
interest, therefore, there must be goals that are more valuable for
reason than mere optional goals without being required in the way
that necessary goals are.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The only
way ontological reason could have such an interest is if there is
something worthy of worship in a spatiomaterial world like ours. And
as it turns out, there is. The reason is that it is possible that
there is — or will be — an absolutely perfect being in a
spatiomaterial world like ours. And the possibility of such a perfect
being is enough, as we shall see, to make the religious attitude
appropriate and to explain how reason has a religious interest in
addition to its individual and spiritual interest. Ontological reason
will pursue goals that are good because they contribute to the
natural perfection of the world itself, and the pursuit of such
religious goals will make the world even more perfect. Indeed, since
ontological reason takes responsibility for doing what is good for
the world, as well as the individuals and spiritual animals whose
behavior it already guides, it will be the agent for the world,
making the world itself a rational being. Thus, the world itself will
be a perfect rational being. God is immanent, not transcendent.
Though such an absolutely perfect rational being is something that
will be created by reason, it is something that is worthy of worship,
and the work of ontological reason in the world is to bring God into
existence. That is how reason <i>makes </i>the world &quot;whole.&quot;
</font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">A<img src="" name="OdnR_2" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="106" height="41" border="0">
Perfect Being is possible in a spatiomaterial world like ours,
because it could be the outcome of evolution. We have seen how the
basic nature of a spatiomaterial world with a large scale structure
like our own and with matter that is capable of taking on complex
molecular structures like ours makes evolution by reproductive
causation inevitable. Not only does evolution inevitably begin on
suitable planets, but it goes through inevitable stages that lead up
to rational beings like us. And as we have seen, when reason finally
comes to understand how the world is whole, it discovers its own
nature as a behavior guidance system for both the individual and the
spiritual animal, and as I have suggested, that makes reason the most
powerful being in the world. But what I want to suggest now is that,
if rational beings take the perfect being that would come to exist
they it were to pursue religious goals to be worthy of worship,
ontological reason will eventually evolve all the perfections that
have traditionally been attributed to God, insofar as that is
possible in a spatiomaterial world. The evolution of ontological
reason would make the world itself an absolutely perfect being, that
is, God. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdnR_3" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="74" height="37" border="0">he
personal perfection attributed to God are omniscience, omnipotence,
and absolute goodness. It is possible for reason to evolve all the
perfections attributed to God as a person, because a person is a
rational being and theses traits are the perfection of reason as a
behavior guidance system. They are, respectively, the perfection of
knowing, doing, and choosing. This would be the outcome of a late
phase of cultural evolution during the philosophical stage of
spiritual evolution, one that starts with reason understanding of its
own nature and place in the world (that is, with ontological reason)
and may not be complete for some time. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Reason has
three functions, let us recall, because behavior guidance systems are
not mere cybernetic (or functional) systems, which use feedback to
guide their behavior toward some goal, but have a function in
addition to input and output, namely, choosing between incompatible
goals. Even if the same input is used to select the kind of behavior
and to generate it, as in animals, the selection is a third,
essential sub-function of behavior guidance systems, the one that
makes them the locus of evolutionary progress. It is the perfection
of these three functions of behavior guidance systems that accounts
for the traditional perfections: omniscience has to do with the input
function, omnipotence with the output function, and absolute goodness
with the function of choosing. In rational beings, the first has to
do with the perfection of knowing, the second with the perfection of
doing, and the third with the perfection of choosing. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>O<img src="" name="OdnR_4" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="54" height="34" border="0">mniscience</i>.
Reason will eventually be omniscient, because the input to this
behavior guidance system will be the most complete knowledge of the
world possible. Reason will be able to know everything that it is
possible for reason to know about the world. That is possible, given
the nature of space and matter in our world, since as we know,
everything in the world and everything about the world can be
explained by how it is constituted by those two kinds of opposite
substances. What is ontologically necessary in a spatiomaterial world
like our own can be known without explaining why the basic laws of
physics are true, but there is no reason to doubt that reason will
eventually understand the essential natures of space and matter that
make the basic laws of physics true. The knowledge of what is
ontologically necessary is the framework that makes it possible to
explain as completely as required any aspect of the world. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To be sure,
this kind of omniscience does not include knowing all the contingent
details about the world, nor does it include knowing aspects of the
future that depend on its own practical reasoning. But that is the
kind of omniscience one might expect of a transcendent God, not what
can be expected of an immanent God. As an immanent God, reason will
be able to know as much about any contingent aspect of the world as
is possible for any part of a world made of space and matter. And
since it will be able to figure out how efficient causes can be used
to control whatever can be controlled in such a world, it will be
able to discover whatever is relevant to attaining its goals. That is
as much as is possible for a being in space and time.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">As
ontological reason begins this phase, the biggest gap in its
knowledge is in astronomy and cosmology. But that does not affect the
possibility of this future course of evolution, because it does not
affect what reason knows about evolution and its own nature as the
outcome of biological evolution. It is not necessary to know why the
basic laws of physics are true to demonstrate the global regularities
about change; it is only necessary to know that they are true. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>O<img src="" name="OdnR_5" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="54" height="34" border="0">mnipotence.</i>
Reason will also be omnipotent, because the output of this behavior
guidance system can control conditions in the world as well as any
structural cause can in a spatiomaterial world like ours. Its
omniscience includes knowledge about the means to any goals it may
choose (or, at least, where to look for them and how to recognize
them when they are found), and so the only limit to its power will be
its ability to structure the thermodynamic flow of matter from
potential energy to evenly distributed heat. But reason is
responsible for guiding the behavior not only of individual rational
subjects, but also spiritual animals, and thus, no structural cause
can be more powerful than the spiritual structural cause of spiritual
animals guided by reason, for it can coordinate the behavior of as
many, independently moving animal bodies as are needed to attain the
goals that it pursues. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nothing can
equal its power except another spiritual animal. But as we shall see,
war would be overcome, when reason understands the nature of
goodness, because of its pursuit of religious goals. Understanding
the basic cause of war makes it clear what rational beings must do in
order to attain their goals without resorting to war. Without such
conflicts among spiritual animals, rational beings will be as
powerful as possible as anything that can exist in a spatiomaterial
world. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nor is the
omnipotence of such spiritual animals is merely potential. Though the
parts are rational subjects who are autonomous, they will cooperate
in pursuing the goals that spiritual animals pursue, if they are
good. Their autonomy as rational beings is what enables them to
cooperate in pursuing such goals, because it enables them to do what
they believe is good. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Though
reason will not be omnipotent in the way that a transcendent God is
supposed to be, it will be able to attain any goal that is it
possible for a part of a spatiomaterial world. And the lack of the
power to do magic or create a natural world from nothing is not a
real limitation, if the world is made of space and matter, because it
is not ontologically possible in the first place. Omniscience has
never been understood as the power to do what is impossible. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>A<img src="" name="OdnR_6" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="58" height="34" border="0">bsolute
Goodness.</i> Reason could also be absolutely good in the end. We
have already seen why reason would pursue what is good for reason.
All that needs to be added for reason to be a perfect being is that
it also pursue what is good for the world as a whole, that is, to
pursue religious goals. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Ontological
reason would always pursue what is good for itself, as we have seen,
because the function of choosing how to behave is served by a
behavior guidance system that discovers what is good by understanding
the nature of goodness. It recognizes that goodness is contributing
to natural perfection, and rational imagination gives reason the
ability to tell what is naturally perfect by seeing how it is a
unique optimum against the background of what is possible. And since
ontological reason recognizes itself as an essential part of such a
natural perfection, it has sufficient reason to do what is good. It
knows that there can be no reason not to do what contributes to the
natural perfection of which it is part. Thus, it will do what is good
for reason, that is, it will pursue goals that contribute to the
natural perfection of reason itself, including both necessary and
optional goals.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
order to be absolutely good in the sense implicit in traditional
theology, however, reason would have to pursue goals beyond what is
good for rational subjects and spiritual animals. To do Gods work
is to pursue religious goals, and that means pursuing goals that are
good in virtue of contributing to the natural perfection of the world
itself. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">That would
be possible, if there are conditions that reason can bring about that
would make the world itself more naturally perfect and they would not
come to be in any other way. The natural perfection toward which
evolution proceeds is only what is possible by reproductive
causation, and natural selection is a crude instrument that takes
much time and can involve much suffering. By doing what natural
selection cannot do, or doing it more quickly or less wastefully,
reason could make contributions to natural perfection that are not
otherwise possible. It might make the structural causes bundled
together in organisms or the organisms combined in ecologies even
more optimal in the sense of having more power to control relevant
conditions, and reason might make contributions to the natural
perfection of life and the natural perfection of change by avoiding
setbacks in evolutionary progress or changing their timing. Such
goals would require much more detailed understanding of the evolving
structures involved, but it is not impossible to make the world even
more naturally perfect than it would be otherwise. Thus, reason could
be good in the sense of doing what is good for the world itself,
rather than just what is good for rational subjects and spiritual
animals. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
are some specific goals that might be good for reason to pursue
because they contribute something to the natural perfection of the
world that cannot come to exist in any other way. They include the
goals mentioned above as optional goals for spiritual animals. But
what we need to recognize now in order to see how there could be a
perfect being in a spatiomaterial world like ours is that they are
also good in a different way -- not because they are chosen, but
because they contribute to the natural perfection of the world.
Instead of being optional, we need to suppose that reason pursues
them because they are good for the world as a whole, thereby taking
responsibility for making the world more perfect than it would be
otherwise. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">One such
goal is the protection of the ecology from disruption by spiritual
animals, or what is called protection of the environment. Though the
capacity to survive storms, asteroids and other natural disasters may
be part of the natural perfection of the ecology, protection from
what spiritual animals do to it is unique, because it is an effect on
the ecology that only reason can control. Furthermore, there may also
be other ways in which reason might make the ecology more perfect in
the sense of maximizing the use of available free energy to fuel
reproductive cycles than is possible by reproductive causation. For
example, it might make the ecology more perfect to tend it like a
garden so that more of the available free energy is consumed.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Another
such goal would be to replace the natural selection of spiritual
animals by warfare with measures that would make spiritual animals
just as perfect, but without the suffering involved in warfare. The
only way to stop war, however, is to control population growth, since
war is merely the form that the natural selection caused by
reproduction takes in the case of spiritual animals. But this would
not necessarily make evolution and the world more naturally perfect,
unless reason also tended to spiritual animals themselves so that
they become no less naturally perfect for organisms of their kind
without natural selection. But if that is possible, it would surely
make the world itself more perfect, because it would attain the same
end with fewer and simpler means than all suffering the effects of
war. War is, after all, a very wasteful means to the evolution of
spiritual animals. Thus, the creation of a world order in which all
spiritual animals could live in peace with one another into the
indefinite future is a plausible religious goal.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Another
possible religious goal would take over natural selection at the
individual level as well as the social level. Natural selection at
the individual level is responsible for rational subjects evolving
toward the natural perfection of organisms of their kind, but insofar
as it is still at work, it is also a wasteful process because of the
suffering that it involves (such as individuals dying of genetic
diseases). But reason could take over from natural selection as the
cause of individual evolution by intervening in the germ line to
correct genetic defects and to change genetic structures so that
rational subjects are more powerful in attaining the goals they
pursue, that is, are more naturally perfect as rational subjects. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">There are
surely other religious goals, including many that can be pursued on
the individual level, because there are other changes that reason
could bring about in the world that are neither necessary goals nor
mere optional goals, but that would make the world itself more
naturally perfect. And as far as spiritual animals are concerned, one
of the more important religious goals will probably be the
colonization of the solar system in the sense of changing conditions
on them so that life can evolve on them as well as on earth. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">All
that is required for the outcome of evolution to have the personal
perfections traditionally attributed to God is for ontological reason
to pursue goals because they contribute to the natural perfection of
the world itself, rather than just because they contribute to the
natural perfection of reason in its role as the behavior guidance
system for rational subjects and spiritual animals. That would mean
that religious goals rank after the necessary goals of rational
beings, yet ahead of their optional goals. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Religious
goals would not be good because they are necessary goals of reason.
Necessary goals of reason are those that control conditions that
affect its reproduction, either as individuals or as spiritual
animals. But religious goals are good because they contribute to the
natural perfection, not of the individual or the spiritual animal,
but the world itself. Religious goals cannot reduce to necessary
goals of reason as the behavior guidance system of the world, because
there are no conditions that affect the reproduction of the world
itself. What makes religious goals good is simply contributing to the
natural perfection of the world. But that requires seeing the world
itself as a form of natural perfection. It depends on reason
understanding the nature of goodness as contributing to natural
perfection and seeing how what reason can do beyond merely
controlling conditions that affect the reproduction of rational
beings would contribute to the natural perfection of the whole. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nor would
religious goals be good as mere optional goals, either of individual
subjects or spiritual animals. Optional goals are good for reason
because they are already good in some way, and reason makes them good
for reason by choosing them. Though religious goals are also already
good, they are good in a unique way, because they contribute to the
natural perfection of the world itself, not just to the natural (or
artificial) perfection of a part of it that happens to catch ones
fancy. Nor are religious goals good for reason simply because reason
chooses to pursue them. Rather they are good because they make the
world itself naturally perfect. If religious goals are good for
reason at all, they are good for reason whether or not rational
beings choose to pursue them. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
religious interest, if ontological reason has such an interest, is,
therefore, distinct from both necessary and optional goals. There is
no reason to believe that religious goals would conflict with the
necessary goals of reason, because the control of conditions
affecting individual and social level reproduction would be an
essential part of the natural perfection of the world. But the
pursuit of religious goals would affect the pursuit of optional
goals, both individual and spiritual, because reason would see their
goodness as prior to optional goals. Most optional goals would be
compatible with the natural perfection of the world, because optional
goals also contribute to natural (or artificial) perfection in some
way. But the religious interest would set priorities among optional
goals, because in the context of an overall plan is to make the world
itself perfect, some optional goals will contribute more to the
natural perfection of the whole than others. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ontological
reason has, therefore, the potentiality of being not only omniscient
and omnipotent, but also absolutely good. But if that is the future
of evolution, it means that the advent of ontological philosophy is
only the beginning of a phase of the philosophical stage of the
gradual evolution of spiritual animals that leads to it. It will be
mainly cultural evolution by rational selection, but the natural
perfection for culture of this kind may not be complete until the far
distant future, because there may be much for reason to do,
including, perhaps, even stages in the evolution of the means it uses
to attain its ends. After all, the social and political problems that
it must solve are not insignificant and reason has only begun to
acquire the technological control of nature that is possible.
However, if ontological reason does pursue religious goals, a perfect
being with all three personal perfections traditionally attributed to
God would be the natural perfection toward which gradual change
during that stage will proceed. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
existence of such a perfect individual and spiritual being in the
world would be a form of natural perfection by our definition of
“natural perfection,” because it would be the kind of optimal
part-whole relation that makes the most of what exists in a
spatiomaterial world like ours. For an all-knowing and all-powerful
being to act for the good of the world as a whole would be for
structural causes to use as much free energy as possible to control
as much as possible of what happens in the world. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To pursue
religious goals would make reason more powerful than simply pursuing
necessary and optional goals, because it would be to set a priority
among optional goals with an eye to making the world as a whole
naturally perfect. Since the goals pursued would do what is required
for the natural perfection of the whole, they would fit together more
completely than any other set of goals, and thus, reason would be
doing as much as possible to control what happens in the world. In
other words, to pursue goals that conflict with religious goals could
only detract from the maximum power of life, and to pursue optional
goals instead of religious goals would be to have less effect on the
world than is possible. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Acknowledging
its religious interest would, of course, make only its planetary
system naturally perfect, because given how space separates it from
other planetary systems, that is the only part of the world that it
can affect. But that is all that ontological reason can contribute to
the natural perfection of the world as a whole, at least, for the
foreseeable future. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Furthermore,
it is clear that there can be no further evolutionary stage in the
series that has led to ontological reason, because there is no higher
level of part-whole complexity in reason as a behavior guidance
system that would make it any more powerful. No higher level of
forensic organization (that is, in the part-whole complexity of
argument) can guide behavior any better than one in which reason
understands its own nature as a system for guiding behavior that has
evolved in a world of matter and space in time like our own, for
there is no higher level of reflection than one that understands the
wholeness of the world. Ontological philosophy is already complete in
that way. Thus, once reason understands its own nature and function
as a behavior guidance system, no other structure could discover what
is good for individuals or spiritual animals better than it. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">There is,
by the way, no possibility that machines constructed as artifacts
will replace multicellular animals as rational subjects, except for
modifications of human biology. A machine could, perhaps, eventually
be as powerful as reason, though that would require it to have
rational imagination (including spatial and structural imagination as
well as the capacity to reflect on itself). But such a machine would
not be conscious in the way we are, unless it was constructed of
neurons like our own, because the phenomenal properties whose
intrinsic natures explain the subjective aspect of experience (or the
fact that it is like something to perceive and think) are the
intrinsic natures of the photons generated by the synchronized firing
of many neurons throughout the cerebrum, like an extraordinarily
complex antenna. Rational beings would not choose to replace
conscious rational beings with machines that are not conscious, that
is, with Zombies. They might know and control all the same conditions
that make the world perfect, but without the unity of mind, there is
a way in which the perfection would not exist at all. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">If,
therefore, ontological reason does find the prospect of such a
perfect being worthy of worship and reason does evolve toward natural
perfection of this kind, it will be the last stage of evolution,
because it will have a kind of behavior guidance system than which
none more naturally perfect can be conceived. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdnR_7" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="74" height="37" border="0">he
kind of natural perfection that exists at this point in the evolution
of philosophical spirit may be dwarfed by the perfection that
eventually comes to exist, but it is clear that its basic nature
permits it to acquire all the perfections that have traditionally
been attributed to God as a person. Indeed, the traditional view of
God can be seen as an attempt to conceive the greater perfection that
is potential in rational beings before reason understands its own
nature and place in the world. The traditional belief in God merely
looks for God in the wrong place, as something that transcends
nature, rather than as something in or about nature itself. But in
order to show that what could evolve from ontological reason is a
perfect being in the sense of a traditional God, it is necessary to
show that this kind of perfect being also has the ontological
perfections traditionally ascribed to God: being necessary,
ubiquitous, and eternal. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Just as
omniscience, omnipotence, and absolute goodness are simply the
perfection of the three subfunctions of a behavior guidance system,
so these three <i>ontological perfections </i>can be seen as holding
of reason because it is the inevitable outcome of evolution in a
world of matter and space like ours enduring through in time. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>N<img src="" name="OdnR_8" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="65" height="36" border="0">ecessary
being.</i> God as a perfect rational being would be a necessary being
in a spatiomaterial world like ours, if it is the eventual outcome of
evolution, because evolution is a process that inevitably gets
started on suitable planets. His existence would follow from the
nature of a world of matter and space in time, given that matter has
the nature described by the basic laws of physics in this world and
the universe has a large scale structure like our own. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">If
ontological reason inevitably acknowledges a religious interest, the
existence of a perfect being would be a consequence of the basic
nature of a spatiomaterial world like ours. Since evolution is, as we
have seen, a global regularity, we might say that the necessity of a
perfect rational being is shown mainly by recognizing how space is an
ontological cause of evolution. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This would
give God, however, the same kind of necessity that the world itself
has, and there is another way in which God has traditionally been
thought to be necessary. That is, substances exist necessarily
because they cannot come into existence nor go out of existence as
time passes, and that makes God necessary, since God is their
necessary ontological effect. But the necessary existence of God has
been said to derive from His being the cause of Himself, or <i>causa
sui</i>. That would also be true of this perfect rational being, as
we shall see, if ontological reason, in its practical capacity,
inevitably acknowledges a religious interest. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>U<img src="" name="OdnR_9" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="63" height="36" border="0">biquitous
being.</i> God is ubiquitous in a spatiomaterial world, because it is
a necessary being. Reason will evolve everywhere in a spatiomaterial
world with a large scale structure like our own, though its frequency
depends on how often suitable planets occur. If reason must evolve
into God, God will exist throughout the universe. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To be sure,
scientists who understand that life could exist on other planets have
set up antennas to listen for messages from more advanced life forms
in the hope of solving the mysteries of the universe, and they have
come up with nothing. But if ontological philosophy is right about
the course of evolution, that is just what we should expect.
Ontological reason will not even try to communicate with life on
other planets, because it will know that intervening and solving the
problems that reason confronts on other planets would only cripple
the spiritual beings that are evolving there. On the other hand, if
ontological reason has already evolved on distant planets, there is
nothing to say to them, at least, not in that way. (There may be
other ways that rational beings from different planetary systems
interact. But they will be severely limited, given the distances they
are separated in space and the impossibility of traveling faster than
light, and they will occur at a much later point in the evolution of
perfect rational beings.) </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Reason is
also ubiquitous in another sense, which comes from its spiritual
nature as the behavior guidance system of a spiritual animal. As
ontological reason evolves control over everything that happens on
its planet or in its planetary system, there will be a single
spiritual structural cause whose non-reproductive work dominates its
entire planet, and eventually the entire planetary system where it
evolves.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
ubiquity of a perfect being is a consequence of the basic nature of a
spatiomaterial world like ours, but in a world that is obviously in
space, evolution depends on matter being of the same kind everywhere.
Hence, we might hold that its ubiquity is shown mainly by how matter
is an ontological cause of evolution.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>E<img src="" name="OdnR_10" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="60" height="36" border="0">ternal
being. </i>God is eternal in a spatiomaterial world, also because it
is a necessary being. God will exist as long as the universe itself
does, because He will evolve again and again throughout the existence
of the world. If the universe is eternal, God will have eternal life.
</font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Moreover,
particular Gods can be eternal in their own planetary systems,
because spiritual animals can exist indefinitely, even if individual
rational subjects cannot, and there will always be some free energy
to use as fuel for their reproductive cycles. Though God may have to
inhabit only the farther reaches of the planetary system when the sun
becomes a red giant and engulfs the earth. There is now about four
and a half billion years to prepare. And if the red giant later
becomes a white dwarf, God could move back in closer and have all the
free energy required to exist indefinitely, if He so chooses. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This is to
hold that the expansion of the universe does not end (as suggested in
our discussion of cosmology). That is the most likely case, because
as far as scientists can tell, there is not enough matter for
gravitation to cause the universe to collapse back to another Big
Bang, and apparently not even enough to slow the expansion to a stop
asymptotically, that means the universe is eternal. However, if the
Big Bang is a recurrent local process, as suggested earlier, there
would be no end to the evolution of perfect rational beings. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
eternity of a perfect being is also a consequence of the basic nature
of a spatiomaterial world like ours. But since it depends on how the
space and matter constituting the world endure through time as
substances, its eternity is shown mainly by how time is an aspect of
the existential aspect of the nature of substance as substance. Thus,
the eternality of God might be said to depend on how time is an
ontological cause of evolution. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">E<img src="" name="OdnR_11" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="74" height="37" border="0">xcept
for being the creator of the world, therefore, ontological reason
could eventually come to have all the perfections traditionally
attributed to God, both personal and ontological perfections. It
depends on whether ontological reason has a religious interest, that
is, on whether it chooses to pursue religious goals in addition to
its spiritual and individual goals, and that depends, in turns, on
whether the prospect of the perfect being that would result is worthy
of worship. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">A<img src="" name="OdnR_12" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="55" height="34" border="0">ll
that is required for ontological reason to evolve into a perfect
being is for it to pursue goals that are good because they contribute
to the natural perfection of the world itself, rather than just goals
that contribute to the natural perfection of reason as the behavior
guidance system for rational subjects and spiritual animals. Will
ontological reason pursue religious goals? </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
cannot be shown that reason ought to and will pursue religious goals
in the same way that its pursuit of individual and spiritual goals,
because religious goals do not contribute to the natural perfection
of rational beings. Religious goals are not necessary goals of
reason. They do not control conditions that affect the reproduction
of rational beings at either the multicellular or social level of
biological organization. And religious goals cannot be explained as
optional goals, for that does not explain their special worth. Nor
would optional religious goals make the existence of God inevitable. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To have a
religious interest, reason would have to be the behavior guidance
system for the world as a whole. But that is not a function reason
could possibly have as a result of biological evolution. The pursuit
of goals that contribute to the natural perfection of the world
cannot evolve like another level of biological organization,
beginning another stage of biological evolution, because the world
itself is not a reproducing organism. That is, the world as a whole
is not a primary structure generating reproductive cycles. Even
something as small as the planetary system or the planet is still the
whole in which evolution takes place, not a level of biological
organization. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
is nevertheless possible for ontological reason to have a religious
interest. The belief that rational beings ought to pursue religious
goals would evolve by the rational selection of practical arguments,
if what would result were perfect enough to be worthy of worship,
because to beings with a faculty of rational imagination, it will be
clear that accepting arguments for acknowledging a religious interest
gives them the most rationally coherent world view. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">As rational
beings come to understand the nature of reason and its place in the
world, they will see how it is possible for there to be a perfect
being in a spatiomaterial world like ours, and they will recognize
that its existence depends on whether they pursue religious goals, in
addition to the necessary and optional goals of their and spiritual
interest. If the perfect being that would result from pursuing
religious goals is exalted enough that rational beings revere it and
serve it from the sheer recognition of its unique natural perfection,
rational beings will identify with the world itself, not just their
spiritual animals or themselves as individuals. And by acting in the
interest of the world as a whole, they will contribute what only
reason can contribute to the natural perfection of all the organisms,
to the natural perfection of the ecology, to the natural perfection
of life, and to the natural perfection of evolutionary change itself.
And by pursuing religious goals, a perfect being will come to exist
in their planetary system. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
answer that ontological reason will give to this question is obvious
to anyone who understands the situation in which reason will find
itself and what is at stake in its choice. Once ontological
philosophy evolves in the cultures of existing spiritual animals,
rational beings will actually face this choice, and the answer will
be acted out in history, determining the future course of evolution.
But as rational beings who have traveled the path of this whole
argument, we are in a position to know that ontological reason will
see the perfect being that they can bring into existence by their
actions as worth the effort. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Reason
gives them more power than they need to pursue necessary goals, and
among the optional goals that are open to them, some will take
precedence because they contribute to the natural perfection of the
whole of which they are part. By acknowledging that it has a
religious interest, reason will change in the direction of maximum
holistic power, because when the world as a whole is naturally
perfect, as much as possible of what happens in its planetary system
will be controlled using the available free energy as efficiently as
possible. Ontological reason will, therefore, choose to pursue
religious goals. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This choice
is similar to another stage of evolution, because an entire new range
of conditions come under the control of living organisms. In this
case, those conditions are not relevant in the sense of affecting the
reproduction of an organism with a higher level of part-whole
complexity. But the conditions that are controlled are on a higher
level of part-whole complexity than the necessary and optional goals
of rational beings, because they contribute to the natural perfection
of the world itself (that is, at the scale of its planetary system,
the part of the world it can affect). Thus, what makes it good to
pursue religious goals is the same thing that makes a higher level of
part-whole complexity in evolving organisms good: it contributes to
the natural perfection of life. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Though the
autonomy of reason makes it possible to pursue any goals that are
good, the pursuit of religious goals maximizes the holistic power of
reason, because, as we have seen, they are aimed at controlling all
those conditions that make the biggest difference in the perfection
of the world as a whole. There is no other set of goals that would
enable reason to control more of what happens in the world, and thus,
religious goals would contribute to the natural perfection of reason
itself. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>T<img src="" name="OdnR_13" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="56" height="34" border="0">he
self-creation of God. </i>For rational beings to choose to pursue
religious goals, however, is for ontological reason to choose to
transform itself into God. It is the prospect of a perfect being
inspires them to make this choice, but the perfect being in prospect
comes from reason itself, and thus, it comes from reason choosing to
do what is good because it contributes to the natural perfection of
the world as a whole. But since that is to act as the perfect being
that ontological reason intends to bring into existence, God already
exists in those actions. Thus, the belief in God is a self-fulfilling
belief. God creates Himself. And God continues to create Himself in
all the actions that are done in the interest of the world itself. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Even the
immanent God in a spatiomaterial world like ours would be <i>causa
sui</i>. God would create Himself, because ontological reason makes
itself into God by acting in the name of God. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>The
world as a rational being.</i> To pursue religious goals is, however,
to act for the good of the world as a whole, and thus, it is for the
world itself to be a rational being. That is, ontological reason
takes up the function of being the behavior guidance system for the
world itself, and thus, it does for the world what it does for the
spiritual animal and for the individual rational subject. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To be sure,
the world does not become a rational being because it is a
reproducing organism like individuals and spiritual animals, imposing
natural selection on themselves by their own reproduction. But that
is merely to say that the world does become a rational being as a
direct result of natural selection, or biological reproductive
causation. It is due, instead, to the cultural evolution of practical
arguments by rational selection. The world acquires the power of
reason to do what contributes to the natural perfection of the world
itself, because the kind of natural perfection that inevitably comes
to exist within it includes rational beings who are able to
understand how the world is whole, who recognize themselves as a
necessary consequence of its nature, and who see how and why it is
good for them to act in the interest of the world as a whole. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>The
world as a perfect rational being.</i> Since this outcome is
inevitable, however, the world is not only a rational being, but a
perfect rational being. The nature of a spatiomaterial world like
ours makes it inevitable that evolution will begin, because as we
have seen, the effect of the cycle of night and day on the kinds of
molecules that exist on suitable planets is the existence of
reproductive cycles, which impose natural selection on themselves.
The course of evolution is inevitable, because, as we have seen, it
involves an inevitable series of evolutionary stages, each caused by
a higher level of part-whole complexity in the evolving structures of
reproductive organisms (taken broadly to include arguments that
reproduce within spiritual animals as primary structures). We have
seen how the inevitable outcome is ontological reason, that is,
rational beings who understand how the world is whole, who recognize
themselves as the inevitable outcome of evolution, and who inevitably
choose to pursue religious goals because they see how it would make
the world itself perfect. With reason acting as a behavior guidance
system in its interest, the world is a rational being. But since it
is an inevitable consequence of the nature of a spatiomaterial world
like ours, it is an expression of the essential nature of what
exists. The nature of the world is revealed, not only in the basic
nature of what exists, the essential natures of space and matter in
time and how they exist together as a world, but also in the nature
of what inevitably comes to exist from it. Thus, it turns out that
the world itself is perfect. And since the world is inevitably a
rational being, the world is a perfect rational being.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">What we
have been calling “natural perfection” are part-whole relations
that are optimal because of the basic nature of the world, but now we
find that that nature not only sets the standard of perfection, but
also measures up to it in the most complete way. In general, the
perfect makes the most out of the least. But the standard of
perfection appropriate to nature is fixed by the second law of
thermodynamics, because that makes it possible for structural causes
to use the thermodynamic flow of potential energy towards evenly
distributed heat to make things happen that would not otherwise
happen. Judged according to this standard, part-whole relations are
optimal when structural causes are combined in such a way that they
use the available free energy as efficiently as possible to control
as much of what happens in the world as possible. That is how to make
the most out of what exists in a world constituted by space and
matter enduring through time. And now we find that the basic nature
of the world not only sets the standard of natural perfection, but
also makes it inevitable that what happens in the world eventually
measures up to that standard as completely as possible. And it is
more complete than what is possible by natural selection alone,
because it uses a behavior guidance system that guides behavior to
what is good by recognizing how and why the good is good, even when
it does not control conditions that affect its own reproduction. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>The
world as God.</i> Since the world, because of its very nature,
inevitably becomes a perfect rational being, the world itself is God.
As ontological reason acknowledges its religious interest, it takes
responsibility for the world as a whole, doing what ought to be done
because it contributes to the natural perfection of the world as a
whole. That is the work of ontological reason in the world, to act
for the good of the world itself.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, it
will be possible for ontological reason to answer G. E. Moores
doubts about the possibility of any such naturalistic explanation of
the goodness of religious goals in the same way as it does his doubts
about the goodness of other goals. To a rational subject who
understands her nature as a rational subject and her place in the
natural world, including her identification with the world as much as
with her spiritual animal or her individual Self, it will simply does
not make sense to ask, But is contributing to the natural perfection
of the world good? She will know that it is contributing to her own
natural perfection and, thus, that it is good in the same way as her
other goals are good. Religious self interest will, therefore, take
its place, along with spiritual self interest and individual self
interest, as what determines the goals she will pursue. That is, they
all contribute to the natural perfection of reason. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The pursuit
of religious goals is also the wisdom that Socrates was seeking,
because this ontological explanation of the nature of goodness
explains why religious goals are good for the rational subject in a
way that will make him religious. The pursuit of religious goals is
good for him as a rational being, because it contributes to his own
natural perfection. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>A<img src="" name="OdnR_14" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="59" height="34" border="0">n
act of free will.</i> God comes into existence from an act of
self-creation, and though it is inevitable, it is an act of free
will. As we have seen, free will is autonomy, or the power that
reason gives individual subjects to do the good simply because they
know that it is good. The choice of ontological reason to pursue
religious goals is autonomous in that sense, because it comes from
the knowledge that it is good for rational beings to contribute what
only reason can contribute to the natural perfection of the world as
a whole. It is inevitable, but only because it really is good and
reason understands things so completely that it knows that it is
good. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Gods
act of self-creation within a spatiomaterial world is free in the
same sense that Aquinas had in mind when he argued that Gods
choice to create the natural world was free. Aquinas was, of course,
talking about the traditional, transcendent God of epistemological
philosophy. But he wanted to deny that the existence of the natural
world is a necessary consequence of Gods nature, because that
would mean that it was not an act of free will. What Aquinas meant
can be expressed, I believe, by saying that God created the world
because He understood the nature of goodness. Because that
understanding enabled Him to see that it would be good to create the
world, He chose to create it because it is good. In the same sense,
it is by an act of free will that God creates Himself in a
spatiomaterial world: ontological reason understands the nature of
goodness and, by seeing that it would be good for God to exist,
chooses to create God because it is good. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">That
is also the sense in which practical reason, according to ontological
philosophy, cannot be reduced to theoretical reason. Since
ontological reasons choice to pursue religious goals is
inevitable, the existence of God is among the necessary truths about
<i>What is </i>that reason can know by theoretical reason, that is,
in reasons capacity as knower of the true. But that does not mean
that <i>What is </i>includes everything that holds necessarily <i>for
reason </i>because spatiomaterialism is the best ontological
explanation of the world, because <i>What is </i>is, in part, a
result of what ontological reason does. Reason creates God, that is,
transforms itself into God by acknowledging that is has a religious
self interest, as well as a spiritual and individual self interest.
<i>Doing</i> cannot, therefore, be eliminated in favor of <i>knowing</i>.
It is a product of ontological reason in its practical capacity.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In
explaining what happens before the evolution of ontological
philosophy, reason can be treated like any other evolving structure.
But when ontological philosophy evolves, that explanation becomes
part of what is evolving, and as ontological reason, it is the agent
whose practical reasoning brings about the subsequent course of
evolution. Ontological reason cannot sit back and simply contemplate
the existence of God, because the coming into existence of a perfect
rational being is the <i>doing </i>of reason. And it does what it
does, not because it recognizes its inevitability, but because what
it does is guided by <i>What ought to be. </i>In the end, therefore,
“ought” implies “is.”</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To be sure,
the content of practical reason, including all the goals that ought
to be pursued, coincides, in part, with the content of theoretical
reason. Its necessary truths about <i>What is </i>include what reason
does inevitably in the world. But the diagram of the whole argument
of ontological philosophy does not misrepresent what holds
necessarily for reason by separating the conclusion about <i>What
ought to be </i>from the conclusions about <i>What is</i>, because
<i>for reason</i>, there is a difference between <i>knowing </i>and
<i>doing</i>. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
difference between theoretical and practical reason is nearly as
basic to reason as the difference between the ontological foundation
and the necessary truths that follow from it, which is represented in
a similarly fundamental way in the diagram of the whole argument. In
that case too, the content of necessary truths coincides with part of
the content of the ontological foundation, because the necessary
truths, being truths that follow from it, are implicit in it. But the
distinction is important <i>for reason</i>, because there is a
difference between what reason knows about the world empirically (by
an inference to the best ontological explanation of the world) and
what reason knows about the world prior to discovering what happens
in the world by experience. If there were no difference between
ontologically necessary truths (including conditionally ontologically
necessary truths) and ordinary empirical knowledge, ontology would
not be a new way of doing philosophy.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">God
is known first of all, therefore, as an intention of practical
reason, as the goal of ontological reasons own plan of individual
and social level behavior in the world. That is the sense in which
practical reason is not reducible to theoretical reason. The creation
of God is the work of ontological reason in the world.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0; page-break-before: always">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">O<img src="" name="OdnR_15" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="136" height="41" border="0">ntological
philosophy entails, as we have seen, the existence of an immanent
God. But believers in a traditional religion, especially those who
believe in a transcendent God, are likely to be skeptical about the
world itself being sufficiently perfect to be worthy of worship. One
way to quell such doubts is to show that all the reasons for holding
that a transcendent God is worthy of worship are reasons that also
hold for the immanent God of ontological philosophy. That is possible
in this case because the points of disagreement about the nature of
God are not relevant to God's worthiness of worship. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
what follows, I will argue that the immanent God entailed by
spatiomaterialism is worthy of worship by arguing that it has all the
traits that are thought to make the traditional God of
epistemological philosophy worthy of worship. And since it will also
solve the theoretical problems that philosophical theology has
encountered trying to think about God coherently, it may even
convince traditional theists that such an immanent God is what they
have actually been believing in. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
is to give an ontological interpretation of Christianity, but a
similar argument can be constructed, I believe, for the beliefs of
all the other traditional religions. In their case as well, what
makes God worthy of worship is also implicit in this immanent God, as
would be shown by giving an ontological interpretation of them. That
is, at least, what ontological philosophy would expect, since
traditional religions are trying to grasp something about the world
that really is holy, but as through a glass darkly. However, only
Christian theology will be discussed in the following argument.
Christianity is the religion in which epistemological philosophy was
historically developed most fully, and though this critique of
Christian theology will suggest how it would work in other
traditional religious, I must leave that to others. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Let me
emphasize, however, that what I say here about Christianity is not
the result of a conversion experience on my part. I have not been
reborn by accepting Jesus as my savior. I long ago abandoned the
faith of my parents and left the church, because I could not believe
that naturalism is false, at least, not in the way required to
believe in a transcendent God. Nor could I believe that one discovers
the truth about such matters by an act of faith. However, in the long
process of working out this ontological explanation of the wholeness
of the world, I have become increasingly sympathetic with religion,
for I have slowly discovered that the wholeness of the world entails
the existence of a perfect being -- one that can be recognized as the
God referred to by Christian theology, because it has all the traits
that make the transcendent God of traditional Christianity worthy of
worship. Thus, all that Christians would have to give up in order to
recognize that ontological philosophy confirms what they want to
believe about the world are metaphysical beliefs that cause
theoretical problems — except possibly for the belief in personal
immortality, and I will argue that they would not really want that,
if they understood the nature of existence. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Some might,
therefore, claim that Jesus is a prophet of ontological philosophy.
But Jesus is not what leads reason to recognize the existence of God.
The path that leads to the explanation of the wholeness of the world
in its most complete sense is the path that Socrates was on. And that
is a path that began when the Pre-Socratic philosophers gave up
religious explanations of the world in favor of an ontological
explanation. Indeed, ontological philosophy is, I believe, the wisdom
that Socrates was seeking when he distinguished himself from the
sophists as a philosopher, that is, a <i>lover </i>of wisdom. It is
the knowledge of the nature of the world, including the nature of
goodness, that makes rational beings choose goals that are good
because they are good. That is, knowledge is virtue! The Socratic
principle is true. Thus, although the end of the road of reason is,
as I will argue, what Jesus was talking about, it is only reason, not
faith (and certainly not force), that can lead us there.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>The
doctrines of Christian theology. </i>What I take to be Christian
theology can be summed up as five doctrines. They are mainly the
doctrines that emerged in the medieval period. Many variations on
them and interpretations of them have been developed since then,
including some that take Christianity to be merely a mythical
representation of a moral code. But the more traditional Christian
beliefs about the nature of God and the meaning of life bring out
more clearly what is true in Christianity, according to this
ontological theology. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Gods
transcendence of the natural world. </i>Christians (and Jews) have to
believe that God transcends the natural world, because He is supposed
to have created it by an act of free will. The natural world includes
everything in space and time, and thus, unless God were a substance
that exists outside space and time, He could not have created it. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>The
trinity.</i> The most distinctive tenet of Christian theology is,
perhaps, the doctrine of the trinity, that God is actually three
persons: the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. The Father is the
creator of the natural world, who for some reason put human beings on
earth. The Son is the incarnation of God on earth whose sacrifice was
meant to earn the forgiveness of our sins so that believing that
Jesus is Christ would give us salvation from sin and eternal bliss.
Thus, God had to be at least two persons. But Christians also believe
that God acts in the world by way of the Holy Spirit as well, and
that is God as a third person. Thus, despite being a single
substance, God is supposed to be three persons, the Father, the Son
and the Holy Spirit (and theologians have struggled vainly to explain
how that is possible).</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Original
sin. </i>The source of evil in the world is supposed to be a result
of original sin. In the beginning, when Adam and Eve were in the
Garden of Eden, God forbad them to eat the fruit of the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil. But Adam and Eve had free will, and being
persuaded by a serpent, representing Satan (an angel in rebellion
against God), they ate the apple, thereby defying Gods command.
That was the original sin. As punishment, God banished Adam and Eve
from the Garden of Eden, and after the fall, they and all their
children and children's children became mortal beings. They were
ashamed of their bodies; they had to labor in order to live; they
were both agents and patients of such suffering as war; and they who
had to suffer famine and disease, as well as death. Thus, the evil in
the world is supposed to come from an act of free will in defiance of
Gods command. And their offspring would always be tempted to
choose evil and sin, because Adam and Eve had eaten the fruit of the
tree of the knowledge of good and evil. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>The
gospel.</i> Christians believe that the “good news” brought by
Jesus as the Christ, or savior, was that God had forgiven our sins,
including our original sin. It was possible, therefore, with the
grace of God, to avoid sin. This meant, according to Jesus, that the
kingdom of God is at hand and, since it would thereafter be possible
to avoid the evils that had plagued the descendants of Adam and Eve,
we would live in heaven forever. All that is required for this to
happen is that that we believe in Jesus as our savior, that we love
God, and that we love our neighbors as ourselves, that is, a
conversion to Christianity. Though only faith in Christ is required
for salvation from sin, it is the struggle to overcome sin and evil
that is the basic meaning of life, according to Christianity.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Immortality.</i>
When Jesus was crucified, God sacrificed his only Son, and the
divinity of Jesus was shown by his resurrection from the dead after
three days and his bodily ascension into Heaven some while later,
joining his Father. The reward of believing in Christ is salvation
from sin, and according to the traditional Christian belief, that
means having eternal life in the presence of God, that is, in heaven.
Thus, Christianity holds that everyone has an immortal soul in the
sense that each person is a substance that lives after the death of
their bodies on earth. For the saved, that means living eternally in
the presence of God, and heaven is thought to transcend the natural
world, just as God Himself does. But the eternal fate of our souls
depends on our free will, that is, whether we choose to believe in
Christ. Those who do not are not saved, and their immortal souls
spend eternity in Hell, deprived of Gods presence. Thus, what is
at stake in the choice one makes about how to live ones life is
the fate of ones eternal soul.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>An
ontological interpretation of Christian doctrines.</i> God is
immanent, according to ontological philosophy, because it implies
that the world itself is a perfect being. The basic nature of a
spatiomaterial world like ours gives rise to progressive evolution,
and that eventually leads to the existence of perfect rational
beings, who act for the good of the world as a whole. That is our
foundation for explaining what is true and what is false in the
doctrines of Christian theism. Insofar as the beliefs that make the
Christian transcendent God worthy of worship can be explained by our
immanent God, Christians must admit that this pantheistic God is also
worthy of their worship. Nor can Christians deny that this immanent
God is worthy of their worship, if the ways in which it contradicts
traditional theism are not what make their transcendent God worthy of
worship. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This way of
showing that the pantheistic God of ontological philosophy is worthy
of worship is, of course, an <i>ad hominum </i>argument for
Christians. It will not persuade everyone, because non-Christians may
deny that even the Christian God is worthy of worship. But that is
not necessary, since we have already seen that ontological reason
acknowledge a religious reason. But it will show how ontological
reason can be seen as taking up where Christianity (and religion
generally) leaves off, enabling rational beings to have from reason
something more than what Christians had to take on faith.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">I will take
up each of the traditional doctrines of Christianity and offer what
seems to me to be the most sympathetic interpretation of them from
the standpoint of ontological philosophy. But I will leave the first
doctrine, about the transcendence of God, to the last.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdnR_19" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="118" height="26" border="0">he
central doctrine from which Christianity derives its name is the
belief that Jesus was Christ, the Son of God. The doctrine of the
incarnation of God is problematic, because it means that one and the
same substances that created the natural world must also be
particular substance in that world. It is hard to explain how a
single substance can be two such different persons, but if God must
be two persons, it is not much more implausible to suppose that there
are three altogether. Indeed, Christianity assumes that, in addition
to the transcendent Father and bodily Son, God exists in a third
form, as the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is supposed to do Gods
work on earth. Thus, the doctrine of the trinity holds that, even
though God is a single substance, He is three different persons: the
Father, who created the natural world and sent his Son to save us;
the Son, who brought the father's word to the world; and the Holy
Spirit, who does God's work. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
seems to some that the doctrine of the trinity is self-contradictory,
and though believers are willing to believe that it is just another
mystery that lies beyond the understanding of finite rational beings,
the immanent God entailed by spatiomaterialism suggests a solution to
that mystery. It is possible for finite rational beings to understand
how the three persons of God are a single substance, because in a
spatiomaterial world like our own, that substance could be the whole
world. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is
possible to explain what is meant by &quot;God, the Father,&quot;for
that could be the basic nature of the world. That is what is
responsible for the existence of beings like us in the world, for it
is the ontological cause of the evolutionary process by which a
rational beings come to exist in the world. Since what evolves in the
culture of philosophical spiritual animals is the knowledge that
provides makes heaven on earth possible. The word of God can be seen
as what is spoken by rational subjects with ontological reason, and
thus, they can be seen as what is meant by &quot;God as the Son.&quot;
That is, the individual's knowledge of the truth about the wholeness
of the world, including the nature of goodness, is the knowledge of
the word of the Father, which Christ was supposed to have. And the
&quot;Holy Spirit&quot; refers to the spiritual animal that exists
when the word of the Father is known, because when ontological
philosophy evolves, reason understands the wholeness of the world,
and by acknowledging its religious interest, ontological reason does
Gods work, the work of becoming a perfect rational being, that is,
Gods self-creation. Thus, all three persons of God can be seen as
aspects of the same perfect substance, namely, the world as a whole. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
might seem that, although ontological philosophy can explain how a
single substance can have all three aspects, it does not quite
explain the doctrine of the Trinity, because it does not show that
they are all persons. Individuals are clearly persons, because they
are rational beings. And since spiritual animals are rational beings,
they can also be called persons. But even if the basic nature of a
spatiomaterial world like ours is perfect in the sense of giving rise
to natural perfection, the world as a whole is hardly a person. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This
objection overlooks, however, a consequence of ontological reason
acting in the interest of the world as a whole. When reason takes on
the function of being the behavior guidance system for the world
itself, the world itself becomes a rational being. And since rational
beings are persons, the world is a person. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In other
words, the reason that there are three <i>persons </i>of God is that
ontological reason has three practical interests, individual,
spiritual and religious. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">These three
rational beings are a single substance in the sense that they are all
constituted by space and matter, the substances whose existence
explains the existence of everything else in the world. The
difference between them is that they are rational beings on different
levels of part-whole complexity in space. The Son refers to each of
the rational subjects who are parts of spiritual animals after
ontological reason evolves. The Holy Spirit includes the spiritual
animal (or all the spiritual animals) whose behavior is guided by
ontological reason to do what is good for the world as a whole. And
the Father is the whole world to whose natural perfection religious
goals contribute. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To be sure,
what is affected by the activities of the Son and the Holy Spirit may
extend no farther than their own planetary system. But that does not
mean that it is not a contribution to the natural perfection of the
world as a whole. It does make the whole world more perfect than it
would be without ontological reason, and it happens throughout the
universe, since because perfect rational beings evolve on every
suitable planetary system. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
most telling objection to traditional pantheism is that it is
incompatible with God being a person, but that does not tell against
the kind of pantheism entailed by ontological philosophy. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The God of
ontological theology is a person, because He has the nature of a
rational being. Even though ontological philosophy takes the world as
a whole to be God, that is compatible with God being a person,
because the world itself has behavior that is guided to do what is
good for it by rational subjects who do what as good for the world as
part of their self interest. That is not incompatible with God being
a rational agent that also has an individual and spiritual self
interest. Indeed, even if Christianity had not believed in the
Trinity, ontological philosophy would still have had to recognize
something surprisingly similar to it, because a spatiomaterial world
like ours necessarily has rational subjects with an individual,
spiritual and rational self interest. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">I<img src="" name="OdnR_17" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="118" height="26" border="0">t
is even possible for ontological philosophy to confirm the
traditional Christian view of original sin as the source of evil in
the world and, thereby, understand its view of the meaning of life.
But since its interpretation of that doctrine locates original sin in
the larger context of evolution, it avoids the problems that the
existence of evil has posed for traditional theism.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Original
sin can be explained as war. Accordingly, the Garden of Eden would
represent the innocent life of higher primates or first hominids. War
was an inevitable evil, because this means that the serpent that
talked Adam and Eve into disobeying God's command was the evolution
of natural sentences (rather than an angel rebelling against God,
which is, in any case, difficult to reconcile with God's omnipotence.
The use of language made war a possible means for groups of hominids
to overcome the scarcity caused by the reproduction of spiritual
animals, and it can even be seen as a &quot;violation&quot; of God's
command in the sense that groups of nonlinguistic animals are
apparently unable to evolve the behavior of killing other groups of
animals from their own species in order to acquire food. But the
evolution of war in spiritual animals was inevitable, and the advent
of war can be seen as banishing them from the Garden of Eden, for it
forced them to live in a dangerous world indeed. To fight wars was,
furthermore, to eat the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil, because as we have seen, the group-level selection pressure
imposed by warfare led to the evolution of reason. Though the
original function of reason was to choose more reliably between war
and peace, that became, as reason evolved, the more general choice
between good and evil, because reason had to enable members of
spiritual animals to live at peace with one another. Evil is what is
at stake in morality, because individuals had the option of
intentionally harming others as a means to their ends, and from their
adaptation to war, they even had desires that made it possible to
enjoy killing other members of their own species. Reason discovered
moral rules that limited the pursuit of their interests, and it gave
them autonomy, or free will, that is, the ability to resist even the
strongest animal desire and do what they believe is good and right.
But it was an imperfect mechanism, and moral evil was an inevitable
apart of the world. Thus, their fate was to be both the agent and
patient of harm done intentionally, both war and moral trespasses
against other individuals — not to mention bearing the burden of
the labor involved in the evolution spiritual animals. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ontological
philosophy can, therefore, confirm, in a way, the traditional
doctrine of original sin. But what is more, ontological theology
solves other problems that Christian theology faces about the nature
of evil. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">One problem
with the doctrine of original sin is the inability to explain why God
would create beings with a free will who He knew would disobey Him.
That is supposed to be part of Gods mysterious purpose and, thus,
beyond human understanding. And even though Christians believe that
God ultimately would forgive them their original sin, making
salvation possible, there is no explanation why, generation after
generation, the fate of their immortal souls should depend on the
choices they make on earth. That was still part of the mystery. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Another
problem is the fact that evil exists at all, for that argues against
the existence of a supernatural God. That is the so-called “problem
of evil.” If God created a world that contains evil, then either
(1) God must not be absolutely good, (2) God must not be all-knowing,
or (3) God must not be all-powerful. God must lack at least one of
these three traditional perfections. There is some plausibility to
the claim that the existence of moral evil is necessary on the
grounds that evil will be done as long as there are beings who have
both free will and the capacity to do evil, and that cannot be
avoided, if the existence of human beings in a world like our serves
some higher purpose that God in creating the natural world in the
first place. But it is still a mystery why the existence of finite
beings with free will is good or makes the natural world good. And
even if there is some such explanation of moral evil, there is still
no explanation why natural evil, such as famine, disease, and
earthquakes, should be part of God's plan. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ontological
theology, however, solves both these problems. Evil does not show
that an immanent God must lack any of the personal perfections of
God, because the world as a perfect rational being will do everything
that can be done to avoid evil in the world. It is just that the evil
that occurs in evolution is not something that can be avoided,
because that is how perfect rational beings come to exist. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Ontological
philosophy also explains, therefore, why there are beings with free
will who must struggle against original sin in order to avoid evil.
War and the evolution of reason is an inevitable stage in the
evolution of spiritual animals. Furthermore, this explanation reveals
why the existence of such rational beings is good: it makes a
necessary contribution to the natural perfection of life, the natural
perfection of evolutionary change, and in the end, to the evolution
of perfect rational beings in the world. No being who lacks the power
to do evil can be an all-powerful being. The progressiveness of
evolution, therefore, compensates for the moral evil that exists in
the world. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Finally,
even the natural evil that exists in the world is compensated.
Nothing can be good without evil, because evil is necessary for
evolution. The scarcity caused as reproductive cycles multiply is
evil, by our definition of &quot;good&quot;, because it detracts from
the natural perfection of which it is part. But such evil is
compensated. There would be no natural perfection and, thus, no
goodness without it, because that is how reproductive cycles impose
natural selection on themselves and propel evolution along. Likewise,
since disease is a necessary consequence of the evolution of
organisms at lower levels of biological organization, it makes a
contribution to the natural perfection of the ecology. Death is a
necessary part of the structure of the reproductive cycles of
multicellular animals and, thus, of subsequent evolution. And even
natural catastrophes, like the impact of asteroids, play a necessary
role, because they alter conditions so radically that inherently more
powerful organisms can replace inherently less powerful incumbents in
ecological niches. That is, after all, how mammals replaced dinosaurs
in the most energy rich ecological niches some 65 million years ago. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">N<img src="" name="OdnR_18" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="118" height="27" border="0">ot
only does the belief in an immanent God make it possible to see a
truth in the Christian belief about the meaning of life -- that it is
the struggle for salvation from original sin -- but it can also be
seen as confirming the “glad tidings” taught by Jesus about
eventual success. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Grace.
</i>The “good news” was that God has forgiven us our sins, and
according to ontological philosophy, Christians are right to believe
that salvation from original sin is possible. Indeed, it can even be
said to depend on the grace of God, although the grace of God must be
understood, not as a gift of forgiveness of sin by a transcendent
God, but rather as the fact that the nature of the world makes
perfection possible for spiritual animals and their members. It is
possible in the end to control population growth and arrange human
affairs so that wars do not occur and human beings are not even
tempted to do evil to one another. Indeed, that is part of the
natural perfection of the world itself that ontological reason
undertakes to bring about when it acknowledges its religious
interest. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Heaven.</i>
Salvation from sin means that the kingdom of God is at hand and that
we shall have eternal life in heaven. What Jesus saw was the kind of
natural perfection that is possible for beings like us, who can see
into one another minds and act together in pursuing goals. Jesus was
right to insist that what it involves is loving God and loving ones
neighbor, for that is what is involved in pursuing religious goals.
But according to ontological theology, heaven will be at hand only
when ontological reason acknowledges its religious interest and
pursues goals because they make the world as a whole naturally
perfect. And in that heaven, there will be eternal life. Once a
perfect rational being exists, reason can go on pursuing goals that
are in individual, spiritual and religious interest forever, because
spiritual animals can live as long as the world. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>Belief
in Christ.</i> Salvation is supposed to be the result of believing in
Christ, that is, believing that He is the Son of god and following
his commandments to love God and our neighbors as ourselves. But
Jesus was mistaken to believe that all that heaven requires is a
change of heart, a conversion to Christianity. Heaven will exist only
when original sin is overcome, and according to this naturalistic
ontological interpretation of his gospel, that requires the labor of
reason, though cultural evolution and history. When Jesus taught his
vision of perfection, there was still much more for reason to learn
before it could understand the wholeness of the world. And once that
is understood, reason still must do Gods work by, among other
things, controlling the causes of war and controlling the causes of
the moral evil that individuals do to one another. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">On this
interpretation of Christian theology, therefore, the significance of
the belief that Christ is God become man is that it is possible for
rational subjects like us to understand the word of God and create
heaven on earth. That is, Jesus represents the fate of rational
subjects generally. It happens during the philosophical stage of
spiritual evolution when reason finally understands how the world is
whole, sees itself as the inevitable outcome of evolution, and by
understanding the nature of goodness, understands how and why it is
good for reason to pursue goals that are good for the world as a
whole. As ontological reason acknowledges its religious interest and
does the work of creating God, original sin is overcome and eternal
life in heaven begins. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In sum,
salvation depends, not on faith, but on reason. The incarnation of
God is that rational subjects have the kind of understanding that God
was supposed to have when he created the natural world. It is, in
effect, to understand God's purpose in creating the world. And that
is what makes it possible to create heaven on Earth.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdnR_20" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="118" height="25" border="0">he
promise of eternal life in the presence of God may seem to be where
ontological philosophy fails to explain Christian theology, because
it must deny that rational subjects have immortal souls. The immortal
soul is supposed to be a substance that continues to endure though
time after the body decays. But except for the matter and space that
constituted the body, there is no such substance, and thus, there can
be no life after death. That does not mean, however, that ontological
philosophy must deny the promise of eternal life in heaven. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Though they
are not immortal as individuals, rational beings can and will be
immortal as a spiritual animal. Spiritual animals can be immortal,
because they do not reproduce by the sexual mixing of parts of their
structures, like eukaryotes. They reproduce by division, like
prokaryotes. The same spiritual animal can continue to exist
indefinitely, and that is what begins when reason evolves into God.
The perfect rational being that comes to exist on earth as the
outcome of evolution is the existence of God in the world, and that
is eternal life in heaven. The immortality of the spiritual animal is
a kind of immortality for the rational subject, because the spiritual
animal is an aspect of the self in whose interest the rational
subject acts. Indeed, the <i>world itself </i>as a whole is an aspect
of the self in whose interest the rational subject acts, once the
world becomes a perfect rational being in that sense. The immortality
of the spiritual animal and the world are way in which the self live
on after the death of the individual body. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To be sure,
the individual must eventually die. Since rational subjects are
multicellular animals, they cannot live without going through
reproductive cycles in which they are born and die. But the life of
the rational subject as an individual multicellular animal is not the
only life she has, because she is, as a rational being with
ontological reason, the agent who guides the behavior of her
spiritual animal and even the world itself, not just her own body.
That is, the self in whose interest she acts is not just the
individual, but also the spiritual animal and the world, and her
spiritual and divine self are immortal. That is how the rational
subject has life after death.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ontological
philosophy does imply, nevertheless, that rational subjects do not
continue to live as individuals after the death of the body, and this
is not what Christians believe about how their souls are immortal. It
may, however, be closer to what Jesus himself actually meant, because
as a Jew, the kind of salvation that he probably believed the Messiah
would bring was heaven on Earth. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">The
belief that salvation takes the form of immortal souls in an
otherworldly heaven could have been what the earliest followers of
Jesus came to believe in order to avoid losing their faith in Jesus
message when he was crucified. If they expected the kingdom of God to
begin immediately on earth, his death would suggest that Jesus was
simply mistaken. But it was possible to continue to believe that
Jesus' followers would have eternal life in heaven, even though it
did not happen on earth, if it meant having immortal souls that live
in the presence of God in a transcendent realm. That would be the
significance of the resurrection and ascension, and it would be
another distortion caused by the belief in a transcendent God. (For a
defense of such a view, see Thomas </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Sheehan"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Sheehan</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">,
1986.) </span></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Though
ontological philosophy must deny that rational subjects have immortal
lives as individuals, that does not mean that its immanent God is any
less worthy of worship than the traditional Christian God. It merely
reflects the difference in what rational beings really want that
comes from understanding the nature of existence. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In a world
constituted by space and matter, the immortality of bodily existence
is not a good thing. Rational subjects who understand their nature
ontologically as inevitable products of evolution by reproductive
causation will not want to be immortal as individual multicellular
animals. They will recognize that the desire to have an immortal soul
is a form of narcissism, an unhealthy kind of &quot;selfishness.&quot;
</font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is
possible to extend lives, and that will be done, because it is good.
Life is not currently long enough to make the most of it. And it will
probably also be possible to make the body immortal in the sense that
it will not die of old age or disease, but only by accident. But it
would not be good to make the body immortal, because the natural
perfection of the rational subject as an individual requires a
temporal limit to life. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The life of
an individual is a process of growth. She starts out as a baby, only
later acquiring the capacity for reflection, and she goes through a
process of development and growth that continues throughout life,
until death. What makes the maximum holistic power of the
multicellular animal <i>holistic </i>is that it controls all the
conditions that affect reproduction over the whole cycle. That is the
way to make the most of the least in the case of the individual
animal. The parts that fit together as such an optimal whole are
mainly the rational actions that make up the life as a
four-dimensional object, and the individual gains power to control
relevant conditions in the process of growing older. One acquires
practical wisdom as time is running out. The self one constructs is
like a painting, as I suggested earlier, that is painted from left to
right on the canvas, trying to make the most of every part of the
life. That each moment make its own essential contribution to the
perfection of the whole -- that is, that it not be redundant -- is a
essential aspect of the structure of the natural perfection of the
individual animal. If life did not terminate at some point, there
would be no whole of which the parts are all parts and thus no
possibility of a natural perfection about it. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Or to put
it negatively, growth is such an essential part of the structure of
the natural perfection of individual life that the worst hell that a
reflective subject with ontological reason could imagine is to have
grown as much as possible for beings of her kind and yet be unable to
die. Even if she were in perfect health and in possession of her
faculties, it would become boring to go on living, because in a world
made of space and matter, there is a limit to how much an rational
subject can do and learn and enjoy. After she had passed that limit
far enough, it would be torture to wake up each day and know that it
would just another repetition of something already experienced many
times before. Fortunately, such a condition is not possible for
rational subjects with behavior guidance systems based on brains. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif">G<img src="" name="OdnR_16" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="118" height="26" border="0">ods
transcendence of the natural world.</font> Christians believe that
God transcends the natural world, and that seems to be an aspect of
traditional theology that ontological philosophy must deny. But
transcendence is not relevant to God's worthiness of worship, for it
is simply what Christians had to believe in order to believe that God
is responsible for their own existence and the source of purpose in
the world. Ontological philosophy makes it possible to see God as the
creator in the latter sense without transcending the natural world. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Christian
believe that God created the natural world out of nothing. It is the
role of God as the Father to call into existence by an act of will
the natural world and the teleological order it involves, including
human beings. But if God as the Father is the basic nature of a
spatiomaterial world like ours, as ontological philosophy implies,
God is still the source of human beings and all the purpose in the
world. That is, God is still the creator of the natural world in the
relevant sense, and thus, such an immanent God is no less worthy of
worship than the transcendent God of traditional Christian theology.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">An immanent
God cannot create the world as act of will. But the world can, and
does, by the very nature of what exists in it, give rise to the
existence of rational beings like us. It is our “creator” in the
sense of being the source of our existence. To be sure, since we are
a necessary consequence of its nature, we are not something done from
the knowledge of the nature of goodness, that is, created as an act
of free will. But the nature of the world gives rise to us as part of
the process by which it gives rise to natural perfection and a real
difference between good and bad in the world. Thus, even though God
is not a substance existing outside space and time that gives rise to
a world of objects in space that change through time, God turns out
to be the cause of our human world and the source of real difference
between good and bad. Hence, an immanent God is no less awesome. Nor
is such an immanent God any less beneficent, that is, “good-doing,”
though, of course, He cannot be benevolent, that is, “good-willing,”
except through Gods self creation as a perfect rational being. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Simply
being immanent does not make God any less a perfect rational being
than a transcendent God. To be sure, an immanent God does not know as
much and is not as powerful as it seems a transcendent God would be.
But that does not make an immanent God any less worthy of worship,
because it does not imply that an immanent God is inferior to a
transcendent God. It is merely a difference is the conception of
perfection that comes from one's conception of the nature of
existence. The kind of perfect knowledge and power that is
conceivable in a substance that exists outside space and time is
different from the kind of perfect knowledge and power that is
conceivable in something made of space and matter in time. But that
does not show that one is better than the other, for it is just a
question of which ontology is true of the actual world. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Finally, if
there is a difference in perfection, there is one way in which an
immanent God is more perfect than a transcendent God. Both are alike
in having something permanent and unchanging about them. A
transcendent God is unchanging because He outside of time, whereas an
immanent God is unchanging because He is constituted by substances
that endure through time with the same essential natures and they
inevitably give rise to perfect rational beings. But since a
transcendent God is outside time, He cannot change at all. Thus, He
lacks at least one perfection that an immanent God can have, namely,
the natural perfection of change itself. When evolution is change in
the direction of natural perfection, as we have seen, each moment in
the existence of the world makes a unique and necessary contribution
to the existence of a perfect rational being in the world. Time is
another way in which parts may be combined optimally as a whole, and
a transcendent God is deprived of it. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Gods
transcendence of the natural world is not, therefore, what makes Him
worthy of reverence. Rather, transcendence marks Him as the God of
epistemological philosophy. Though Christianity inherited the belief
that God is the creator of the natural world from Judaism, His
transcendence of the natural world is explained in Christian theology
in a way that depends on Western philosophy. Ever since Augustine, at
least, it has been explained in terms of Platos dualism of
Becoming and Being (albeit by way of its transformation into a more
idealist, neo-Platonist metaphysics by Plotinus). Plato first used
the dichotomy between naturalistic and subjectivistic understanding
(together with the radically different phenomenal appearances of the
objects of each form of understanding) to explain what is good in the
natural world as deriving from a supernatural source. And deriving
from a form of metaphysical dualism that results from the
epistemological approach to philosophy, it is not surprising that the
belief in a transcendent God leads to serious theoretical problems.
The problems are all solved by ontological theology.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>The
Problem of Proving God's Existence. </i>The most immediate problem of
traditional theology is proving God's existence. The dualism entailed
by realism in epistemological philosophy usually leads, as we have
seen, to doubts about realism, or anti-realism, and in the case of
Christian theism, that means atheism. The transcendence of God makes
it impossible to prove His existence from within space and time. But
it is possible, as we have seen, to prove the existence of an
immanent God, for this is a spatiomaterial world of the right kind. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
metaphysical dualisms of epistemological philosophy are inherently
problematic. Plato could not explain adequately how two such
different substances as Being and Becoming are related as parts of
the same world. Christianity escapes being embarrassed by that
problem only by insisting that the relationship is just part of the
mystery about God. Though as persons (or rational beings), we are
supposed to be created in the image of God, we are finite rational
beings, and thus, we must simply accept the mystery and have faith in
God. But the mysteriousness of God cannot, as such, make God worthy
of worship. At best, the mystery merely leaves the possibility that
God will turn out to be holy. And at worst, it is a mask that could
just as well be worn by an evil or contemptible being and faith could
be our undoing. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><i>The
Problem of God's Foreknowledge. </i>Nor does the dualism of God and
nature escape the theoretical problems inherent in a Platonic
metaphysics. For example, God, being perfect, is supposed to be
omniscient, as well as omnipotent and absolutely good. But since He
exists outside of time as the creator of the natural world, He
creates all the moments in the history of the natural world at once,
including everything that finite rational beings ever do. Thus, God
must already know what each individual will choose in each situation
she faces. But that is hard to reconcile with the belief that
individuals have a free will and that what becomes of us and the
world is the result of our doing it. The future is not open. It is
always already determined what we will do. Thus, Gods
foreknowledge of what will happen seems to deny that rational
subjects are free to choose in the way they think they are. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">No such
problem arises from the belief that God is immanent, even though God
is still a perfect rational being, including omniscience, because
knowing everything that it is possible to know as a rational being
constituted space and matter does not include knowing what every
rational being will ever do. It is possible to know what individuals
have done in the past. And it is possible to know what will happen in
the long run because of global regularities. But there are no
necessary truths about what rational beings will choose in particular
situations. That is among the contingent details that can be known
only through experience of the world. (Nor is there any reason to
believe that actual choices can be predicted by knowing how the bits
of matter constituting a rational subject are moving and
interacting.) In any case, since what exists are substances that
endure through time, the future is open in the sense that it depends
on what we choose to do (along with what else is happening at the
time). Thus, the belief in an immanent God solves the traditional
problem about Gods omniscience imply foreknowledge of our choices.
</font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Nothing
that Christians must give up, if they accept the foundation of
ontological philosophy and accepts the necessary truths that follow
from it, shows that the immanent God entailed by spatiomaterialism is
any less worthy of worship than their traditional God. What changes
is one's conception of the nature of existence, and that has
implications about the nature of perfection that can be conceived in
such a world. Thus, even though ontological philosophy must deny that
God transcends the natural world, that does not mean that there is no
perfect being, for as it turns out in a spatiomaterial world like
ours, the world itself is as perfect a perfect being as can be
conceived to be made of space and matter. And that perfect being is
demonstrably worthy of worship, if the God of traditional Christian
theology is. Indeed, ontological theology would have to include the
doctrine of the trinity, quite apart from Christian theology, because
the ultimate perfection of the world comes from how perfect rational
subjects have three kinds of self interest: individual, spiritual and
religious. Far from denying the doctrine of original sin, ontological
philosophy clarifies what it is. With that clarification of original
sin is, it not only confirms the Christian belief about the meaning
of life being the struggle to overcome sin, but it points the way to
overcoming it. Salvation is surely no less valuable for being
achieved by reason rather than by faith. The denial of personal
immortality may seem to be a sticking point for some, but the
desirability of immortality is an illusion that comes from failing to
recognize the basic nature of the life of individual reflective
subjects, for when it is understood ontologically, its natural
perfection precludes immortality. Indeed, it would be hell, and as it
turns out, there is no hell, according to ontological theology. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">If,
therefore, the Christian God is worthy of worship, the perfect
rational being that the world turns out to be, according to
ontological philosophy, is no less worthy of worship. On the
contrary, the insights into the nature of God make Him more worthy of
worship. Not only is it possible to know about God without a leap of
faith, but it is possible for reason to know what work it is that
needs to be done in the name of God.</font></font></font></p>
<div id="sdendnote1">
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote" style="margin-bottom: 0.25cm"><font color="#000000"><a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote1sym" href="#sdendnote1anc">i</a>
Moore is not unaware of this aspect of goodness. According to his
principle of organic unities, (<i>Principia Ethica</i>, Ch. 1, Sec.
18-23) a whole may have an intrinsic value different in amount from
the sum of the values of its parts. </font>
</p>
</div>
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