1.8 KiB
2016-12-05
Governance of decentralised infrastructures academia UoN @personal
The futility of trying to regulate decentralised infrastructures is evident, particularly as the infrastructures become both more secret and anonymous, using strong cryptography.
Regulating traditional, centralised infrastructures relied on due process, which is in the final analysis a singularity, a monopoly of power to coerce. Indeed a singularity to break the law.
In decentralised systems based on software, 'code is law'. Trying to regulate decentralised domains in the same, traditional way is harmful to progress, while also being a distraction away from the type of regulation suitable for a decentralised infrastructure. Monopoly on the power to coerce, to break the law, is the direction where policing should focus. Trying to maintain a monopoly, or at least strong advantage, on the power to coercion in traditional domains, can be paralleled by trying to maintain a monopoly, or at least a strong advantage on breaking code in the new, decentralised domains. While being itself subject to regulation, the state should try to stop regulated decentralised domains, and focus on being the strongest code breaker.
As coloured coins continue to be lost or stolen, while deed holders continue to hold possession of property, smart property contracts will become less relevant in a blockchain and a new blockchain will need to be created (every Sabbath?) Or human overrides, vested in a sovereign or a judge or a jury, will need to be introduced.
Smart contracts move us forward but towards a commerce system that corresponds more to common law contracts than statutes.