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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font color="#ff0000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>C<img src="" name="OdkC1" align="right" hspace="5" width="99" height="39" border="0">hange.
</b></font></font>The third set of necessary truths entailed by
spatiomaterialism has to do with change, and it is by far the largest
set, since it includes all of science. Science is the explanation of
change by efficient causes, and the range of kinds of changes found
in the world means that science includes not only all the branches of
natural science (physics, chemistry, biology, and physiology), but
also all the social sciences (psychology, sociology, economics,
political science, anthropology, and history). </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">What
changes in the natural world are properties and relations of
substances, not the basic substances themselves, since substances, as
substances, simply endure through time. Properties and relations are
aspects of substances constituting the world, and given the essential
natures of the basic substances and the basic relationship by which
they exist together as a world, there are aspects that can change.
That means that some of those changes can be given genuine
ontological explanations., And such ontological explanations are
important, because they can explain the nature of the necessity about
efficient causation.. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Some
changes in contingent properties can be <i>explained </i>ontologically,
because they are simply changes in certain aspects of basic
substances as they endure through time. Such ontological explanations
can be given only when the possibility of change is entailed by the
essential properties of matter and space and how they exist together
as a world. For example, the possibility of changes in spatial
relations can be explained ontologically. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">As we shall
see, change in spatial relations is possible, because bits of matter
can have different relations at different times without compromising
the essential nature of either space or matter and compatibly with
their basic relationship as parts of the same world. It can occur by
motion, and those same ontological causes entail, as we shall see,
that spatial relations can change only by motion.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Efficient
cause explanations depend on regularities about change, that is, on
so-called &quot;laws of nature.&quot; But insofar as such
regularities about change are given genuine ontological explanations,
the connections they describe between efficient causes and their
effects are shown to be ontologically necessary (because they follow
from the endurance of the substances through time with the same
essential natures). That explains the necessary connection between
efficient causes and what they make happen in the world.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Ontological
explanation is genuinely explanatory only when substances work
together in some way to constitute something more that what is
assumed about them. Or to put it negatively, insofar as change has to
do with regular changes in the contingent properties that are used to
define the essential natures of substances (that is, insofar as the
substances have temporally complex, or dispositional, essential
properties), there is no genuine ontological explanation of the
change, for the change is simply what is assumed by the ontology.
Hence, there is no ontological necessity. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Traditional
epistemological philosophy, by contrast, does not treat change as an
aspect of the substances constituting the world, but rather as an
object of knowledge. Science tries to explain what happens in the
world by finding efficient causes, and since such efficient-cause
explanations presuppose laws of nature, epistemological philosophy
takes the goal of science to be the discovery of laws of nature. But
that approach to the philosophy of science has encountered problems
that remain unsolved. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">One main
problem of epistemological philosophy of science has been the
explanation of the nature of efficient causation itself. Efficient
causes are supposed to produce their effects, that is, make it
necessary that they occur. But the laws of nature on which science
bases such efficient-cause explanations seem to be just descriptions
of regularities about how properties and relations that have been
observed to change over time. But if they are merely descriptions of
observable regularities, there is no explanation of the source of the
necessary connection that is supposed to hold between the efficient
cause and what it explains. This is basically the problem about
causation that Hume discovered. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Since
epistemological philosophy of science takes the goal of science to be
the discovery of the laws of nature on which efficient-cause
explanations are based, it has also encountered a major problem
concerning the relationship between the laws discovered by different
branches of science. It now seems that the laws (and, thus, the
efficient-cause explanations) of the less general sciences cannot be
reduced to the laws of more general branches of science and
ultimately to the basic laws of physics. That complicates the problem
about the nature of efficient causation, because the causal
connections described by less general branches of science cannot be
explained by physics. But it also makes the relationships among the
branches of science problematic. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Though
epistemological philosophy of science has not found an adequate
solution to either of these problems, we will see how ontological
philosophy solves them when we return to the issue of efficient
causation after explaining change as an aspect of substances. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Another
project of philosophy of science has been to show that what science
claims to know about change is genuine knowledge. Since it takes an
epistemological approach to philosophy, that is the project of
defending realism in some form, and it leads, once again, to
anti-realism, or skepticism about science. But we will see how this
problem is solved when we trace the course of evolution at the end of
this chapter. Indeed, we will see why the problem arises. (See
</span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCbGeRRS10C.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
Evolutionary stage 10, the Career of epistemological philosophy</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">.)
</span></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif">C<img src="" name="OdkC2" align="right" hspace="5" width="103" height="32" border="0">hange
as an aspect of substances. </font>Existence is one of the two most
basic aspects of substance as substance, and as we have seen, there
are two aspects to the existential aspect of substance, particularity
and temporality. Temporality was not relevant in explaining the truth
of mathematics, since spatial relations exist completely at each
moment. (Particularity was required to explain the relations among
basic substances, since relations depend on how substances exist
together as a world). The temporal aspect of the existential aspect
of a substance is how substance endures through time, and its
consequences are considered in this chapter.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Though
we assume that substances have essential natures that do not change
as time passes, change is possible, as we have seen, because space
and matter have opposite natures and each bit of matter coincides
with some part(s) of space or other. But since spatiomaterialism
leaves it open which parts of space each bit of matter coincides
with, it is ontologically possible for bits of matter to have
different locations at different times. Moreover, it is possible for
bits of matter to change their locations as time passes, because bits
of matter can move. Motion is possible, as we have seen, because the
parts of space are connected continuously, just as moments in time.
Furthermore, motion makes it possible, as we have also seen, for bits
of matter to change by interacting with one another, because if bits
of matter can move, the three dimensional geometrical structure of
space makes it possible for more than one bit to move to the same (or
adjacent) parts of space. When bits of matter have the same or
adjacent locations, they can act on one another, thereby changing
properties or relations of the bits of matter and parts of space
involved. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Their ways
of moving and interacting are extrinsic properties of bits of matter.
Their intrinsic properties may also change as their extrinsic
properties change, though changes in intrinsic aspects of their
essential natures do not affect how bits of matter move and interact.
</font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">What
makes it possible to <i>explain </i>change ontologically, rather than
merely assume it, is the essential nature of space, that is, its
structure or wholeness. The parts of space are all necessarily
connected in three dimensions according to Euclidean geometry
(entailing that space is whole), and since space contains all the
bits of matter, its nature makes it possible for bits of matter to
move and interact with one another. And we will see how space and
matter work together to constitute the regularities described by the
basic laws of physics. But not only does the basic nature of a
spatiomaterial world make change possible and afford an ontological
explanation of the laws of physics, it also makes certain kinds of
changes impossible and other kinds ontologically necessary. They are
the ontologically necessary truths about how change takes place.
Unless those regularities hold, the world cannot be constituted by
matter and space enduring through time with all the matter contained
by space. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
are, however, two basically different kinds of regularities entailed
by spatiomaterialism, because space not only constrains how each bit
of matter can move and interact <i>in relation </i>to other bits of
matter in its neighborhood, but it also connects all the changes they
undergo <i>in any region of space</i>. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
ontological constraint on how bits of matter can move and interact in
relation to one another entail necessary principles about the kinds
of <i>local regularities </i>that can hold. Within those
ontologically necessary limits, there are further regularities about
change that are contingent. More specific aspects of local
regularities depend on the specific kind of matter and space making
up the actual world, and thus, they can be known only by further
experience of the world. They are the regularities described by the
basic laws discovered by physics, and as we shall see, there ways of
explaining ontologically why those laws are true. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The way
that space connects the changes that happen to different bits of
matter in any region imposes <i>global regularities </i>on change.
The changes that occur to all the bits of matter in any region must
“add up” in a certain way as time passes, because they all
coincide with parts of space in the same region and space also
endures through time as a substance with a wholeness that connects
all of them to one another. Their motion and interaction “add up”
in any closed or isolated region of space to global regularities
about change, though most of the specific global regularities also
depend on the laws of physics that hold only in spatiomaterial worlds
like ours. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
wholeness of space can be distinguished from the geometrical
structure of space, because the fact that all the parts of space fit
together as a whole is just one consequence of its parts having
geometrical relations to one another. Thus, we can say that, whereas
the local regularities depend on the <i>structure </i>of space as an
ontological cause, the global regularities also depend specifically
on the <i>wholeness </i>of space as an ontological cause. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font color="#ff0000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>L<img src="" name="OdkC3" align="right" hspace="5" width="90" height="32" border="0">ocal
regularities about change. </b></font></font>Regularities about
change are local when they are about how each bit of matter moves and
acts relative to other bits of matter. This aspect of the world is
singled out when we focus on a particular bit(s) of matter and
consider how it moves in relation to other bits of matter in its
neighborhood or how it interacts with them. There is, however, a
difference between necessary principles and contingent laws about
local regularities. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
are certain aspects of such changes that hold, regardless of anything
further that physics may discover empirically about the essential
natures of the matter or space involved, because they are entailed by
spatiomaterialism (or the basic nature of matter and space and how
space contains matter). They are what I will call “ontologically
necessary principles” about local regularities. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Many
possible ways of changing are left open by the limits imposed by the
necessary principles about local regularities. And bits of matter
(and space) can change only in some <i>determinate </i>way, for they
are just substances with some specific essential nature or other,
entailing that such change is regular in some way. But how they
change depends on the specific kind of matter and space of which the
actual world is constituted. The regularities about change that
depend on the specific nature of matter and space will be called
“contingent laws” about local regularities. These contingent laws
include all the basic laws of physics. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
what follows, we will see how it is possible to explain the basic
laws of physics ontologically. It must be possible to explain them by
the specific essential natures of matter and space, if
spatiomaterialism is true. The possibility of such an ontological
explanation is not very surprising in the case of classical physics
(though it has some surprising implications, for example, about the
nature of kinetic energy). But the possibility of such an explanation
is precisely what is put in doubt by contemporary physics. Showing
how relativity theory can be explained ontologically by
spatiomaterialism is one of the mortgages that remains to be paid in
order to use that ontology as the foundation for this argument
demonstrating necessary truths, and as we shall see, quantum
mechanics can also be explained ontologically by spatiomaterialism. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font color="#993366"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>N<img src="" name="OdkC4" align="right" hspace="5" width="64" height="30" border="0">ecessary
principles about local regularities. </b></font></font>Necessary
principles about local regularities follow from the basic natures of
space and matter as substances enduring through time assuming that
each bit of matter coincides with some part of space or other. We
have already seen how their essential natures explain the <i>possibility
</i>of change by motion and interaction ontologically. The same
ontological causes imply that they can change <i>only </i>by local
motion and local action. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>T<img src="" name="OdkC5" align="right" hspace="5" width="43" height="27" border="0">he
principle of local motion. </b></font>The principle of local motion
holds that bits of matter can change their locations as time passes
only by moving continuously across the space that separates the
starting points and the ending points. That is what I will call
“local motion.” What it denies is that bits of matter can ever
change their locations by simply disappearing from one location at
one moment and appearing somewhere at a distance at the next moment.
That is, it denies that bits of matter can “flit about”
discontinuously in space from moment to moment. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
reason that “flitting about” is impossible is that it could occur
only if one of the three basic assumptions of spatiomaterialism were
false, that is, only if space were not a substance, matter were not a
substance, or bits of matter did not coincide with parts of space. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Given
that the bit of matter is a substance enduring through time, how
could it have one location at one moment and another location at a
distance from it the very next moment, that is, without moving to the
second location? It might be possible if space were not a substance,
but a mere relation between bits of matter, for spatial relations
could simply be <i>defined </i>as kinds of relations that change
discontinuously. That is a possibility for a materialist ontology,
which reduces space to relations among bits of matter. But if space
is a substance with the essential nature we have assumed and it gives
bits of matter spatial relations by how they coincide with different
parts of space, then the spatial relation between the first location
and the second location depends on the existence of all the other
parts of space enduring as substances through time, including all
those parts of space in between the two locations. Thus, the only way
that the bit of matter could come to have the new spatial relations
is by coinciding with a continuous series of parts of space
separating the two locations as time passes. That is the only way
that bits of matter can change their spatial relations in space, if
they get their spatial relations from the relations among the parts
of space with which they coincide and the parts of space are all
related according to a geometrical structure. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Given,
therefore, that space is a substance, how is it possible for bits of
matter to flit about discontinuously? It might be possible, if the
bit of matter could simply drop out of existence at one moment and
come back into existence at the distant location the next. But that
would be to deny that the bit of matter is a substance in our sense,
for it would not be enduring through time. Its existence would not be
continuous, if it dropped out of existence and then came back into
existence, even if it came back into existence the very next moment. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Nor
can we suppose that the bit of matter simply slipped out of space
altogether at one location and slipped back into space at another
location, because that would contradict the assumption that bits of
matter are contained by space. The basic relationship assumed by
spatiomaterialism is that, at the present moment, each bit of matter
coincides with some part of space or another. This is what give bits
of matter their spatial relations to one another. And since it holds
at the present moment, it must have held at all moments in the past
and it must hold at all moments in the future, for there is no other
way for bits of matter to acquire spatial relations to one another </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
a spatiomaterial world, therefore, the only way that bits of matter
can change their spatial relations is by local motion, that is, by
moving continuously across space. Nothing else is compatible with the
assumption that space and matter are substances enduring through
time, with all the bits of matter coinciding with parts of space. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">And
that means that bits of matter move with a finite velocity, since
infinite velocity would be equivalent to “flitting about” in
space.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>T<img src="" name="OdkC6" align="right" hspace="5" width="43" height="27" border="0">he
principle of local action. </b></font>Once again, the same factors
that explain the possibility of change by interaction also imply that
such change can occur only by local action. Motion makes it possible
for bits of matter to come to occupy the same or adjacent locations,
and if motion does so, that puts them in a position to act on one
another, assuming that matter has a more specific essential nature
that includes such powers. On the other hand, if bits of matter are
not in the same (or adjacent) locations in space, they coincide with
distinct parts of space that are separated by other parts of space,
and they cannot affect one another without something traveling across
the space between them, for space is the only connection the bits of
matter have to one another. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">They are
also related by being parts of the same world, but we are using
“parts of the same world” to mean only that they exist or are a
part of everything that exists, and bare existence does not entail
any other relations between them. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
order for bits of matter located at a distance from one another to
interact, another bit of matter must travel across the space
separating the one bit of matter from the other as time passes. The
bit of matter may be just the exertion of a force (in which case it
is an <i>inter</i>-action, with an opposite force also being exerted,
according Newtons third law of motion). But even if such a force
were just a “modification” of relevant parts of space, it would
still be a bit of matter, that is, a material substance, and as such,
it cannot get from one location to the other without something moving
across space as time passes time, or else it would violate the
principle of motion. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
principle of local action is not as simple as it sounds, for as we
shall see, there are various forms of matter, and some of them
coincide with more than one part of space at any given moment.
Indeed, one form of matter (forces with infinite range) can, in
principle, coincide with all parts of space (albeit not all equally).
Such forms of matter can interact with other bits of matter wherever
they are located. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">There are,
however, other forms that are completely outside one another in space
(including, as we shall see, some of the rest mass of the material
objects that exert forces with infinite range), and the principle of
local action does constrain their interactions. These complications
will be taken up as we explain the various forms of matter and how
they move and interact. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
principle of local action has to do with how bits of matter that are
localized in space can <i>act </i>on one another when they are
located at a distance from one another, and such “actions” will
be defined more fully in explaining how quantum mechanics is true in
a spatiomaterial world. But there is another kind of very limited
effects that certain forms of matter can have on one another, in
addition to such inter-<i>actions</i>, and space is an ontological
cause of the same kind of limitation on them. That is, the principle
of local action is really just part of a more basic principle, which
might be called the “principle of local action or effect.” </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">These
peculiar effects that bits of matter of certain kind can have on one
another without the mediation of other bits of matter are possible in
a spatiomaterial world, because if space and matter are both
substances, then not only can space and matter affect one another,
but parts of space can affect one another. Though a bit of matter can
affect only those parts of space with which it coincides (but not any
distant parts of space), it is possible for a bit of matter to have
effects on space itself that affect other parts of space and,
thereby, the bits of matter that coincide with distant parts of
space. However, if there were such effects (and, as we shall see,
there are, though they are severely limited), the ontological causes
of the principle of local action would impose the same constraint on
them. One bit of matter cannot have effects on other bits of matter
at a distance by way its effects on space without some change in
space traveling across space as time passes from the location of the
one bit of matter to the location of the other. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">There is no
reason to doubt that it is possible for parts of space to affect one
another. Parts of space are particular substances, even though they
all have necessary geometrical relations to one another. Each part of
space, as a substance, endures through time, and spatiomaterialism
leaves open the possibility that parts of space have properties that
can change under certain circumstances (though that would be a
temporally complex aspect of the essential nature of space, since
there is no deeper ontological explanation of it). However,
spatiomaterialism does imply that, if a property of one part of space
can change a property of other parts of space, it can affect only
neighboring parts of space, so that in order to affect parts of space
at a distance, the effect would have to propagate across space as
time passes. Such a further causal connection among the parts of
space could mediate the effect of one bit of matter on bits of matter
at a distance from it, but it would depend on some change traveling
across space as time passes. And it would have to be at a finite
velocity, for effects with an infinite velocity would be effects at a
distance. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">What
is relevant here is the general principle that what happens to the
bits of matter in one location cannot affect (either interact with or
have an effect on) what happens to bits of matter located elsewhere
without something traveling across the space separating them. What
moves across space may be another bit of matter, or it may a change
in space itself. But those are the only ways for one to change the
other, because bits of matter have no connection with one another
except for how they coincide with parts of space.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">If a bit of
matter were to get from one location to the other without moving
across space in time, it would violate the principle of motion. And
its velocity must be finite, or else the bit of matter would be
flitting about. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">If a
modification in one location of space were to affect other locations
in space immediately, it would mean that space is not made up of
parts of space that endure through time as distinct substances.
Though the geometrical relations among parts of space are aspects of
their essential natures, they are distinct substances related
geometrically, that is, by way of the parts of space between them,
and any change in one part of space must first produce real changes
to the parts in between before it can affect more distant parts of
space. And it must propagate at a finite velocity, or it would not be
propagating at all.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In either
case, whether the action is mediated by a bit of matter or by space
itself, something must move across space as time passes, or there can
be no effect of one on the other. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
principle of local action (and effects) denies that there is any
action (or effect) at a distance. Though action at a distance is
ontologically impossible in a spatiomaterial world, it is
conceivable, because if space were not a substance, but merely a kind
of relation that holds among bits of matter (or an aspect of how they
exist together as a world), the relations postulated might include
bits of matter acting on one another at a distance. Such a spatial
relationism would be a kind of materialism. But substantivalism about
space makes action at a distance impossible, because bits of matter
at a distance from one another are separated (and connected) by all
the other spatial substances that exist between (and around) them.
Space is the ontological cause that limits interaction to local
actions. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Empirical
science explains events and conditions by efficient causes, but if
those causal connections have ontological explanations at all (and
those connections are not merely assumed as part of the specific
nature of matter or space), they must be mediated by the motion and
interaction of bits of matter in space (or effects in space) as time
passes, because nothing else is permitted by the necessary principles
of local motion and local action. We shall see that spatiomaterialism
can go quite a way in explaining efficient causes ontologically, but
it may be possible to go even farther than what is sketched here.</font></font></font></p>
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