Files
memex/0_inbox/books/TWOW/html/27 Quantum Mechanics.html

552 lines
40 KiB
HTML
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
<title>Quantum Mechanics</title>
<meta name="generator" content="LibreOffice 4.2.8.2 (Linux)">
<meta name="author" content="Amr Gharbeia">
<meta name="created" content="20010831;12000000000000">
<meta name="changed" content="20150721;234016922743610">
<style type="text/css">
<!--
@page { margin-right: 1.2cm; margin-top: 1.2cm; margin-bottom: 1.25cm }
p { text-indent: 1.27cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm; direction: ltr; color: #99ccff; line-height: 120%; text-align: left; widows: 2; orphans: 2 }
p.western { font-family: "Arial", sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; so-language: en-US }
p.cjk { font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 10pt }
p.ctl { font-family: "Simplified Arabic"; font-size: 10pt; so-language: ar-EG }
a:link { color: #0000ff }
-->
</style>
</head>
<body lang="en-GB" text="#99ccff" link="#0000ff" dir="ltr">
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font color="#ff0000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>Q<img src="" name="TtsOtkCLQm_01" align="right" hspace="5" width="150" height="69" border="0">uantum
Mechanics.</b></font></font> Quantum mechanics is the other great
revolution in contemporary physics. Classical physicists would have
admitted that the existence of ordinary material objects is a
phenomenon that still needed an explanation, and as it turns out,
that explanation came with the quantum revolution. Not only does
quantum mechanics describe the electromagnetic forces responsible for
the structure of all ordinary objects down to molecules and atoms,
but the mathematics that is now used (in a gauge field theory called
&quot;quantum electrodynamics&quot;) is the model for explaining even
the short-range forces (the strong and the weak forces) which
responsible for the nucleus and deeper structure of material objects.
The issues involved in explaining the truth of quantum mechanics is
taken up in this chapter, and the two short-range forces, along with
the basic particles of physics, will be explained in the next. The
challenge posed by quantum mechanics and what is at stake in
explaining its truth ontologically are discussed in the first
section, and the rest of the chapter suggests one way, at least, in
which its truth can be explained by spatiomaterialism. But at the
outset, it should be noticed that spatiomaterialism already provides
an explanation of how those forces are related to gravitation. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">One
of the greatest current mysteries of contemporary physics concerns
the relationship between the force of gravity and the other three
basic forces of nature. The problem is that the electromagnetic force
and the two short range forces are explained by the exchange of a
distinctive kind of particle (the gauge boson, such as the photon, in
the case of electromagnetism), and the general theory of relativity
does not lend itself to representation as a gauge field theory. The
most promising way to represent gravitation as the exchange of such
gauge bosons (called “gravitons” in the case of gravitation)
would incorporate all four basic forces and the objects on which they
act. But this so-called “superstring theory” requires the
postulation of ten or more dimensions to space, and it seems to be
completely immune from possible empirical falsification. There is
nothing to recommend it but the mathematical uniformity in the
representation of all four basic forces of nature, and as we have
seen exclusive reliance on mathematics does not necessarily lead to
the best explanation. . </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Spatiomaterialism
offers a solution to this problem, if quantum electrodynamics and the
two short range forces are explained as interactions mediated by the
inherent motion in space (that is, space as the &quot;ether&quot;),
as I have been assuming, because this ontological explanation of
relativity theory would also explain how the other three forces are
related to gravitation. Gravitation is not a gauge theory, because
the gravitational force acts on the inherent motion itself, that is,
on space, not on bits of matter directly. It is by changing the
“medium” (or &quot;ether&quot; as a condition of space) in which
gauge particles are exchanged that gravitation accelerates bits of
matter. It is not necessary for centers of matter accumulation to
exchange gravitons with individual bits of matter in the region to
accelerate them. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">What makes
the problem of relating gravitation and the other forces seem so
intractable is the assumption that it requires the discovery of a law
of nature from which Einsteins general theory of relativity as
well as the gauge forces can all be derived. The discovery of a basic
law covering all the basic kinds of interactions among bits of matter
has long been the so-called “holy grail” of physics, and that is
the assumption that has led to attempts to formulate a gauge theory
of gravitation. It seemed that such a basic law of physics could be
discovered only if gravitation could be represented mathematically in
the same way as the other forces. That is the goal of superstring
theory. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Spatiomaterialism
would solve this problem <i>ontologically, </i>rather than
mathematically. The solution does not require the discovery of a new
law of nature from which all the other laws follow, but only an
ontological explanation of the truth of the laws that have already
been discovered, for that reveals how gravitation is related to the
other three forces. We have seen how the truth of general relativity
can be explained ontologically, and thus, if spatiomaterialism can
explain the truth of the other basic forces of nature in terms of the
inherent motion in space, there is an ontological explanation of the
relationship between the two kinds of forces. It is the recognition
of the inherent motion (or &quot;ether&quot;) as an aspect of the
essential nature of space that makes this possible. By contrast, the
gauge field theories are, in effect, the attempt to represent space
as nothing but the forces by which particles interact. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">If the
explanation is ontological, what makes the problem of reconciling
gravitation and the other forces of nature seem so intractable is,
once again, the empirical method of physics, that is, the method of
inferring to the best <i>efficient-cause explanations </i>of what
happens in nature (and letting ontology be determined by realism
about its theories). It was inevitable that physics would eventually
find itself in this predicament, because physics first became a
science by taking advantage of the power of mathematics to describe
regularities about change. By insisting on mathematical theories that
make surprising, quantitatively precise predictions of measurements,
physics was able to discover the most abstruse facts about how bits
of matter move and interact with one another. That is what enabled
modern physics to go beyond the ancient atomists in understanding the
nature of the elementary objects. But despite the acuity of its
vision of regularities, physics was blind to a more basic aspect of
the world. It failed to recognize that the job of science is not just
to describe the regularities by which it is possible to predict and
control what happens in the world, but also to describe the basic
substances that constitute those regularities (not just the particles
to which they refer, but all the substances that cause them
ontologically). It comes from a failure to recognize that ontology
can be explanatory in its own right and that ontological-cause
explanations are a deeper kind of explanation from efficient-cause
explanations, that is, from the same oversight that led to the
Einsteinian revolution in the first place. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font color="#993366"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>T<img src="" name="TtsOtkCLQm_02" align="right" hspace="5" width="200" height="36" border="0">he
challenge of quantum mechanics. </b></font></font>Like the
Einsteinian revolution, quantum mechanics might also be thought to
pose a challenge for ontological philosophy. The quantum revolution
has also overthrown assumptions of classical physics about the nature
of the world, and if spatiomaterialism were unable to explain
ontologically why the laws of quantum mechanics are true, physics
might provides a reason for denying that ontological philosophy can
use spatiomaterialism as the foundation for doing philosophy in a new
way, despite its explanation of relativity theory. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
quantum revolution does not, however, challenge spatiomaterialism in
the same, direct way as relativity. Quantum mechanics has not led to
any consensus among physicists about the nature of what exists that
is incompatible with spatiomaterialism. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
Einsteinian revolution is generally assumed to be the discovery of
something that directly contradicts spatiomaterialism. In
contemporary physics, absolute space and absolute time have
explicitly been replaced by spacetime. But absolute space and time
are entailed by the assumption that space and matter are substances
enduring though time. Thus, in order to defend the use of
spatiomaterialism as the foundation for this philosophical argument,
I had to show that what Einsteins two theories imply about the
world could be explained on the assumption that space and time are
absolute. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The quantum
revolution has not led to ontological beliefs that directly
contradict spatiomaterialism. This is partly because there is no
consensus among physicists concerning what quantum mechanics implies
about the nature of what exists. There is no dispute about the laws
themselves; they are among the most precise and highly confirmed in
physics. But scientific realism about quantum mechanics does lead to
general agreement in ontological beliefs. There are so many disputes
about the kinds of entities that are required for the laws of quantum
mechanics to be true and they are so intractable that most physicists
beat a hasty retreat to their empirical method and take cover by
simply pointing out that its laws are the best way of predicting and
controlling the relevant phenomena. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To be sure,
there are ontological interpretations of quantum mechanics that are
incompatible with spatiomaterialism. For example, some philosophers
take measurements in quantum mechanics (involving the so-called
“collapse of the wavefunction”) to be an event that depends on a
conscious mind coming to know something about the world, and that is
to assume that mind is a fundamentally different kind of substance
from matter, which is is a form of immaterialism that
spatiomaterialism rejects. Another interpretation, called the “many
worlds view,” interprets measurement in quantum mechanics (again,
the collapse of the wavefunction) to be the occasion of the universe
splitting into different universes in which each of the different
possible outcomes of each measurement are realized, which is not
compatible with the world being constituted by substances. However,
the possibility of such views is hardly an objection to
spatiomaterialism, as long as it is possible to give an ontological
interpretation of quantum mechanics that is compatible with
spatiomaterialism. Thus, the issue is whether <i>all </i>possible
ontological interpretations are incompatible with spatiomaterialism.
It was the universal assumption that Einsteinian relativity is
incompatible with space being absolute that forced us to take out a
mortgage on spatiomaterialism, promising to show how it can explain
Einsteins two relativity theories ontologically as a condition of
using it as the foundation for ontological philosophy. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">To
be sure quantum mechanics did overthrow the <i>classical </i>view of
the nature of matter. But that does not necessarily challenge
spatiomaterialism, because spatiomaterialism is no more committed to
the classical view of matter than it is to the classical view of
space. The relevant issue is whether it is <i>possible </i>to explain
the truth of the laws of quantum mechanics by making assumptions
about the nature of matter (and space) that are consistent with
spatiomaterialism. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Materialism
in general is not generally thought to be what is refuted by quantum
mechanics. On the contrary, many physicists who are quite confident
of the truth of quantum mechanics would consider themselves
“materialists” in the broad sense in which that term is used to
classify ontological positions. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
question is what more specific essential nature material substances
must have in order for quantum mechanics to be true. It is clear that
the regularities described by quantum mechanics cannot be explained
ontologically by the kinds of material objects and light waves
recognized by classical physics. But spatiomaterialism does not have
to defend that view of matter. Indeed, as we have seen, its
explanation of why the laws of classical physics are true (insofar as
they are true) depends on assumptions about the nature of matter that
are not part of classical physics. I assumed, for example, that
kinetic energy is a form of matter that exists in addition to the
rest masses of material objects, and that potential energy is as form
of matter (force field matter) that is already counted in the rest
masses of the objects exerting the forces. And in explaining the
truth of the special and general theories of relativity, I have made
further non-classical assumptions about the nature of the world —
for example, that there is an inherent motion in space and that it
can itself be accelerated and have a velocity relative to space. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
is not to say that there is nothing puzzling about quantum mechanics.
There are two, basically different ways that it might seem to
challenge spatiomaterialism directly. One has to do with a long
recognized indeterminacy about its predictions, and the other is a
more recently discovered problem about action at a distance (deriving
from Bells theorem). </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><b>Indeterminism.</b>
The laws of quantum mechanics do not describe nature as having
deterministic causal connections among states of affairs. Those laws
often imply only that, given everything that can be known about a
given situation, any of a number of different states might follow (or
precede) it. The most that can be done is to assign a probability to
each of those possible outcomes.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This is
fundamentally different from classical physics, for its laws were
deterministic. As Laplace pointed out in the eighteenth century, if
the basic laws of classical physics are true, then given a complete
description of the current situation (even the state of whole
universe), it would be possible, in principle, to predict any future
state (or even any earlier state). The state of the universe (or any
closed system) at any one moment determines its state at every other
moment. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Even in
very limited situations, the laws of quantum mechanics do not usually
support such deterministic predictions. Given a complete quantum
mechanical description of a situation, there is a range of possible
events that can happen (such as what measurements will reveal), and
there is no way of saying which one it will be (though it is possible
to assign probabilities to the alternatives). Thus, physics no longer
assumes that complete knowledge of the current state of the universe
would make it possible to predict what would happen.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This lack
of precise predictability comes from the nature of the Schrödinger
equation. Its solution for a given situation is a wavefunction which
is a complete quantum description of that situation (in
pre-relativistic quantum mechanics). It describes precisely how the
quantum system evolves as time passes, just like a wavefunction in
classical physics. But the Schrödinger wavefunction is not
classical, because it involves complex numbers (containing <i>i</i>,
or the square root of minus one), and the space in which the wave is
contained is a “configuration space,” which is a space with three
times as many dimensions as there are particles involved in the
situation being described. There is no obvious way to relate such a
wavefunction to the natural world. The standard interpretation of the
Schrödinger wavefunction takes the square of the amplitude of the
wavefunction (for a single particle) in any small region of space to
represent the <i>probability </i>of finding the particle at that
location. (And there are mathematical operators on the wavefunction
that predict measurements, but they cannot predict precisely both of
any pair of complementary variables, such as the position and
momentum of an electron.)</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
limitation on precise predictions of what will happen is summed up in
the famous Heisenberg uncertainty principle. This principle can be
taken as reflecting either an indeterminism about the world itself or
as merely an incompleteness in what can be known about it. Though in
either case, it is a limitation in principle, rather than practice, a
mere incompleteness in our possible knowledge about the world would
not contradict spatiomaterialism. Substances enduring through time
could still constitute causal connections, even if some aspects of
those substances cannot be measured precisely. Furthermore, even if
this uncertainty did derive from an indeterminism in the nature of
what happens independently of how it is known, it would not
necessarily be incompatible with spatiomaterialism. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Indeterminism
would contradict spatiomaterialism if it was incompatible with the
world being constituted by substances enduring through time. Such an
extreme indeterminism would be true, if the predictions supported by
quantum mechanics corresponded to <i>all </i>the causal connections
that there are between the properties that hold at one moment and the
those that hold at the next. To hold that what is unpredictable is
not determined at all is incompatible with any explanation of the
world as constituted by substances enduring though time, because it
is to assume, in effect, that something comes from nothing. What is
unpredictable about the next moment would not depend in any way on
what existed at the previous moment, and since it would have to come
from nothing at all, extreme indeterminism would contradict the
assumption that the world (and all its aspects) are constituted by
substances enduring through time. Though this does not bother
epistemologically minded naturalists, it would be a death blow to
ontological naturalism.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">A less
extreme form of indeterminism is compatible with an ontological
explanation of the natural world, though it is still hard to swallow.
Indeterminism might hold that what is unpredictable according to the
Heisenberg principle is a result of an inherent randomness in the
essential nature of the matter making up the world. This would be
more than a mere limitation in what <i>we </i>can know about the
determining conditions, because it also would be a limitation in what
even God could know. There would be no need to believe that something
comes from nothing, because what exists at the next moment would be
constituted by the same substances that constituted the world at the
previous moment. But here would be no aspect of the nature of those
substances at the previous moment that determines which of certain
aspects it will have the next moment, because the randomness would be
an aspect of the essential nature of the kind of matter that
constitutes the world. The randomness would be a temporally complex
aspect of the essential nature of matter, for it would make the
connections between properties that substances have at different
moments random. It would be as if matter itself contained a
randomness generator that even God could not use to predict what will
happen (though God would presumably still know the future, since he
is the creator of all the moments of the world). Though such a view
about the nature of matter would be consistent with
spatiomaterialism, it would not be as good as one that could give a
genuine ontological explanation of what happens, that is, which
explains what happens as aspects of the world that follow from the
natures of the basic substances as they endure through time
constituting the world. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">However,
The Heisenberg uncertainty principle does not preclude a genuine
ontological explanation of what is unpredictable. To hold that
quantum uncertainty is merely a limitation in what beings like us,
who are parts of the world, can know about the world is to hold that
what happens does have a cause, but that we cannot know precisely
what it is. This is to interpret the probabilistic nature of quantum
mechanics as an <i>incompleteness</i> in our knowledge, rather than
as <i>indeterminism</i> about the world. It assumes that there is
some “hidden variable” that is actually determining what happens,
though for some reason, that variable cannot be measured. That is not
incompatible with spatiomaterialism, because the reason for the
Heisenberg uncertainty could be that the interactions required for
scientists, as material objects in space, to know about particular
conditions in the world so disturb the world that they alter the
conditions being known. That limitation must, of course, be caused by
the basic nature of those interactions. But that does not mean that
it is impossible to identify the nature of the hidden variable. It
means only that its quantity cannot be measured accurately in any
particular case. And having inferred to spatiomaterialism as the best
ontological explanation of the world, we may be in a better position
to identify the nature of the hidden variable that makes quantum
mechanics incomplete. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><b>Bells
theorem.</b> Though the traditional puzzles about the apparent
indeterminism of quantum mechanics do not necessarily contradict
spatiomaterialism, there is a more recently discovered implication of
quantum mechanics that may. It occurs when particles separate from
one another in a way that gives them opposite orientations of a
quantum property called “spin.” John Bell showed that when such
particles move away from one another in opposite directions, it is
possible for a measurement made of one particle at one location to
predict (probabilistically) measurements that are made at another
location more accurately than would be possible if the particles had
the properties being measured from the time they parted from one
another. These “Bell correlations,” as I will call them, seem to
imply that spin is not a property that the particles carry with them
locally, but one that depends on the entire system, including both
particles rushing away from each other. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This
suggests according to a standard interpretation of quantum mechanics
that the measurement of one particle affects the other particle (that
is, that such effects are part of what is called the “collapse of
the wavefunction”). But if measurement does have such effects, then
it would have to be able to have its effect faster than the velocity
of light, and that seems to contradict the principle of local action.
I have assumed that what happens in one part of space cannot affect
what happens elsewhere any faster than the velocity of light, for
that velocity is determined by the inherent motion in space. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">There is,
however, something suspicious about the Bell correlations. There is
no other evidence of faster than light effects in nature.
Furthermore, it has been shown that, whatever is going on, Bell
correlations are the kind of signal that can be used to communicate
information. They are peculiarly lacking in further consequences.</font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is not
clear, therefore, that this departure of quantum mechanics from
Bells theorem (about what local action entails) depends on one
measurement affecting the other measurement causally. However,
worries about the possibility of action at a distance will probably
not be put to rest completely unless it is explained how it is
possible for quantum mechanics to make such predictions. Thus, there
something that needs explaining. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
is, therefore, reason to explore the ontological explanations of
quantum mechanics that are opened up by spatiomaterialism. We would
be justified in using spatiomaterialism as the foundation for
ontological philosophy without explaining why quantum mechanics is
true. But if its explanation of the aspects of the natural world to
which the equations of quantum mechanics correspond did help clear up
the quantum puzzles, there would be an additional reason for
believing that spatiomaterialism is true.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
the first section, I will review the traditional puzzles about the
nature of matter posed by quantum mechanics. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
the second section, I will introduce several new assumptions about
the nature of space and matter and show how they would enable
spatiomaterialism to explain the forms of matter that were assumed in
explaining the truth of the laws of classical physics. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
third section will return to the quantum puzzles and show how the
proposed ontological assumptions would explain those puzzling
phenomena ontologically, including a response to the challenge that
seems to be posed for spatiomaterialism by the more recent discovery
of Bell correlations. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This more
detailed ontological theory about the nature of matter is offered in
a speculative vein. It differs from the ontological explanation of
relativity theory, because no such explanation must be given in order
to use spatiomaterialism for philosophical purposes. And it differs
from the arguments to come about global regularities, because they
attempt to prove that certain proposition are ontologically necessary
truths. The reason that this ontological explanation of quantum
mechanics is not ontologically necessary is that there may be other
ontological explanations of quantum mechanics that are also
consistent with spatiomaterialism (and what is says about relativity
theory). Thus, the most I would claim to show is that some such
ontological explanation is true. It may not be this one, but it will
be clear, I believe, that there is some way of explaining the truth
of quantum mechanics on a spatiomaterialist foundation. And since
speculation is valuable as a way of exploring the possibilities, this
particular version of spatiomaterialism may contribute to the
discovery of the more complete truth about the natural world. </font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
explanation of quantum mechanics is, like its explanation of
relativity theory, ontological, rather than mathematical. I will be
trying to show how the new phenomena predicted by quantum mechanics
can be constituted by space and matter as substances enduring through
time, not that there is a better efficient-cause explanation of what
happens. It does not claim to make any new predictions of what
happens in the world.</font></font></font></p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Though
I will give reasons for believing that this ontological explanation
is quantitatively accurate (or can be made so), I will not try to
show in detail how the formidable mathematical formalism of quantum
mechanics relates to the world. Such a mathematical argument would
take us too far afield. And in any case, it has already been done by
David Bohm. (See <font color="#0000ff"><u><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Bohm">Bohm</a></u></font>,
1993, with Basil J. Hiley.) That is, the ontology I will be proposing
is a variation on the ontology that Bohm shows to correspond to the
Schrödinger equation, the basic equation of quantum mechanics, and
thus, if Bohms ontology is a possible explanation of the truth of
quantum mechanics, then so is this one. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">There are
many good accounts of quantum mechanics, but a reasonably accessible
one that I have recently found useful is Jim <font color="#0000ff"><u><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Bohm">Baggott's</a></u></font>
<i>The Meaning of Quantum Theory. </i></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
most cases, it will be clear that the kinds of assumptions I will be
making can be refined to made them quantitatively adequate. This is
much the same attitude I took in explaining ontologically the truth
of general relativity, except that in the case of quantum mechanics,
I also leave open the choice between various more detailed,
alternative ontological assumptions. Thus, in order to show that it
is not possible to explain the truth of quantum mechanics
ontologically in this way, it would be necessary to show that none of
these possibilities can be quantitatively adequate for the whole
range of quantum phenomena. </font></font></font>
</p>
<p lang="en-US" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; text-indent: 0cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Nor
do I claim that the ontological theory being presented here is the
best spatiomaterialist explanation of quantum mechanics, only that it
(or one much like it) is possible in the sense of accounting for all
the relevant phenomena. There may be ways in which space and matter
existing together as a world can explain the truth of quantum
mechanics more simply. That would be interesting and preferable. But
it is not the crucial point, because the possibility of such an
ontological explanation is all that is relevant to rest of
ontological philosophy. And seeing how it is possible is the first
step toward discovering the best such theory.</font></font></font></p>
</body>
</html>