763 lines
66 KiB
HTML
763 lines
66 KiB
HTML
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<title>By “self interest” I mean, in this case, “individual self interest,” or the interest that the rational subject has as an indiv</title>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">B<img src="" name="OdlS_1" align="right" hspace="5" width="151" height="52" border="0">y
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“self interest” I mean, in this case, “individual self
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interest,” or the interest that the rational subject has as an
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individual. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">Since
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in our terms, the “Self” refers to the life of the rational
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subject, all the practical interests of the rational subject can be
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can be called forms of self interest. Thus, given that the rational
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subject also has a spiritual and religious interest, their
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corresponding names would be her “spiritual self interest” and
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her “religious self interest,” respectively. (See discussion of
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these forms of self interest in </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCbGeRRS09Si.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
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Dichotomies of rational level culture</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.)</span></font></font></font></p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Individual
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self interest includes, as we have seen, two kinds of goals,
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necessary goals and optional goals. The necessary goals are the goals
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that are good for the individual because they control conditions that
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affect her reproduction as an individual. Optional goals are goals
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that are good for the individual because they are good in some other
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way and the individual chooses to pursue them, making them good for
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herself. These two kinds of goals are good in different ways, and
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since there are correspondingly different reasons why they are what
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ought to exist as far as reason is concerned, let us consider them
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separately. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdlS_2" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="142" height="45" border="0">he
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individual subject is a multicellular animal, and like any animal,
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there are certain conditions that the rational subject must control
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because they affect her reproduction. These are the necessary goals
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of individual self interest. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdlS_3" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="121" height="48" border="0">hey
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include all the goals implicit in animal nature, such as obtaining
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food, shelter and other necessary resources. But they also include
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goals implicit in the nature of the animals that are parts of
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spiritual animal, that is, the social goals, such as maintaining
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family relations, having friends, and other social relations that are
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normal for members of one’s spiritual animal. To a certain extent,
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therefore, they are relative to the technology and style of life that
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prevails in the spiritual animal in which one lives. However, they do
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not include animal goals that are incompatible with being a member of
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a spiritual animal, such as avoiding the risk of losing one's life
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fighting wars, since that is a necessary aspect of the ecological
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niche that individuals occupy </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
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should be kept in mind, however, that necessary goals do not include
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reproduction itself. Reproduction is not one of the conditions that
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affect reproduction, but, rather, what determines which conditions
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are relevant to control, which is the criterion for necessary goals.
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By controlling relevant conditions, the subject is in a position to
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reproduce, if she chooses. But reproduction itself is an optional
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goal (unless, perhaps, reproduction must be controlled because of
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necessary goals pursued by the spiritual animal). Reproduction is
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good for the subject, if she chooses to reproduce, and it brings with
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it all of the other goals that having children entails. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Necessary
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goals are normally picked out by desires that are inherited as part
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of biological nature, which include social goals. From hunger to the
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need for companionship and love, the goal selection system built into
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individual subjects by the biological behavior guidance system guides
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behavior toward goals that control conditions that are relevant in
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the sense of affecting individual reproduction. But what makes the
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goals good is not that they satisfy desire, as hedonism mistakenly
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assumed. Rather, as evolution by reproductive causation implies, they
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satisfy desires because they are good in the sense of contributing to
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one’s maximum holistic power as an organism, that is, of
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contributing to the natural perfection of the individual as an
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organism.</font></font></font></p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
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function of the desires that motivate the pursuit of necessary goals
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is the same as in other animal organisms, namely, that they control
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some condition that must be controlled in order maximize one’s
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power to control relevant conditions over one’s entire reproductive
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cycle. In other words, they contribute to the natural perfection of
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the individual in the same way as the goals pursued by non-rational
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animals. </font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Even the
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hedonistic rational subject, before ontological philosophy evolves,
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is more powerful than non-rational animals, because when she chooses
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to behave in the current situation in ways that will maximize the
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satisfaction of her desires over her lifetime, she also tends to be
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choosing ways of behaving that control the relevant conditions more
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efficiently and reliably.</font></font></p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">But when
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the rational subject gives up hedonism in favor of a functional
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explanation of desires and recognizes that the control of relevant
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conditions, rather than the desire, is what makes the object of
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desire good, she is even more powerful over her whole life than the
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hedonist. The desires built into the brain as part of its goal
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selection system are a crude indication of the kinds of goals that
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will give the individual the maximum holistic power of an organism.
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She is better able to see the relative importance of such goals and
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how they can be attained as efficiently as possible by considering
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their role in controlling relevant conditions than by the amount of
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pleasure they give. </font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<img src="" name="OdlS_4" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="121" height="46" border="0"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Our
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ontological explanation of the nature of goodness implies, therefore,
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that necessary goals are good for the rational subject as an
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individual because they contribute to her natural perfection as an
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individual organism. And since they are good for the rational
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subject, we infer that the rational subject ought to pursue them.
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That is the form of the argument that will be used to show that goals
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are good for reason in each of the cases below. But it is commonly
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assumed that the difference between facts and values makes any such
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proof impossible, that is, that values cannot be reduced to facts.
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Indeed, there is a famous philosophical argument against this kind of
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explanation of what ought to exist, and it will be answered here,
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||
though it works the same way for all the goals that determine what
|
||
ought to exist for reason. What is at issue is whether there is a
|
||
naturalistic fallacy. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">I<img src="" name="OdlS_5" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="74" height="34" border="0">t
|
||
seems that there is reason to doubt that this argument about the
|
||
goals that rational subjects ought to pursue is valid. For it can be
|
||
argued that, from the premise that a goal is good for a rational
|
||
subject in the sense of contributing to her natural perfection as an
|
||
individual organism, it does not follow that she ought to pursue it.
|
||
Indeed, the belief that any such implication holds is called the
|
||
“naturalistic fallacy.” </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ontological
|
||
philosophy does give a naturalistic definition of “good,” because
|
||
it defines “good” as contributing the natural perfection and that
|
||
is a property that can be known by theoretical reason alone in
|
||
explaining the nature of evolution (as reproductive global
|
||
regularities). But according to G. E. Moore, goodness cannot be
|
||
explained naturalistically. Indeed, he would insist that it commits a
|
||
logical fallacy which he called the “naturalistic fallacy.” </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Moore’s
|
||
own positive view is that goodness is a simple, non-natural property
|
||
that supervenes on natural properties (where that means that if one
|
||
thing has it, then anything else with a relevantly similar physical
|
||
nature also has it). Its simplicity keeps goodness from being
|
||
explained in terms of simpler properties, and its non-naturalness is
|
||
supposed to explain its normative meaning, that is, that what has the
|
||
property, goodness, ought to exist. But what is relevant here is the
|
||
problem to which Moore was pointing, which is better known as the
|
||
difference between fact and value. Can values be reduced to facts, or
|
||
is there something inherently irreducible about them. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The most
|
||
compelling argument that G. E. Moore gives for believing that there
|
||
is a naturalistic fallacy is the so-called “open question
|
||
argument.” Moore argues that, given any naturalistic definition of
|
||
“good,” it is possible to ask meaningfully of something that is
|
||
good according to that definition, “But is it good?” For example,
|
||
if “good” is defined as being pleasurable, it makes sense to ask
|
||
of something that is pleasurable,” But is it good?” because it
|
||
might be bad, for example, because of its later consequences or
|
||
because it is morally wrong. It is an open question whether something
|
||
satisfying that naturalistic definition is actually good and ought to
|
||
be chosen. Moore insists that the same holds of any naturalistic
|
||
definition of “good.” If any such naturalistic definition of
|
||
“good” were correct, Moore’s question should be as
|
||
insignificant as asking, “But is the good good?” or “Is the
|
||
good what ought to be chosen?” Thus, the fact that Moore’s
|
||
question can be asked significantly with respect to any naturalistic
|
||
definition of “good” shows that there is a naturalistic fallacy.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">A. J. Ayer
|
||
argued in a similar way against naturalism, albeit is as a logical
|
||
positivist. He argued that if a naturalistic definition of "good"
|
||
were correct, it would be self contradictory to hold that something
|
||
that satisfies the definition is not good. Thus, the fact that no
|
||
such proposition is self contradictory would also suggest that
|
||
naturalism rest on a fallacy. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">However,
|
||
it is not possible to know in advance that Moore’s question will be
|
||
significant with respect to every naturalistic definition of “good.”
|
||
Thus, it can be argued that Moore simply had not tried the right
|
||
naturalistic definition. And that is the way to refute Moore’s open
|
||
question argument without denying its validity as a test for
|
||
fallaciousness. (Likewise for Ayer's way of challenging the truth of
|
||
naturalistic definitions of "good.")</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Let
|
||
us, therefore, apply Moore’s open-question argument to our
|
||
ontological explanation of the nature of goodness. The issue is,
|
||
then, whether it can be asked with significance, Is what contributes
|
||
to natural perfection good? Or since we are talking about what is
|
||
good for reason, the questions is, Is what contributes to the natural
|
||
perfection of a rational being good for that rational being? </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">There is a
|
||
way in which Moore’s question might seem significant, though it is
|
||
not relevant here. It might seem significant, because one does not
|
||
understand what it means to say that something contributes to natural
|
||
perfection. In order to understand the question, it is necessary to
|
||
understand this ontological explanation of the nature of goodness,
|
||
and that means understanding its explanation of the cause of
|
||
evolution and seeing how it involves an inevitable series of stages
|
||
leading up to rational subjects like us. Let us assume, therefore,
|
||
that the question is being asked by someone who understands the
|
||
conclusions of theoretical reason about what is and recognizes
|
||
herself as a rational subject of the kind they entail. That is, let
|
||
us assume that it is being asked by someone at the stage of
|
||
ontological philosophical spirit, that is, by ontological reason. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In that
|
||
case, the answer to Moore’s open-question argument will be that it
|
||
is not significant, at least, not in any way that is relevant to
|
||
showing that some mistake is being made. Let us focus on the case at
|
||
issue, about the goodness of the necessary goals of individual
|
||
interest. The theory implies that such goals are good because they
|
||
contribute in essential way to one’s natural perfection as an
|
||
individual organism. To ask, But are these necessary goals good? is
|
||
to ask whether one has sufficient reason to pursue them. But rational
|
||
subjects do have sufficient reason to pursue goals that are good in
|
||
this sense, because pursuing goals of that kind is part of their
|
||
nature as rational subjects. When the rational subject recognizes
|
||
that she is a being of the kind that comes to exist as a result of
|
||
evolution by reproductive causation, that she is able to ask this
|
||
question about whether she ought to pursue necessary goals because
|
||
she is rational in the way implied by this theory, and (as we shall
|
||
see) that <i>all </i>the goals she already takes to be good as a
|
||
rational being are shown to be good by their contribution to one’s
|
||
natural perfection as a rational subject, it simply does not make
|
||
sense to ask if what contributes to one’s natural perfection is
|
||
good. That is simply what reason does: it pursues the good in that
|
||
sense. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This point
|
||
can also be put from the outside, so to speak, because Moore’s
|
||
question is closed by the ontological explanation of the dichotomy
|
||
between theoretical and practical reason. The difference between
|
||
facts and values is one of the dichotomies among arguments at the
|
||
rational spiritual stage of evolution. Facts are conclusions of
|
||
theoretical reason, and values are conclusions of practical reason.
|
||
Ontological philosophy overcomes this dichotomy, as we have seen, by
|
||
deriving the nature of reason as part of the course of evolution by
|
||
reproductive causation, for that reveals that reason is a behavior
|
||
guidance system that uses knowledge of the true to discover what is
|
||
good. “Good” in that sense is defined as contributing to natural
|
||
perfection, which is a naturalistic definition. But when we recognize
|
||
that we are rational beings in that sense, then that is also what <i>we
|
||
</i>mean by the word, “good.” To ask whether what contributes to
|
||
one’s own natural perfection is good, when one accepts ontological
|
||
philosophy, is as senseless as asking, But is the good good? </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Likewise
|
||
for Ayer's argument against a naturalistic definition of "good."
|
||
For someone with ontological reason, it is self contradictory to deny
|
||
that something that contributes to natural perfection is good, for
|
||
that is what "good" refers to in a spatiomaterial world
|
||
like our own. There simply is no other meaning that "good"
|
||
could have in such a world.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdlS_6" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="74" height="34" border="0">he
|
||
more profound refutation of the naturalistic fallacy is ontological
|
||
philosophy's response to Moore, because its way of closing Moore’s
|
||
open question also provides the kind of wisdom that Socrates was
|
||
seeking in the name of philosophy, as love of wisdom. I am assuming
|
||
that what Socrates was seeking is an explanation of the nature of
|
||
goodness that would make any rational subject who understood it
|
||
virtuous. That is my interpretation of the meaning of the Socratic
|
||
principle: knowledge is virtue. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This is a
|
||
plausible interpretation of Socrates’ argument in the <i>Apology.</i>
|
||
When the oracle at Delphi says that Socrates is the wisest man in
|
||
Athens, Socrates insists that he does not have the kind of wisdom
|
||
that he takes the sophists to be claiming to have when they offer to
|
||
teach virtue for a fee. In order to find out what the oracle meant,
|
||
Socrates explains, he went about cross examining various kinds of
|
||
respected figures in Athens about the nature of wisdom, and he found
|
||
in each case that they did not have the wisdom that they claimed to
|
||
have. How he showed this might be called “Socrates’ open-question
|
||
argument,” because when they explained their wisdom about goodness,
|
||
he was always able to point out that there was some question about
|
||
whether it was really good. In the end, the only wisdom that Socrates
|
||
admits to having is knowing that he does not have knowledge. But in
|
||
the context of the <i>Apology,</i> it is clear that what he means is
|
||
a knowledge about the nature of goodness that would make one
|
||
virtuous, that is, the kind of wisdom that the sophists claimed to
|
||
have by promising to teach virtue. Thus, the merely human wisdom that
|
||
Socrates does have, which he describes by saying that he knows he
|
||
does not have knowledge, can be expressed more positively as
|
||
knowledge about what wisdom is, namely, that it is knowledge about
|
||
the nature of goodness that would make one virtuous. That is the kind
|
||
of wisdom that Socrates takes philosophy to be the love of. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Our way of
|
||
closing Moore’s question is also, therefore, a way of giving
|
||
Socrates the wisdom that he sought as a philosopher, or lover of
|
||
wisdom. It explains not only what is good for the rational subject,
|
||
but it also explains why it is good and, thus, gives the rational
|
||
being a sufficient reason to choose it. The good is <i>what
|
||
</i>contributes to one’s own natural perfection as a rational
|
||
subject, and what makes the good good is <i>that </i>it contributes
|
||
to one’s own natural perfection. The answer that Socrates was
|
||
seeking is the same answer that Moore was denying was possible,
|
||
namely, a self-understanding by reason that reveals how reason is
|
||
related to a kind of perfection that is appropriate to the nature of
|
||
what exists (including himself) in a spatiomaterial world like ours. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, since
|
||
ontological philosophy can explain the goodness of all the goals that
|
||
we believe that rational beings pursue, it succeeds in doing what
|
||
Plato tried to do for Socrates by taking an epistemological approach
|
||
to philosophy. It vindicates Socrates’ merely human wisdom by
|
||
showing that there is, indeed, a kind of goodness the knowledge of
|
||
whose nature would make a rational being virtuous. But instead of
|
||
being The Good Itself (the source of the other Forms in the realm of
|
||
Being, according to Plato) what makes things good is the natural
|
||
perfection that is entailed by progressive evolution, when evolution
|
||
is explained as a global regularity caused ontologically by
|
||
reproductive cycles and space. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">W<img src="" name="OdlS_7" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="74" height="34" border="0">ithin
|
||
this ontological theory, however, let me mention a way in which it
|
||
might seem that Moore’s question is still open and significant (and
|
||
Socrates’ quest is not fulfilled), though it comes from failing to
|
||
recognize the nature of natural perfection. What generally makes
|
||
Moore’s question significant when asked about other naturalistic
|
||
definitions of “good” is that there are always ways that it could
|
||
turn out that something that satisfies the naturalistic definition is
|
||
not good because of some larger context in which it occurs where it
|
||
is bad. That is, I assume, how Socrates was able to cast doubt on the
|
||
wisdom about virtue that other Athenians claimed to have. But that is
|
||
not possible, because of the way in which "good" is defined
|
||
by ontological philosophy, that is, how it explains the nature of
|
||
goodness ontologically. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In the case
|
||
of hedonism, for example, Moore points out that, although defining
|
||
“good” as pleasure seems plausible at first, we discover that the
|
||
definition is faulty when we see that it makes sense to ask, But is
|
||
pleasure good? That question makes sense because we know there are
|
||
situations in which pleasure is bad. (Socrates uses this argument as
|
||
well.) </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">But Moore’s
|
||
question cannot be significant in an analogous way when applied to
|
||
our definition of “good,” because there is no larger context in
|
||
which what contributes to natural perfection can turn out to be bad.
|
||
All the forms of natural perfection fit together as parts of the
|
||
overall structure of natural perfection as a single, spatio-temporal
|
||
whole, and thus, whatever is good by virtue of contributing to some
|
||
form of natural perfection is good by virtue of contributing to the
|
||
natural perfection of the whole. That is the unity of goodness on
|
||
this theory. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is true
|
||
that what is good for one organism can be bad for another, as we have
|
||
seen in the case of the predator and its prey. Eating another animal
|
||
is good for the predator and bad for the prey. But this is not an
|
||
ultimate conflict, because the predator catching the prey is good for
|
||
the ecology, that is, contributes to the natural perfection of the
|
||
ecology (not to mention how it contributes to the natural perfection
|
||
of life or to the natural perfection of change). </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nor does
|
||
Moore’s question become significant by wondering whether the
|
||
natural perfection within which everything else is good might turn
|
||
out to be bad in a still larger context, like a perfect murder or
|
||
perfect tyranny. The overall structure of natural perfection includes
|
||
spatially a whole planet or, perhaps eventually, a whole planetary
|
||
system, and temporally, the whole course of evolution. Its larger
|
||
context is the rest of the universe, with all its other stars and
|
||
galaxies. But there is nothing about the large scale structure of the
|
||
universe that could possibly make natural perfection bad. What we
|
||
know about the rest of the universe is that evolution will follow the
|
||
same course on any other suitable planet, and that can hardly make
|
||
evolution in our planetary system bad. On the contrary, given the
|
||
vast reaches of space separating planetary systems, the rest of the
|
||
universe seems, at worst, to be indifferent to what happens on any
|
||
one planet (or planetary system). It is meaningless to suggest there
|
||
is some larger context in which natural perfection is bad.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
|
||
is, however, a way in which it does make sense to ask, Is what
|
||
contributes to natural perfection good? But it is not a way that
|
||
supports belief in a naturalistic fallacy. One could be asking if
|
||
there isn’t something more to goodness, some further story to be
|
||
told about its nature that is not included in the definition. That
|
||
surely makes sense. What is good by our definition could be good for
|
||
other reasons as well. I suggest something like that below. But what
|
||
is relevant here is that the possibility of such a deeper explanation
|
||
of the nature of goodness does not supply any reason to doubt that
|
||
what contributes to our natural perfection is good. It merely adds to
|
||
the story about why the good, so defined, is good. And far from
|
||
supporting the claim that there is a logical fallacy about defining
|
||
“good” naturalistically, it presupposes the possibility of such a
|
||
naturalistic explanation.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
|
||
is, therefore, no naturalistic fallacy. G. E. Moore’s mistake was
|
||
to infer from his own inability to find a naturalistic definition of
|
||
“good” that would close his “open question” to the conclusion
|
||
that there <i>can </i>be none. He promoted his inability to think of
|
||
a naturalistic definition into a logical fallacy. But as we have
|
||
seen, there is a naturalistic property to which “good” might be
|
||
referring that does close his question, at least, if evolution is
|
||
caused by reproduction. (The same holds for Ayer.)</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In fact,
|
||
the nature of the property, goodness, may also explain why Moore saw
|
||
“good” as referring to a simple, non-natural property. Goodness
|
||
may seem to be a simple property, for the goodness of anything
|
||
actually depends on how it is part of a unique kind of structure that
|
||
is as large as the planet, at least. That is why “good” cannot be
|
||
defined by any set of physical properties that characterize the local
|
||
objects, events and conditions that are said to be good.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote1anc" href="#sdendnote1sym"><sup>i</sup></a></sup>
|
||
And goodness seems to be non-natural, since to be good means that it
|
||
ought to exist, and unless one understands the nature of the natural
|
||
perfection in the world and recognizes oneself to be part of it, it
|
||
is hard to see how any naturalistic property could call for things
|
||
that have it to exist. Thus, by closing his open question, not only
|
||
does this view of goodness show, on Moore’s own turf, that there is
|
||
no naturalistic fallacy, but it also explains why Moore takes it to
|
||
be a simple, non-natural property. It seems to be a simple,
|
||
non-natural property because it is actually the most complex, natural
|
||
property. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="OdlS_8" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="142" height="45" border="0">he
|
||
autonomy of reason, as we have seen, makes the subjects who have the
|
||
power of reason basically different from all other multicellular
|
||
animals. It enables them to do what is good because they believe that
|
||
it is good, and thus, in addition to goals that control conditions
|
||
that affect their own reproduction as individuals, they can pursue
|
||
goals that are good in virtue of contributing to the natural
|
||
perfection of other evolving things or to artificial perfection, such
|
||
as works of art. And since rational subjects will inevitably choose
|
||
to pursue them, we have assumed that such goals are good for the
|
||
rational subject when she chooses to pursue them. That is how we
|
||
introduced the notion of optional goals for rational beings. But now
|
||
that the issue arises for practical reason, it might be asked whether
|
||
rational subjects <i>ought </i>to pursue optional goals. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">R<img src="" name="OdlS_9" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="116" height="48" border="0">eason
|
||
is autonomous, because it is the new, language-based behavior
|
||
guidance system that takes over control of animal behavior as
|
||
primitive spiritual animals evolve into rational spiritual animals.
|
||
The animal desire to submit to the leader’s instructions becomes
|
||
the desire to submit to the conclusions of practical reason, and
|
||
thus, reason wrests control of behavior from (other) animal desires
|
||
(that is, from control by the goal selection system of the
|
||
multicellular animal behavior guidance system). That is, as we have
|
||
seen, what makes it possible for the rational subject to puruse what
|
||
she believes are necessary goals of individual self interest, even
|
||
when it is opposed by strong immediate desires. But since reason
|
||
works by enabling the subject to intend and actually do what she
|
||
<i>believes </i>is good, it also enables her to pursue goals beyond
|
||
those that control conditions that affect her individual
|
||
reproduction, or optional goals.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Optional
|
||
goals include all goals that are good for other reproducing
|
||
structures, the ecology, life, or change because of how they
|
||
contribute to their natural perfection, as well as what is good in
|
||
virtue of contributing to artificial perfection. They include, for
|
||
example, doing good for other individual rational beings (beyond what
|
||
is required by morality, that is, as supererogation), making
|
||
contributions to culture (beyond the normal rational interest in
|
||
knowing the good, the true and the beautiful), serving the interest
|
||
of one’s spiritual animal (beyond duty), doing good for other
|
||
spiritual animals, for the ecology, for life, or for evolution
|
||
generally. And optional goals include creating or enjoying works of
|
||
art, including not only works of fine art, but also the aesthetic
|
||
aspect of one’s daily life.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is good
|
||
to pursue optional goals, however, only insofar as necessary goals
|
||
are already being attained. Necessary goals take priority over
|
||
optional goals. But the power of reason is so great that rational
|
||
beings are often in situations where they are able to control more
|
||
conditions in the world than what affects their individual
|
||
reproduction, and they spend their extra rational action on optional
|
||
goals. The choice of such goals is what makes them good for the
|
||
rational subject. But as rational subjects, they cannot choose to
|
||
pursue any goal unless they believe (correctly or mistakenly) that it
|
||
is already good in some way, that is, by contributing to the natural
|
||
or artificial perfection of something. The autonomy of reason is the
|
||
power to do what they believe is good, not the power to act
|
||
arbitrarily or capriciously. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
natural (or artificial) perfection of other things in the world is
|
||
often something that rational subjects can detect, because rational
|
||
imagination enables rational subjects to see the actual against the
|
||
background of the possible and that can reveal ways in which the
|
||
whole is an optimal part-whole relation. The rational interest in
|
||
beauty is also what enables rational subjects to see how best to
|
||
control all the conditions that affect their individual reproduction,
|
||
not to mention what enables them to judge what is true. It plays the
|
||
same role in the choice of optional goals and pursuing them.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">When a
|
||
rational subject pursues an optional goal, she is guided by the
|
||
perception of what is good for something other than herself, that is,
|
||
by her perception of how it contributes to some other natural
|
||
perfection. The judgment of what it is good to do is disinterested,
|
||
because it depends of her belief about what is good for it. This is
|
||
true even in the case of a work of art. What is good for the work of
|
||
art is not what contributes to the natural perfection of something
|
||
that is already evolving, because it does not even exist until the
|
||
artist chooses to create it. But it does have an optimal part-whole
|
||
relation, which is called beauty, and thus, it is like natural
|
||
perfection and recognized by rational imagination in the same way.
|
||
Artists testify that, as the work of art grows, it “calls for”
|
||
certain additions so that the artist is merely ministering to its
|
||
needs. That is the sense in which works of art imitate nature: the
|
||
beauty of art is the imitation of the natural perfection found in
|
||
nature. It is artificial perfection.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">To
|
||
say that rational subjects can choose to do what is good because they
|
||
believe that it is good, even when it does not control relevant
|
||
conditions, is not to deny that they may also have a desire to pursue
|
||
that goal. It is only to say that the desire to pursue the goal is
|
||
not what makes it good. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Desire may
|
||
prompt the choice of one optional goal over another, for example,
|
||
when the desire to listen to music leads one to become a musician or
|
||
even just to listen to music. But that is not what makes the goal
|
||
good. What makes it good is that what one is listening to or adding
|
||
to the whole makes an essential contribution to the optimal
|
||
part-whole relation of the work of art itself. Likewise, a benevolent
|
||
desire may prompt her to take an interest in the good of someone
|
||
else, but what makes the rational subject’s actions in pursuit of
|
||
it good is not how it satisfies that benevolent desire, but how it
|
||
contributes to the other’s natural perfection and, by doing so,
|
||
contributes to her own natural perfection. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Moreover,
|
||
once one has chosen music, say, as an optional goal, the desire that
|
||
is the source of the enjoyment one gets from pursuing it is not
|
||
merely the desire that prompted the choice in the first place. What
|
||
the rational subject learns about its natural perfection in pursuing
|
||
the optional goal transforms that desire. Not only does she come to
|
||
enjoy new aspects of music, or whatever the object, but she also
|
||
enjoys them for other reasons, having to do with how they contribute
|
||
to the natural perfection of the whole. The desire that is being
|
||
satisfied is ultimately the desire to submit to reason, though given
|
||
how reason grows and matures with the rational pursuit of optional
|
||
goals, it might be better called the desire to enjoy the power of
|
||
reason. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is the
|
||
nature of rational imagination that leads us, as we have seen, to
|
||
appreciate aesthetic goodness. The perception of beauty is implicitly
|
||
the recognition of perfection, and that is what accounts for our
|
||
response to it. In perceiving that nothing can be done to make it
|
||
better, reason would have us leave it as it is and simply enjoy it. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">However,
|
||
if goals are not good because they satisfy desire, but rather because
|
||
of the relevant conditions they control, as our ontological
|
||
explanation of goodness and our functional explanation of desire
|
||
imply, one might doubt that optional goals are good at all. Since
|
||
they do not control conditions that affect the rational subjects
|
||
reproduction as an individual, what makes them good?</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is clear
|
||
that optional goals are not good for rational subjects in the same
|
||
way that the goals of behavior in other multicellular animals are
|
||
good for them, because the attainment of optional goals does not
|
||
control “relevant conditions” in the sense of conditions that
|
||
affect the rational subject’s reproduction as an individual.
|
||
Controlling them does not necessarily make the individual better able
|
||
to reproduce. Thus, ontological philosophy cannot explain why
|
||
optional goals are good for the individual in exactly the same way as
|
||
it does necessary goals.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">O<a href="#10"><img src="" name="OdlS_10" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="10" width="115" height="46" border="0"></a>ntological
|
||
philosophy does, however, imply that it is good for rational beings
|
||
to pursue optional goals, because it explains the nature of goodness
|
||
as contributing to natural perfection, not necessarily as
|
||
contributing to its own maximum power to control conditions that
|
||
affect its own reproduction. The latter is merely how the power to
|
||
contribute to natural perfection is usually brought into being in a
|
||
spatiomaterial world like ours.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The power
|
||
of reason makes rational subjects essentially different from other
|
||
multicellular animals, indeed, from all other organisms (except
|
||
spiritual animals), and that means that their natural perfection is
|
||
different from other animals. Though other organisms can only evolve
|
||
behavior (and other structural effects) that control conditions that
|
||
affect their own reproduction, that limitation is lifted in the case
|
||
of rational beings, because reason guides behavior as a result of a
|
||
cultural evolution of arguments that discover the true, the good and
|
||
the beautiful. It is a behavior guidance system that is able to tell
|
||
what is good more generally than by pursuing goals dictated by the
|
||
biological behavior guidance system and what can evolve biologically
|
||
by natural selection. It enables rational subjects to do what is good
|
||
simply because they believe that it is good. Furthermore, since
|
||
reason often gives rational beings more power than they need to
|
||
control relevant conditions, the natural perfection of rational
|
||
beings is not just the maximum power to control all conditions that
|
||
affect individual reproduction. It is the maximum power to control
|
||
conditions generally that are good.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In other
|
||
words, the fact that a power to contribute to natural perfection does
|
||
not evolve by making the organism better able to complete its own
|
||
reproductive cycle does not imply that it is not good. Reproductive
|
||
causation is merely what is usually responsible for the existence of
|
||
such powers in the world. And if at later stakes in evolution,
|
||
organisms acquire powers of that kind without being naturally
|
||
selected for having them, that does not mean that they are not good.
|
||
Given the nature of goodness, any contribution to the natural
|
||
perfection of the whole of which something is part is good,
|
||
regardless how it comes to exist in the world. That is something that
|
||
reason enables the rational subject to recognize, though that is not
|
||
why reason evolved in the first place. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Perfection
|
||
is an optimal part-whole relation in which the whole does the most
|
||
with the least, and in the case of natural perfection, it is an
|
||
optimal part-whole relation in which the whole has as much power to
|
||
use free energy to control what happens in the world with the fewest
|
||
and simplest structural causes as possible. In the case of reason,
|
||
the structural causes are the sources of rational action, that is,
|
||
the use of practical arguments to guide one’s behavior toward the
|
||
good. Thus, the optimum cannot be a matter of using the fewest and
|
||
simplest structural causes to attain some given ends, for there is a
|
||
fixed supply of structural causes, namely, all the behavior of a
|
||
rational subject over her lifetime. In this case, the part-whole
|
||
relation does more with less by using the structural causes already
|
||
available to do more, that is, to control more of what happens in the
|
||
world. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nor is
|
||
there any question about what counts as more or less control of what
|
||
happens in the world, because optional goals are goals that control
|
||
conditions that contribute to natural (or artificial) perfection in
|
||
some way or other. Though they may not control conditions that affect
|
||
one’s own reproduction, optional goals are not arbitrary or random
|
||
changes in the world. They are not chosen by reason unless they are
|
||
seen as contributing to the natural perfection of some other
|
||
organism, to some other form of natural perfection, such as the
|
||
ecology or evolution, or to an artificial perfection that imitates
|
||
natural perfection, such as works of art. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, the
|
||
natural perfection of rational beings is more like the natural
|
||
perfection of life than the natural perfection of organisms. New
|
||
levels of part-whole complexity in the structures of reproducing
|
||
organisms contribute to the natural perfection of life not because
|
||
they control conditions that are already relevant to reproduction,
|
||
but rather because their higher level of organization makes new
|
||
conditions relevant and brings new conditions under control,
|
||
extending the power of life as such to control what happens in the
|
||
world. Likewise, what contributes to the natural perfection of reason
|
||
is what increases the power to control what happens in the world, not
|
||
to control conditions that are relevant to its own reproduction. In
|
||
both cases, however, the new conditions brought under control are not
|
||
arbitrary, but are good because they contribute to natural (or
|
||
artificial) perfection in some way. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Rational
|
||
subjects ought, therefore, to choose optional goals and pursue them.
|
||
Though the optional goals themselves are not necessary, it is a
|
||
necessary goal of rational subjects to pursue some optional goals or
|
||
others, if they have the extra power to do so. It contributes to
|
||
their natural perfection as rational subjects, even though those
|
||
goals do not control conditions that are relevant to their own
|
||
reproduction. The pursuit of optional goals is, therefore, good for
|
||
rational subjects. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, it is
|
||
possible for ontological philosophy to answer G. E. Moore’s doubts
|
||
about the possibility of any such naturalistic explanation of the
|
||
goodness of optional goals in the same way as it did necessary goals.
|
||
To a rational subject who understands her nature as a rational
|
||
subject and her place in the natural world, it simply does not make
|
||
sense to ask, But is contributing to one’s own natural perfection
|
||
good?</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The pursuit
|
||
of optional goals is also part of the wisdom that Socrates was
|
||
seeking, because this ontological explanation of the nature of
|
||
goodness explains why optional goals are good for the rational
|
||
subject. And the pursuit of any optional goal that one has chosen is
|
||
good, because the pursuit of optional goals is good for rational
|
||
beings and this goal is the one that the rational subject has chosen.
|
||
</font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<div id="sdendnote1">
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
|
||
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote1sym" href="#sdendnote1anc">i</a>
|
||
Moore is not unaware of this aspect of goodness. According to his
|
||
principle of organic unities, (<i>Principia Ethica</i>, Ch. 1, Sec.
|
||
18-23) a whole may have an intrinsic value different in amount from
|
||
the sum of the values of its parts.
|
||
</p>
|
||
</div>
|
||
</body>
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||
</html> |