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5257 lines
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><font size="4" style="font-size: 16pt"><b>Foundation
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of Ontological Philosophy</b></font></font></font></p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ontological
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philosophy is a new way of doing philosophy. Implausible though it
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may sound at this late date, after more than 2 millennia of trying,
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there is a new way of doing philosophy. And it is one that works. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Furthermore,
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since ontological philosophy is a form of naturalism that uses the
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empirical method, it is equally a new way of doing science. In other
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words, it unites philosophy and science. Not surprisingly, it has
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profound and far reaching implications. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<br><br>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>Philosophy.</b></font>
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Philosophy is different from ordinary ways of knowing. It aspires to
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a kind of knowledge that is prior to everyday reasoning, such as
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modern science and everyday practical reasoning. Since it takes a
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special foundation to defend a more fundamental kind of knowledge,
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foundationalism is the heart of philosophy. Ontological philosophy is
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a new kind of “first philosophy.”</font></font></font></p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
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the past, philosophers have used epistemological foundations to argue
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for more fundamental truths. They used reflection on how we know to
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arrive at a theory about the nature of reason and knowledge such as
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the intuition of forms, certainty about ideas in the mind, and the
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language-users’ understanding of language. Such approaches to
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justifying a more fundamental kind of knowledge have failed, however,
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to garner general acceptance (mainly because they lead to
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metaphysical dualism and skepticism). Indeed, the failure of
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traditional, “epistemological” philosophy is one of the few
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points on which most contemporary philosophers can agree. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><i>Ontological
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philosophy.</i></font> It is not hard, therefore, to see why we might
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wish there were a new way of doing philosophy. And there is one. For
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it is possible to use <i>empirical ontology </i>(the acceptance of
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whichever ontology is the best ontological explanation of what is
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found in nature), rather than epistemology, as the foundation for
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justifying a more fundamental kind of knowledge. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">By
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“ontology,” I mean a theory about the basic substances that
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constitute the world, where “substances” are self-subsistent
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entities that never come into existence and never go out of
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existence. That is what we implicitly assume when we take objects in
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the natural world to exist independently ourselves. They must be made
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of something that can exist on its own, or else they would depend on
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us. (And they must be related to one another in some way to exist
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together as a world.) To be the best ontology, as the empirical
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method requires, however, such a theory would have to postulate the
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<i>fewest and simplest </i>basic substances (and basic relationship)
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that can explain <i>everything </i>in the world. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Suppose
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there were an ontology that is demonstrably better than any
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alternative, including those offered by physics. And suppose that it
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entailed further propositions about the world that were not already
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recognized as true. Such an ontology would be a foundation for
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philosophy, for what else it implied would be ontologically
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necessary. Its implications could be denied only by giving up the
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best ontological explanation of the world. They would be
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<i>ontologically necessary truths</i>. Such truths would be more
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fundamental than and, thus, prior to what is known by ordinary means.
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</font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">As
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it happens, there is such an ontology. It is “spatiomaterialism,”
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the theory that the world is constituted by space as well as matter
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enduring through time as substances. It is a better ontological
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||
explanation of the world than any alternative currently considered by
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naturalists. And it has many implications about the world that are
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not currently recognized as true, much less as necessary. It does
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what philosophy has always aspired to do. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The main
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reason that naturalists do not already accept spatiomaterialism is
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that they do not choose which ontology to believe by inferring to the
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best <i>ontological-cause explanation </i>of the world. Instead, they
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believe in empirical science, which infers to the best
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<i>efficient-cause explanations </i>of what happens in the world, and
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they accept whatever ontology is required for scientific theories to
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be true. The Einsteinian overthrow of the Newtonian belief in
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absolute space and time has led naturalists to assume that space
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cannot be a substance enduring through time. But, as will be shown
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below (under <font face="Arial, sans-serif">Change</font>), it is
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possible to explain the truth of both Einstein’s special and
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general theories of relativity on the assumption that space endures
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through time (and, thus, is absolute). That is clearly a better
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ontological explanation of the world than ontologies derived from
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realism about theories in physics, because it is simpler and less
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puzzling than the belief that spacetime is what contains all the
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matter in the world. </font></font>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Spatiomaterialism
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is also better than forms of materialism that take it for granted
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that bits of matter have spatial relations and that spatial relations
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can change over time, for it explains why they have spatial relations
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and how change is possible. Furthermore, since spatiomaterialism can
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explain the truth of all the other basic laws of physics, science
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offers no reason to doubt that it is true. </font></font>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Empirical
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ontology affords, therefore, a way of doing philosophy that is not
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currently being considered. And as we shall see, it has many profound
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consequences. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><i>Epistemological
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philosophy. </i></font>Ontological philosophy is different from
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traditional philosophy, because philosophers have traditionally taken
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an epistemological approach. They tried to demonstrate more
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fundamental truths about the world than ordinary ways of knowing by
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taking as their foundation a theory about the nature of reason which
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was arrived at in some way by reflecting on how we know. Those truths
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were called “necessary,” but since the foundation was
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epistemological, rather than ontological, all that could be
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accomplished was to show that they are certain. In epistemological
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philosophy, what distinguishes necessary truths from ordinary
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knowledge is certainty (rather than being entailed by a deeper
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explanation of the world). Certainty is <i>epistemological necessity</i>.
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</font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">To
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be sure, the systems constructed by the most ambitious
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epistemological philosophers had ontologies, and the claims they made
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about substances were supposed to be necessary. But these ontological
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truths were not <i>ontologically </i>necessary; they were truths
|
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about ontology that were supposed to be epistemologically necessary,
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or certain. That is because ontology is just an afterthought in
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||
traditional philosophy. The primary goal is to show the
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||
conclusiveness of the certain propositions about the world. But
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insofar as those necessary truths entailed theories about what
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exists, epistemological philosophers found themselves committed to
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||
some ontology or other. In other words, their ontological theories,
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||
or metaphysical systems, as they are called, were just implications
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||
of their epistemologically necessary truths, not their foundations. </font></font></font>
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||
</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Furthermore,
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these implications were unwelcome in the end, for their metaphysical
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systems inevitably cast doubt on their epistemological argument,
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leading to skepticism. Since success in epistemological philosophy
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comes from demonstrating that something beyond the epistemological
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foundation can be known (or so-called realism), it entails a
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problematic ontological dualism of some kind. In addition to whatever
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accounts for the existence of their epistemological foundation,
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epistemological philosophers find themselves committed to the
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existence of the other kind of substances whose reality they are
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demonstrating, and as it happens, it is never easy to explain how
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such different kinds of substances fit together as parts of a single
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world. Thus, realism leads by way of some problematic ontological
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dualism to anti-realism, or skepticism about the reality of what is
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supposed to be demonstrated, and the failure of epistemological
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philosophy in inevitable.</font></font></font></p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<br><br>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>The
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foundation of ontological philosophy.</b></font> Though ontological
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philosophy is based on ontology, rather than epistemology, it must
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also secure its foundation. That requires defending a specific theory
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about the nature of the world, and as mentioned above, the specific
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theory that will be defended here is spatiomaterialism. It cannot be
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justified by reflecting on how we know without reducing to
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epistemological philosophy. By calling it “empirical ontology,” I
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mean to suggest that it is justified empirically. Before saying what
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I mean by the empirical method, however, let me say a bit more about
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the other two assumptions on which spatiomaterialism will be
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justified.</font></font></font></p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><i>Naturalism.</i></font>
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The following defense of spatiomaterialism assumes that what is being
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explained by empirical ontology is the natural world. By the natural
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world, I mean everything in space and time. This is a form of
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naturalism, for it is to assume that the world is <i>just </i>the
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natural world. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This kind
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of naturalism is implicitly assumed by natural science. Naturalism is
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implicit in science’s commitment to the empirical method, for
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science has traditionally limited the evidence that is relevant in
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choosing among theories to observation, or what can be known by
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perception. Everything that can be known by perception is located in
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space and time. </font></font>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Reflection,
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by contrast, has been excluded by the empirical method of traditional
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science. That has enabled science to set aside the reflection-based
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epistemological theories of traditional, epistemological philosophy.
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Ontological philosophy also relies mainly on perception. </font></font>
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</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">But there
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||
is no principled reason to exclude reflection as a source of
|
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information about the natural world. Reflective subjects are, after
|
||
all, parts of the natural world, and in the end, an ontology of the
|
||
natural world will have to explain what is known about the world
|
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through reflection as well as what is known through perception. What
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is still excluded from ontological philosophy, however, is the use of
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reflection as a foundation for proving necessary truths. The
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||
foundation of necessary truths in ontological philosophy is the
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ontological explanation that best explains what is perceived. Only
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||
ontologically necessary truths are justified from its ontological
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||
foundation. As it turns out, however, spatiomaterialism puts
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||
ontological philosophy in a position to explain why it has seemed
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||
that some propositions can be known with certainty. </font></font>
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||
</p>
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||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><i>Ontological
|
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explanation. </i></font>What makes it possible for empirical ontology
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to be used as a philosophical foundation is the recognition that
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ontology can be a kind of explanation. "Ontology" means,
|
||
literally, "theory of being." It is a theory about the
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nature of existence, and ontology <i>can </i>be explanatory, if
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||
existence can be reduced to basic substances and how they exist
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||
together as a world. That is to assume that substances, as
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||
substances, are self-subsistent entities. Since basic substances
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||
exist on their own, each distinct from all other substances in the
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||
world, it may be possible to explain everything in the world by
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||
showing how it is constituted by basic substances of certain kinds
|
||
with a certain basic relationship to one another.</font></font></font></p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">For
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naturalists, the world in which everything is to be explained
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||
ontologically is the natural world, or what is found in space and
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time. But to explain everything in such a world is not merely to
|
||
explain the existence of the objects in space. It is to explain all
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their properties, their relations to one another, and how properties
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||
and relations change as time passes. In other words, the natural
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||
world can come down to a few basic kinds of substances related in
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certain basic ways only if that can explain everything in the natural
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||
world and everything about the natural world. The inability to
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||
explain the possibility of some aspect of the world would show that
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||
the world is not constituted by the basic substances and
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||
relationships postulated by the ontology.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><i>Empirical
|
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method.</i></font> When ontology is understood as a kind of
|
||
explanation, it is possible to use the empirical method to choose
|
||
which specific ontology to believe. By the empirical method, I mean
|
||
the method used by science. I assume that that method is basically an
|
||
inference to the best explanation of what is found in the natural
|
||
world. Thus, by empirical ontology, I mean the project of <i>inferring
|
||
to the best ontological explanation of what is found in the natural
|
||
world</i>. </font></font></font>
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||
</p>
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<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">No attempt
|
||
will be made to justify the empirical method. Justifying the
|
||
empirical method is a road traveled by traditional philosophy, and
|
||
ontological philosophy takes a different road by simply using the
|
||
empirical method, as science does. This way of judging between
|
||
conflicting theories is what beings like us do naturally. (Later,
|
||
when we take up necessary truths about evolution, we will trace that
|
||
disposition to the function of the brain and how the brain works.)</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Our main
|
||
departure from empirical science is, therefore, to apply the
|
||
empirical method to ontology, rather than just to theories about
|
||
efficient causes of what happens. That is, we shall be deciding what
|
||
to believe about the nature of <i>what exists </i>in the world,
|
||
rather than only what to believe about the causes of <i>what happens
|
||
</i>there. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">More
|
||
precisely, we shall infer to the <i>simplest </i>and <i>fewest</i>
|
||
basic substances (and basic relationship among them) that can explain
|
||
everything in the world, that is, every kind of object in the natural
|
||
world and every aspect of the natural world, including those which
|
||
have to do with how things change over time. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>Ontological
|
||
science.</b></font> Empirical ontology affords, therefore, a way of
|
||
doing philosophy that is not currently being considered. It is
|
||
equally, however, a new way of doing science, because ontological
|
||
philosophy is tantamount to recognizing ontology as a more basic
|
||
branch of natural science than physics. That means that the basic
|
||
substances (and basic relationship) discovered by empirical ontology
|
||
must be able to explain the truth of all the basic laws of physics,
|
||
much as physics has often been thought to explain the laws of less
|
||
basic branches of science, such as chemistry and biology. But that
|
||
does not mean that science is any less empirical, not as long as
|
||
ontology also uses the empirical method. Nor is this a trivial or
|
||
meaningless change in science, for it makes all the explanations of
|
||
less general sciences reducible to the most basic branch of
|
||
(ontological) science. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ontology
|
||
is not, however, quite like other branches of science, because its
|
||
uses substances, rather than laws of nature, to explain what is found
|
||
in the world. That is the difference between ontological-cause
|
||
explanations and efficient-cause explanations. Efficient-cause
|
||
explanations depend on laws of nature to connect efficient causes to
|
||
their effects, and accordingly, to infer to the best efficient-cause
|
||
explanations is to attempt to discover the simplest and most
|
||
comprehensive laws describing the regularities found in nature. But
|
||
the causes in ontological explanation are the basic substances and
|
||
the basic relationship among them, and since things are explained
|
||
ontologically by showing how they are constituted by substances,
|
||
ontological explanations do not depend on laws of nature. Ontological
|
||
explanations show how basic substances are identical to what is found
|
||
in the world. And since the laws of nature are explained
|
||
ontologically (by showing how the basic substances and relationships
|
||
postulated by the ontology make the laws true), the explanations
|
||
given by ontological science all cite substances as causes in the
|
||
end.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
|
||
is now widely recognized that laws in less general branches of
|
||
science are not reducible to the laws of physics. But as we shall
|
||
see, when empirical ontology is seen as the most basic branch of
|
||
natural science, it is possible to reduce not only the basic laws of
|
||
physics, but also the laws of all the less general branches of
|
||
natural science, including biology, physiology, and the social
|
||
sciences, to the best explanation in the most basic branch of
|
||
science. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To be sure,
|
||
it is an ontological reduction, rather than scientific reduction (or
|
||
reduction to the laws of physics). But in “ontological science,”
|
||
all the theories of the less general branches of natural science can
|
||
be reduced to the most basic branch, accomplishing a great
|
||
unification of scientific knowledge. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">That
|
||
is how empirical ontology unites philosophy and science. But a
|
||
difference between them can still be discerned because of their
|
||
different interests. While philosophy sees empirical ontology as a
|
||
foundation for defending ontologically necessary truths about the
|
||
world, science sees it as a way of explaining the truth of theories
|
||
in physics and other branches of science. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">That is,
|
||
the recognition that ontology is a more basic branch of empirical
|
||
science than physics introduces the project of discovering the
|
||
simplest and fewest kinds of basic substances that can explain the
|
||
truth of the laws of physics. That is spatiomaterialism, and combined
|
||
with the truth of the laws of physics, it entails the ontological
|
||
necessary truths by which all the theories in less general branches
|
||
of science are reduced to a simple ontological theory.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>the
|
||
Wholeness of the World.</b></font> The reason for calling this
|
||
philosophical argument “the Wholeness of the World” is that
|
||
spatiomaterialism explains everything in the world. As an ontological
|
||
theory, spatiomaterialism must be able to account for (in the sense
|
||
of explaining the possibility of) everything found in the world,
|
||
including not only all the objects in space, but all their
|
||
properties, relations and how they change. But it can lead to new
|
||
beliefs about the world only by demonstrating ontologically necessary
|
||
truths about the world. In some cases, what is new is just
|
||
recognizing the necessity of what is already believed to be true, but
|
||
in other cases, the beliefs themselves are new. It is the
|
||
completeness of its ontological explanation in this latter sense that
|
||
earns this argument the title, "the Wholeness of the World."
|
||
Once spatiomaterialism is elaborated in a way that can explain why
|
||
the basic laws of physics are true, its implications hold in every
|
||
possible spatiomaterial world like our own, and those ontologically
|
||
necessary truth explain the nature of the world in a most complete
|
||
way. How complete it is can be suggested by mentioning that it
|
||
explains all the puzzling phenomena that seem to lie beyond the
|
||
limits of science and have raised doubts about naturalism, including
|
||
<i>consciousness</i>, <i>goodness</i>, and even how there can be
|
||
something worthy of worship, or <i>holiness,</i> in a strictly
|
||
natural world. What makes this possible are its implications about
|
||
the nature of evolutionary change, and the completeness of this
|
||
theory of evolution is evident in how many organisms in our world
|
||
turn out to have essential natures, including not only plants and
|
||
animals, but also subjects like us who come to know that the world is
|
||
whole in this way. But it will not be possible to explain fully what
|
||
all is meant by “the wholeness of the world” until the
|
||
conclusion, because its various aspects fit together in a way that
|
||
makes the world even more whole than can be seen at first. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Insofar
|
||
as it is a complete explanation the nature of the world, it is not
|
||
merely <i>an </i>explanation of the world. It is <i>the </i>explanation
|
||
of the world. That is the sense in which it is the Absolute Truth.
|
||
This is to deny the conceptual relativism of contemporary kantians,
|
||
like Hillary Putnam, because there is no other theory that can
|
||
explain everything in and about the world as simply as one based on
|
||
spatiomaterialism. Ontological philosophy <i>is </i>the "metaphysical
|
||
realism," the "One True Theory," and the "God's
|
||
Eye View" of the world whose possibility is denied by such
|
||
so-called internal realists. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0; page-break-before: always">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><b>N<img src="" name="OdcNNat_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="129" height="39" border="0">aturalism.</b></font></font>
|
||
<font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Naturalism
|
||
is the first assumption of ontological philosophy. It is the belief
|
||
that the world is </font></font><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>just
|
||
</i></font></font><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">the
|
||
natural world. By the "natural world," I mean the world
|
||
disclosed to us by perception, the world where we find ourselves,
|
||
each having a body alongside others as parts of a world of objects in
|
||
space that move and interact over time. That is the world of our
|
||
daily lives. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
|
||
is the world to which we are all referring when we speak to one
|
||
another, as language-using animals, about ordinary matters. We refer
|
||
to objects in space, attribute properties and relations to them, and
|
||
explain what happens to them. But some of the objects in space are
|
||
also subjects, like ourselves, and we describe them in a special way.
|
||
To them we attribute intentions, desires, thoughts, beliefs,
|
||
perceptions and other subjective (or psychological) states. They are
|
||
known by reflection, rather than perception (though knowing about the
|
||
subjective states of others usually depends on perception as well).
|
||
But that does not mean that subjective states are not parts of the
|
||
natural world. They are parts of the natural world because they are
|
||
states of beings like us, who exist as animals in the natural world.
|
||
The natural world includes, therefore, not only what is known by
|
||
perception, but also what is known by reflection. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>W<img src="" name="OdcNWe_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="120" height="49" border="0">hat
|
||
exists.</b></font> The role of naturalism in ontological philosophy
|
||
is to identify what needs to be explained, and for that purpose, it
|
||
is appropriate to understand it in terms of its implications about
|
||
what exists and what does not exist. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>P<img src="" name="OdcNPos_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="73" height="50" border="0">ositively.</b></font>
|
||
Positively, naturalism is the belief nothing exists but what is
|
||
located in space and time. All the objects we perceive are located in
|
||
space. Indeed, they are all related to one another as parts of a
|
||
single world, since all the locations in space are connected to one
|
||
another continuously in three independent dimensions. But objects can
|
||
also move and interact with one another, and the events involving
|
||
them are also parts of the same world, because all moments in time
|
||
are connected continuously in a single dimension. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">Though
|
||
naturalism assumes that whatever exists is located in space and time,
|
||
that does not mean that whatever has a location in space and time
|
||
exists. Though events in the past and future have locations in space
|
||
and time, they may not exist. Whether they do or not depends on how
|
||
we resolve a profound ontological issue about the relationship
|
||
between existence and time. We must decide whether to believe that
|
||
existence itself is in time, so that only the present moment exists
|
||
(or "presentism"), or to believe that time is just another
|
||
kind of relation, like space, which holds among the things that
|
||
exist. (See </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtdOTemp.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Ontology:
|
||
Temporality</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">and
|
||
</span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtfSTime.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Spatiomaterialism:
|
||
Time</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.)</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>N<img src="" name="OdcNNeg_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="74" height="50" border="0">egatively.</b></font>
|
||
Space and time are so inclusive that naturalism may seem to be
|
||
obviously true, but the significance of this assumption comes into
|
||
better focus when we consider it negatively. For naturalism is also
|
||
the denial that anything exists outside space or time. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>G<img src="" name="OdcNGod_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="61" height="39" border="0">od.</b></i>
|
||
God, for example, is supposed to exist outside both space and time.
|
||
That is, at least, what traditional theists (and deists) must hold,
|
||
for they believe that God is the creator of the natural world. (Nor
|
||
is God part of the natural world by virtue of being ubiquitous, for
|
||
that means existing everywhere in space at once, and if that were how
|
||
God exists, He would be space.) Belief in a creator-God is a kind of
|
||
supernaturalism. In fact, that is what was being scorned by those who
|
||
first called themselves "naturalists" in the eighteenth
|
||
century. They expected to be able to explain everything in the world
|
||
without appeal to anything outside nature, and that negative sense of
|
||
"naturalism" is what is intended here. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>F<img src="" name="OdcNForms_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="60" height="39" border="0">orms.</b></i>
|
||
It is not just God, however, that naturalism denies. Neither are
|
||
there any Platonic Forms. Plato held that there are objects knowable
|
||
only by reason, such as mathematical objects, justice, and the nature
|
||
of human beings, and even The Good Itself, which exist independently
|
||
of the natural world. By that he meant that they existed not only
|
||
outside space, but also outside time, for he he described it as a
|
||
Realm of Being, opposite in nature from the Realm of Becoming, or
|
||
nature. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Plato's
|
||
main reason for postulating the Forms was to explain the nature of
|
||
goodness objectively. He held that all the other forms follow from
|
||
The Good itself, making them, and what participates in them, good.
|
||
But this motive for believing that something exists outside space and
|
||
time now generally takes the form of the belief in a supernatural
|
||
God. Platonism is still defended, however, in the philosophy of
|
||
mathematics. For example, numbers are supposed to be abstract
|
||
objects. But since what makes them abstract is that their existence
|
||
is not supposed to depend on anything located in space and time,
|
||
naturalism must deny their existence. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>M<img src="" name="OdcNMinds_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="60" height="40" border="0">inds.</b></i>
|
||
Minds are also denied by naturalism, if they exist outside space, as
|
||
the tradition of modern philosophy would have it. Though Descartes
|
||
assumed that minds are in time, he denied that they are in space. (He
|
||
argued that mind has a unity that precludes its being extended, which
|
||
he took to be the essential property of objects in the natural world.
|
||
Thus, he believed that mind is an opposite kind of substance from
|
||
body, with mind and body existing independently of one another.)
|
||
Insofar as minds are supposed to exist outside space, naturalism must
|
||
deny their existence. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>P<img src="" name="OdcNProb_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="115" height="51" border="0">roblems.</b></font>
|
||
Naturalism holds, therefore, that there is nothing to be explained
|
||
but the natural world. However, that does not mean that it can simply
|
||
deny the existence of Cartesian minds, Platonic Forms, a transcendent
|
||
God, and whatever else is supposed to exist outside either space or
|
||
time. Naturalism must explain everything in space and time, and in
|
||
each case, certain natural phenomena have led people to believe in
|
||
the existence of these supernatural entities. Though those phenomena
|
||
may depend on reflection, not just perception, they are clearly part
|
||
of the natural world, for they occur to subjects like us in space and
|
||
time. Thus, like everything else in space and time, they need to be
|
||
explained. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>C<img src="" name="OdcNCon_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="109" height="50" border="0">onsciousness.</b></font>
|
||
What makes the mind seem immaterial is consciousness, that is, the
|
||
way in which whatever we experience has an appearance to us. When we
|
||
perceive a green leaf, for example, the color of the leaf has a
|
||
certain intrinsic quality, and even though that quality seems to be
|
||
located in the leaf, it has an appearance to us which we could not
|
||
explain to someone who was blind from birth. The same holds not only
|
||
for other colors, but also for sounds, odors, tastes, and bodily
|
||
sensations of all kinds. These peculiar objects of reflection are
|
||
called "phenomenal properties," "qualia," "raw
|
||
feels," or the like, and they abound in normal perception. In
|
||
perceiving the leaf, for example, we see many green qualia as
|
||
covering its surface along with color qualia of other kinds on its
|
||
stem and other nearby objects. Other kinds of sensory qualia seem to
|
||
make us aware of its odor, its coolness, its taste, and the like.
|
||
Each simple phenomenal property seems of have a certain location in
|
||
space relative to the others at the time, and in the case of bodily
|
||
sensations, such as itches and pains, they seem to have a locations
|
||
in some part of the body which, in turn, is located in some part of
|
||
the same phenomenal space as other objects of perception. Much the
|
||
same kinds of appearances occur to us in remembering, imagining, and
|
||
any kind of thinking about objects in space, though they are fainter,
|
||
less distinct, and not always as spatially coherent. Indeed, even
|
||
emotions, abstract thoughts, and other mental events have appearances
|
||
for the subject to whom they occur.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
|
||
fact about experience is what will be meant here by "consciousness."
|
||
Consciousness can make it seem that the conscious subject is not just
|
||
an object in space, not merely a body alongside other objects in
|
||
space, because each subjective state involves the appearance of many
|
||
different kinds of qualia (or simple phenomenal properties) to the
|
||
subject at the same time. This is the unity of mind to which
|
||
Descartes pointed in order to show that mind is a basically different
|
||
kind of substance from body. It means that mind cannot be cut up or
|
||
divided into parts like extended objects in space. In other words,
|
||
consciousness is not located in space, like a material object, but
|
||
rather seems to contain a space of its own, because each sensory
|
||
qualia appears to have a spatial location relative to all the others,
|
||
as in the colors that appear to be on the surface of the leaf or its
|
||
stem. Descartes called these appearances "ideas" and the
|
||
subjects to whom they appear "minds," but the natural
|
||
phenomenon to which he was pointing is the fact that there are such
|
||
appearances to beings like us: qualia of many kinds all have
|
||
locations in a phenomenal space, which is distinct from the space in
|
||
which material objects exist. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
essential difference between mind and body led Descartes to believe
|
||
that mind is a substance that is not located in space at all. Being
|
||
indivisible, mind could not be part of extension, and thus, it was
|
||
supposed to be an immaterial substance. Naturalism must deny that
|
||
there are any minds in that sense. But to be credible, naturalism
|
||
must somehow explain consciousness as a natural phenomenon. For we
|
||
are certainly parts of the natural world, and it is hardly plausible
|
||
to deny that we are conscious.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><b>G<img src="" name="OdcNGood_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="109" height="50" border="0">oodness.
|
||
</b></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">If
|
||
naturalism could explain consciousness in beings like us, it might
|
||
seem that there would be nothing left to explain about Platonic
|
||
Forms, because the abstract objects that appear to the experiencing
|
||
subject in reasoning could be explained in the same way as ideas in
|
||
the mind. (An explanation of abstract entities is, in any case,
|
||
rightly demanded of naturalists, and brief statement of the one given
|
||
here can be found in </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtjR14.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Relations:
|
||
Ontological theory of mathematical knowledge</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.)
|
||
There is, however, another aspect of the phenomena that led Plato to
|
||
believe in Forms that would remain unexplained. Plato believed in the
|
||
existence of Forms not merely because they are objects of rational
|
||
intuition, but also because he believed that they are ideal and that
|
||
things in nature are striving to be like them. That was his theory
|
||
about the nature of goodness. Just as we try to be virtuous human
|
||
beings, natural objects strive to be like their Forms, because the
|
||
Forms are good. </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Not
|
||
only Platonists believe that there is a real difference between good
|
||
and bad. It seems obvious to many people that goodness is something
|
||
about the object, state, or event that makes it so that it ought to
|
||
exist, whatever we may believe about it. For example, what makes an
|
||
action morally right or wrong for beings like us is something about
|
||
the action itself that makes it worth choosing, not just something we
|
||
may believe or feel about it. Thus, goodness is also an aspect of the
|
||
world that naturalism must explain. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The first
|
||
attempt to explain goodness naturalistically was made by Aristotle.
|
||
He thought that every natural object (as opposed to artifact) changes
|
||
on its own for the sake of attaining an end, or final state, which is
|
||
the fullest actualization of its essential form, and he explained
|
||
this phenomenon by holding that there are "final causes" at
|
||
work in the natural world along with efficient causes. For example,
|
||
the acorn grows into an oak tree because the final cause of its
|
||
natural kind is to be a mature oak tree. Growth and development are
|
||
due to what is called "final causation." Aristotelian
|
||
teleology, as it is called, explains how goodness is something
|
||
objective by postulating a special kind of "force" in
|
||
nature. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The belief
|
||
in final causation was decisively rejected by most naturalists with
|
||
the rise of modern science in the Renaissance. Modern science began
|
||
with the discovery of laws of nature by which events in nature can be
|
||
predicted, and explanation by such efficient causes was so obviously
|
||
explanatory that, by contrast, explanations by final causes had to be
|
||
rejected as merely descriptions of phenomena which call for
|
||
explanation by efficient causes. Thus, teleology was rejected by
|
||
naturalists. Nor could they reconcile the belief in final causes with
|
||
their new found mechanism by holding that natural objects are
|
||
designed to work mechanically toward certain ends, because that way
|
||
of explaining the objectivity of goodness required them to believe in
|
||
a God who created the natural world.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Many
|
||
naturalists believe such that a naturalistic explanation of the
|
||
difference between good and bad has been given by Darwin's theory of
|
||
evolution. Darwin showed how organisms acquire traits that seem to be
|
||
directed toward ends as a result of the natural selection of random
|
||
variations on their heritable traits as the organisms succeed in
|
||
reproducing. That explains why organisms seem to be changing in the
|
||
direction of ends which are good for them. Thus, the difference
|
||
between good and bad does not depend on how we feel about it. And
|
||
Darwin's explanation involves only efficient causes. Thus, it is
|
||
sometimes seen as the reduction of teleology to efficient causes. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">However,
|
||
most of those who believe that there is a real difference between
|
||
good and bad and between right and wrong are not satisfied with the
|
||
Darwinian explanation because of its accidentalism. As contemporary
|
||
Darwinists understand it, natural selection is caused by external
|
||
changes in the environment, which are inherently unpredictable, and
|
||
that makes what evolves far too accidental to explain the difference
|
||
between good and bad that is objective in the sense that they mean.
|
||
(For a discussion of its accidentalism, see </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtkCbGeRAccidentalism.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Accidentalism.</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">)
|
||
They will insist that there is more for naturalism to explain about
|
||
this phenomenon before they will be convinced that the world is just
|
||
the natural world. Teleology is, therefore, still a problem for
|
||
naturalism.</span></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>H<img src="" name="OdcNHol_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="110" height="51" border="0">oliness.</b></font>
|
||
Again, however, it might seem that if naturalism could give an
|
||
adequate explanation of the objective difference between good and
|
||
bad, it would not be necessary to explain the belief in God. God has
|
||
been the traditional foundation for explaining why good is different
|
||
from bad, for it is supposed to come down to his inscrutable purpose
|
||
in creating the natural world. But even if there were a naturalistic
|
||
explanation of the difference between good and bad, many who believe
|
||
in God would not be satisfied, because what they believe in is not
|
||
just that there is an objective difference between good and bad. They
|
||
also believe that there is something worthy of worship, something so
|
||
inherently good that we ought to accept it as the highest good,
|
||
submit our wills to it, and treat it in a uniquely reverential way,
|
||
that is, as something sacred or holy. The faithful believe that they
|
||
have experiences of a kind that reveal the actual existence of such a
|
||
thing to them, and the universality of religion among the cultures of
|
||
the world makes this a phenomenon that must also be explained by
|
||
naturalism, even though it denies there is any God existing outside
|
||
space or time. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"> <font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">One
|
||
way for naturalists to explain consciousness, the belief in a real
|
||
difference between good and bad, and the sense that there is
|
||
something in the world worthy of worship is to deny the reality of
|
||
these phenomena. Naturalists can hold, in other words, that their
|
||
critics are simply mistaken in how they describe these phenomena --
|
||
that what is being referred to is something quite different from what
|
||
they believe. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Consciousness
|
||
might be dismissed as a belief that results from a linguistic
|
||
confusion (such as the belief in a "private language" or
|
||
the acceptance of "folk psychology"). </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The belief
|
||
in a real difference between good and bad might be explained away as
|
||
a mere projection of our subjective feelings onto the world (in much
|
||
the same way as objects in nature seem to have the colors and other
|
||
phenomenal properties that are just ideas in the mind). </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">And the
|
||
belief in something worthy of worship might be explained as simply
|
||
what is feels like to submit to a higher authority. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Naturalists
|
||
have given such explanations in the past. But they have not convinced
|
||
those who take these phenomena to be real, and thus, naturalism has
|
||
rightly been treated as just one possible view of the world among
|
||
others. Though naturalism may be plausible to many people without an
|
||
adequate explanation of these phenomena, there is good reason to
|
||
doubt its truth as long as these explanations are not accepted as
|
||
adequate by those who appeal to these phenomena. Theists, mind-body
|
||
dualists, and those who believe in objective goodness are rational
|
||
beings too, and if naturalism is a reasonable view, it should be
|
||
reasonable to them. Thus, the burden that naturalism must bear is
|
||
rather large. It must be able to explain <i>everything </i>in the
|
||
world, including these problematic phenomena, to the satisfaction of
|
||
every rational being, including those who have been led to believe in
|
||
entities existing outside space or time — that is, as long as they
|
||
are willing to give reasons and not just be arbitrary and dogmatic in
|
||
their assertions about what exists. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0; page-break-before: always">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><b>O<img src="" name="OddOOntology_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="100" height="40" border="0">ntology.
|
||
</b></font></font><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
second assumption of ontological philosophy is about ontology.
|
||
Ontology is, literally, the study of the nature of being (or
|
||
existence), and what we shall assume is that ontology is a kind of
|
||
explanation. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ontological
|
||
philosophy takes ontology to be a kind of explanation in which the
|
||
causes are basic substances (along with their basic relationships to
|
||
one another), and the effects are what is found in the world, or all
|
||
the phenomena. Given the existence of certain kinds of basic
|
||
substances and basic relationships, it explains the things found in
|
||
the world by showing how their existence is constituted by such
|
||
substances and relations among them. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">If
|
||
ontology is a valid kind of explanation, an adequate ontology should
|
||
explain everything found in the world, for it is a theory about the
|
||
nature of existence and what we mean by "the world" is
|
||
everything that exists. To assume that ontology is a valid kind of
|
||
explanation is to assume, therefore, that everything found in the
|
||
world can be explained by showing how its existence is constituted by
|
||
basic substances, given how they exist together as a world —
|
||
including all the objects in the world, all their properties, all
|
||
their relations to one another, and every way that they can change.
|
||
It holds, in other words, that nothing exists, ultimately, but the
|
||
basic substances. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
other way of doing philosophy is based on epistemology, and for
|
||
epistemological philosophy, ontology is something quite different.
|
||
Ontology is simply a thesis about what exists. Epistemologists base
|
||
their claims about certain truths being necessary relative to our
|
||
ordinary ways of knowing on a theory about how we know. Thus, they
|
||
find themselves committed to the existence of entities of all the
|
||
kinds that are known, including the entities presupposed by their
|
||
foundation as well as all the additional entities entailed by their
|
||
conclusions (assuming that they succeed in defending those
|
||
conclusion). Since it is committed to the reality of <i>additional
|
||
</i>entities of some kind, its ontology is called "realism."
|
||
It is the belief in the "reality" of those additional
|
||
entities. But since, as it turns out, they never fit together
|
||
intelligibly with the entities constituting the epistemological
|
||
foundation, realism is a form of ontological (or metaphysical)
|
||
dualism that engenders skepticism. Hence, realists have always had to
|
||
do battle with so-called anti-realists, who accept only the entities
|
||
presupposed by their epistemological foundation. To mark how this
|
||
view of ontology differs from ontological philosophy, let us call it
|
||
"ontology as realism."</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>O<img src="" name="OddOAsEx_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="104" height="30" border="0">ntology
|
||
as a form of explanation.</b></font> For ontological philosophy,
|
||
ontology is explanatory. We <i>assume </i>that a certain kind of
|
||
explanation is valid, which is to believe that there are causes and
|
||
effects of certain kinds. In this case, the causes are the basic
|
||
substances and their basic relationship to one another, and their
|
||
effects are what they can constitute, which includes, if adequate,
|
||
everything that can be found in the world, including all the objects,
|
||
their properties and relations, and how they change over time. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>O<img src="" name="OddOCauses_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="72" height="33" border="0">ntological
|
||
causes.</b></font> To see how such effects are produced
|
||
ontologically, let us consider, first, the nature of the causes, both
|
||
the substances and their relations, and, then, their effects. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>S<img src="" name="OddOSub_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="91" height="26" border="0">ubstances.</b></i>
|
||
Substances are one part of every ontological cause, and in order to
|
||
explain how they help produce effects, we must consider both the
|
||
nature of substance itself and a relevant difference among the kinds
|
||
of basic substances that may be postulated by an ontology. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>N<img src="" name="OddONature_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="49" height="21" border="0">ature
|
||
of substance.</i> Substance, we shall assume, has a nature that
|
||
includes to two basic aspects. For something to be a substance, it
|
||
must not only have a certain determinate nature, but must also be
|
||
self-subsistent. That is, a substance must have, as a substance, both
|
||
an <i>essential aspect </i>and an <i>existential aspect</i> to its
|
||
nature. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>E<img src="" name="OddOEssence_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="60" height="21" border="0">ssential
|
||
aspect of substance.</i> A substance must have an <i>essential aspect
|
||
</i>to its nature as substance, because in order to exist at all, it
|
||
must exist in a determinate way. It is not possible for anything to
|
||
exist without existing in a determinate way; indeterminate existence
|
||
would be tantamount to nothing existing. The essential aspect of a
|
||
substance includes all its kind-differentiating properties that do
|
||
not change as time passes. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">To
|
||
assume that substance as substance has essential properties is not to
|
||
assume that properties exist in addition to the substances that have
|
||
them. We can and shall assume that properties are simply aspects of
|
||
the substances themselves. Thus, essential properties are simply </span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><i>how
|
||
</i></span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">substances
|
||
exist, implying that substances can exist in different ways, as in
|
||
substances being of different kinds. Beings like us can think about
|
||
aspects of substances and distinguish their aspects from one another,
|
||
and when we do, we are thinking about their properties. But
|
||
ontological philosophy cannot answer questions about how rational
|
||
beings have the ability to think about the aspects of substances as
|
||
distinct from the substances themselves until it has explained the
|
||
nature of what exist and the existence of beings in the world, like
|
||
us, who can think at all. (See, for example, </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtkCbGeRRS10AbstractObjects.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:AbstractObjects</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
or for a briefer statement of the entire theory about the nature of
|
||
reason, </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtjR14.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Relations:
|
||
Ontological theory of mathematical knowledge.</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">)</span></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">We will
|
||
take up the kinds of basic substances after explaining the nature of
|
||
substance as substance.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>E<img src="" name="OddOExist_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="59" height="21" border="0">xistential
|
||
aspect of substance.</i> Substances also have an <i>existential
|
||
aspect </i>to their nature as substance. They must, because, in an
|
||
ontological explanation of the world, it is the existence of
|
||
substances (in certain relations) that explains the existence of what
|
||
is found in the world. Substances are, in other words,
|
||
self-subsistent. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Existence
|
||
is, therefore, a property of substance as substance, just as having
|
||
an essential aspect is. But in both cases, these aspects of
|
||
substances have to do with their having aspects. The essential aspect
|
||
is that they have an aspect of the kind we will call their "essential
|
||
nature," and the existential aspect is that what has such an
|
||
essential aspect exists independently of the rational being who know
|
||
about them. That there are aspects of substances that have to with
|
||
their having aspects is no more puzzling than that they have aspects
|
||
at all and is answered in the same way, as we shall see, by the
|
||
ontological explanation of the nature of reason. (See </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCbGeRRS09.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Stage
|
||
9, Rational Spiritual Animals</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
under </span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US">Reproductive
|
||
Global Regularities</span></font></font><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">under
|
||
</span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US">Change</span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">.)</span></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
|
||
are, however, two aspects to the existential aspect of the nature of
|
||
substance as substance: particularity and temporality.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">P<img src="" name="OddOPart_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="74" height="21" border="0">articularity.</font>
|
||
First, substances are self-subsistent in the sense each substance has
|
||
an existence that cannot be reduced to the existence of any other
|
||
substance or substances in the world. Each substance exists on its
|
||
own. That is not to say that substances must be able to exist even if
|
||
all the other substances were to drop out of existence. (For example,
|
||
it may not be possible for material substances, given their essential
|
||
nature, to exist without having spatial relations to other material
|
||
substances.) It is merely to say that there is something in the world
|
||
whose existence would not be accounted for if only all the other
|
||
substances in the world were assumed to exist. In short, each
|
||
particular substance has an existence that is <i>distinct </i>from
|
||
every other substance in the world. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">We
|
||
must accept that substances are related to one another in one way, at
|
||
least, since we are assuming that there is more than one substance in
|
||
the world. By "the world," we mean everything that exists,
|
||
and thus, if there is more than one substance in the world, the world
|
||
is a <i>whole </i>composed of parts. Since every substance is, by
|
||
virtue of the existential aspect of its nature as a substance,
|
||
something that exists, each substance is a "particular"
|
||
substance in the further sense of "being <i>part of </i>the
|
||
world." Each substance has a relationship to the world as a
|
||
whole, and since it has an existence that is distinct from every
|
||
other substance in the world, it also has a relationship to the other
|
||
substances as a different part of one and the same world with them.
|
||
In other words, when we postulate basic substances, we assume that
|
||
they are parts of one and the same world. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">There is
|
||
another relationship that all substances have, namely, being
|
||
identical to themselves. Relationships, like properties, are not
|
||
something in addition to what has them, but merely an aspect of the
|
||
substances that have them. And we continue to put off discussing how
|
||
beings like us know about relationships until we explain the nature
|
||
of reason ontologically. Although identity is a relationship, it is a
|
||
relationship that something has to itself, and thus, it may be
|
||
considered another aspect of each substance taken separately, like
|
||
its properties. That is, each substance is identical to itself. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">By the way,
|
||
this is to assign ontological meaning to each of three basic senses
|
||
of "is." "Is" can be used to say that something
|
||
exists, and in that sense it refers to the property of existence, or
|
||
the existential aspect of substance as substance. "Is" can
|
||
also be used as a copula, to attach a predicate to a grammatical
|
||
subject. In this case, it is referring to the relationship between a
|
||
substance and some aspect of it, either a property that characterizes
|
||
its essential nature or one that characterizes a changeable aspect of
|
||
it (such as the roundness of a piece of wet clay). Finally, "is"
|
||
can be used to assert identity. When identity is asserted of two
|
||
substances, it says that the two substances have the same relation to
|
||
one another as each has to itself, that is, that they are identical.
|
||
But when identity is asserted of aspects of substances, that is, of
|
||
properties, it has a different meaning, because different substances
|
||
can have the same aspects and be of the same kind under each aspect.
|
||
For example, all substances have the existential aspect, and "being"
|
||
is the same property in each case. Likewise, substances of the same
|
||
kind have the same essential properties. It will be possible to keep
|
||
track of which properties are identical and which are different,
|
||
because one thing an ontology provides by explaining everything in
|
||
the world is an inventory of all the aspects of substances. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">T<img src="" name="OddOTemp_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="74" height="22" border="0">emporality.</font>
|
||
Second, we assume that substances are self-subsistent in a temporal
|
||
sense. Substances do not go out of existence over time, nor do they
|
||
come into existence. Thus, a substance that exists at one moment must
|
||
have existed at the previous moment. And it will continue to exist
|
||
the next moment. Thus, if a substance exists at all, it exists at
|
||
every moment in the history of world. It is permanent. The substances
|
||
that exist at any one moment are the same substances that exist at
|
||
every other moment in the history of the world.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
|
||
is a strong assumption to make about the nature of substance as
|
||
substance, and it is not one that has always been made, even by
|
||
naturalists. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">According
|
||
to Aristotle, for example, substances come into existence and go out
|
||
of existence over time in a process of generation and corruption,
|
||
though he did assume that they also had "material causes,"
|
||
or matter, that endures through change. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Other
|
||
naturalistic ontologists do not postulate substances at all, but only
|
||
"tropes," or properties considered as particular entities.
|
||
Though tropes are supposed to explain everything in the world, they
|
||
are not substances in our since, for they are supposed to come into
|
||
existence and go out of existence at determinate locations in space
|
||
from moment to moment. See </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Williams"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Williams.</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Though
|
||
ontological philosophy makes this strong assumption about the
|
||
temporal aspect of the existential aspect of substance as substance,
|
||
there is an issue about the temporal aspect that we will leave open
|
||
for the time being. To hold that substances never come into existence
|
||
nor ever go out of existence over time is to presuppose that they are
|
||
in time. That is, time is built into the nature of substance, as part
|
||
of the existential aspect of the nature of substance as substance.
|
||
But there are two different views about the nature of time and how it
|
||
is related to existence. One is the "endurance" theory and
|
||
the other is the "perdurance" theory. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><i>Endurance
|
||
theory of time.</i></font> The first view holds that substances
|
||
<i>endure </i>through time. This theory assumes that existence itself
|
||
is in time. That is, only the present exists. The past and the future
|
||
do not exist. Thus, for a substance to exist at all is for it to
|
||
exist at the present moment. This view is also called "presentism."
|
||
But since substances never come into existence, every substance must
|
||
have existed at every past moment in the history of the world. And
|
||
since they never go out of existence, every substance will still
|
||
exist at every future moment in the world’s career. In other words,
|
||
substances are identical through time: each substances that exists
|
||
now is identical to some substance that existed or will exist at
|
||
every other moment in the history of the world. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Since
|
||
endurance theory assumes that the past and the future do not exist,
|
||
they must explain the sense in which statements about the past and
|
||
the future are true. It holds that such statements are true of
|
||
substances that exist now, though the properties being ascribed to
|
||
them have to do either with what has happened or with what will
|
||
happen to them. That is, the aspects of substances which exist now
|
||
include the states they had in the past and the states they will have
|
||
in the future. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><i>Perdurance
|
||
theory of time.</i></font> The other view is that substances <i>perdure
|
||
</i>across time (or over time). Instead of assuming that existence is
|
||
in time, this theory holds that time is a relation that holds among
|
||
parts of substances. On this view, the past and the future exist in
|
||
the same sense as the present. Though perdurance theorists can agree
|
||
that substances never come into existence nor go out of existence
|
||
over time, what they mean is that each substance is made up of a
|
||
continuous series of moments stretching all the way back and all the
|
||
way forward in the temporal dimension. Thus, instead of seeing
|
||
substances as identical through time, they see substances as
|
||
involving a part-whole relation: each substance is a whole whose
|
||
parts include its state at every moment in its history. Thus,
|
||
corresponding to the part of each substance that exists at any one
|
||
moment, there is another part at every other moment in the history of
|
||
the world.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">T<img src="" name="HistCmt" align="right" hspace="5" width="149" height="22" border="0">he
|
||
distinction between the endurance and perdurance theories about the
|
||
existential aspects of substance as substance can be traced to
|
||
</span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#McTaggart"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>McTaggart</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
who argued around the turn of the twentieth century that it is
|
||
self-contradictory to hold that only the present exists. But
|
||
recently, it has been resurrected by analytic philosophers defending
|
||
the so-called "tenseless theory of time," as opposed to the
|
||
"tensed theory of time". (The tenseless theory holds that
|
||
statements about the past, present and future can all be translated,
|
||
without any loss of content, into sentences about the relations of
|
||
moments in time that hold eternally, whereas the tensed theory
|
||
insists that some content is lost, namely, what they imply about
|
||
which moment is actually present, that is, not just present relative
|
||
to some particular time of utterance. See </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#OaklanderSmith"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Oaklander
|
||
and Smith</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">.)
|
||
And even more recently, the perdurance theory has been defended,
|
||
albeit without admitting it, as what is called "four-dimensionalism"
|
||
against "three dimensionalism." (See </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Sider"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Sider</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">.)
|
||
But the reason I leave the issue open here is because a similar view
|
||
is currently accepted by naturalists who are trying to be realists
|
||
about the notion of spacetime introduced by Einstein’s special and
|
||
general theories of relativity. Spacetime taken ontologically entails
|
||
the perdurance theory. </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Since
|
||
purdurance theory assumes that all moments in the history of the
|
||
world are ontologically equivalent, it holds that statements about
|
||
the past and the future are true in exactly the same sense as
|
||
statements about the present. There is no need to hold that
|
||
statements about the past and the future are really about substances
|
||
that exist now.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Whatever
|
||
the relationship between time and existence, the temporal aspect of
|
||
the existential aspect of substance involves a relationship between
|
||
moments in time. Everyone agrees that moments occur in a continuous
|
||
series, though endurance theorists think of time as flowing from the
|
||
past into the future, and perdurance theorists think of time as just
|
||
an order about the moments that all exist. But since endurance
|
||
theorists take existence itself to be in time, they take time to be
|
||
as ontologically basic as existence and substance, and thus, they
|
||
take temporal relations to be a measure of the separation between
|
||
different moments in the existence of a substance that is identical
|
||
over time. Perdurance theorists, on the other hand, take all the
|
||
moments in the history of a substance to exist in the same way, and
|
||
thus they explain time, in effect, as how these moments exist
|
||
together as a substance in the world. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
|
||
difference between these theories can be seen in what they imply
|
||
about change. In a world where substance is permanent, what changes
|
||
are the properties or relations of substances, or aspects of them.
|
||
Endurance theory holds that change involves properties or relations
|
||
coming into existence or going out of existence over time, because if
|
||
the future and the past do not exist, there is no "place"
|
||
for them to come from or to go to. On the other hand, perdurance
|
||
theory holds that properties and relations never come into existence
|
||
and never go out of existence, because if the future exists, the
|
||
properties and relations already exist before the change takes place.
|
||
And if the past exists, the properties and relations continue to
|
||
exist after the change is long over.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>K<img src="" name="OddOKinds_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="48" height="21" border="0">inds
|
||
of substances.</i> The substances that an ontology postulates are the
|
||
causes by which it explains the world. But in order to explain
|
||
completely what is found in the world, those substances must be the
|
||
most elementary substances that constitute the existence of things in
|
||
the world. Let us call such ultimate parts of the world "basic
|
||
substances." </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">All
|
||
substances have, as substances, the same kind of existential aspect,
|
||
but the essential aspects of their natures may be different. Thus,
|
||
there may be different kinds of basic substances making up the world.
|
||
But it is important to recognize at the outset that the essential
|
||
natures that distinguish kinds of basic substances from one another
|
||
may be either temporally simple or temporally complex. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">We
|
||
are assuming that the properties that characterize basic substances
|
||
are simply aspects of them. The properties that characterize the
|
||
essential nature of a substance are aspects of the essential aspect
|
||
of their nature as substance, and they distinguish one kind of basic
|
||
substance from another. Such essential properties do not change over
|
||
time. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Temporally
|
||
simple.</i> Now, a substance that exhibits its full nature at each
|
||
moment is a simple substance. That is, a substance will be said to
|
||
have a "temporally simple essential nature" insofar as its
|
||
essential properties are aspects of it that exist complete at each
|
||
moment in the history of its existence. The contrast to complex
|
||
substances will make this clear.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Temporally
|
||
complex.</i> The essential nature of a substance may also be defined
|
||
by how its properties change over time. Properties that can change
|
||
over time are contingent (or "accidents"), but if
|
||
contingent properties always change in the same way, the way in which
|
||
they change may be an essential property. For example, the properties
|
||
a substance exhibits at one moment may depend on the properties it
|
||
had the previous moment (together with its relations to other
|
||
substances), and since the regularity about how they change would be
|
||
a property that the substance has at every moment, it would be an
|
||
essential property of the substance. But its essential nature would
|
||
be dispositional. Insofar as the essential aspect of the nature of a
|
||
substance is defined by a regularity about how its contingent
|
||
properties (or relations) change over time, it will be said to have a
|
||
"temporally complex essential nature."</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>R<a href="html/11.html"><img src="" name="OddORelation_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="90" height="24" border="0"></a>elations.</b></i>
|
||
Substances are only one part of every ontological cause. The other
|
||
part is the relationship that holds among the basic substances.
|
||
Relations are necessary for ontological explanation, because
|
||
substances have nontrivial ontological effects only by working
|
||
together, that is, by combining with one another in some way to
|
||
constitute the existence of things found in the world. What makes
|
||
ontological explanation explanatory is that substances can work
|
||
together in different ways to produce different effects.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">We
|
||
must assume, therefore, that there is more than one substance in the
|
||
world. Though it is conceivable that the world is made up of a single
|
||
substance, nothing in such a world could be <i>explained
|
||
</i>ontologically, in our sense, for everything found in such a world
|
||
would be the same as what is assumed by the ontology in postulating
|
||
that single substance.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">S<img src="" name="Image1" align="right" hspace="5" width="149" height="22" border="0">pinoza
|
||
was not, therefore, giving an ontological explanation of the world in
|
||
our sense, because according to his <i>Ethics</i>, he assumed that a
|
||
single substance makes up the entire world.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">If
|
||
there is more than one substance in the world, they must have, as we
|
||
have noted, at least one basic relationship to one another, for they
|
||
are parts of the same world. Since their combination causes the world
|
||
to exist, that relationship together with the substances might be
|
||
said to explain the world. But if having such a relationship did
|
||
account for everything in the world, it would be trivial, for nothing
|
||
that is contained in any one of the ontological causes is really
|
||
explained. It is merely assumed. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Finally,
|
||
if the substances in the world had no further relationship to one
|
||
another, beyond being different parts of the same world, they could
|
||
not combine to constitute anything, except for the world as a whole.
|
||
Though each substance might be said to cause itself ontologically
|
||
(because it would still constitute its own existence), that would
|
||
explain nothing, for its existence is precisely what is assumed in
|
||
postulating the substance. It too would be trivial. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>N<img src="" name="Image2" align="right" hspace="5" width="49" height="21" border="0">ature
|
||
of relations.</i> We must assume, therefore, that basic substances
|
||
have relationships of some kind to one another (beyond simply being
|
||
parts of the same world). That is not to assume that relationships
|
||
are something that exist in addition to the substances that have
|
||
them. We can and will assume that the basic relationships are simply
|
||
how basic substances exist together as a world. For example, bits of
|
||
matter may be assumed to have spatial relations to one another as how
|
||
they exist together as a world; or bits of matter may be assumed to
|
||
exist together with space as a substance by coinciding with some part
|
||
of space or other; and parts of space may be assumed to exist
|
||
together as a world by having unchanging geometrical relations to one
|
||
another. Such basic relationship are like properties, which, as we
|
||
have assumed, are simply aspects of substances. But instead of being
|
||
aspects of substances taken separately, the relationships we are
|
||
assuming are aspects of the world, or how substances exist together
|
||
as a world. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The basic
|
||
relationships among substances being postulated as part of the
|
||
ontological causes to be used in explaining everything in the world
|
||
should be distinguished from the two relations, already mentioned,
|
||
which substances have to themselves or among their parts: the
|
||
identity relation and temporal relations. We are considering the
|
||
relationships that an ontology must postulate along with substances
|
||
in order to explain things ontologically, whereas the identity
|
||
relation and temporal relations are aspects of how each substance
|
||
exists on its own and do not depend on how they exist together as a
|
||
world.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Since
|
||
naturalism is the belief that what exists is just what is in space
|
||
and time, one kind of basic relationship that any naturalism will
|
||
require among substances is spatial. It is hard to see how any
|
||
substance could be in space and time without having spatial relations
|
||
to other substances. By spatial relations, I mean the distances that
|
||
can hold between substances in three independent dimensions, and I
|
||
assume that such distances are continuously variable. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Though
|
||
spatial relations are found in the natural world, that does not mean
|
||
that a naturalistic ontology must assume that having spatial
|
||
relations is how substances exist together as a world. There is
|
||
another way of existing together that would entail their having
|
||
spatial relations: if space is a substance, bits of matter could have
|
||
spatial relations by coinciding with parts of space. The real nature
|
||
of spatial relations is another issue that we will leave open for the
|
||
time being, until we are in a better position to decide what to
|
||
believe. (See Space under </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtfS.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Spatiomaterialism</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">.)</span></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>K<img src="" name="Image3" align="right" hspace="5" width="48" height="21" border="0">inds
|
||
of relations.</i> As in the case of substances, there is an important
|
||
difference to be recognized between kinds of basic relations that
|
||
might be assumed to hold among the substances postulated. Though such
|
||
basic relationships are just how the basic substances exist together
|
||
as a world, they can, like the essential aspects of substances, be
|
||
either temporally simple or temporally complex. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Temporally
|
||
simple.</i> Relations that exhibit their full nature at the moment
|
||
that the substances exist together in that way are temporally simple.
|
||
That is, relations are "temporally simple" to the extent
|
||
that they are how substances exist together at a single moment in the
|
||
history of the world. In a world constituted by space and matter, for
|
||
example, the basic relationship between the two basic substances
|
||
would be simple in this sense, for it would be true at every moment
|
||
that each bit of matter coincides with some part of space or another.
|
||
</font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Temporally
|
||
complex.</i> The relations that exist fully at any one moment may,
|
||
however, change the next moment. That is, some relations may go out
|
||
of existence over time and other relations come into existence. Such
|
||
relations would be contingent, and the only way to define the basic
|
||
relations by which substances exist together as a world may be the
|
||
way in which contingent relations change over time. If change in
|
||
contingent relations were regular, the way that substances exist
|
||
together as a world might be defined by how their contingent
|
||
relations change, for that would be a relationship that does not
|
||
change over time. That is, the relations among substances might be
|
||
dispositional. To the extent that the relationship by which
|
||
substances exist together as a world have a nature that is defined by
|
||
how contingent relations change over time, it will be said to be a
|
||
"temporally complex relation."</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">For
|
||
example, an ontology may assume that the way that substances exist
|
||
together as a world is by having spatial relations. Particular
|
||
spatial relations change over time, for example, as objects move, and
|
||
the possibility of such change could be built into the the meaning of
|
||
"having spatial relations." "Having spatial relations"
|
||
might accordingly be defined as meaning that substances have spatial
|
||
relations of some kind or other at each moment, but that they can
|
||
change from one moment to the next as long as they are all
|
||
geometrically consistent as a whole. "Having spatial relations"
|
||
would then be a temporally complex relation among substances, and the
|
||
substances themselves could have a relatively simple, inert nature. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is
|
||
possible to hold that spatial relations are temporally simple without
|
||
postulating space as a substance. The change in spatial relations
|
||
could be explained by the temporally complex essential natures of the
|
||
substances, such as material substances defined as substances that
|
||
move and interact according to the basic laws of physics. That is,
|
||
everything that happens in the world, including all the spatial
|
||
relations that come to exist, might be explained as what is required
|
||
because material objects obey the laws of physics. What must be
|
||
assumed is that those material objects had certain spatial relations
|
||
at the beginning, say at the Big Bang or when God created the world.
|
||
The spatial relations assumed by such an ontology could be temporally
|
||
simple, for they could all exist fully at a single moment, at the
|
||
very beginning. (It might be mentioned, however, that this view would
|
||
not even be possible, given the Heisenberg uncertainty principle of
|
||
quantum mechanics, unless there is a so-called hidden variable that
|
||
makes the indeterminism of quantum theory a mere appearance of the
|
||
incompleteness of its explanation.) </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>O<img src="" name="OddOEffects_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="71" height="33" border="0">ntological
|
||
effects.</b></font> Ontological explanations use substances as causes
|
||
to explain things in the world as their effects. Such causes produce
|
||
their effects by constituting the things being explained. Since there
|
||
are relations among substances, different effects can be produced
|
||
when basic substances are combined in different ways. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
|
||
should be emphasized, however, that insofar as the phenomenon being
|
||
explained is the same as the substance that constitutes it, the
|
||
explanation is trivial and, thus, not a genuine explanation at all.
|
||
The <i>explanatory power </i>of ontology comes from showing how the
|
||
substances cited as ontological causes <i>work together </i>so that
|
||
jointly they constitute what is being explained. Thus, even if the
|
||
existence of some object is explained by showing how it is
|
||
constituted by the combination of various particular substances, the
|
||
object's properties are still not explained if they are simply the
|
||
essential properties of the basic substances constituting it. For
|
||
example, it does not explain why something is moving in a certain
|
||
direction to say that all its parts are moving that way. The
|
||
"explanation" in ontological explanations comes from
|
||
showing how ontological causes work together to produce something
|
||
that may seem different from them. Anything that is entailed by the
|
||
essential natures of substances taken separately is not explained,
|
||
but just assumed. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">What
|
||
is explained by ontological causes includes both the objects found in
|
||
space and how they change over time.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>O<img src="" name="OddOObjects_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="61" height="24" border="0">bjects.</b></i>
|
||
The existence of particular objects can be explained by the
|
||
substances constituting them. Substances have, as substances, an
|
||
existential aspect to their nature, that is, they are
|
||
self-subsistent, and the relations by which they exist together as a
|
||
world permit them to work together in constituting objects. How they
|
||
do so depends on the specific ontology.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Likewise
|
||
the natures of objects found in the world, or their properties, can
|
||
be explained by the substances constituting them because of the
|
||
essential aspects of their natures as substances, that is, their
|
||
essential properties, and the relations by which they exist together
|
||
as a world permit substances to be combined in different ways. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Thus,
|
||
it is possible to explain a diversity of things in the world. Things
|
||
may be different in kind because they are constituted by different
|
||
kinds of basic substances combined in the same way, or because they
|
||
are constituted of the same kinds of basic substances combined in
|
||
different ways, or because of some combination of both factors.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">I<img src="" name="Image4" align="right" hspace="5" width="149" height="22" border="0">f
|
||
only out of respect for the Pre-Socratic philosophers, it should be
|
||
noted that the attempt to explain the world ontologically was first
|
||
attempted about 600 BC, before epistemological philosophy began.
|
||
These first philosophers were naturalists looking for the "first
|
||
principle" (or <i>arche</i>) by which to explain the natural
|
||
world, and they assumed that it must be a "stuff" of some
|
||
kind that constitutes the existence of everything in the world.
|
||
Thales thought it was water. His student, Anaximander, insisted it
|
||
was an inchoate stuff ("apeiron") without properties of its
|
||
own. And Anaximander's student, Anaximines, argued for it being air.
|
||
Though these so-called "Ionian" Pre-Socratics disagreed
|
||
about its essential nature, they all agreed that the world is
|
||
constituted by only one basic kind of material substance. Their
|
||
ontologies were forms of monistic materialism. Spatial relations were
|
||
taken for granted.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">As
|
||
the Pre-Socratics soon discovered, however, none of these ontologies
|
||
offered an adequate explanation of the natural world, for they could
|
||
explain neither the diversity of the objects in nature nor the change
|
||
that occurs in them. The only properties postulated by any of them
|
||
were those that characterize the essential nature of the single kind
|
||
of material substance making up the world, and that left unexplained
|
||
all the properties that distinguish one kind of object from other
|
||
kinds, not to mention how such properties could come or go from
|
||
existence as time passes. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Parmenides
|
||
can be read as making this point. What Parmenides was referring to by
|
||
his famous dictum. "What is, must be, and what is not, must not
|
||
be," was a basic aspect of the nature of substance (the temporal
|
||
aspect of its existential aspect). Substance cannot go out of
|
||
existence, nor can it come into existence. But since Parmenides
|
||
agreed that the "first principle" for explaining the world
|
||
is a single kind of substance (with a temporally simple essential
|
||
nature), he argued that there cannot be any real change or diversity
|
||
in the world. Thus, he insisted that change and diversity are an
|
||
illusion. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Heraclitus
|
||
drew the opposite conclusion from the assumption that there is only
|
||
one first principle for explaining the natural world. But he took, as
|
||
the first principle, change and diversity itself. That was, in
|
||
effect, to deny that there is any such thing as substance underlying
|
||
change or diversity. Since the essential natures of substances are
|
||
defined by their properties, to take the change of properties as
|
||
basic was to deny that properties are aspects of substances, for
|
||
otherwise substances would have to be coming into and going out of
|
||
existence as time passes. Though Heraclitus did assume that change
|
||
and diversity are guided in a regular way by <i>Logos</i> (which is
|
||
something like laws of nature), this is to read Heraclitus' famous
|
||
claim that you cannot step in the same river twice as saying that
|
||
what exists in the natural world is nothing but properties that
|
||
change over time. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Between
|
||
them, therefore, Heraclitus and Parmenides posed a dilemma for any
|
||
explanatory ontology that would postulate only one basic principle to
|
||
explain the world: either the first principle is a material substance
|
||
of some kind and there is no change nor diversity, or else change and
|
||
diversity themselves are the first principle, and there is no
|
||
substance. The former fails to explain the natural world, and the
|
||
latter abandons ontological explanation altogether.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Pre-Socratic
|
||
philosophy was a process of posing hypotheses, criticizing them, and
|
||
posing new hypotheses, and it discovered two ways of solving this
|
||
dilemma. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Pluralists
|
||
held that the world is constituted by more than one kind of material
|
||
substance. That made it possible to explain diversity and change by
|
||
the mixture and separation of different kinds of material substances
|
||
each with a simple essential nature. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Empedocles
|
||
postulated four basic substances, earth, air, fire, and water, and he
|
||
explained the diversity and change of things in the world by their
|
||
mixture and separation (according to the forces of "love"
|
||
and "strife"). Anaxagoras gave the same kind of
|
||
explanation, except that he postulated infinitely many different
|
||
basic substances (or "seeds," as he called them). In both
|
||
cases, the essential natures of the basic substances were defined in
|
||
terms of their qualitative properties, such as hot and cold, wet and
|
||
dry, and their mixture was supposed to account for all the other
|
||
sensible qualities of objects. (It was probably the limited range of
|
||
objects that could be explained by only four basic substances that
|
||
led Anaxagoras to insist on infinitely many "seeds.") </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
other solution to this dilemma was offered by the atomists, Leucippus
|
||
and Democritus. They are said to have explained diversity and change
|
||
"quantitatively", rather than "qualitatively,"
|
||
because they took spatial relations into account. They assumed that
|
||
the material substances are atoms whose natures differ from one
|
||
another only by their size and shape, and they explained the
|
||
differences in kinds of objects not only by the shapes and sizes of
|
||
their constituent atoms, but also by the spatial relations that hold
|
||
among them. That forced the ancient atomists to believe, however,
|
||
that the sensible qualities that objects seem to have are actually
|
||
subjective, a view that was not generally accepted until the
|
||
beginning of the modern era. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>C<img src="" name="OddOChange_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="60" height="24" border="0">hange.</b></i>
|
||
In order to <i>explain </i>change, an ontology must not only assume
|
||
that substances have a temporal aspect to their existential nature,
|
||
but also that they can be combined in different ways at different
|
||
times. In that case, as time passes, an object may change because
|
||
some of the kinds of basic substances constituting it are exchanged,
|
||
or because the relations by which the same basic substances are
|
||
related in constituting it change, or because of some combination of
|
||
such factors. But that is to assume that, in addition to having
|
||
relations, the relations among basic substances are capable of change
|
||
over time.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="Image5" align="right" hspace="5" width="149" height="22" border="0">his
|
||
is clearly what Empedocles was assuming in holding that the objects
|
||
perceived in nature change because of the mixture and separation of
|
||
elements, such as earth, air, fire and water. He took it for granted
|
||
that they can move, explaining one kind of change by assuming the
|
||
possibility of another, namely, motion.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
atomists, however, believed that it was necessary to explain how
|
||
motion itself is possible. That is why they postulated the void as
|
||
well as all the atoms. They are traditionally understood as having
|
||
argued that bits of matter would not be able to move, if there were
|
||
no void, because there would always be other bits of matter in the
|
||
way. But if there were a void as well as the atoms, atoms would be
|
||
able to move without obstruction, at least, until they collided with
|
||
other atoms. However, since the void exists only where atoms do not
|
||
exist, the void can be understood as a very subtle kind of material
|
||
substances that atoms can displace more easily than other atoms. On
|
||
that interpretation, atoms move through the void like fish through
|
||
water, displacing a fluid-like substance which offers no resistance.
|
||
We will return to their explanation of the possibility of change.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
|
||
is, it should be emphasized, no ontological explanation of change, if
|
||
the change being explained is the same kind of change that the
|
||
substances undergoing that change are postulated as having as part of
|
||
their essential nature. Whether we are explaining objects and their
|
||
properties or change in them, when cause and effect are the same,
|
||
there is no ontological explanation, but only ontological assumption.
|
||
</font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Explanatory
|
||
ontology is, in sum, the attempt to <i>reduce </i>everything in the
|
||
world to the various kinds of basic substances constituting them and
|
||
the relations by which those substances exist together as a world.
|
||
But that is explanatory only to the extent that the substances and
|
||
their relations are more elementary than what they explain and
|
||
produce those effects by how they are combined. But if it were
|
||
successful, an ontological explanation of the world would be a simple
|
||
and complete explanation of the world, for it would show how
|
||
everything in the world is identical to certain basic kinds of
|
||
substances and certain basic kinds of relations among them.
|
||
Everything in the world would be explained in the same way.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>O<img src="" name="OddOAsReal_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="99" height="28" border="0"><img src="" name="EpistCmt" align="right" width="202" height="20" border="0">ntology
|
||
as realism.</b></font> For traditional, epistemological philosophy,
|
||
ontology is realism (or, more precisely, its ontology is determined
|
||
by the position it takes on realism). The foundation of
|
||
epistemological philosophy is a theory about how we know (or a theory
|
||
about the nature of reason) which is based on reflecting on our
|
||
mental processes. From this foundation, it attempts to justify
|
||
certain conclusions about the world, which would be necessary
|
||
relative to our ordinary ways of knowing about it. Thus, success
|
||
generally means that it is committed to the existence of certain
|
||
entities beyond those assumed at the beginning. "Realism"
|
||
is the name for belief in their reality. But realism is usually a
|
||
form of dualism. Epistemologists are already committed to the
|
||
existence of the subject whose way of knowing is the foundation for
|
||
their epistemological argument, and realism commits them to the
|
||
existence of entities of a fundamentally different kind. Hence, they
|
||
wind up defending some form of ontological dualism, and that
|
||
typically leads to anti-realism, since the two kinds of substances do
|
||
not fit together intelligibly as a world. This pattern can be found
|
||
in every era of the history of Western philosophy. I will suggest
|
||
how, very briefly, in order to make clear what I mean.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>A<img src="" name="OddOAncient_up" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="15" width="25" height="137" border="0">ncient.</b></font>
|
||
Reflecting on the difference between the objects of perception and
|
||
the objects that seem to be present to us in reasoning about kinds of
|
||
things, Plato argued that, in addition to all the visible objects in
|
||
the realm of Becoming, there is a realm of Being where such objects
|
||
of rational intuition exist as unchanging Forms. He called the latter
|
||
realm "Being" because the Forms were supposed to be
|
||
permanent and unchanging. It was supposed to be outside space and
|
||
time, beyond the natural world of changing, visible objects. Thus,
|
||
his realism committed him to believing in the existence of both Being
|
||
and Becoming, and since they are so fundamentally different in their
|
||
natures, his ontology is clearly a kind of dualism.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Plato’s
|
||
was a very problematic dualism, because it is hard to explain how
|
||
entities that are not supposed to be in space and time are related to
|
||
visible objects which are, much less to show how such Forms could
|
||
cause visible objects to have the natures they seem to have. That
|
||
makes it easy to be skeptical about the transcendent realm of Being,
|
||
and naturalists are already inclined to be anti-realists about
|
||
abstract entities of any kind, because they assume that everything is
|
||
located in space.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Aristotle
|
||
tried to avoid these problems by postulating, instead, substances in
|
||
the natural world that are compounds of two elements, matter and
|
||
form. This was not, however, to abandon Plato’s epistemological
|
||
foundation, for Aristotle continued to assume that the "material
|
||
cause" is an object of perception and that the "formal
|
||
cause" is an object of rational intuition. Though essential
|
||
forms were located in space, they had to have a peculiar nature to
|
||
play their role, because each had to be located in many different
|
||
particular substances at the same time and yet be one and the same
|
||
thing. That earned them the name "universals." Though
|
||
Aristotle could claim to be a naturalist, he was still a realist
|
||
about essential forms as something beyond what is known by
|
||
perception. That landed him with his own ontological dualism because,
|
||
even though neither matter nor form can exist without the other, the
|
||
existence of one is distinct from and cannot be reduced to the
|
||
existence of the other. Realism about universals invited a type of
|
||
skepticism called "nominalism."</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Attempts
|
||
to avoid matter-from dualism characterize Aristotle’s later work on
|
||
the nature of substance as substance. Though there is much dispute
|
||
about it, Aristotle seems to argue in </span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><i>Metaphysics,
|
||
Books VII </i></span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">and
|
||
</span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><i>VIII</i></span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
that substances are basically just essential forms. He apparently
|
||
reduces the material cause to the fact that forms exist only as
|
||
particular substances despite being entities that exist as many
|
||
different particular instances of the same form (that is, as
|
||
universals). That position seems to reduce matter to a principle of
|
||
individuation. This later notion of essential form and matter is
|
||
closer to the distinction between essence and existence assumed here
|
||
(see </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#04"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="1" style="font-size: 7pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Substances</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">above).
|
||
In any case, Aristotle's conception of being as being (that is,
|
||
substance as substance) poses so many problems that many traditional
|
||
philosophers have been inclined to avoid ontology altogether.</span></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>M<img src="" name="OddOMed_up" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="15" width="23" height="136" border="0">edieval.</b></font>
|
||
In the Medieval period, realism took the form of belief in the
|
||
existence of God, rather than a realm of Being, outside space and
|
||
time. Theists believed that it was possible to prove the existence of
|
||
God on the basis of what can be observed in the natural world. For
|
||
example, they argued from the natural belief that every event has a
|
||
cause to the existence of God as the first cause, or cause of nature
|
||
as a whole. And they argued from natural teleology to God, both as
|
||
the designer of the natural order and as the ultimate final cause of
|
||
natural things. Realism about God, or theism, committed them,
|
||
therefore, to believing in the existence of God as well as nature.
|
||
After Augustine, this ontological dualism was modeled on Plato’s,
|
||
and it was no less problematic. The fundamental difference in their
|
||
natures makes it difficult to explain how God and the natural world
|
||
are related as parts of a single world. It was ultimately left as a
|
||
mystery that could not be fathomed by finite rational minds. Denial
|
||
of this kind of realism is generally considered atheism, though mere
|
||
skepticism about it is often distinguished as agnosticism.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>M<img src="" name="OddOMod_up" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="15" width="26" height="138" border="0">odern.</b></font>
|
||
With the rise of modern science, it was recognized that our
|
||
perceptual experience of the natural world is something distinct from
|
||
the natural world itself (as the ancient atomists first held), and
|
||
the foundation of epistemological philosophy shifted from reflection
|
||
on how we know in which we are living bodies in the natural world to
|
||
reflection on how we know in which we are minds where ideas have an
|
||
appearance. Mind is the epistemological foundation from which
|
||
Descartes tried to prove the existence of the body and the external
|
||
world of which it is part. The success of Cartesian philosophy would
|
||
entail realism about the natural world, and thus ontological dualism.
|
||
But mind and body are substances with such radically different
|
||
natures that it is, once again, a very problematic ontology, namely,
|
||
mind-body dualism. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
|
||
were, of course, skeptics about its success, notably, the British
|
||
Empiricists, and they are interesting for their views about
|
||
substance. Locke argued that realism about material objects involves
|
||
belief in a substratum, or substance as nothing but a support of the
|
||
properties that perception reveals objects to have. Since that was to
|
||
believe that substances have no properties of their own, it was, in
|
||
effect, to reduce substance as substance to its existential aspect,
|
||
and thus, Locke could plausibly hold that substratum is an incoherent
|
||
idea. But even the existential aspect was denied by Berkeley and
|
||
Hume. They accepted the "bundle theory" of substances, that
|
||
is, the view that substances are just the bundle of properties that
|
||
we seem to perceive in them. In any case, since the foundation of
|
||
modern philosophy was mind, they were implicitly committed to one
|
||
kind of substance, and the only ontological position open to skeptics
|
||
was idealism of some kind or other, though only Berkeley embraced it
|
||
explicitly. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Later
|
||
attempts to justify science from the epistemological foundation of
|
||
modern philosophy led to other forms of realism, though they were not
|
||
called that. Kant tired to avoid the problems of Cartesian philosophy
|
||
by holding that space and time are merely forms of intuition in the
|
||
mind. But since he continued to believed that there are things in
|
||
themselves, he was implicitly committed to entities that are not in
|
||
space and time. That landed him with the same kind of problematic
|
||
ontological dualism as Plato, and like Augustine, he simply denied
|
||
that it is possible to explain the relationship between the natural
|
||
world and the things in themselves which are outside time and space. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>C<img src="" name="OddOContemp_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="27" height="137" border="0">ontemporary.</b></font>
|
||
Early in the twentieth century, developments in logic by Russell and
|
||
Frege offered a new foundation for epistemological philosophy.
|
||
Reflecting on our use of language, so-called Anglo-American analytic
|
||
philosophy took as their epistemological foundation what we all know
|
||
about the meanings and references of the terms and sentences we use.
|
||
This foundation has been used in various way, leading to different
|
||
forms of realism. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Analytic
|
||
philosophy was able to reformulate empiricism as a justification of
|
||
science at the expense of modern metaphysics. Logical positivists
|
||
took the observation of objects in the natural world as the
|
||
epistemological foundation of science, and they tried to show how
|
||
scientific conclusions were supported by it. Though their original
|
||
purpose was to show that whatever is not based on observation is
|
||
meaningless metaphysics, it was soon noticed that even theories in
|
||
physics mention unobservable entities, such as electrons, quarks, and
|
||
force fields. Thus, those who believed in their existence came to
|
||
called "realists about theoretical entities." </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">More
|
||
recently, the recognition that such unobservable entities are not
|
||
very different from the observable objects on which science bases its
|
||
theories has led to calling the defenders of science "scientific
|
||
realists." Scientific realism is taken to involve a commitment
|
||
to the existence of both the observable and unobservable objects
|
||
recognized by science. Or in the words of Wilfred </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Sellars63"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Sellars</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
"science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is,
|
||
and of what is not that it is not" (p. 173). But disputes still
|
||
rage in the professional literature about the significance of calling
|
||
it "realism." </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">Most
|
||
recently, philosophers of science have tried to avoid problems about
|
||
realism by simply abandoning traditional epistemology all together.
|
||
They often call themselves "naturalized epistemologists,"
|
||
for they hold that the only foundation for justifying science is
|
||
science itself (that is, the conclusions that science draws about how
|
||
we know). Though they say that they believe that philosophy is
|
||
continuous with science, to ontological philosophy, they seem to be
|
||
giving up philosophy altogether in favor of being cheerleaders for
|
||
science. See </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Kitcher"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Kitcher</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">and
|
||
</span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Kitcher"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Rosenberg</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Giving
|
||
up epistemological philosophy does not necessarily mean, however,
|
||
taking up ontological philosophy. The habit of epistemology makes it
|
||
seem that ontology is purely descriptive. The job of ontology seems
|
||
to be just to discover the kinds of entities to which one is
|
||
committed by holding certain beliefs to be true. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">With regard
|
||
to natural science, for example, ontology is just realism about the
|
||
conclusions of science.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In the
|
||
philosophy of mathematics, realism is defended by so-called
|
||
Platonists, who hold that numbers and other mathematical entities
|
||
exist independently of the subjects who know about them (in
|
||
opposition to logicists, who argue that mathematics can be reduced to
|
||
logical truth, and to constructivists, who argue that mathematical
|
||
objects are simply constructs of the imagination). </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Even
|
||
language is taken as a foundation for descriptive ontology. </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Quine53On"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Quine</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">(1953,
|
||
1960) has argued that talk of classes implies the existence of at
|
||
least that one kind of abstract entity. Some analytic philosophers
|
||
now argue that to believe in the truth of descriptive statements is
|
||
to be committed to the existence of properties as well as the
|
||
substances that have them, or what might be called substance-property
|
||
dualism. </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Scientific
|
||
realism leads some analytic philosophers of science to take laws of
|
||
nature to be real, which entails a dualism of laws and the objects
|
||
that that obey them. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
|
||
any case, realism is not explanatory ontology, but just ontology as
|
||
realism. It does not use the entities it postulates to explain
|
||
anything beyond the phenomena on which their existence was defended.
|
||
That leaves plenty of room for philosophical argument, because
|
||
descriptive ontologists generally take a skeptical attitude and
|
||
are inclined to deny the existence of any kinds of entities whose
|
||
existence is not forced on them by their epistemological foundation.
|
||
But that is a different issue entirely from explanatory ontology.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0; page-break-before: always">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><b>M<img src="" name="OdeMMethod_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="101" height="38" border="0">ethod.</b></font></font>
|
||
<font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
final assumption needed to secure a foundation for ontological
|
||
philosophy is a method for deciding which of the possible ontological
|
||
explanations to believe. We will assume that we ought to believe the
|
||
best ontological explanation of the world, and since we are
|
||
naturalists, that means preferring the best ontological explanation
|
||
of the natural world. Since the empirical method can be defined as
|
||
inferring to the best explanation, that makes the foundation of
|
||
ontological philosophy </font></font><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>empirical
|
||
ontological naturalism</i></font></font><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">.
|
||
</font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
empirical method is the same method that science uses, except for
|
||
applying it to a different kind of explanation. But it is not the
|
||
only possible method for deciding what to believe. The alternative is
|
||
the rational method of traditional, epistemological philosophy. Its
|
||
foundation was a theory about how we know, which was based on
|
||
reflecting on our processes of knowing. It might also be considered
|
||
an inference to the best explanation. But since the way we ordinarily
|
||
explain what is known by reflection is by giving reasons, the method
|
||
of epistemological philosophy always came down to the claim that
|
||
certain truths are required by reason itself. Though the actual
|
||
standard was different in different eras of Western philosophy, they
|
||
can all be called forms of the <i>rational method</i>.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
empirical method, by contrast, may be considered an inference to the
|
||
best explanation of what is known by perception. Perception provides
|
||
relevant evidence in deciding what to believe because it discloses
|
||
facts about what exists in the world. But for naturalists seeking an
|
||
ontological explanation, there is no need to limit the evidence to
|
||
perception. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Given our
|
||
assumption, as naturalists, that the natural world is the world
|
||
disclosed to us by perception, the empirical method might also be
|
||
described as inferring to the best explanation of the natural world.
|
||
Though science may limit itself to explaining what is known by
|
||
perception, the latter formulation is preferable, given our
|
||
ontological purposes, because there is no need to limit the evidence
|
||
we have about the natural world to what is known by perception.
|
||
Reflection should also be accepted as providing evidence about the
|
||
nature of the substances and relations constituting the natural
|
||
world, because we believe, as naturalists, that the beings in whom
|
||
reflection occurs are themselves parts of the natural world. That
|
||
would not be to revert to the rational method of epistemological
|
||
philosophy, as long as we take reflection and what is known by it to
|
||
be something found in the natural world that needs explaining, and
|
||
not as providing a standard for judging what is true. What is known
|
||
by reflection is no less evidence of what exists in the natural world
|
||
than what is known by perception, though when we define "naturalism"
|
||
ontologically, as holding that the world is just what is in space and
|
||
time, we are taking perception to disclose its basic nature more
|
||
completely. Thus, since it is the natural world itself, not just what
|
||
is perceived, that we are trying to explain ontologically, we shall
|
||
interpret the empirical method broadly as inferring to the best
|
||
explanation of the natural world, not just what is known by
|
||
perception. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Having
|
||
assumed naturalism and the validity of ontological explanation, the
|
||
third and final assumption of ontological philosophy is the empirical
|
||
method. That is, if this argument is logically valid, it will not be
|
||
possible to reject the necessary truths justified by it, unless one
|
||
denies naturalism, the validity of ontological explanation, or the
|
||
empirical method.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote1anc" href="#sdendnote1sym"><sup>i</sup></a></sup></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>T<img src="" name="OdeMEmpM_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="128" height="32" border="0">he
|
||
empirical method.</b></font> By the "empirical method," I
|
||
mean an inference to the best explanation of what is found in the
|
||
natural world (either by perception or perception and reflection).
|
||
Though this way of deciding what to believe presupposes a kind of
|
||
explanation, the method can be stated abstractly, because its
|
||
standard for judging what is best that can be applied to any kind of
|
||
explanation, or at least, any kind that cites causes in order to
|
||
explain effects. So let us consider the method abstractly, and then
|
||
take up the various applications of it. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>I<img src="" name="OdeMIbe_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="156" height="57" border="0">nference
|
||
to the best explanation of the natural world.</b></font> The standard
|
||
for the best explanation is simply explaining the most with the
|
||
least. The best explanation can be identified as the one that
|
||
requires the least in the way of causes to explain the most in the
|
||
way of effects. After explaining what this empirical standard
|
||
requires generally, we will see how it applies to various kinds of
|
||
explanation, including ontological explanation.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>S<img src="" name="OdeMIbeScope_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="71" height="25" border="0">cope.</b></i>
|
||
The explanation with the greater scope is better, other things being
|
||
equal. That is, if two explanations are equally simple, the empirical
|
||
method requires us to prefer one over the other, if it explains more
|
||
of what is found in the world than the other. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
preference for explanations with larger scopes does not always
|
||
determine which explanation to believe even when other things are
|
||
equal. When two theories have overlapping scopes, for example, it may
|
||
be unclear which explains more. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>S<img src="" name="OdeMIbeSimp_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="72" height="26" border="0">implicity.</b></i>
|
||
The simpler explanation is better, other things being equal. What
|
||
does the explaining in an explanation are its causes, for they
|
||
produce the effects, which are what is explained by the explanation.
|
||
Thus, if two explanations explain the same range of phenomena, the
|
||
empirical method requires us to believe one rather than the other, if
|
||
it requires fewer causes or the causes it requires are simpler. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Nor
|
||
does the preference for simpler explanations always determine which
|
||
theory to believe when other things are equal. There may be a
|
||
trade-off between fewer causes and simpler causes. There is no way to
|
||
say in general whether to prefer fewer, more complex causes or a
|
||
larger number of simpler causes. It depends on the kind of
|
||
explanation involved or, perhaps, the specific case. And even then,
|
||
there may be no way to decide. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Scope
|
||
and simplicity are the basic criteria for judging explanations, but
|
||
there is no reason to deny that there may be other issues about which
|
||
is the best explanation that arise when specific kinds of
|
||
explanations are being considered. Appeal can always be made to the
|
||
basic standard for judging the best among explanations of the same
|
||
basic kind: explaining the most with the least. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Two
|
||
sources of error using the empirical method should be noticed. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">First, any
|
||
limitation in the range of theories being considered can lead to
|
||
errors. Since the empirical method chooses the best among the
|
||
possible explanations, it works only insofar as <i>all </i>possible
|
||
theories are being considered. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Second, any
|
||
limitation in the range of evidence being considered can lead to
|
||
errors. Since the empirical method chooses the best explanation of
|
||
what is in the world, it works only insofar as we have found
|
||
everything relevant in the world. And as mentioned above, naturalists
|
||
have no reason, in principle, not to include as evidence, along with
|
||
perception, what is found out about the natural world by reflection,
|
||
if it is relevant. The subjects and the mental processes on which
|
||
they reflect are part of the natural world.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>K<img src="" name="OdeMKinds_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="157" height="58" border="0">inds
|
||
of inferences to the best explanation of the natural world.</b></font>
|
||
Since the empirical method is relative to the kind of explanation
|
||
being sought, we must have the ability to comprehend some kind of
|
||
explanation in order to use it. Nor can we say in advance which kind
|
||
of explanation ought be used. We must simply develop whatever ways of
|
||
explaining we can understand, and then compare them to see how they
|
||
fit together or, if we must choose among them, which to believe. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>E<img src="" name="OdeMEce_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="85" height="49" border="0">fficient-cause
|
||
explanations.</b></i> The empirical method of science is to infer to
|
||
the best efficient-cause explanation. Explanation by efficient causes
|
||
is understood as depending on laws of nature, which describe
|
||
regularities about how causes lead to effects. It is usually
|
||
represented by the deductive-nomological model (or covering law
|
||
model, which can be traced to David Hume). This model holds that an
|
||
event (or regularity) is explained when a description of it can be
|
||
deduced from true laws of nature and the relevant initial and
|
||
boundary conditions. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><img src="" name="DNExplanation" align="bottom" width="385" height="80" border="0"></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
initial and boundary conditions, or certain salient parts of them,
|
||
are said to be the cause, and the event (or regularity) entailed by
|
||
them and the law of nature is the effect. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">This
|
||
model works well for physics, but there has been a long dispute about
|
||
its adequacy for other branches of science. Those disputes are not
|
||
relevant here, since we are more concerned with comparing
|
||
efficient-cause explanations with other forms of explanation than
|
||
with details about how it is applied in specific cases. (A better
|
||
account of the kinds of scientific explanations that this model
|
||
slights will be given when we take up the necessary truths of
|
||
ontological philosophy. See </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCcC.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Epistemological theories of causation</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">)</span></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>S<img src="" name="OdeMEceScope_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="62" height="26" border="0">cope.</i>
|
||
The explanation of any specific event (or regularity) is just one of
|
||
a whole range of explanations that may be based on the same law, and
|
||
the scope of the explanation includes all the events (and
|
||
regularities) that can be explained by it. According to the empirical
|
||
method, therefore, the best efficient-cause explanation, other things
|
||
being equal, is the one that follows from the most general laws of
|
||
nature, that is, the natural laws with the largest scope. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>S<img src="" name="OdeMEceSimp_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="66" height="26" border="0">implicity.</i>
|
||
The simplicity criterion requires us to prefer the explanation with
|
||
the fewest causes and the simplest causes, other things being equal. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
explanation with the fewest causes, in the case of efficient-cause
|
||
explanations, would be the one with the fewest relevant initial and
|
||
boundary conditions. Since what makes such conditions relevant are
|
||
the laws of nature, this is usually the requirement of preferring
|
||
efficient-cause explanations that require the fewest laws. Thus,
|
||
given any two explanations with the same scope, the empirical method
|
||
requires us to prefer the one requiring the fewest laws of nature and
|
||
the fewest relevant initial and boundary conditions. But if two
|
||
explanations appeal to the same laws, we should prefer the one that
|
||
requires the fewest and simplest initial and boundary conditions.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
explanation with the simplest causes may also mean, in the case of
|
||
efficient-cause explanations, the one with the simplest laws of
|
||
nature. The criterion of simplicity in this case has notorious
|
||
problems, because natural laws formulated in terms of quantitatively
|
||
precise mathematical formulas can be simple in different ways.
|
||
However, even without a generally accepted standard of mathematical
|
||
simplicity, scientists usually manage to reach agreement on this
|
||
matter. Those issues need not, in any case, concern us, given the
|
||
altitude of our comparison of these forms of the empirical method.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Since
|
||
criteria for explaining the most with the least can be traded off
|
||
against one another, the empirical method does not necessarily
|
||
determine which theory to believe in science. But this is how the
|
||
goal of science is usually formulated. The so-called "holy
|
||
grail" of contemporary physics is an example. That goal is to
|
||
find a single, basic natural law that would cover all the forms of
|
||
motion and interaction among bits of matter that physics recognizes,
|
||
including not only electromagnetism and the weak and strong (or
|
||
color) forces, but also gravitation. This goal shows a commitment to
|
||
finding the simplest explanation with the largest scope, though
|
||
physicists have encountered intractable problems in their quest to
|
||
formulate such a law. (The biggest problem is that it does not seem
|
||
possible to state Einstein's theory of gravitation in the same kind
|
||
of mathematical formulation as the laws for the other basic forces,
|
||
that is, as a quantum field theory, without postulating ten or more
|
||
dimensions of space!)</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Efficient-cause
|
||
explanations are also given in ordinary life, engineering, and less
|
||
basic branches of science, where the empirical method is applied more
|
||
loosely. We can understand most causal connections apart from formal
|
||
deductions for mathematically formulated laws of nature, because we
|
||
have a form of imagination (spatial imagination) that enables us to
|
||
think about the relations of objects in space and to how they change
|
||
as objects move and interact over time. Spatial imagination
|
||
represents very basic regularities, which are implicit in the laws of
|
||
physics, but it can also represent what specific laws of nature
|
||
require against this background understanding. This remarkable
|
||
capacity is easily overlooked, because it is built into our faculty
|
||
of perception as our way of understanding what perception discloses
|
||
about nature. In any case, this way of understanding efficient-cause
|
||
explanations enables us to use the empirical method, because, despite
|
||
its non-formal nature, it enables us to see which theory explains the
|
||
most with the least. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">When
|
||
events that depart from expectations, such as accidents, for example,
|
||
are explained by efficient causes, the empirical method enjoins us to
|
||
prefer the explanation that requires the simplest causes (the
|
||
simplest deviations from normal, which are most likely) and the
|
||
fewest causes (rather than a combination of independent deviations).
|
||
But it also requires us to prefer the explanation with the largest
|
||
scope, and thus, we prefer an explanation that can also account for
|
||
other details about the accident. Or in the case of regularities
|
||
generated by a mechanism of some kind, the empirical method would
|
||
have us prefer the simplest mechanism that can explain the most about
|
||
the regularity in its behavior. Such judgments depend more on our
|
||
capacity for spatial imagination than precise formulations of laws of
|
||
nature, though the latter may be relevant in choosing among them when
|
||
more precise quantities are relevant.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>R<img src="" name="OdeMRce_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="84" height="49" border="0">ational-cause
|
||
explanation.</b></i> Though social science also uses the empirical
|
||
method of natural science, it has another kind of explanation which
|
||
it shares with the humanities, distinguishing it from natural
|
||
science. It is called "rational explanation." Since it
|
||
explains phenomena by causes, the empirical method can be used in
|
||
inferring to the best rational explanation. But the nature of
|
||
rational explanation is such that the empirical method does not, in
|
||
general, lead to agreement about what to believe about the world.
|
||
What follows is not meant to defend rational explanation in science,
|
||
but merely to show how rational explanation can be seen as another
|
||
instance of the empirical method.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
|
||
is possible to explain what rational beings like us do and believe by
|
||
the reasons that lead them to choose to do it or to believe it. For
|
||
example, actions can be explained by the beliefs and desires that are
|
||
responsible for them, and beliefs can often be explained by the
|
||
perceptions and established beliefs that are responsible for them.
|
||
When we are explaining the actions or beliefs of other subjects, what
|
||
is explained are ultimately objects of perception, just as in natural
|
||
science, for we know about their intentions and beliefs of others
|
||
only by perceiving their behavior. Some of that behavior is, of
|
||
course, verbal behavior, which is especially revealing, but this kind
|
||
of explanation can also be given of other animals, notably, mammals.
|
||
What makes human beings basically different is that they are
|
||
reflective subjects. That is, in them, beliefs, desires and
|
||
perceptions are not mere causes of actions and belief, but causes
|
||
that have effects on other beliefs or behavior by way of the
|
||
subject’s reflecting on them. These causes are so special that they
|
||
are called "reasons." Furthermore, what enables us to
|
||
identify these causes and see their roles in causing action and
|
||
belief is reflection. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Reflection
|
||
plays a role in rational-cause explanation that is analogous to the
|
||
role of spatial imagination in ordinary efficient-cause explanations
|
||
and the laws of nature cited in more formal scientific
|
||
efficient-cause explanations. What enables us to connect cause with
|
||
effect in the case of rational explanations is reflection on our own
|
||
capacity for reasoning. When we explain another person’s action by
|
||
citing certain beliefs and desires, our ability to tell the relevance
|
||
of those beliefs and desires as causes of the action in question
|
||
comes from reflecting on what we would do if we had certain desires
|
||
and we believed that we were in the relevant situation. Likewise in
|
||
seeing the relevance of reasons as causes explaining certain beliefs,
|
||
we reconstruct the argument in our own brains. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Rational
|
||
explanation works well enough in the case of the actions and beliefs
|
||
that occur in the ordinary practice of carrying out our lives.
|
||
Insofar as the actions and beliefs to be explained have to do with
|
||
moving bodies around in a world of objects in space in order to
|
||
satisfy desires, we can understand the causes of the other’s
|
||
behavior by reflecting on what our own spatial imagination would lead
|
||
us to do in the situation. That is the kind of behavior that can be
|
||
explained rationally in other animals. But we can usually reach
|
||
agreement about ordinary social interactions of human beings as well,
|
||
because members of a society share expectations about one another’s
|
||
actions and beliefs. To explain a particular action or belief is
|
||
usually just a matter of identifying which of the familiar reasons
|
||
happened to be responsible for it in that case. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Agreement
|
||
about which is the best rational explanation is reached easily in
|
||
such ordinary causes, and it can be seen as an application of the
|
||
empirical method. Familiar reasons are the simplest in the sense that
|
||
they fit into the background of beliefs and desires that people
|
||
share, and we usually prefer explanations that require the fewest
|
||
familiar reasons to explain any particular action or belief. In
|
||
short, we assimilate their behavior to what is normally expected.
|
||
Furthermore, the scope of such explanations is maximally large,
|
||
because the rational explanation is confirmed by how normal
|
||
expectations also explain other aspects of the person’s behavior.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Actions
|
||
or beliefs that are unusual, however, cannot be assimilated to the
|
||
normal pattern. They call for rational explanation in a way that can
|
||
also be seen as an application of the empirical method. We start, as
|
||
always, from the neutral background of ordinary behavior and beliefs
|
||
with generally accepted reasons in the society and we try to identify
|
||
the special reasons that are responsible for the unusual beliefs or
|
||
behavior. These are desires, beliefs or perceptions that stand out as
|
||
different from that neutral background, and since the empirical
|
||
method requires us to explain the most with the least, we look for
|
||
the explanation that requires the fewest deviations from the
|
||
background and the simplest (or most plausible) ways in which they
|
||
might deviate. And we look for the combination of such deviations
|
||
with the largest scope. The same beliefs and desires can cause many
|
||
different actions and beliefs, and thus, we prefer the rational
|
||
explanation of the action (or belief) in question that can also
|
||
explain other actions (or beliefs). The more of a person’s behavior
|
||
that a rational explanation can explain, the better the explanation,
|
||
other things being equal. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Though each
|
||
of us may use the empirical method to decide what to believe about
|
||
the reasons for a person’s behavior or beliefs, this may not lead
|
||
us to agree on which the explanation. The problem is that rational
|
||
explanation depends on reflection, rather than just perception. Each
|
||
of us must use our own processes of reasoning to judge which possible
|
||
reasons explain the most with the least. Those reasoning processes
|
||
involve our own beliefs about the world, the perceptions that we have
|
||
had, our own desires, values and what we have already decided to do
|
||
or believe on the basis of them. And the further what is being
|
||
explained is from the familiar, everyday actions and beliefs that we
|
||
have all made part of our way of viewing the world, the more
|
||
differences tend to show up in how we think. People have vastly
|
||
different views about the most general and basic issues, such as the
|
||
nature of the world, what is possible, where beings like us come
|
||
from, what is the purpose of life, what is good and bad, what to
|
||
strive for, what is worth worshiping, and the like. And such
|
||
differences extend into everyday actions and beliefs when those
|
||
giving the explanations come from different cultures. Since what is
|
||
the best rational explanation depends, in part, on which set of
|
||
background beliefs and goals the explainers themselves accept, the
|
||
empirical method does not, in general, make it possible to reach
|
||
agreement.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is
|
||
widely recognized that the social sciences and humanities are not as
|
||
objective as the natural sciences. But that is not an indication of
|
||
any inherent weakness in the empirical method. It is, rather, an
|
||
indication of the difference between the forms of understanding that
|
||
are required for the explanations involved. Spatial imagination is
|
||
more uniform than rational imagination, and that makes it easier for
|
||
people to agree about which theory explains more with less. What the
|
||
relativism of the social sciences and humanities shows is not the
|
||
weakness of the empirical method, but the weakness of rational
|
||
explanation (at least, as long as we come from different cultures and
|
||
have different basic beliefs and values). </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>O<img src="" name="OdeMOce_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="85" height="49" border="0">ntological-cause
|
||
explanations.</b></i> The empirical method can also be used in
|
||
philosophy (and science) by inferring to the best ontological-cause
|
||
explanation of the world. The nature of ontological explanation has
|
||
already been explained: it explains the existence of everything found
|
||
in the world by showing how it is constituted by basic substances and
|
||
the basic relationship by which they exist together as a world. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
|
||
kind of explanation is intelligible to us because of our spatial
|
||
imagination (that is, the capacity to think coherently about spatial
|
||
relation and how they change as a result of motion). That is the same
|
||
capacity on which efficient-cause explanation depends. The difference
|
||
is that what is being explained by ontological explanations includes
|
||
the existence and basic traits of the objects found in the world,
|
||
such the fact that objects have spatial relations and that change is
|
||
possible, not just what happens to them. But an adequate ontology
|
||
must also be able to explain why (true) efficient-cause explanations
|
||
are true. The relationship between an efficient cause and its effect
|
||
is a kind of regular change, and an ontology must show how the
|
||
regularities described by the basic laws of physics can be just
|
||
aspects of basic substances enduring through time with the basic
|
||
relationship that makes them parts of the same world. That is how
|
||
ontological-cause explanations are more basic than efficient-cause
|
||
explanations -- they explain the premises of efficient-cause
|
||
explanations, both the laws of nature and the initial and/or boundary
|
||
conditions. . </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Ontological
|
||
explanations differ from one another in the kinds of basic substances
|
||
they postulate and what they assume about how substance exist
|
||
together as a world, and empirical ontology decides which is true by
|
||
which offers the best ontological explanation of the world, that is,
|
||
which explains the most with the least. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>S<img src="" name="OdeMOceScope_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="62" height="27" border="0">cope.</i>
|
||
It might seem that ontological theories are all alike in scope,
|
||
because they all claim to explain the possibility of everything found
|
||
in the world. The failure to account for any aspect might be said to
|
||
show that it is not an ontological explanation at all, must less an
|
||
adequate one. This is not quite true, however, for two reasons.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">First,
|
||
because there is a difference between <i>explaining </i>and merely
|
||
<i>assuming</i>. The causes by which an ontology explains the world
|
||
are the substances it postulates and the basic relationship it takes
|
||
them to have, and thus, to the extent that what is being explained
|
||
about the world is the same as what is assumed by the ontology, it is
|
||
not really explained, but merely assumed. To some extent, that may be
|
||
true of every possible ontology, but the best one will be, other
|
||
things being equal, the one in which more is explained and less is
|
||
merely assumed. That one has the greater scope.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
second reason is that, in an ontological explanation, there is a
|
||
difference between explaining the possibilities of aspects of the
|
||
world and explaining their necessity, and the more aspects of the
|
||
world that are shown to be necessary, the better the ontological
|
||
explanation. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">What an
|
||
ontology entails about the world holds necessarily. Though that
|
||
determines the range of what is possible, contingent aspects of the
|
||
world are left to be known though experience of what is actual. An
|
||
ontology does not itself explain why certain contingent conditions
|
||
are actual and others not; that requires an efficient-cause
|
||
explanations. However, since it must explain the <i>possibility </i>of
|
||
what is contingent, it may be said to "account for"
|
||
whatever falls within the range of the possible. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, the
|
||
minimum requirement of an ontological explanation is that it, at
|
||
least, "accounts for" everything in the world (in the sense
|
||
of showing that it is possible). And if anything is found in the
|
||
world that could not exist, if the ontology were true, then the
|
||
ontology must be false. But ontologies that are not falsified may
|
||
differ in the range of what they show to be necessary and what they
|
||
imply is merely contingent. The principle of explaining the most by
|
||
the least would require those committed to the empirical method to
|
||
prefer ontological explanations in which more about the world is
|
||
shown to be necessary and less turns out to be merely contingent.
|
||
Thus, there is another possible difference in scope among ontological
|
||
theories</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>S<img src="" name="OdeMOceSimp_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="66" height="27" border="0">implicity.</i>
|
||
The simplicity criterion requires us to prefer the explanation with
|
||
the simplest and fewest causes, other things being equal. In the case
|
||
of ontological causes, the explanation with the simplest and fewest
|
||
causes would be the one that postulates the simplest and fewest kinds
|
||
of basic substances and simplest basic relationship among them. Thus,
|
||
given two ontological explanations with the same scope, the empirical
|
||
method requires us to prefer the one that postulates the simpler
|
||
basic substances, the fewer kinds of basic substances, and the
|
||
simpler basic relationship among them.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Though
|
||
it is generally clear which theory has the fewer basic substances, it
|
||
may not be clear which kinds of basic substances and which basic
|
||
relationships are simpler. From what we have assumed about the
|
||
essential natures of basic substances and relationships, however,
|
||
there is one clear criterion. We have seen that the essential natures
|
||
of substances may be temporally simple or temporally complex,
|
||
depending on whether their essential properties exist fully at each
|
||
moment or they are dispositional and have to do with regularities
|
||
about how contingent properties change over time. And we have seen
|
||
that there are also such differences in the simplicity of the basic
|
||
relationship by which an ontology describes how they are parts of the
|
||
same world. Thus, given two ontological explanations with the same
|
||
scope and same number of kinds of basic substances, the empirical
|
||
method requires us to prefer the ontological explanation whose
|
||
substances have the simplest essential natures and the simplest basic
|
||
relationship to one another. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">When
|
||
all these criteria weigh in for the same alternative, the empirical
|
||
method is decisive. But trade-offs among them can keep the empirical
|
||
method from telling us which ontological theory to believe. That does
|
||
not necessarily mean, however, that limitations in the mechanical
|
||
application of these criteria can be used to argue that no choice can
|
||
be made among theories in which there are trade-offs. It may still be
|
||
obvious, when specific trade-offs are considered, which one explains
|
||
the most with the least. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>T<img src="" name="OdeMRatMetho_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="138" height="31" border="0"><img src="" name="Image6" align="right" width="202" height="20" border="0">he
|
||
rational method.</b></font> For epistemological philosophy, by
|
||
contrast, the method of choosing what to believe is not the empirical
|
||
method, but the rational method. This is not quite the same as an
|
||
inference to the best rational-causal explanation, because what
|
||
epistemological philosophy needs in order to be a kind of philosophy
|
||
is a foundation from which to prove necessary truths about the world.
|
||
What makes epistemological philosophy different from ontological
|
||
philosophy is that it uses as its foundation a theory about the
|
||
nature of reason rather than a theory about the nature of the
|
||
substances constituting the world. And the necessity of its
|
||
implications comes down to their certainty, given the certainty of
|
||
the epistemological foundation. Its reliance on a theory about how we
|
||
know about the world is what earns it the name "epistemological"
|
||
philosophy (epistemology being, literally, the explanation of
|
||
knowing). Moreover, such a foundation is secured by reflecting on how
|
||
we know. As we have seen, reflection is what enables us to give
|
||
rational-case explanations of the beliefs and behavior of other
|
||
beings like use. But epistemological philosophy uses reflection to
|
||
explain how reason works in general. That is, it uses reason's own
|
||
power to reflect on how it works to defend a theory about how reason
|
||
works, rather than merely to say which reasons are responsible for
|
||
particular conclusions about what to believe or do.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">Its
|
||
theory of how we know is supposed to show that certain truths must
|
||
hold of the world, and its success in using its foundation to prove
|
||
necessary truths about the world is called realism. Since it would
|
||
show that something exists beyond its epistemological foundation, it
|
||
typically leads to metaphysical dualism of one kind or another (as we
|
||
have seen in </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtdO17.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Ontology:
|
||
As realism</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">).
|
||
</span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">The
|
||
theories about the nature of reason used by epistemological
|
||
philosophy are all based in one way of another on a faculty of
|
||
intuition, which is taken for granted. (The reason for this reliance
|
||
on intuition is explained in </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCbGeRRS10C.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Evolutionary stage 10: The career of epistemological philosophy</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.)</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">There
|
||
is, however, so little agreement in the history of philosophy about
|
||
the nature of reason that the best way to explain the rational method
|
||
of epistemological philosophy is to survey the main kinds of theories
|
||
about the nature of reason that have developed in the history of
|
||
philosophy. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>A<img src="" name="OdeMAncient_up" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="8" width="26" height="158" border="0">ncient
|
||
Philosophy.</b></i> Plato assumed that we know by a kind of intuition
|
||
in which the objects of knowledge are present to the subject. In the
|
||
case of perception, they are visible objects in space which can move
|
||
and interact with other objects, and these he assumed were parts of
|
||
what he called the "realm of Becoming." We also have a
|
||
capacity to reason about things, in which we understand their
|
||
natures, and the objects that are present to us in this way of
|
||
knowing are what Plato called the Forms, which he believed exist in a
|
||
realm of Being outside space and time. His "doctrine of
|
||
recollection" is a myth that explained this rational intuition
|
||
as resulting from our immortal souls having existed in the presence
|
||
of the Forms prior to our acquiring bodies in the realm of visible
|
||
objects. Since the objects of rational intuition are the natures that
|
||
we recognize in visible objects, he thought that the Forms were
|
||
responsible for visible objects having whatever natures they seemed
|
||
to have. Thus, by intuiting the Forms directly, we could know truths
|
||
about them that are necessary relative to perception, that is, our
|
||
ordinary way of knowing. That included knowing what is good about
|
||
visible objects, since the Forms were supposed to follow from The
|
||
Good Itself and visible objects were supposed to be striving to be
|
||
like their Forms.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Aristotle
|
||
also understood perception and reason as forms of intuition that make
|
||
their objects present to us, though he explained them differently.
|
||
Perception was supposed to be the result of our sensitive soul taking
|
||
on the same kinds of sensible forms that exist in the particular
|
||
substances, and reason was supposed to be the result of our rational
|
||
souls taking on the essential forms of the objects as a result of
|
||
"induction" from our perceptual experience of many
|
||
instances of their kinds. Knowing the essential form of an object
|
||
gives us knowledge of what holds necessarily, because according to
|
||
Aristotle, there are final causes at work in nature that make natural
|
||
substances change in the direction of an end state which is the
|
||
fullest actualization of their essential form. Not only does that
|
||
explain certain changes that they undergo, but it also tells us what
|
||
is good for them. This knowledge, Aristotle argued, was prior to the
|
||
received, ordinary ways of knowing the true and the good.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>M<img src="" name="OdeMMed_up" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="8" width="26" height="158" border="0">edieval
|
||
philosophy.</b></i> Medieval philosophy is basically a continuation
|
||
of Platonic dualism, except that The Good Itself, or a Form, is
|
||
replaced by God, or a person. Thus, it retains the theory about the
|
||
nature of reason on which ancient epistemological philosophy was
|
||
based. If anything was new in the Medieval period, it was how the new
|
||
view about the nature of the transcendent being was used to argue for
|
||
its existence. And the main reason that these argument for the
|
||
existence of God were not compelling in the end is that they are
|
||
based on the assumption that principles recognized to be valid within
|
||
the natural world can be applied to the natural world as a whole. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
belief that every event has an efficient cause can be used, for
|
||
example, to show that there must be a first cause, when it is assumed
|
||
that the world as a whole is an event to be explained. Final
|
||
causation affords a similar proof of the existence of God. Given that
|
||
every natural change within space and time has a final cause, it
|
||
could be argued that there must be a final cause of the natural world
|
||
as a whole, as long as it was assumed that the world as a whole is a
|
||
kind of natural change and can be explained by the same principle.
|
||
The argument from design works in the same way. Given that artifacts
|
||
can change for the sake of an end that is good for them only because
|
||
they are designed to do so by their creator, the fact that nature
|
||
itself involves change for the sake of ends that are good could be
|
||
used to show that there is a creator who designed the natural world
|
||
to bring about such ends. Even the argument from the recognition of a
|
||
difference between better and worse to the existence of something
|
||
that is best can be used to show the existence of God when it is
|
||
assumed that the world as a whole is not the best. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
ontological argument was the most original use of the rational method
|
||
in the medieval period to prove the existence of God, and given our
|
||
assumptions about the nature of existence, we can see the fallacy
|
||
involved in it. As Anselm put it, since we can think of being "than
|
||
which none greater can be conceived," God exists. For if the
|
||
being we are thinking of did not exist, there would be a greater
|
||
being, namely, one with all the same perfections we were thinking of
|
||
plus existing. The premise of this argument is that absolute
|
||
perfection entails existence. But if existence and essence are the
|
||
two basic aspects of the nature of substance as substance, existence
|
||
is not entailed by perfection, for perfection characterizes a things
|
||
essential nature and that is a different aspect of any substance from
|
||
its existential nature. The perfect being would exist only if he is a
|
||
substance, and not just a conceivable essence. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This is not
|
||
quite Kant’s critique of the ontological argument, for he argued
|
||
that existence is not a property at all. On our theory about the
|
||
nature of substance, existence is a property, albeit a very basic
|
||
property — as basic as having an essence is. Having both properties
|
||
is what makes something a substance.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>M<img src="" name="OdeMMod_up" align="right" hspace="5" vspace="8" width="25" height="158" border="0">odern
|
||
philosophy.</b></i> Modern philosophers had a fundamentally different
|
||
theory about how we know, for they had given up naïve realism about
|
||
perception and recognized that the appearance of the natural world in
|
||
perception is part of the subject, which they understood as ideas in
|
||
an immaterial mind. That was also to give up the belief that reason
|
||
is a direct intuition of Forms existing independently of the mind.
|
||
But on reflection, they found certain ideas in the mind whose truth
|
||
they could not doubt, and such so-called clear and distinct ideas
|
||
were taken to be truths that hold necessarily. Descartes believed
|
||
that clear and distinct ideas enabled him to prove (by way of proving
|
||
the existence of God) that a natural world exists independently of
|
||
the mind and is the cause of our perceptions. He also believed that
|
||
this showed that the natural world has the essential nature of
|
||
extension, and thus, he claimed that philosophy provided knowledge
|
||
about the natural world that is necessary, relative to what is known
|
||
by perception. Since rational knowledge is prior to what is known by
|
||
experience, Descartes believed that he had justified the method of
|
||
modern science as a way of learning the details of natural
|
||
mechanisms. Other rationalists, such as Spinoza and Leibniz, argued
|
||
from similar theories about the nature of reason to necessary truths
|
||
about the natural world. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Kant
|
||
defended necessary truths about the natural world on a theory about
|
||
how we know that sees the mind as constituting in part what is known,
|
||
including the natural world investigated by science. Thus, Kant could
|
||
argue that the part of what is known that depends on the mind’s
|
||
contribution is <i>a priori</i> knowledge about the natural world,
|
||
holding universally and necessarily relative to what perception
|
||
discloses about what is actual in the world, or what he called
|
||
synthetic <i>a priori</i>. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Kant’s
|
||
theory of knowledge forced him to deny that we could know the real
|
||
nature of things in themselves, that is, what really exists
|
||
independently of mind, but Hegel adapted Kant’s theory of knowledge
|
||
in a way that enabled him to claim for philosophy the power to know
|
||
the real nature of the world. He assumed that that the object of
|
||
knowledge was entirely constituted by a mental substance through what
|
||
he called dialectical reason, and thus, by reflecting on the nature
|
||
of dialectical reason, Hegel also thought that it was possible to
|
||
show what holds necessarily about the world, relative to what is
|
||
known by science or other ordinary ways of knowing.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>C<img src="" name="OdeMContemp_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="25" height="158" border="0">ontemporary
|
||
philosophy.</b></i> Even contemporary analytic philosophy had a
|
||
rational method of knowing what is necessary about the world. They
|
||
assumed that as users of language, we know the meanings and reference
|
||
of the terms and sentences we use. Though we can use language to
|
||
describe what we observe in the world and, thereby, follow the
|
||
empirical method in science, they argued that there are certain
|
||
truths that hold necessarily about the world because they are
|
||
entailed by the meanings of the terms we use. Thus, analytic
|
||
philosophy had a rational method for justifying necessary truths,
|
||
though it was much less ambitious than earlier kinds of epistemology,
|
||
because what is necessary was limited to analytic truths. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
|
||
each era, there have also been skeptics about the rational method,
|
||
especially when they entailed kinds of ontological dualism, such as
|
||
form and matter and mind and body, in which it was hard to explain
|
||
how the two different kinds of substances could be related as parts
|
||
of the same world. The inability to answer those skeptics led to
|
||
doubts about the rational method itself and ultimately to the demise
|
||
of epistemological philosophy.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0; page-break-before: always">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><meta name="changedby" content="Amr Gharbeia"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><b>S<img src="" name="OdfSSM_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="190" height="41" border="0">patiomaterialism.</b></font></font>
|
||
Given these three assumptions of ontological philosophy, the final
|
||
step in securing its foundation for necessary truths is to use them
|
||
to decide what to believe about the basic nature of existence. As it
|
||
turns out, the empirical method is decisive. There is one ontology
|
||
that we must choose over the others, if we follow the empirical
|
||
method, and it is different from the currently accepted ontologies.
|
||
The two received views are both ontologies of science. They come from
|
||
realism about contemporary physics. One is materialism, the view that
|
||
matter is the only kind of substance constituting the world, whereas
|
||
the other maintains that an opposite kind of basic substance helps
|
||
matter constitute the world, namely, spacetime. But as we shall see,
|
||
naturalists who take ontology to be explanatory and follow the
|
||
empirical method in deciding what to believe ought to reject both in
|
||
favor of the view that the world is constituted by space and matter,
|
||
both existing as substances in time, or what I will call
|
||
"spatiomaterialism." </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">We
|
||
can see that spatiomaterialism is the best ontological explanation of
|
||
the natural world by considering the various possible theories on
|
||
each of the basic issues about what exists in the natural world:
|
||
time, space, and matter. In each case we will decide what to believe
|
||
by which theory offers the best ontological explanation of what is
|
||
found in the natural world -- the one that explains the most with the
|
||
least. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Our
|
||
conclusion will be, however, that we ought to accept these
|
||
ontological position <i>if they are otherwise possible.</i> There are
|
||
ways they may be falsified by certain unobvious phenomena which we
|
||
are not currently taking into account. I mean the observations used
|
||
as evidence for Einsteinian relativity, as well as the fact of
|
||
consciousness, the real difference between good and bad, and the
|
||
validity of the belief that there is something worthy of worship. We
|
||
will not be in a position to show how those phenomena can also be
|
||
explained until we take up the necessary truths of ontological
|
||
philosophy. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>T<img src="" name="OdfSTime_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="75" height="29" border="0">ime.</b></font>
|
||
We have already assumed that the world is in time by assuming that
|
||
substance as substance has a temporal aspect to its nature, but as we
|
||
have also seen, there is a further issue to be decided. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><b>P<img src="" name="OdfSTPosEx_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="89" height="49" border="0">ossible
|
||
explanations.</b></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">We
|
||
know from our experience of the world that objects are in time as
|
||
well as in space, but as we saw in </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtdO09.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Ontology:
|
||
Temporality </u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
there are two possible theories about the nature of time. We are
|
||
looking for an explanation of the world by substances, but we can
|
||
believe either that substances endure or that they perdure over time.
|
||
</span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>Endurance
|
||
theory of time.</b></i> To hold that substances endure through time
|
||
is to hold that they exist only at the present moment. Existence
|
||
itself is in time. The past and the future do not exist. This view is
|
||
sometimes called "presentism," but we are also assuming
|
||
that what exists are substances. Thus, since substances never come
|
||
into </font></font><img src="" name="OdfSEndure_up" align="left" hspace="10" width="25" height="146" border="0">
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">existence
|
||
nor ever go out of existence as time passes, the substances that
|
||
exist now did exist in the past and will exist in the future. In
|
||
other words, substances are identical across time. Each substance
|
||
that exists at one moment is identical to some substance that existed
|
||
or will exist at every other moment in the history of the world.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>P<img src="" name="OdfSPerdure_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="26" height="148" border="0">erdurance
|
||
theory of time.</b></i> To hold that substances perdure over time is
|
||
to hold that all the moments of their histories exist in the same
|
||
way. Time is just a relation that holds among those moments. The past
|
||
and the future exist in the same sense as the present, for "past’
|
||
and "future" are just ways of referring to other moments
|
||
relative to some moment <i>taken as </i>present. Though the
|
||
perdurance theory of the temporal existential nature of substances
|
||
can agree that substances never come into existence nor go out of
|
||
existence over time, what they mean is that substances are wholes
|
||
made up of parts, with each substance having a momentary part for
|
||
each moment in the history of the world. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>T<img src="" name="OdfSTBest_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="89" height="49" border="0">he
|
||
best ontological explanation of time.</b></font> Between these two
|
||
theories, the empirical method requires us to prefer the one that
|
||
explains more with less, that is, the one that uses fewer and simpler
|
||
ontological causes to explain more phenomena as effects. According to
|
||
each criterion, the endurance theory is clearly superior. Consider,
|
||
first, simplicity.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>Simplicity.</b></i>
|
||
The perdurance theory must postulate many more substances as
|
||
ontological causes than the endurance theory, because it holds that
|
||
every moment in the history of each permanent substance has a
|
||
distinct and equal existence. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
|
||
fact, each moment is like a substance, according to the perdurance
|
||
theory, for it is a distinct ontological cause that must be
|
||
postulated separately in order to explain the world ontologically.
|
||
But if such moments are substances, they are rather unusual
|
||
substances, because they lack the temporal aspect of the existential
|
||
aspect of the nature of substance as substance. (Though they are as
|
||
eternal as the world, they do not exist at every moment in the
|
||
history of the world, for they are only one moment in the history of
|
||
a permanent substance.) Still, they have particularity. Each moment
|
||
is a particular substance with an existence that is distinct from
|
||
every other substance (including all the other moments in the history
|
||
of the same permanent substance). Thus, each has both an existential
|
||
and essential aspect to its nature (its essential nature being
|
||
whatever properties hold of the permanent substance at the relevant
|
||
moment in its history). So let us grant that they are substances of a
|
||
kind. I will call them "momentary substances," since they
|
||
do not endure through time but exist non-temporally (if not
|
||
eternally) as one moment in the history of a permanent substance. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Since
|
||
every momentary substance must be postulated separately, the
|
||
perdurance theory requires many more ontological causes to explain
|
||
each permanent substance postulated by the ontology. Indeed, the
|
||
perdurance theory must postulate (indenumerably) infinitely many
|
||
momentary substances for each permanent substance, since time is
|
||
continuous (as evident in its infinite divisibility), and may well be
|
||
eternal (that is, infinite in extent). Judging simplicity by the
|
||
number of ontological causes required, therefore, the empirical
|
||
method requires us to prefer the endurance theory. The endurance
|
||
theory needs to postulate only one enduring substance to account for
|
||
each permanent substance in the world. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
|
||
may seem, however, that there is a defense for the simplicity of the
|
||
perdurance theory. Though its "momentary substances" are
|
||
greater in number, each is simpler in its nature than enduring
|
||
substances, and thus, its ontological causes are simpler. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">What
|
||
makes momentary substances seem simpler than enduring substances is
|
||
that momentary substances do not have to endure through time, but can
|
||
simply exist eternally as one moment in the history of a permanent
|
||
substance. But why is that simpler? </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Perhaps,
|
||
the simplicity comes from having a temporally simpler nature.
|
||
Momentary substances cannot have temporally complex properties,
|
||
because they are what exists at only one moment in the history of a
|
||
substance that never comes into existence nor goes out of existence.
|
||
But that does necessarily make them simpler than enduring substances,
|
||
for enduring substances can also have essential properties that exist
|
||
completely at each moment of the existence of the substance. On both
|
||
views, therefore, the essential properties of substances can exist
|
||
completely at each moment of the existence of the substance. Thus,
|
||
the only difference between them is that enduring substances exist at
|
||
many more moments than momentary substances. But that is just the
|
||
difference between them. To take that as showing the greater
|
||
simplicity of the perdurance theory would be to beg the question. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">On the
|
||
other hand, perhaps the greater simplicity is supposed to come from
|
||
its theory about the nature of existence. The endurance theory holds
|
||
that existence itself is in time, and since that means time is an
|
||
aspect of existence, a permanent substance must endure through time
|
||
in order to exist as a substance. Thus, it might be argued that the
|
||
perdurance theory is simpler, because it takes existence to be just
|
||
the self-subsistence of the momentary substances making up the
|
||
histories of permanent substances. Existence is non-temporal, rather
|
||
than being in time. And this greater simplicity about the perdurance
|
||
theory enables it to explain ontologically why permanent substances
|
||
exist at every moment in the history of the world: each permanent
|
||
substance is a whole made up of many momentary substances as its
|
||
parts. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">However,
|
||
that supposed ontological explanation brings out the cost of not
|
||
assuming that existence is in time. Not only must the perdurance
|
||
theory postulate infinitely many momentary substances to account for
|
||
each permanent substance, but it must also assume a basic
|
||
relationship that gives those momentary substances infinitely many
|
||
relations to one another. The events in the history of a permanent
|
||
substance occur in a certain order, and so the momentary substances
|
||
that must be related in a certain way in order to constitute it.
|
||
Though those relations may be simply how the momentary substances
|
||
exist together as a world, they must all be assumed in order to deny
|
||
presentism. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, not
|
||
only are momentary substances not simpler than enduring substances in
|
||
virtue of having temporally simple essential natures, but the
|
||
perdurance theory must also postulate infinitely many momentary
|
||
substances with infinitely many relations among them to account for
|
||
each permanent substances.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">As
|
||
far as simplicity is concerned, therefore, endurance theory is
|
||
clearly superior. It postulates one enduring substance to account for
|
||
each permanent substance, whereas the perdurance theory must
|
||
postulate infinitely many momentary substances with infinitely many
|
||
relations among them in order to explain each permanent substance.
|
||
But this ontological extravagance might be justified, if the
|
||
perdurance theory can explain why permanent substances are in time,
|
||
and so let us turn to the criterion of greater scope.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>Scope.</b></i>
|
||
The criterion of greater scope requires us to prefer the theory about
|
||
the nature of time that explains more to the one that explains less. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
|
||
may seem that the perdurance theory does have a greater scope,
|
||
because it explains at least one phenomenon ontologically that the
|
||
endurance theory simply assumes. It explains ontologically why
|
||
permanent substances are in time by showing how they are constituted
|
||
by momentary substances and relations among them. But this claim to
|
||
have an ontological explanation of substances being in time does not
|
||
stand up, for two reasons.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">First,
|
||
it is <i>ad hoc.</i> Nothing is explained by the assumption that
|
||
permanent substances are constituted by momentary substances and
|
||
relations among them except their being substances that exist at
|
||
every moment in the history of the world. To postulate infinitely
|
||
many ontological causes to explain a single aspect of the world is to
|
||
explain the least with the most, the opposite of the empirical
|
||
criterion. To be sure, the endurance theory does not explain this
|
||
aspect any better. But there is nothing to prefer over the assumption
|
||
that existence itself is in time. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Second,
|
||
there is an aspect of this phenomenon whose possibility the
|
||
perdurance cannot explain. That aspect is how the present moment is
|
||
different from all the other moments in the history of the world,
|
||
both past and future. It is something for which the endurance theory
|
||
can account. And the failure even to account for it (that is, the
|
||
failure to explain its possibility) means that the perdurance theory
|
||
is falsified by it. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Endurance
|
||
theory can account for the fact that one moment in the history of the
|
||
world stands out as different from all the others, because it holds
|
||
that only the present moment exists. The present is different from
|
||
the past and the future in the most basic way, as far as ontology is
|
||
concerned, because the present exists, while the past and future do
|
||
not. That is what it means to hold that existence itself is in time.
|
||
(This is not to explain the phenomenon of the present ontologically,
|
||
because it is simply what the endurance theory assumes about the
|
||
nature of existence. But the endurance theory does not have to deny
|
||
that present is different from the past and future.)</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
|
||
perdurance theory, on the other hand, cannot even account for the
|
||
fact that the present stands out as different from all the other
|
||
moments in the history of the world. It holds that all the moments in
|
||
the history of a permanent substance exist in exactly the same sense,
|
||
and so there is nothing ontological that can distinguish any one
|
||
moment from all the rest that help make up its history. To be sure,
|
||
the perdurance theory can say how any moment in the history of a
|
||
permanent substance that is taken as the present differs from those
|
||
that occur earlier and those that occur latter, for its momentary
|
||
substances are all related to one another in a certain order. But it
|
||
has no way to single out any moment in the history of a permanent
|
||
substance as "now." </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This
|
||
blindness to the present is implicit in what the perdurance theory
|
||
says about the nature of existence and time. Instead of taking time
|
||
to be an aspect of the nature of existence, it takes time to be part
|
||
of the structure of what exists, that is, a certain kind of
|
||
relationship that exists among its momentary substances. It sees time
|
||
as a dimension of what exists, much like spatial dimensions, and
|
||
thus, time contains different moments in the same way that space
|
||
contains different point, which means that all moment are contained
|
||
in the <i>same </i>way. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, far
|
||
from explaining why permanent substances are in time, the perdurance
|
||
theory cannot even explain the possibility of the most basic aspect
|
||
of it. Indeed, the phenomenon of the present being different from the
|
||
past and future would seem to show that the perdurance theory is
|
||
false. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">What
|
||
the perdurance theorists can do, however, is <i>explain away </i>the
|
||
phenomenon. That is, it can explain why we experience the present as
|
||
being different from all the other moments by holding that it is just
|
||
an appearance that holds for each and every moment in the history of
|
||
beings like us. We are rational beings, capable of reflection, and it
|
||
is by reflecting on our experience that we come to believe that the
|
||
present moment is different from the past and the future. But if the
|
||
perdurance theory is correct, each of us is just a set of momentary
|
||
substances that makes up a personal history. Thus, it is possible to
|
||
hold that the essential nature of every momentary substance
|
||
constituting a being like us includes the appearance that that moment
|
||
in one's history is the present and, thereby, different from all the
|
||
moments in the past that may be remembered and all the moments that
|
||
may be anticipated. That is, each moment in the life of a reflective
|
||
subject includes the subjective appearance that it is present, even
|
||
though it is just another momentary substance that exists
|
||
non-temporally. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">But
|
||
this is not to explain the present. It is to claim that our sense of
|
||
the present is an illusion. That is surely an alternative that we
|
||
want to avoid, if possible, for it is <i>ad hoc</i>. Anything found
|
||
in the world could be explained away the same way, that is, explained
|
||
as a mere appearance to the subject by holding that it is actually
|
||
part of his essential nature as a substance. If it is <i>possible </i>to
|
||
explain our sense of the present being different from the past and
|
||
the future in a way that makes it true, we must prefer the theory
|
||
that does so. Hence, the empirical method requires us to prefer the
|
||
endurance theory on the grounds that it explains more than the
|
||
perdurance theory.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote2anc" href="#sdendnote2sym"><sup>ii</sup></a></sup></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
|
||
point can be seen more clearly if we consider how the present being
|
||
different from the past and the future is something found in the
|
||
world by perception, not just by reflection on how it seems to us. We
|
||
perceive change in the natural world, and if we articulate the
|
||
beliefs implicit in such perceptions, we find that <i>what </i>we
|
||
believe is that certain properties go out of existence and other
|
||
properties come into existence as time passes. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Consider,
|
||
for example, a bus passing by us on the street. The property of
|
||
approaching us goes out of existence as the property of being in
|
||
front of us comes into existence, and then the property of being in
|
||
front of us goes out of existence as the property of moving away from
|
||
us comes into existence. That is how we perceive change in the
|
||
natural world, and it implies that the properties that the bus had in
|
||
the past do not exist any longer, and that the properties that it
|
||
will have in the future do not exist yet. That is what we mean by
|
||
their coming into existence and going out of existence as time
|
||
passes. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To be more
|
||
precise, reflecting on our observation, we find that the experience
|
||
involves past, present and future. At the moment we see the bus is in
|
||
front of us, we remember seeing it approach and anticipate its moving
|
||
away. Were the immediate past and future not part of our experience,
|
||
we could not observe that the bus is moving. But while the present is
|
||
seen as <i>existing</i>, the past and future are seen as <i>not
|
||
existing</i>, albeit for opposite reasons. The past event is seen as
|
||
not existing because it is over, while the future event is seen as
|
||
not existing because it has yet to happen. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">That
|
||
only the present exists may be only implicit in the observation. But
|
||
that does not mean that it is not part of </span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><i>what
|
||
</i></span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">we
|
||
observe, only that we have not formulated that aspect as a sentence.
|
||
The belief that the bus’s past and future do not exist now is as
|
||
much part of the observation of the bus’s motion as the belief that
|
||
that the bus is a distinct object in space is a part of the
|
||
observation of the bus itself. It is not surprising, therefore, that
|
||
this is called the ordinary view of the nature of time. It is what
|
||
the “man in the street” would say about the past and future if
|
||
asked about their existence (see, for example, </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Putnam67"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Putnam
|
||
</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">[1967],
|
||
p. 240).</span></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
perception of change as "real" in this sense discloses
|
||
something about the world that cannot be explained by the perdurance
|
||
theory, because it must deny that any properties come into existence
|
||
or go out of existence over time. The perdurance theory holds that
|
||
every moment in the history of every substance exists in exactly the
|
||
same sense, and so the properties that hold at earlier moments still
|
||
exist in the same sense as the present, and the properties that hold
|
||
at latter moments already exist in that sense. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Again, the
|
||
only way that the perdurance theory can account for this perceived
|
||
fact about the world is to deny that it is a fact and to hold that
|
||
what we think is perception of an independently existing world is
|
||
just an illusion. That is, its defenders can hold that each of the
|
||
momentary substances making up the histories of beings like us
|
||
involves, as part of its essential nature, the appearance that change
|
||
really takes place as time passes. That would mean that, relative to
|
||
any given moment, we perceive the past and future states of the world
|
||
as not existing, even though, in fact, they do. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">But this
|
||
is, once again, to <i>explain away </i>the phenomenon, not to explain
|
||
it ontologically. It could be used to explain anything found in the
|
||
world, and thus, it should only be invoked, if it is not possible to
|
||
explain phenomena as what really exists. The perdurance theory has no
|
||
alternative, because if change is real in this sense, it is false.
|
||
But <i>we </i>have an alternative, because the perception can be
|
||
accounted for by the endurance theory. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
perdurance theory does not, therefore, have greater scope than the
|
||
endurance theory. Its explanation is <i>ad hoc</i>, and what is
|
||
worse, it is falsified by the phenomenon that it claims it alone can
|
||
explain, unless we accept further <i>ad hoc</i> assumptions that make
|
||
the phenomenon illusory. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nor do any
|
||
of the arguments for the perdurance theory offered by defenders of
|
||
the so-called tenseless theory of time give us any reason to accept
|
||
it.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote3anc" href="#sdendnote3sym"><sup>iii</sup></a></sup></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
empirical method requires us, therefore, to prefer the endurance
|
||
theory over the perdurance theory. It is simpler in both relevant
|
||
ways (the fewest and simplest ontological causes), and it has a
|
||
larger scope (in the sense that it can, at least, account for our
|
||
sense of the present and our perception of change as really occurring
|
||
in time). It clearly explains more with less. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Nor
|
||
are the basic aspects of the world that only the endurance theory can
|
||
explain trivial. The ability to explain change by the endurance of
|
||
substances through time is the foundation for explaining regularities
|
||
about change ontologically. If ontological philosophy had to accept
|
||
the perdurance theory, it would not be able to show the ontological
|
||
necessity of the connection between cause and effect in efficient
|
||
cause explanations. Nor would it be able to demonstrate the
|
||
ontological necessity of global regularities, on which most of the
|
||
new ontologically necessary truths depend. Without the endurance
|
||
theory, ontological philosophy would not be a new way of doing
|
||
philosophy. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
|
||
does not necessarily mean that it is true. It is only to say that we
|
||
must prefer it, <i>if it is possible</i>, for it may turn out that
|
||
there are other things found in the world contradict the endurance
|
||
theory. That is what contemporary Einsteinian believe, as we shall
|
||
see when we take up spatiotemporalism, and thus, they will have to be
|
||
answered before we can be confident about the truth of the endurance
|
||
theory.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0; page-break-before: always">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>S<img src="" name="OdfSSpace_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="76" height="29" border="0">pace.</b></font>
|
||
Naturalists believe that the world is just what is in space and time,
|
||
and having seen that we should, if possible, believe that substances
|
||
endure through time, the next question is what we should believe
|
||
about the nature of space. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>P<img src="" name="OdfSSPosEx_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="89" height="49" border="0">ossible
|
||
explanations.</b></font> There are basically three alternatives:
|
||
spatiomaterialism (the belief that space and matter are both
|
||
substances), materialism (and the belief that space is just spatial
|
||
relations), and spacetime substantivalism (the belief that the
|
||
substance that exists in addition to matter is not space, but
|
||
spacetime). Though the following argument would have to be
|
||
reconsidered, of course, if a fourth alternative turns up that is
|
||
simpler than all of these, that does not seem likely. After
|
||
describing each of these alternatives, I will consider which offers
|
||
the best ontological explanation of the natural world.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>S<img src="" name="OdfSSPsm_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="25" height="236" border="0">patiomaterialism.</b></i>
|
||
By "spatiomaterialism," I mean the belief that the
|
||
substances constituting the world include space as well as matter. It
|
||
postulates matter, because it assumes that there are substances in
|
||
space that obey the basic laws of physics. But it also postulates
|
||
space as a substance. ("Substantivalism" is the traditional
|
||
name for the view that space is a substance, though as we shall see,
|
||
substantivalism about space should be distinguished from
|
||
substantivalism about spacetime, the kind of substantivalism that is
|
||
taken seriously today.) Finally, spatiomaterialism assumes that the
|
||
bits of matter are all contained by space in the sense that each of
|
||
them coincides with some part(s) of space or other. That is how these
|
||
two substances exist together as a world, and thus, it is the basic
|
||
relationship that spatiomaterialism assumes as the other part of
|
||
every ontological cause. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Spatiomaterialism
|
||
assumes that space is a substance by our definition, for it assumes
|
||
that each part of space has both the essential and the existential
|
||
aspects of the nature of substance as substance. The parts of space
|
||
are all the locations in a single, three dimensional space. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Each
|
||
part of space has both aspects of the existential nature of a
|
||
substance, temporality and particularity, because in addition to
|
||
never coming into existence and never going out of existence, each
|
||
location in space has an existence that is distinct from from all the
|
||
other locations in space (not to mention from any bits of matter that
|
||
may coincide with it). Though spatiomaterialism is compatible with
|
||
both theories about the nature of time, we shall take it to include
|
||
the endurance theory, for as we have just seen, the endurance theory
|
||
is the best ontological explanation of the temporal aspect of
|
||
substances. (Only the endurance theory is compatible with the present
|
||
being different from the past and the future, and the perdurance
|
||
theory even denies that change involves properties coming into
|
||
existence and going out of existence.) </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Though
|
||
parts of space have the same kind of existential nature as bits of
|
||
matter, parts of space have the opposite essential nature. Whereas
|
||
bits of matter exist independently of one another in the sense that
|
||
each could still exist, even if the other bits of matter did not
|
||
exist, parts of space depend on one another in the sense that no part
|
||
of space can exist without all the other parts of space. The
|
||
essential nature of each part of space includes having geometrically
|
||
coherent relations to every other part of space. That is, the
|
||
essential nature of each part of space is defined by its location
|
||
relative to all the other parts. Thus, parts of space exist only if
|
||
space exists as a whole. (Indeed, it is the wholeness of space and
|
||
what it contributes to the natural world that is the key to almost
|
||
all the new necessary truths based on spatiomaterialism.) </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In other
|
||
words, space has an opposite essential nature from matter because its
|
||
parts are not prior to the whole. Since each bit of matter is capable
|
||
of existing independently of all the other bits of matter in the
|
||
world, there is a sense in which the parts of matter are prior to the
|
||
totality. But that is not true of space, because no part of space can
|
||
exist without all the other parts of space. That does not mean,
|
||
however, that, in the case of space, the whole is prior to the parts,
|
||
because the whole of space cannot exist without all its parts. Space
|
||
is whole in a unique way, as we shall see, and one indication of its
|
||
uniqueness is the way that the parts of space and the whole are
|
||
equally basic. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Spatiomaterialism
|
||
assumes that space has a three dimensional Euclidean structure.
|
||
Though non-Euclidean geometries can be described coherently, they are
|
||
not as simple as Euclidean geometry. Euclidean geometry is assumed
|
||
here, because, as it turns out, there is no reason to doubt that the
|
||
simplest alternative is true. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">To
|
||
be sure Einstein's general theory of relativity implies that
|
||
spacetime can be curved and can, therefore, be represented only by a
|
||
non-Euclidean geometry. But what it implies is curved is not just
|
||
space, but spacetime, and as we shall see (in </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCaLbStr.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
General theory of relativity</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">),
|
||
curved spacetime can be explained as an aspect of space as a
|
||
substance with a Euclidean geometrical structure (basically by
|
||
variations across space in the velocity of light relative to space). </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
version of spatiomaterialism considered here will also assume that
|
||
space is infinite. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
infinity of space will be assumed, because that is the simplest
|
||
nature space can have. Even though the parts of space cannot exist
|
||
without one another, they are distinct substances, and the essential
|
||
nature of each particular spatial substance is necessarily unique in
|
||
the sense that it involves a unique relationship to every other
|
||
particular spatial substance. But the simplest assumption is that all
|
||
the parts of space have the same <i>kind </i>of essential nature,
|
||
that is, the same kind of relation to other parts of space as every
|
||
other part of space. However, if the parts of space all have the same
|
||
kind of essential nature, a Euclidean spatial substance must be
|
||
infinite as a whole. For if there were an end to space, no two parts
|
||
of space could have the same <i>kind </i>of essential nature. Each
|
||
part would have a different relation to the edge of space (if makes
|
||
sense at all to talk about an end to space). Thus, the simplest form
|
||
of spatiomaterialism would hold that space is infinite. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">To
|
||
be sure, most astronomers and astrophysicists currently assume that
|
||
space is finite, because its finitude is entailed by the use of the
|
||
general theory of relativity to represent the big bang and the
|
||
subsequent expansion of the universe. And it would be possible, if
|
||
necessary, to formulate a version of spatiomaterialism in which space
|
||
is finite. But it would be a more complex ontological cause than is
|
||
assumed here, for its parts would have to have systematically
|
||
different kinds of essential natures. And it may not turn out that
|
||
the big bang theory is true, as argued in </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCaLeCos.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Cosmology</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">.
|
||
</span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Notice,
|
||
however, that the infinity of space is twofold. There are finite
|
||
distances in space, for that is entailed by its having a geometrical
|
||
structure, and there are opposite way ways in which it is possible to
|
||
generate an infinite series. It is possible, in one way, to keep
|
||
doubling its size, step by step, forever in the same direction, and
|
||
it is also possible to keep dividing it in half, step by step, for
|
||
ever. The former means that space is infinite in extent, whereas the
|
||
latter means that space is continuous (or that parts of space are
|
||
connected continuously). Both kinds of infinity are assumed here as
|
||
simply part of the essential nature of space as a substance. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
|
||
continuousness of space means that the number of points on a finite
|
||
line is greater than the number of whole numbers, which is already
|
||
infinite. Thus, the points on a line are said to be nondenumerable.
|
||
(It can be shown, furthermore, that there are just as many points on
|
||
a finite line as there are points on a finite plane and as there are
|
||
points in a finite volume.) This can seem puzzling, if it is assumed
|
||
that lines are made up of points, because more than an infinite
|
||
number of points would be required to make up a line. This may be
|
||
problematic for mathematics, but not for ontological philosophy,
|
||
because we do not assume that space is made up by combining points at
|
||
all. What is essential about points in space is their distances (and
|
||
directions) from one another (or the metric of their geometrical
|
||
relations), not how many points there are in any finite distance. In
|
||
other words, space is not made up of points in the way that ordinary
|
||
material objects are made up of simpler bits of matter, that is, by
|
||
assembling them alongside one another; indeed, according to
|
||
spatiomaterialism, that way of putting bits of matter together as a
|
||
whole is something that is possible only because the bits of matter
|
||
all coincide with parts of space. Rather space is made up of points
|
||
in the sense that the points all have as their essential natures
|
||
determinate distances from one another in all three dimensions as
|
||
parts of a single whole space. Indeed, points can be picked out at
|
||
all only because the parts of space have such spatial relations to
|
||
one another. That is, once again, the wholeness of space. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Time
|
||
has a twofold infinite nature like space. Given any finite period of
|
||
time, it may be doubled forever or divided forever. Thus, not only
|
||
does time go on eternally, but it also flows continuously (that is,
|
||
the moments in time are continuous with one another). And that is
|
||
likewise simply the nature of time. (Two moments in time are related
|
||
by the amount of time that passes between them, not the number of
|
||
moments between them; the temporal metric is what makes it possible
|
||
to pick out moments in time.) The direction of time, however,
|
||
introduces an asymmetry that is not found in space, separating the
|
||
issue about whether time extends infinitely toward the past from the
|
||
issue about whether it extends infinitely toward the future. Though
|
||
the big bang theory denies the former, it leaves open the possibility
|
||
that the future may be infinite. We will, however, proceed on the
|
||
assumption that time is infinite in both directions, postponing
|
||
discussion of the big bang until </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCaLeCos.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Cosmology</u></span></font></font></a></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">T<img src="" name="Image7" align="right" hspace="5" width="149" height="22" border="0">he
|
||
belief that space is a substance may have been what the ancient
|
||
atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, meant by insisting that the
|
||
</span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><i>arche,</i></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">or
|
||
"first principle," includes two elements, both atoms </span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><i>and
|
||
the void</i></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.
|
||
In other words, the usual interpretation of atomism, mentioned in
|
||
</span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtdOAtomists.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Ontology</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
may be mistaken. What they meant by the void may not have been merely
|
||
a kind of stuff between atoms that is so subtle that, unlike other
|
||
atoms, atoms can move through it without resistance. They may have
|
||
meant that the void is something that exists not only in between
|
||
atoms, but also underlies each and every atom. This way of thinking
|
||
about the nature of space may have been obscured by the lack of any
|
||
better way than "the void" to refer to what they meant.
|
||
That is, arguably, one of interpreting the ancient atomists, which
|
||
would make them the discoverers of the view that is assumed here.</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Notice
|
||
that it is not inconsistent to hold that space is <i>contained by
|
||
space </i>or <i>exists in space</i>, though it holds for a different
|
||
reason from matter. It is not inconsistent, because the parts of
|
||
space are substances and each part of space is, indeed, is located in
|
||
space or is contained by space in the sense that it has a location
|
||
relative to all the other parts of space. Indeed, that is part of the
|
||
essential nature of each part of space. Bits of matter are also
|
||
contained by space or in space in the sense of having a location
|
||
relative to other bits of matter. But according to spatiomaterialism,
|
||
that is not part of the essential nature of matter. Nor is it simply
|
||
how bits of matter exist together as a world. It is, rather, a result
|
||
of each bit of matter coinciding with some part(s) of space. It is
|
||
space that gives bits of matter their spatial relations to one
|
||
another. Given that space and matter are both ontological causes, the
|
||
ontological cause of bits of matter all having spatial relations to
|
||
one another is the basic relationship by which the two opposite
|
||
substances exist together as a world. It is because the parts of
|
||
space are contained by space that the bits of matter coinciding with
|
||
any part are contained by space. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>Spatial
|
||
relationism.</b></i> B<img src="" name="OdfSSPsr_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="26" height="237" border="0">y
|
||
"spatial relationism," I mean the belief that matter is the
|
||
only kind of basic substance in the world and that space is nothing
|
||
but the relations that hold among bits of matter. Matter is assumed
|
||
to have the essential nature described by the basic laws of physics,
|
||
and spatial relations can be explained in one way or another as how
|
||
bits of matter exist together as a world. And we will take spatial
|
||
relationism to include the endurance theory of time (as we did
|
||
spatiomaterialism), since that is the best explanation and spatial
|
||
relationism is compatible with it. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Spatial
|
||
relationism is basically a negative thesis. It is the denial that
|
||
space is a substance distinct from the material substances in the
|
||
world. It denies that space exists independently of matter by holding
|
||
that spatial relations have the same status as properties of matter. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
|
||
is not necessary to postulate any substances in addition to matter in
|
||
order to account for spatial relations, any more than it is necessary
|
||
to postulate additional substances to account for the properties of
|
||
material substance. They can be understood as nothing but aspects of
|
||
the material substances postulated. Just as (monadic) properties are
|
||
aspects of the substances themselves taken separately, the relations
|
||
among them are aspects of their existence together as a world. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">There
|
||
are subtly different versions of spatial relationism, as mentioned in
|
||
</span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtdO12.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Ontology:
|
||
Nature of relations</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
depending on this ontology explains the possibility change in spatial
|
||
relations. How the substances postulated exist together as a world is
|
||
the most basic relationship that an ontology must assume in addition
|
||
to the substances to explain how they exist together as a world. That
|
||
basic relationship determines how substances can be combined and
|
||
recombined as time passes in order to explain ontologically the
|
||
diversity and change in nature. Thus, if spatial relations are
|
||
nothing but how material substances exist together as a world, their
|
||
basic relationship involves change. That is possible, because the
|
||
basic relationship among the material substances can be simply having
|
||
spatial relations of some kind or other, not having any particular
|
||
spatial relations. That basic relationship does not change even when
|
||
the particular spatial relations among material substances are
|
||
changing. But since particular spatial relations do change, there
|
||
must be some way to explain the possibility of such change. (And
|
||
since spatial relations change in regular ways, it must also be able
|
||
to account for those regularities.) </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
|
||
is possible to hold, on the one hand, that the basic relationship by
|
||
which material objects exist together as a world has a temporally
|
||
complex nature. "Having spatial relations" would be defined
|
||
by describing the regularities in how the spatial relations between
|
||
material objects change, for example, that they change only
|
||
continuously over time, that is, by motion. (Material objects do not
|
||
flit about discontinuously form one place to another.) This would be
|
||
to define the essential nature of the basic relationship among
|
||
material substances dispositionally, much as the essential natures of
|
||
material substances are defined dispositionally when they are assumed
|
||
to obey the basic laws of physics, that is, in terms of the
|
||
regularities in how they move and interact. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">On
|
||
the other hand, it may be possible to hold that the basic
|
||
relationship is temporally simple. "Having spatial relations"
|
||
would be understood merely as a kind of condition that holds among
|
||
material objects at each moment as it is present, and the change that
|
||
occurs in spatial relations would be a result of the essential
|
||
natures of the material substances. That is, the essential natures of
|
||
the material substances would be temporally complex, as when they are
|
||
defined in terms of the basic laws of physics, and the ways in which
|
||
spatial relations change over time would simply be a consequence of
|
||
how the basic laws of physics work out. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">There are
|
||
problems with this view, however. One is that the laws of
|
||
contemporary physics include quantum mechanics, and since they do not
|
||
describe a fully deterministic process, spatial relations cannot be
|
||
fully determined by the basic laws of physics (unless there is a
|
||
so-called hidden variable involved). </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">But even if
|
||
the laws of physics were deterministic, there is another problem, for
|
||
the laws of physics can determine the spatial relations that hold of
|
||
bits of matter at any one moment only if their spatial relations at
|
||
some other moment is given. Since the past determines the future, the
|
||
particular spatial relations may have to be fixed for some earlier
|
||
point in the history of the universe, presumably at the beginning of
|
||
the world, such as the Big Bang or when God created it. In any case,
|
||
the basic relationship would not be temporally simple after all, for
|
||
having spatial relations would not be a condition that holds only at
|
||
the present moment, but must include all the particular spatial
|
||
relations that hold at some other moment in the history of the world.
|
||
</font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
|
||
either case, however, spatial relationism holds that space is nothing
|
||
but spatial relations, where those relations are, ontologically, just
|
||
the basic relationship by which material objects exist together as a
|
||
world, that is, ultimately, an aspect of the material substances
|
||
themselves.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">L<img src="" name="Image8" align="right" hspace="5" width="149" height="22" border="0">eibniz
|
||
denied that space is a substance. (And he debated the issue with the
|
||
Newtonian, Samuel Clarke. See </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Earman1"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Earman</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.)
|
||
But spatial relationism as defined here should be distinguished from
|
||
the kind of spatial relationism entailed by Leibniz's ontology.
|
||
Leibniz did not take spatial relations to be how the basic substances
|
||
exist together as a natural world. The substances Leibniz postulated
|
||
to explain the natural world were monads, or minds of various kinds,
|
||
and he explained spatial relations as how monads </span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><i>appear
|
||
</i></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">to
|
||
one another, that is, as ideas in those minds. The way that monads
|
||
existed together as a natural world was by each being created by God,
|
||
though Leibniz did hold that the appearances of spatial relations in
|
||
all the different monads fit together coherently as a natural world. </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">In
|
||
any case, defenders of Newton were never able to refute spatial
|
||
spatial relationism, because they assumed that the only way to prove
|
||
that space is a substance is by empirical science, that is, by
|
||
confirming some crucial prediction. Even Newton's theory did not
|
||
provide any way to measure absolute rest or motion, and all the same
|
||
phenomena (including the famous rotating bucket; see </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Earman2"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Earman</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
pp. 61-90) could also be explained on the assumption that space is
|
||
nothing but spatial relations among material substances (by taking
|
||
into account spatial relations to distant stars).</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">According
|
||
to </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Ryansiewicz"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Ryansiewicz</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
the classical debate between spatial relationism and substantivalism
|
||
about space is no longer meaningful in the context of contemporary
|
||
physics. But that position is compellingly refuted by </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Hoefer98"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Hoefer98</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>S<img src="" name="OdfSSPst_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="25" height="236" border="0">patiotemporalism.</b></i>
|
||
Spatiotemporalism agrees with spatiomaterialism that the spatial
|
||
relations among bits of matter depend on another substance, in
|
||
addition to matter. What makes it different from spatiomaterialism is
|
||
that it takes that substance to be spacetime, rather than space. In
|
||
fact, that makes it fundamentally different from both other theories.
|
||
Spatial relationism (or materialism) and spatiomaterialism can both
|
||
accept the endurance theory of time (and both do, as we they have
|
||
been defined here). But the belief in spacetime as an ontological
|
||
explanation of the world entails the perdurance theory of time. That
|
||
is what it means, when speaking ontologically, to deny that space and
|
||
time are absolute. Though this view is usually called
|
||
"substantivalism about spacetime," I will call it
|
||
"spatiotemporalism" in order to bring out the contrast with
|
||
spatiomaterialism and spatial relationism. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">This
|
||
preference for spatiotemporalism over spatiomaterialism is justified
|
||
by Einstein’s relativity theories. Minkowski introduced the notion
|
||
of spacetime in 1908 as a way of summing up what Einstein’s 1905
|
||
special theory of relativity implied about the world, and he
|
||
predicted that it was the beginning of the recognition that space and
|
||
time are not independent of one another. Einstein then took spacetime
|
||
as basic in constructing his general theory of relativity, that is,
|
||
in his explanation of gravitation as a result of a curvature imposed
|
||
on spacetime by large accumulations of matter in it. And since
|
||
spacetime must be a substance in order for it to interact with matter
|
||
in that way, it is now common for philosophers of spacetime to hold
|
||
that spacetime is the opposite kind of substance that exists in
|
||
addition to matter and explains why bits of matter have spatial
|
||
relations. (See </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Friedman"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Friedman</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">and
|
||
</span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Earman"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Earman</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
for example.)</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The basic
|
||
nature of spacetime is determined by Einstein's special theory of
|
||
relativity. Einstein called it a theory of "relativity,"
|
||
because it holds that the places and times at which events occur
|
||
depend on the inertial frame of reference from which they are
|
||
observed. Different inertial frames have different velocities, and
|
||
according to Einstein's special theory, they assign different spatial
|
||
and temporal coordinates to events in the universe. For example,
|
||
observers on two different inertial frames that happen to be located
|
||
at the same point at the same time will have different views about
|
||
which events in the histories of distant objects are occurring at the
|
||
same time their paths cross. Einstein's special theory holds that
|
||
their views are equally true, and that implies that the distant
|
||
objects actually exist now at both moments in their histories. (With
|
||
additional inertial observers, this means that the distant objects
|
||
must exist equally at <i>all </i>the moments in their histories that
|
||
can be said to be simultaneous with different inertial observers here
|
||
and now). This loss of agreement about the simultaneity of events at
|
||
a distance might seem to be just a theoretical problem about the
|
||
nature of objects at a distance, but since Einstein's special theory
|
||
holds that all possible inertial frames are equivalent, it has the
|
||
same implications for inertial observers here and now. That is,
|
||
observers on different inertial frames observing us from a distance
|
||
would similarly disagree about which moment in <i>our </i>history is
|
||
simultaneous with their present moment, and thus, in order for all
|
||
their views to be true, <i>we must actually exist equally at
|
||
different moments in our history</i>, indeed, equally at all of them.
|
||
This is to deny presentism, because it forces us to believe that our
|
||
past and our future exist in the same way as the present. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is the
|
||
loss of agreement about simultaneity at a distance that makes the
|
||
belief in spacetime so problematic. To be sure, no problems arise for
|
||
physics, because it is always possible to predict from one inertial
|
||
frame what observers on all the others will say. But when spacetime
|
||
is understood ontologically, that is, as describing the basic nature
|
||
of space and time, the denial of simultaneity at a distance entails
|
||
the perdurance theory of time. What really exists are not substances
|
||
with spatial relations enduring through time, but a kind of eternal,
|
||
unchanging four-dimensional world whose parts are spread out not only
|
||
in the spatial dimension, but also in the temporal dimension. Since
|
||
the world is constituted by all its parts, different moments in the
|
||
history of each permanent substance are different parts of the world
|
||
in exactly the same sense that different permanent substances
|
||
(including different locations in space) are different parts of the
|
||
world. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
substantival nature of spacetime is entailed, at least for scientific
|
||
realists, by the interaction between its curvature and matter that
|
||
explains gravitation according to Einstein's general theory of
|
||
relativity. Spacetime could not be what causes material objects to
|
||
exhibit gravitational acceleration unless it were something that
|
||
exists in addition to those material objects. This ontological
|
||
interpretation of spacetime, or substantivalism about spacetime, is
|
||
what I mean by "spatiotemporalism." It holds that time is
|
||
ontologically on a par with space (by contrast to spatiomaterialism,
|
||
which holds that matter is ontologically on a par with space). That
|
||
is the perdurance theory of time. To hold that time is just another
|
||
dimension relating parts of substances geometrically is to hold that
|
||
just as different places in space all exist in the same way, so
|
||
different moments in time all exist in the same way. This implies
|
||
that ordinary, permanent substances (that is, substances with a
|
||
temporal aspect to their existential aspect as substances) do not
|
||
endure through time, but perdure over time.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>T<img src="" name="OdfSSBest_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="89" height="50" border="0">he
|
||
best ontological explanation of space.</b></font> If we follow the
|
||
empirical method, we will believe the theory about the nature of
|
||
space that provides the best ontological explanation of the natural
|
||
world. That is clearly spatiomaterialism, if it is possible (in
|
||
particular, not falsified by the any phenomena covered by
|
||
contemporary physics), because it is better than spatial relationism
|
||
and better than spatiotemporalism. And since, as I will show, physics
|
||
does not make it impossible, naturalists who follow the empirical
|
||
method in deciding which ontology to believe will accept
|
||
spatiomaterialism.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>S<img src="" name="OdfSSBSmOSr_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="25" height="236" border="0">patiomaterialism
|
||
is better than spatial relationism.</b></i></font></font> <font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
|
||
may seem at first that spatial relationism is a better explanation of
|
||
space than spatiomaterialism, because it postulates only one kind of
|
||
basic substance, rather than two. Spatial relationism is basically
|
||
just a kind of materialism that has made its beliefs about space
|
||
explicit, whereas spatiomaterialism holds that space is a substance
|
||
existing independently of matter which contains all the bits of
|
||
matter in the world. On grounds of simplicity, therefore, it might
|
||
seem that we should prefer spatial relationism to spatiomaterialism.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Simplicity
|
||
is not, however, the only empirical grounds for preferring one theory
|
||
over another. There is also the criterion of scope, and by it,
|
||
spatiomaterialism is clearly superior. Thus, if spatial relationism
|
||
were simpler than spatiomaterialism, there would be a trade-off
|
||
between them which keeps the empirical method from choosing between
|
||
them. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">But
|
||
that standoff is not the final word, because when we look closer at
|
||
the criterion of simplicity, we will find that spatiomaterialism is
|
||
at least as simple as spatial relationism, if not simpler. Simplicity
|
||
is not a simple criterion, for there are two ways in which
|
||
ontological explanations can be simpler (not only by the number of
|
||
ontological causes, but also their natures), and by one of them,
|
||
spatiomaterialism is clearly simpler than spatial relationism. There
|
||
is, therefore, a standoff on grounds of simplicity, and that makes
|
||
the criterion of greater scope decisive. Empirical ontologists should
|
||
prefer spatiomaterialism. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">But
|
||
a decision in favor of spatiomaterialism is even more clear-cut than
|
||
this may make it seem, for the way in which spatiomaterialism is
|
||
simpler also reveals another way in which it has a greater scope. In
|
||
the end, there is no doubt that spatiomaterialism explains more with
|
||
less. The empirical method will require ontologists, therefore, to
|
||
prefer spatiomaterialism over spatial relationism. Let us begin by
|
||
considering the issue about the scope of explanation.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Scope.</i>
|
||
Spatiomaterialism explains more about the natural world than spatial
|
||
relationism, because it <i>explains </i>why bits of matter have
|
||
spatial relations, whereas spatial relationism merely <i>assumes </i>that
|
||
they do. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Space
|
||
is a substance with an opposite essential nature from matter, and so
|
||
if it contains all the bits of matter in the sense that each bit of
|
||
matter coincides with some part of space or other, the bits of matter
|
||
acquire their spatial relations from the spatial relations that
|
||
already hold among the parts of space with which they coincide. That
|
||
is, space and matter work together as ontological causes to produce
|
||
spatial relations. Having spatial relations is not just an
|
||
ontological assumption about bits of matter, since three different
|
||
ontological assumptions are needed to explain it. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">By
|
||
contrast, spatial relationism does simply assume that bits of matter
|
||
have spatial relations. To be sure, materialism can "account
|
||
for" spatial relations; the fact that bits of matter have
|
||
spatial relations does not show that materialism is false (as
|
||
presentism and the fact of real change falsify the perdurance theory
|
||
of time). But that is not to <i>explain </i>why bits of matter have
|
||
spatial relations. Thus, since we are seeking the best explanation,
|
||
we must prefer the theory which explains more.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Materialists
|
||
may demur by insisting that postulating space to explain spatial
|
||
relations is <i>ad hoc </i>and, thus, not an explanation at all.
|
||
Though it may appear to be an explanation, they will hold that
|
||
substantivalism about space is equivalent to assuming that bits of
|
||
matter have spatial relations. Indeed, it is the same assumption that
|
||
spatial relationists make, except for being disguised as a substance.
|
||
Substantivalism about space merely reifies spatial relations.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
|
||
objection will not stand, however, because spatial relations are not
|
||
all that substantivalism about space explains ontologically. It also
|
||
explains, together with matter, the possibility of change (as well as
|
||
certain ontologically necessary truths about how bits of matter
|
||
change, as we shall see later). </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">The
|
||
assumption that all the bits of matter are contained by space as a
|
||
substance implies only that each bit of matter coincides with </span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><i>some
|
||
part of space or other.</i></span></font></font><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">But
|
||
that leaves open which place it is. Moreover, parts of space are
|
||
connected with one another continuously, so that there are no gaps,
|
||
so to speak. That is just the essential nature that spatiomaterialism
|
||
takes space to have. Thus, as space and matter endure through time,
|
||
it is possible for spatial relations among bits of matter to change,
|
||
because bits of matter can move across space over time without giving
|
||
up any of spatiomaterialism's assumptions. The continuousness of time
|
||
works together with the continuousness of space to make motion
|
||
possible. Neither space nor matter changes their essential natures,
|
||
and the bits of matter are always contained by space, always deriving
|
||
their spatial relations from space. (This way of explaining motion
|
||
ontologically also implies that motion is the only way that bits of
|
||
matter can change their spatial relations as time passes. See in
|
||
</span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US">Local
|
||
Regularities</span></font></font><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">under
|
||
</span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCaL.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change.</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">)
|
||
</span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Since
|
||
substantivalism about space explains something more than just why
|
||
bits of matter have spatial relations, it is not <i>ad hoc</i>, but
|
||
genuinely explanatory. Spatial relations are only one of several
|
||
basic phenomena explained by spatiomaterialism. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This is to
|
||
explain the possibility of change by motion, but it is also possible
|
||
for spatiomaterialism to explain the possibility of change in another
|
||
way: by interaction. That is how motion changes, as we shall see.
|
||
Being in space, bits of matter can move to the same location, and
|
||
when they do, they are in a position to act on one another, because
|
||
they not separated from one another by space. (The impossibility of
|
||
action at a distance -- that is, with spatial substances separating
|
||
the bits of matter -- is also shown in <font face="Arial, sans-serif">Local
|
||
Regularities </font>under <font face="Arial, sans-serif">Change</font>.)</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, since
|
||
spatiomaterialism can explain the possibility of both motion and
|
||
interaction, that is, both kinds of change described by the laws of
|
||
physics, its explanation of spatial relations is not <i>ad hoc</i>.
|
||
In other words, the greater scope of spatiomaterialism is shown by
|
||
its ontological explanation of at least three basic facts about the
|
||
natural world that are just assumptions of spatial relationism --
|
||
that bits of matter have spatial relations, that they can change by
|
||
motion, and that their motion (and other properties) can change by
|
||
interaction. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">T<img src="" name="Image9" align="right" width="149" height="22" border="0">his
|
||
may not be an original argument for substantivalism about space. The
|
||
way in which space makes motion and interaction possible may have
|
||
been what Leucippus and Democritus were getting at when they insisted
|
||
on postulating the void as an element along with the atoms, though
|
||
that is still a controversial interpretation of ancient atomism.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Simplicity.</i>
|
||
Since empirically minded ontologists must prefer ontologies that
|
||
explain more, they have a good reason to prefer spatiomaterialism
|
||
over spatial relationism. But materialists might hope for a standoff
|
||
between these two ontologies at this point. The empirical method
|
||
might fail to choose between them. Although the criterion of greater
|
||
scope favors spatiomaterialism, the criterion of simplicity may favor
|
||
spatial relationism, because spatial relationism postulates only one
|
||
kind of basic substance, not two. Simplicity is not, however, a
|
||
simple criterion, and when we consider both ways in which
|
||
explanations can be simple, we will see that there is also a way in
|
||
which spatiomaterialism is simpler than spatial relationism. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Such
|
||
a standoff on grounds of simplicity would force ontologists to prefer
|
||
spatiomaterialism, because they are equal except for the greater
|
||
scope of the latter. But the empirical method is even more decisive
|
||
than this suggests, because the way in which spatiomaterialism is
|
||
simpler is another way in which spatiomaterialism explains more than
|
||
spatial relationism. Thus, it will be clear in the end that, even
|
||
though spatiomaterialism postulates two basic substances, rather than
|
||
one, it explains more with less. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
reason that materialism is not necessarily simpler than
|
||
spatiomaterialism is that simplicity is judged not only by the number
|
||
of basic ontological causes, but also by the simplicity of their
|
||
natures. That is, materialism may not be simpler than
|
||
spatiomaterialism, even though it postulates only one kind of basic
|
||
substance, because it may require either matter or the basic
|
||
relationship among them to have a more complex essential nature than
|
||
spatiomaterialism. This is how it will turn out, and in order to see
|
||
why, let us look more closely at the basic relationship assumed by
|
||
materialist ontology. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
basic relationship among bits of matter, according to spatial
|
||
relationism, is that bits of matter all have spatial relations with
|
||
one another. But we are assuming that they are all geometrically
|
||
coherent, that is, that their spatial relations all fit together as
|
||
parts of a three dimensional world. That assumption about their basic
|
||
relationship can be understood in two different ways, and together
|
||
they pose a dilemma for spatial relationism, for both have
|
||
consequences that make spatial relationism more complex than
|
||
spatiomaterialism.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">"Having
|
||
coherent spatial relations" may be taken as an aspect of the
|
||
spatial relations that all the particular bits of matter have <i>at
|
||
the present moment</i>, or it may be taken as an aspect of their
|
||
particular spatial relations <i>at every moment </i>in the history of
|
||
the world. In the first case, materialism must explain why bits of
|
||
matter have coherent spatial relations at every moment, and the only
|
||
way of doing so undermines the way that physical explanations are
|
||
ordinarily understood. In the second case, the basic relationship of
|
||
materialism must have a temporally complex nature, for its essential
|
||
nature must include a fact about the world that spatiomaterialism
|
||
explains by ontological causes that are temporally simple. Let us
|
||
consider each horn of this dilemma in turn. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Notice, by
|
||
the way, that in both ontologies, the basic relationship is not the
|
||
particular spatial relations that bits of matter actually have, but
|
||
an aspect of those particular spatial relations. For materialism, it
|
||
is the geometrical coherence of those spatial relations, whereas for
|
||
spatiomaterialism, it is that those spatial relations come from bits
|
||
of matter coinciding with parts of space. The <i>particular </i>spatial
|
||
relations that bits of matter actually have are taken by both
|
||
theories to be something that can be known only by experience of the
|
||
world.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Temporally
|
||
simple basic relationship.</i> The basic relationship assumed by
|
||
spatiomaterialism is temporally simple. It assumes that the way that
|
||
space and matter exist together as a world right now is by each bit
|
||
of matter coinciding with some part of space or other, and that is
|
||
temporally simple, for its two basic substances can have that
|
||
relationship completely at one moment in the existence of the world.
|
||
And this assumption needs to be made only about the present moment,
|
||
because if all the bits of matter are contained by space at the
|
||
present moment, then the fact that substances endure through time,
|
||
never coming into existence and never going out of existence as time
|
||
passes, entails that they have the basic relationship at every other
|
||
moment. There is no way for a bit of matter to escape from space
|
||
altogether, for it exists now as part of the same world by coinciding
|
||
with some part of space or other and space endures through time along
|
||
with matter. For the same reason, it could not get into space, if the
|
||
bit of matter did not already coincide with some part of space or
|
||
other. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
basic relationship assumed by spatial relationism can also be
|
||
temporally simple. It is the assumption that bits of matter have
|
||
coherent spatial relations, and that relationship can hold completely
|
||
at any moment in the history of the world. But unlike
|
||
spatiomaterialism, if that basic relationship is assumed to hold at
|
||
the present moment, it does not necessarily hold at all other moments
|
||
in the history of the world. It is conceivable that bits of matter
|
||
would move and interact in ways that would give them spatial
|
||
relations that are not geometrically coherent. (Similarly, it is
|
||
conceivable that the present spatial relations are a result of the
|
||
motion and interaction of bits of matter from earlier states in which
|
||
their spatial relations were geometrically incoherent.) </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is
|
||
conceivable, for example, that when matter of a certain kind is given
|
||
the shape of a cave, the cave from inside is larger than the cave
|
||
from the outside. That is, when measuring rods are taken inside the
|
||
cave and used to measure how large the cave is, the internal
|
||
distances measured turn out to be greater than the size of the cave
|
||
when it is measured from the outside. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It might be
|
||
argued that such spatial relations are not geometrically incoherent,
|
||
but merely show a curvature about space. They are only incoherent
|
||
according to Euclidean geometry. But postulating non-Euclidean
|
||
geometry will not always preserve geometrical coherence. For example,
|
||
suppose that when matter of a certain kind was shaped into a cave and
|
||
extended into a tunnel, another entrance cut in the distant wall of
|
||
the cave would open up in some far distant location in three
|
||
dimensional space. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Topology
|
||
explores many such possible connections among regions of spatial
|
||
relations, and we need only think of them as being the effect of
|
||
shaping matter in certain ways in order to conceive how the motion
|
||
and interaction of bits of matter could lead to their having
|
||
incoherent spatial relations. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
|
||
fact, spatial relations do not become geometrically incoherent in
|
||
such ways, and so having geometrically coherent spatial relations at
|
||
every moment is a basic aspect of the world than an ontology needs to
|
||
explain. Now, spatial relationists may insist that they can explain
|
||
this aspect of the world by the essential nature of matter. They
|
||
assume that the essential nature of matter is defined by the basic
|
||
laws of physics, and so they can argue that, if spatial relations are
|
||
geometrically coherent at the present moment, they will be
|
||
geometrically coherent at all moments in the future (and in the
|
||
past), because those future (and past) spatial relations are
|
||
determined by those bits of matter moving and interacting according
|
||
to the basic laws of physics. Their geometrical coherence is, in
|
||
other words, a consequence of the nature of matter. The reason that
|
||
spatial relations will be geometrically coherent at other times, if
|
||
they are geometrically coherent now, is that it is <i>physically
|
||
</i>necessary. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This
|
||
possibility is suggested by the structure of explanations in physics.
|
||
As explicated by the deductive-nomological model, the basic laws of
|
||
physics together with initial and boundary conditions make it
|
||
possible to predict (or retrodict) any future (or past) state. Thus,
|
||
if we take momentum to be a property of the bits of matter, the
|
||
particular spatial relations among bits of matter at any one moment
|
||
will determine their spatial relations at any other moment. Hence,
|
||
they will be coherent at every moment, if spatial relations are
|
||
coherent now.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Notice that
|
||
this way of explaining why spatial relations are geometrically
|
||
coherent depends on complete determinism, such as was assumed in
|
||
Newtonian physics. (It was Laplace who first argued that the laws of
|
||
Newtonian physics made this possible.) It is not, however, compatible
|
||
with quantum mechanics, if Heisenberg's principle is taken to
|
||
represent an indeterminism about what happens in the world as bits of
|
||
matter move and interact, for such indeterminism would leave plenty
|
||
of room for bits of matter to acquire incoherent spatial relations.
|
||
It is, of course, possible that Heisenberg's principle represents
|
||
merely an inevitable incompleteness about physical theory. There
|
||
could be a hidden variable that makes physical processes
|
||
deterministic, though it cannot be measured. But most naturalists
|
||
would be surprised to find that they are committed ontologically to
|
||
such an interpretation of quantum mechanics by their acceptance of
|
||
materialism (that is, reducing space to spatial relations). </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Even
|
||
if physical laws are deterministic enough to explain why bits of
|
||
matter always have coherent spatial relations, there is an
|
||
intolerable cost to be paid in our understanding of how physical
|
||
processes take place. Physicists ordinarily think of what happens in
|
||
nature as a result of how bits of matter move and interact <i>in
|
||
space</i>, where their spatial relations are one factor that combines
|
||
with their motion and the forces they exert as a different kind of
|
||
factor to determine what happens to them. But that is not possible,
|
||
if the regularities described by laws of physics are what make
|
||
spatial relations coherent in the first place, for then there is no
|
||
way to explain how spatial relations work together with motion and
|
||
forces as different kinds of efficient causes. Both kinds of factors
|
||
are simply contingent aspects of bits of matter, and ontologically,
|
||
they have the same status. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">When
|
||
material objects exert forces on one another, for example, when a
|
||
planet exerts a gravitational force on a material object near its
|
||
surface, we naturally think of the acceleration of the object as
|
||
having two kinds of efficient causes: its distance from the planet
|
||
and the force exerted by the planet. If object were released farther
|
||
away, the same force would give it more momentum before colliding
|
||
with the planet. And if the force were greater where it was released,
|
||
the object would also have more momentum before colliding. We think
|
||
of spatial relations and forces as two different kinds of efficient
|
||
causes determining the later state. But if the basic laws of physics
|
||
are supposed to explain why bits of matter have coherent spatial
|
||
relations in the future, there is no way to distinguish the effect of
|
||
forces from the effect of spatial relations. Instead, laws of physics
|
||
must be seen as operating on the spatial relations, velocities, and
|
||
forces that exist at one time to determine new spatial relations,
|
||
velocities, and forces at a later (or earlier) time. Though what
|
||
happens is predictable, the cause is not the planet's gravitation
|
||
force acting on the object across space, because there is no way to
|
||
distinguish the effect of the space from the effect of the force.
|
||
Both depend on the regularities described by the laws of physics in
|
||
the same way. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Likewise
|
||
for motion. When a material object has a certain velocity, we think
|
||
of its future spatial relations to stationary material objects as a
|
||
result of its motion through a space that is already there. Its
|
||
momentum is something that the object has, and we ordinarily see its
|
||
future locations as being determined by its momentum together with
|
||
its location in a space that is somehow independent of it. But that
|
||
way of conceiving physical causes must be given up, if the
|
||
conservation of momentum helps cause bits of matter to have coherent
|
||
spatial relations. The future spatial relations are not caused by
|
||
moving through space. They are caused by its motion and its past
|
||
spatial relations, changing according to a basic law of physics which
|
||
is taken as defining the nature of matter. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This form
|
||
of spatial relationism makes almost everything that happens in the
|
||
world depend on the nature of matter, rather than on what it assumes
|
||
about the nature of spatial relations (namely, that they are
|
||
geometrically coherent at the present moment). . This can also be
|
||
seen how materialism explains other aspects of motion and interaction
|
||
that spatiomaterialism explains by substantival space. Whether or not
|
||
it is ontologically necessary, it is true that bits of matter do not
|
||
change spatial relations by flitting about from place to place
|
||
discontinuously, but only by moving across space as time passes.
|
||
Spatial relationists would deny that this depends in any way on the
|
||
nature of spatial relations. They would explain this regularity as
|
||
just another aspect of the regularities described by the basic laws
|
||
of physics, which define the nature of matter. The same holds for the
|
||
materialists' explanation of why bits of matter do not act one one
|
||
another at a distance.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
|
||
other words, to assume that having coherent spatial relations is a
|
||
basic relationship that holds only at the present moment is to
|
||
assume, in effect, that matter has an essential nature that is more
|
||
complex temporally than the matter assumed by spatiomaterialism.
|
||
Materialists have to attribute more aspects of what happens in the
|
||
world to the nature of material substance as an ontological cause
|
||
than do spatiomaterialists. The greater complexity of the essential
|
||
nature of matter is what contradicts the claim that materialism is
|
||
simpler than spatiomaterialism. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Temporally
|
||
complex basic relationship.</i> Instead of making the coherence of
|
||
spatial relations a consequence of the basic laws of physics,
|
||
materialists can take the basic relationship by which bits of matter
|
||
exist together as a world to be having geometrically coherent spatial
|
||
relations <i>at every moment</i>. This would be to postulate a basic
|
||
relationship with a <i>temporally complex nature</i>, for the basic
|
||
relationship would have to work together with the forces described by
|
||
the laws of physics as another efficient cause determining what
|
||
happens. And the basic relationship would have to work together with
|
||
velocity as a second efficient cause determining its future spatial
|
||
relations. (This form of materialism could also use its basic
|
||
relationship to explain why bits of matter change spatial relations
|
||
only by motion and why they do not interact at a distance.)</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Though this
|
||
would allow materialists to interpret the laws of physics as
|
||
descriptions of how bits of matter move and interact in space, it
|
||
would be to assume that the basic relationship does for materialism
|
||
what substantival space does for spatiomaterialism. The materialists'
|
||
basic relationship would not be simply how bits of matter exist
|
||
together at the present moment, but a way of existing together at the
|
||
present moment that also constrains how they can exist together at
|
||
future (or past) moments in a way that is independent of the
|
||
constraints imposed by their forces and velocities. Since that is to
|
||
assume that the basic relationship entails that particular spatial
|
||
relations can change only in certain ways, it would be to assume that
|
||
the basic relationship has a temporally complex nature.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">But that
|
||
makes spatial relationism more complex than spatiomaterialism. The
|
||
materialists' basic relationship would be replacing both space and
|
||
the basic relationship of spatiomaterialism. Though one assumption is
|
||
replacing two assumptions, materialism is arguably more complex than
|
||
spatiomaterialism, because its one assumption has a temporally
|
||
complex nature, whereas both of the spatiomaterialists' assumptions
|
||
are temporally simple. That is, aspects of regularities about change
|
||
that are merely assumed by spatial relationism are explained
|
||
ontologically by spatiomaterialism, including not only that bits of
|
||
matter have geometrically coherent spatial relations at every moment,
|
||
but that they change spatial relations only by motion and that they
|
||
do not interact at a distance. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Furthermore,
|
||
it might be argued that, if materialism builds these regularities
|
||
about change into its basic assumption about how bits of matter exist
|
||
together as a world, it is violating the spirit of ontological
|
||
explanation. Ontology tries to explain basic aspects of the world by
|
||
showing how they are constituted by substances that endure through
|
||
time with an unchanging nature. Since the basic relationship does not
|
||
endure through time on its own like a substance, but is merely how
|
||
the substances exist together as a world, it cannot be a source of
|
||
regularities about change in the same way as substances can. Thus,
|
||
not only does spatial relationism fail to explain ontologically why
|
||
bits of matter always have coherent spatial relations, it also fails
|
||
to account for them in the way expected of an ontology. In short, its
|
||
need to postulate a basic relationship with a temporally complex
|
||
nature is itself a reason for rejecting an ontology. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Although
|
||
materialism seems to be simpler than spatiomaterialism, therefore,
|
||
there is, in either case, a way in which it is more complex than
|
||
spatiomaterialism. Either its assumption about the essential nature
|
||
of matter is more complex, or its assumption about the basic
|
||
relationship by which material substances exist together as a world
|
||
is more complex. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Thus,
|
||
there is, at least, a standoff between spatial relationism and
|
||
spatiomaterialism on grounds of simplicity. And that means that
|
||
spatiomaterialism is favored by the empirical method, since
|
||
spatiomaterialism has a greater scope (explaining the possibility of
|
||
change by motion and by interaction). </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Furthermore,
|
||
the way in which spatiomaterialism is simpler than spatial
|
||
relationism also a way in which it explains aspects of the world that
|
||
spatial relationism can only assume. Spatiomaterialism can explain
|
||
ontologically why spatial relations are always geometrically coherent
|
||
(not just now, but in the future and past), whereas materialism must
|
||
build that assumption either into the nature of the matter it
|
||
postulates or into the nature of the basic relationship it assumes
|
||
bits of matter have. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Though
|
||
spatiomaterialism postulates two basic substances, rather than just
|
||
one, its ontological causes are simpler than those of spatial
|
||
relationism. But since both ontologies account for the same basic
|
||
facts, that means that spatiomaterialism explains more with less. At
|
||
the outset, we saw the greater scope of spatiomaterialism in its
|
||
ontological explanation of why bits of matter have spatial relations
|
||
and how change is possible (not to mention what will be show later,
|
||
that they change spatial relations only by motion and do not interact
|
||
at a distance). But in showing that spatiomaterialism is simpler than
|
||
spatial relationism, despite initial impressions to the contrary, we
|
||
have seen that its ontological causes explain another aspect of the
|
||
world that materialism can only assume, namely, why bits of matter
|
||
always have coherent spatial relations. In the end, therefore, it is
|
||
how spatiomaterialism explain more less than makes the decision in
|
||
favor of spatiomaterialism clear, at least, for naturalists who
|
||
accept the empirical method. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>S<img src="" name="OdfSSBSmOSt_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="25" height="236" border="0">patiomaterialism
|
||
is better than spatiotemporalism. </b></i>Substantivalism about
|
||
spacetime entails, as we have seen, the perdurance theory about the
|
||
temporal existential aspect of substances. But since we have already
|
||
seen that the empirical method in ontology requires us to prefer the
|
||
endurance theory to the perdurance theory of time, we ought to
|
||
believe either spatial relationism or spatiomaterialism rather than
|
||
spatiotemporalism. Both allow us to accept the endurance theory
|
||
(thereby giving us an explanation of why the present is different
|
||
from the past and future and allowing us to believe that change is
|
||
real in the sense of properties coming into existence and going out
|
||
of existence as time passes). But having established that the
|
||
empirical method prefers spatiomaterialism to spatial relationism
|
||
(that is, to materialism), we must conclude that spatiomaterialism is
|
||
the best ontological explanation of the natural world (assuming, of
|
||
course, that there is no fourth theory that is still better than
|
||
spatiomaterialism). </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Defenders
|
||
of spatiotemporalism will, however, object to this conclusion. They
|
||
believe they are forced to accept spatiotemporalism by contemporary
|
||
physics. Einstein’s discovery of the special and general theories
|
||
of relativity was a revolution that led to the overthrow of the
|
||
Newtonian belief in absolute space and time in physics. It is clear
|
||
that any ontology that holds that material substances endure through
|
||
time entails that space and time are absolute. To hold that the
|
||
substances constituting the world always exist at only one moment in
|
||
their histories is to hold that they all exist at the same moment,
|
||
for they are part of a single world and they must exist together to
|
||
be parts of the same world. Thus, if there are substances with
|
||
spatial relations to one another, the spatial relations they have at
|
||
the present moment hold for every possible observer. This is even
|
||
clearer, if space is also a substance, for in that case the spatial
|
||
relations are all constituted by a substance that exists only at the
|
||
present moment. Since that is to believe that space and time are
|
||
absolute, to choose to believe spatiomaterialism, or for that matter
|
||
spatial relationism, would be a counterrevolution in physics. Thus,
|
||
it is not likely to attract many followers among physicists and
|
||
philosophers of science.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">What
|
||
led physics to reject Newtonian absolute space and time in favor of
|
||
the spacetime of Einstein’s relativity theories was the empirical
|
||
method of science. Physicists were merely inferring to the best
|
||
explanation of what they could observe about the world. The special
|
||
and general theories both predicted quantitatively precise
|
||
measurements that were not expected by classical Newtonian physics,
|
||
and they have been confirmed repeatedly. Nor does anyone dispute the
|
||
mathematical simplicity of Einstein’s theories. The special theory
|
||
was a paragon of simplicity by comparison with the cobbling together
|
||
of ad hoc constraints by which Lorentz had proposed to explain the
|
||
same phenomena. The general theory of relativity was based on the
|
||
special theory, and though its mathematics was novel in physics,
|
||
there is no question about its elegance. These two theories were
|
||
clearly the best explanation that physics offered of the space and
|
||
time found in the natural world, and that caused a revolution in
|
||
physics, because neither theory had any use for absolute space or
|
||
absolute time. All that was required for them to be true was
|
||
spacetime, that is, the ontological equality of all points in space
|
||
<i>and time</i>.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote4anc" href="#sdendnote4sym"><sup>iv</sup></a></sup></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
empirical method in science is, however, different from the empirical
|
||
method in ontology, and thus, what is the best scientific explanation
|
||
may not be the best ontological explanation. Science tries to explain
|
||
<i>what happens</i>, and thus, it infers to the best <i>efficient-cause
|
||
explanation </i>of what can be observed. Its criteria of truth are
|
||
prediction and control. But there is, as we have seen, a difference
|
||
between efficient-cause and ontological-cause explanations. Ontology
|
||
tries to explain everything in the world, not only what happens
|
||
there, but also what exists there — including the properties and
|
||
relations of the objects found in the world, and how it is possible
|
||
for anything to happen in the first place. Such things are explained
|
||
ontologically by showing how they are constituted by basic substances
|
||
and relations among them. Thus, empirical ontology tries to explain
|
||
the world most completely using the fewest and simplest substances
|
||
with the fewest and simplest relations. Though the goal of explaining
|
||
the most with the least is the same, the kinds of explanation
|
||
involved are different.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Since we
|
||
know on empirical grounds, that spatiomaterialism is the best
|
||
ontological explanation of the world, empirically minded ontological
|
||
naturalists must prefer it to spatiotemporalism, if it is possible.
|
||
Thus, the only relevant question is whether it is possible that
|
||
spatiomaterialism is true, given that Einstein’s special and
|
||
general theories of relativity are the best efficient-cause
|
||
explanations of all the relevant phenomena. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
answer is Yes. It is possible to explain all the observational
|
||
predictions of what will happen that is entailed by either the
|
||
special or the general theory of relativity on the assumption that
|
||
space is a substance enduring through time and, thus, absolute. To be
|
||
sure, spatiomaterialism must make certain additional assumptions
|
||
about the nature of space and matter and how they interact, which
|
||
are, in effect, new laws of nature. But it is possible. (And the fact
|
||
that spatiomaterialism is able to explain the truth of Einstein's two
|
||
theories is further reason for preferring it over spatial
|
||
relationism, because spatial relationism cannot explain them. It can
|
||
only assume them in the same way it does the geometrical coherence of
|
||
spatial relations.)</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">The
|
||
spatiomaterialist interpretation of Einstein’s special and general
|
||
theories of relativity is given a detailed defense below (in </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCaLbStr.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Special theory of relativity</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">and
|
||
</span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCaLcGtr.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
General theory of relativity</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">),
|
||
as one of the implications of spatiomaterialism for physics. But we
|
||
can see the possibility of such an interpretation in the abstract,
|
||
and since this may seem unlikely to some, let me sketch briefly just
|
||
how the truth of Einsteinian relativity will be explained
|
||
ontologically by spatiomaterialism. </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Given
|
||
the endurance theory of time, what substantivalism about space
|
||
implies is that only one moment in the history of each location in
|
||
absolute space exists. That is the present moment, and it is the same
|
||
for all of them, since the parts of space are all parts of the same
|
||
world. Thus, all that a spatiomaterialist interpretation requires is
|
||
that each and every part of space (along with the bits of matter
|
||
coinciding with parts of it) be in a state at the present moment that
|
||
is consistent with Einstein’s two theories. What that means is
|
||
that, among all the possible inertial frames, which relativity takes
|
||
to be equivalent, one, and only one, is true. This is not to say that
|
||
it is possible to determine by some measurement which one it is. That
|
||
is clearly precluded by Einstein’s theories; if it weren't, they
|
||
could not be called relativity theories. But it is equally clear that
|
||
there <i>can be </i>an inertial frame at absolute rest, even though
|
||
it is not possible to detect which one it is.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">What
|
||
makes such an easy accommodation possible is that empirical science
|
||
and empirical ontology have different criteria of truth. Since the
|
||
empirical method of science seeks the best efficient-cause
|
||
explanation of what happens in the world, its criterion of truth
|
||
depends on predicting and controlling what happens, and thus, given
|
||
that inertial frames are all equivalent in that regard, it can take
|
||
the truth to be <i>what is the same for all of them</i>. In ontology,
|
||
however, the empirical method seeks the best ontological-cause
|
||
explanation of what exists in the world. Its criterion of truth is
|
||
the simplest substances and relations that will explain everything in
|
||
and about the world, and thus, <i>it must explain how all the
|
||
different inertial frames could be part of the same world.</i> That
|
||
is something that science can take for granted, because one observer
|
||
can always predict what coordinates will be assigned by other
|
||
observers. And since the reasons for believing that there is an
|
||
absolute frame of reference are ontological, the lack of any
|
||
difference in the predictions made from different inertial frames is
|
||
not a reason to doubt that it exists.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
detailed spatiomaterialist explanation of the two relativity theories
|
||
shows, from the point of view of the inertial frame at rest in
|
||
absolute space (whichever one that is), how it is possible that all
|
||
the other inertial frames are observationally indistinguishable from
|
||
it. Here is the gist of the explanations given in CHANGE.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><b>The
|
||
special theory of relativity </b>implies that the various possible
|
||
inertial frames (that is, the various possible unaccelerated material
|
||
objects that might be used as the basis for measuring distances in
|
||
space and intervals of time) are all equivalent, making it impossible
|
||
ever to determine by measurement which one is at rest in absolute
|
||
space. But the undetectability of absolute rest does not mean that
|
||
there <i>is </i>no such thing. Indeed, as Lorentz began to show early
|
||
in the twentieth century, it is possible to explain the observational
|
||
equivalence of inertial frames which makes absolute rest undetectable
|
||
on the assumption that all the material objects are located in an
|
||
absolute space in which light has a constant velocity. Lorentz showed
|
||
that it would not be possible to detect absolute motion by
|
||
measurements of the velocity of light, if material objects with a
|
||
high velocity relative to absolute space suffered several distortions
|
||
(including the shrinking of their lengths in the direction of motion,
|
||
the slowing down of their clocks, and increase in their mass at a
|
||
certain rate). It is also possible to show that, if observers on all
|
||
inertial frames accept Einstein's definition of simultaneity at a
|
||
distance (and synchronize their clocks on the assumption that the
|
||
velocity of light is the same both ways, back and forth, in every
|
||
direction -- that is, as if they were at rest in absolute space),
|
||
those same "Lorentz distortions" will make all inertial
|
||
equivalent even when it comes to their measurements of one another.
|
||
(Observers on both of any pair of inertial frames will see the
|
||
other's clocks slowed down, the other's measuring rods as shrunken,
|
||
etc.) </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In other
|
||
words, if we think of the effect of space on the material objects it
|
||
contains as the "ether" in which Newtonian physicists
|
||
thought that light had a fixed velocity (or what I will call an
|
||
"inherent motion" in space), and if we assume that the
|
||
motion of material objects through the ether has certain distorting
|
||
effects on them and their physical processes, then all of the
|
||
observational consequences of Einstein’s special theory of
|
||
relativity follow. We will have explained all the phenomena without
|
||
referring to spacetime. Thus, it is not necessary to give up the
|
||
assumption that space is a substance enduring through time to explain
|
||
what is described by Einstein's special theory of relativity. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><b>The
|
||
general theory of relativity </b>is a theory about gravitation
|
||
formulated in terms of spacetime. It holds, in effect, that matter
|
||
accumulation in spacetime imposes a curvature on spacetime, and that
|
||
in curved spacetime, the path of inertial motion is not straight, but
|
||
curved, or in other words, accelerated. But all the predictions that
|
||
follow from assuming that spacetime is curved can also be made on the
|
||
assumption that the velocity of light relative to space varies from
|
||
place to place in space. That is, the spatiomaterialist
|
||
interpretation of Einstein’s special theory of relativity is, in
|
||
effect, an ontological interpretation of what is meant by
|
||
"spacetime,"and that is what makes it possible to explain
|
||
the observational adequacy of Einstein’s general theory of
|
||
relativity on the assumption that space is a substance enduring
|
||
through time. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">As
|
||
suggested above, talk of "spacetime" can be replaced by
|
||
talk of an ether, in which the velocity of light is equal both ways
|
||
in every direction, though that is really just a way of describing
|
||
how space interacts with the matter it contains. In our ontological
|
||
explanation of the special theory, we assume that the ether is at
|
||
rest in absolute space and we explained all the other inertial frames
|
||
as observers on the one that is at absolute rest. In order to explain
|
||
the general theory, we assume that the ether itself can have a
|
||
velocity in space, one that varies across space according to the
|
||
accumulations of matter nearby. That means that the absolute velocity
|
||
of light varies from location to location in absolute space (that is,
|
||
at different locations in the inertial frame at absolute rest, from
|
||
which we are giving this explanation). But it also means that
|
||
material objects, which interact with one another by way of
|
||
electromagnetic interactions through the ether, are accelerated with
|
||
the ether, and such a moving, accelerated ether is what "curved
|
||
spacetime" comes down to ontologically, for as we shall see, it
|
||
explains all the observational predictions of the general theory of
|
||
relativity. It could all be just the effect that space has on the
|
||
light and matter it contains, if the right states for space to have
|
||
such effects are imposed on space by the accumulation of matter in
|
||
space. Precisely the same observational predictions follow from this
|
||
theory as from Einstein’s general theory of relativity, and thus,
|
||
it is possible that space is a substance enduring through time, that
|
||
is, absolute. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">These
|
||
sketches of the spatiomaterialist explanation of the truth of
|
||
Einstein's two relativity theories may be too brief for most people
|
||
to follow easily. But they are included here because even a
|
||
suggestion of the nature of these arguments may clarify what is meant
|
||
by saying that it is possible that spatiomaterialism is true,
|
||
notwithstanding the Einsteinian revolution in physics. But at this
|
||
point, it is still just a promise, and thus, we accept the obligation
|
||
to show in detail how it is possible as we take up showing what holds
|
||
necessarily, if spatiomaterialism is true. It is like taking out a
|
||
mortgage in order to construct the ontological foundation for this
|
||
philosophical argument. If it should turn out, as we build the
|
||
edifice of ontological philosophy, that relativistic phenomena cannot
|
||
be explained on the assumption that space is a substance existing in
|
||
time, spatiomaterialism will have been falsified and we will not be
|
||
entitled to use it as a foundation to support any conclusions about
|
||
the world. We will have to concede that we do not have a new way of
|
||
doing philosophy after all. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">As
|
||
it stands, however, spatiomaterialism is a better ontological
|
||
explanation of the natural world than either spatial relationism or
|
||
spatiotemporalism, because the latter two theories have opposite
|
||
failings. Spatial relationism (that is, materialism) can explain why
|
||
the present is different from the past and future (and, thus, can
|
||
hold that change is real), but it cannot explain spatial relations.
|
||
Spatiotemporalism can explain spatial relations, but it cannot
|
||
explain why the present is different from the past or the future,
|
||
that is, except as another kind of relation like that of space (and,
|
||
thus, cannot hold that change is real). Spatiomaterialism, however,
|
||
can explain both spatial relations and why the present is different
|
||
from the past and the future (and, thus, can hold that change is
|
||
real).</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0; page-break-before: always">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>M<img src="" name="OdfSMatter_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="76" height="29" border="0">atter.
|
||
</b></font>Naturalists believe that the world is just what is in
|
||
space and time, and having seen that we should, if possible, believe
|
||
that substances are in time in the sense of enduring through time,
|
||
and that substances are in space in the sense of either being parts
|
||
of space itself or coinciding with parts of space, the final issue to
|
||
be settled is about the nature of the substances that coincide with
|
||
space and endure through time. The simplest theory is obviously
|
||
materialism, the belief that matter is the only kind of basic
|
||
substance that coincides with space. But some phenomena seem to
|
||
require immaterial substances as well. Our ontological causes would
|
||
be more complex, if we had to postulate both material and immaterial
|
||
substances as coinciding with space. But if the scope of our
|
||
ontological theory is increased by postulating immaterial substances,
|
||
it can be argued that there is a tradeoff between simplicity and
|
||
scope that keeps the empirical method from requiring naturalists to
|
||
accept materialism. In this case, therefore, we must decide whether
|
||
there are any phenomena that require us to postulate immaterial
|
||
substances as well as material substances. Let us set the stage by
|
||
considering more carefully what materialism holds. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><b>M<img src="" name="OdfSMaterial_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="89" height="49" border="0">aterialism.</b></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">Materialism
|
||
holds that none but material substances coincide with parts of space.
|
||
Matter comes in particular bits, and by "matter," we shall
|
||
mean only substances whose behavior in space makes the laws of
|
||
physics true. Thus, we assume that bits of matter move and interact
|
||
in the regular ways required by the basic laws of contemporary
|
||
physics and that there are enough different kinds of bits of matter
|
||
to account for all the kinds of entities mentioned by those laws,
|
||
from electrons and nucleons (or triplets of quarks) to force fields
|
||
and photons. We will see what essential nature material substances
|
||
that coincide with space must have for this to be true. (See
|
||
</span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">Contingent
|
||
Laws</span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">under
|
||
</span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">Local
|
||
Regularities </span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">under
|
||
</span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCaL.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.)
|
||
But given that it is true, materialism may also be called
|
||
"physicalism," because the properties mentioned by the
|
||
basic laws of physics are called "physical properties." </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">More
|
||
abstractly, bits of matter are "basic" substances in the
|
||
sense that they are the most elementary substances of their kind.
|
||
Since each has an existence that is distinct from all the rest, they
|
||
are "particular" substances. They are "concrete"
|
||
in the sense that no bit of matter can be in two different locations
|
||
at the same time. And they are "independent" of one another
|
||
in the sense that the existence of one bit of matter does not, in
|
||
general, depend on the existence of the others. That is, bits of
|
||
matter can also move independently of one another and interact
|
||
locally (though, as we shall see in </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtkCaL09.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Forms of matter</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
there are some varieties of matter that cannot exist except in
|
||
conjunction with matter of a different variety).</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">Since
|
||
spatiomaterialism holds that bits of matter are in space in the sense
|
||
of being contained by space as a substance, we shall take the basic
|
||
laws of physics to be descriptions of regularities about their motion
|
||
and interaction that result from their being contained by space, that
|
||
is, as ontological effects of both space and matter. That is
|
||
different from what spatial relationism assumes about the nature of
|
||
matter, because spatial relationism can simply </span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><i>define
|
||
</i></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">the
|
||
essential aspect of material substances by the basic laws of physics,
|
||
implying that there is nothing more to be known about their natures
|
||
and that bits of matter have an essential nature that is irreducibly
|
||
temporally complex. But since we take space to be a substance, we are
|
||
assuming that at least some of the regularities described by basic
|
||
laws of physics can be explained ontologically, that is, by how the
|
||
essential nature of space works together with the essential nature of
|
||
matter, because of how matter and space coincide, to constitute those
|
||
regularities. That is why we took spatiomaterialism to have a greater
|
||
scope than spatial relationism: it could explain why bits of matter
|
||
have spatial relations and how change is possible, rather than just
|
||
assuming it. That is also how spatiomaterialism can promise to
|
||
explain the truth of Einstein's relativity theories, as just
|
||
mentioned. And it is how we will explain the other laws of physics in
|
||
</span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">Contingent
|
||
Laws </span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">under
|
||
</span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtkCaL01.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.
|
||
Indeed, the possibility of such explanations is what we assumed by
|
||
taking ontology to be a kind of explanation, rather than merely
|
||
realism about science. But that means that spatiomaterialism must
|
||
take matter to be a kind of substance that, working together with
|
||
space as the substance with which it coincides, makes the basic laws
|
||
of contemporary physics true. </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">In
|
||
addition to explaining why efficient-cause explanations are true,
|
||
moreover, ontological-cause explanations can also explain why
|
||
rational-cause explanations are true, making all the kinds of
|
||
explanations mentioned in </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOteM01.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Method</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">parts
|
||
of a single explanation of the world in the end and reducing the
|
||
social sciences by way of natural science to spatiomaterialism. </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Although
|
||
spatiomaterialism implies that there is more to be known about the
|
||
essential nature of matter, what is relevant for present purposes is
|
||
that it agrees with materialism (or physicalism) about physics being
|
||
causally complete. What happens in the world is just what comes
|
||
about, given the initial and boundary conditions that prevail, as the
|
||
result of bits of matter moving and interacting according to the
|
||
basic laws of physics. That is how all efficient causes bring about
|
||
their effects, according to materialism, and spatiomaterialism
|
||
expects to be able to explain why those causal connections hold.
|
||
Naturalists who follow the empirical method must prefer that kind of
|
||
ontology, if it is possible, because it is the simplest explanation
|
||
of what happens in nature. The only question is whether it is
|
||
possible. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><b>I<img src="" name="OdfSImmat_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="97" height="49" border="0">mmaterialism.
|
||
</b></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">It
|
||
is not possible, according to critics of materialism, because there
|
||
are aspects of the natural world that require us to postulate
|
||
immaterial substances in space. Though all naturalists deny the
|
||
existence of anything outside space and time, all the kinds of
|
||
phenomena mentioned in </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtcN08.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Naturalism:
|
||
Problems</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">as
|
||
posing a problem for naturalism also pose a problem for materialism.
|
||
That is, consciousness, goodness and holiness, the phenomena that
|
||
lead, respectively, to the belief in Cartesian minds, Platonic Forms,
|
||
and a transcendent God, can also be used to argue for the existence
|
||
of substances whose natures are not described by the basic laws of
|
||
physics. However, to postulate mental substances, teleological
|
||
substances, or spiritual substances would be to give up materialism
|
||
in favor of a more complex ontology, one with immaterial substances
|
||
that coincide with space and endure through time, along with material
|
||
substances. </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Notice
|
||
that, although space is not a material substance, it is not an
|
||
immaterial substance in the sense relevant here. Space is not a
|
||
material substance in the sense that it has an opposite essential
|
||
nature to matter. (Whereas bits of matter are independent of one
|
||
another, parts of space cannot exist without one another.) But here
|
||
we are concerned with the causal completeness of physics, and by
|
||
"immaterial substances," we mean only substances that
|
||
coincide with space. What makes them immaterial is that they do not
|
||
move and interact as described by the basic laws of physics. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Though
|
||
space is not a material substance, it is not an immaterial substance
|
||
in the relevant sense, because substantivalism about space does not
|
||
itself deny the causal completeness of physics. On the contrary, it
|
||
affords an ontological explanation of why the basic laws of physics
|
||
are true and, thus, an explanation of the connection between cause
|
||
and effect in efficient-cause explanations. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Ironically,
|
||
however, as it will turn out, all that needs to be added to
|
||
materialism in order to explain the problematic phenomena that lead
|
||
to belief in immaterial substances is substantivalism about space. As
|
||
we shall see, that is because it shows the ontological necessity of
|
||
global regularities, as well as the local regularities described by
|
||
the basic laws of physics. It order to see what spatiomaterialism
|
||
must do, let us consider more carefully each of the reasons for
|
||
believing in immaterial substances. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><i><b>M<img src="" name="OdfSMental_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="26" height="161" border="0">ental
|
||
substances.</b></i></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">The
|
||
first challenge to materialism comes from the existence of conscious
|
||
beings like us. As explained in </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtcN10.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Naturalism:
|
||
Consciousness</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
the basic phenomenon that leads to belief in the existence of mind is
|
||
"consciousness," which will be understood here as the fact
|
||
that it is like something to perceive the world and experiences of
|
||
other kinds. The appearances involved in perception are something
|
||
distinct from what exists in the natural world independently of us,
|
||
and when we reflect on how we know about them, it seems that the
|
||
appearances themselves are responsible for our being aware of them
|
||
and for the judgments we make about them. That is what led Descartes
|
||
to believe that minds are immaterial substances not located in space.
|
||
Though we must, as naturalists, deny the existence of Cartesian
|
||
minds, we must give an ontological explanation of the natural world
|
||
that explains the phenomenon of consciousness. </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">To
|
||
be conscious is to have <i>qualia </i>or phenomenal properties. Since
|
||
they are properties of a radically different kind from the physical
|
||
properties by which the essential nature of matter is defined,
|
||
materialism seems to be incapable of explaining consciousness. There
|
||
are several alternatives.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><i>Eliminative
|
||
materialism.</i></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">What
|
||
materialists can do is explain away the phenomenon. That is the
|
||
position called "eliminative materialism." It assumes that
|
||
everything that conscious subjects do in the world can be explained
|
||
by the brain and other forms of efficient causation. That means that
|
||
there is no way to show that someone else is conscious by how they
|
||
behave or anything else that happens in the world. Thus,
|
||
consciousness eludes the method of empirical science, since the only
|
||
acceptable evidence for scientific explanations is what is known by
|
||
perception. Eliminative materialism would "solve" the
|
||
problem of consciousness by simply denying the existence of
|
||
phenomenal properties. It holds that belief in them is the result of
|
||
a confusion (see </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#DennettC"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Dennett</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">)
|
||
or the lack of an adequate scientific explanation of the brain (see
|
||
</span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Churchland"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Churchland</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.)
|
||
This position is not easily refuted, since the evidence for
|
||
consciousness is strictly private, in the sense that it depends on
|
||
first-person reflection. </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">The
|
||
willingness to reduce conscious subjects to what materialism can
|
||
explain is, however, the sort of attitude that has given
|
||
reductionistic materialism such a bad name. Most naturalists (like
|
||
</span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Chalmers</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">)
|
||
doubt that eliminative materialists are taking consciousness
|
||
seriously, for naturalists are themselves parts of the natural world
|
||
and they can know that they are conscious by reflection, even if
|
||
natural science cannot. </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Emergentism.</i>
|
||
At the other extreme is emergentism. It is possible for naturalists
|
||
to give up materialism and hold that what explains this phenomenon
|
||
are mental substances that coincide with space along with material
|
||
substances. Emergentism is different from the belief in Cartesian
|
||
minds, because it takes the mental substances to be <i>in space</i>,
|
||
and for spatiomaterialists, to be contained by space as a substance
|
||
is to coincide with some part(s) of it. But emergentism agrees with
|
||
the Cartesian view about mental substances making a difference to
|
||
what happens in the world. It holds that mental substances are partly
|
||
responsible, at least, for behavior that is ordinarily attributed to
|
||
conscious mind, such as rational behavior. Such a view, however,
|
||
denies materialism, for it denies the causal completeness of physics.
|
||
It implies that there are substances in space and time that do not
|
||
obey the laws of physics, thereby denying that physics can, in
|
||
principle, explain everything that happens in nature.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote5anc" href="#sdendnote5sym"><sup>v</sup></a></sup></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It may seem
|
||
that emergentism is not a form of immaterialism, because what
|
||
emergentists mean by "conscious mind" cannot be a substance
|
||
by our definition. We are assuming that substances never come into
|
||
existence nor go out of existence over time, but emergentists
|
||
typically hold that conscious mind comes into existence at some point
|
||
because of the complexity of physical causes, for example, at some
|
||
stage in the evolution of the brain. However, these views are not
|
||
incompatible, because the way in which conscious mind emerges can be
|
||
explained by assuming that matter itself has a (temporally complex)
|
||
nature that allows its nature to change from being the kind described
|
||
by the laws of physics to being a kind that gives consciousness a
|
||
causal role in the world. That is to hold that there are immaterial
|
||
substances in space, for it implies that there are substances that do
|
||
not obey the basic laws of physics. That may mean that there are no
|
||
material substances, only immaterial substances that appear at times
|
||
to be material. In any case, it is a naturalistic theory. But since
|
||
bits of matter would have to follow more complex laws than those of
|
||
physics, the existence of emergent minds would require a more complex
|
||
ontology, and thus, naturalists have good reason to prefer a less
|
||
disruptive explanation of consciousness, if it is possible. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Epiphenomenalism.</i>
|
||
Epiphenomenalism is a compromise between eliminative materialism and
|
||
emergentism. It holds that all the causal roles of conscious mind are
|
||
really the work of the brain and, thus, can ultimately be explained
|
||
by matter alone. Thus, it cleaves to materialism and believes in the
|
||
causal completeness of physics. But it also holds that processes
|
||
involving physical properties of those kinds "give rise" to
|
||
phenomenal properties. That is how it explains the phenomenon of
|
||
consciousness. Since those phenomenal properties have no effects, in
|
||
turn, on what happens in the world, it is called "epi-phenomenalism."
|
||
That is, phenomenal properties are effects of physical properties
|
||
without ever themselves being causes of anything. Such a view avoids
|
||
postulating any immaterial substances, since the substances in space
|
||
would always obey the laws of physical. But it would have to assume
|
||
that material substances can have properties that are not mentioned
|
||
by the basic laws of physics. Thus, it accepts what is called
|
||
"property dualism," while cleaving to materialism (or
|
||
physicalism). Matter must have phenomenal properties as well as
|
||
physical properties.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Epiphenomenalism
|
||
is, however, an unhappy compromise, because phenomenal properties are
|
||
fundamentally different from the properties by which materialists
|
||
define the essential natures of material substances. They are not
|
||
entailed by anything that physics can discover about the world. Thus,
|
||
it is possible to conceive of a physical world in which organisms
|
||
with brains exactly like our own did not have phenomenal properties.
|
||
That is, there may be zombies. Or to use </span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Kripke"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Kripke</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">’</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">s
|
||
famous metaphor, epiphenomenalism makes it seem as though, God, after
|
||
creating the physical world, had to go back and tack phenomenal
|
||
properties onto material substances in order to make beings like us
|
||
conscious. Thus, even though epiphenomenalism allows naturalists to
|
||
avoid immaterialism, there is still reason to believe that
|
||
materialism is not the deepest truth about the nature of existence in
|
||
the natural world, because consciousness is still something found in
|
||
the world that does not seem to be constituted by material
|
||
substances. </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
|
||
order to be the best ontological explanation of the natural world,
|
||
therefore, spatiomaterialism must explain consciousness. That is, it
|
||
must explain the relationship between physical and phenomenal
|
||
properties in a way that shows phenomenological properties to be
|
||
ontologically necessary. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">And
|
||
it can. Indeed, that will be the first necessary truth derived from
|
||
this ontological foundation. (See </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOthP.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Properties</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.)</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">However,
|
||
since this is only a promise at this point, we are taking out a
|
||
second mortgage on the house of ontological philosophy in order to
|
||
construct its foundation (that is, in addition to explaining why
|
||
Einsteinian relativity is true), and only if we pay off both
|
||
mortgages will we have a clear title to a new way of doing
|
||
philosophy. But as it now stands, if we do pay them back, the
|
||
empirical method will require us to accept spatiomaterialism as true,
|
||
and we will not be able to deny the necessary truths that follow from
|
||
it. This argument will be a new way of doing philosophy.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>T<img src="" name="OdfSTeleo_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="26" height="161" border="0">eleological
|
||
substances. </b></i>Another problem with naturalism is the existence
|
||
of a real difference between good and bad, that is, a difference in
|
||
the objects or events themselves that make it true that some ought to
|
||
exist and others ought not. That is the phenomenon that led Plato to
|
||
believe in the existence of Forms in a realm of Being, and the same
|
||
phenomenon that theists believed they could explain by the existence
|
||
of a God who created the natural world. Though as naturalists, we
|
||
must deny both of those supernaturalistic explanations, we do need an
|
||
explanation of the phenomenon itself. If it cannot be explained by
|
||
materialism, goodness will count as evidence for the existence of
|
||
immaterial substances. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Hedonism.</i>
|
||
The time-honored way for materialists to explain the phenomenon of
|
||
goodness is by offering a causal explanation of what is good, such as
|
||
psychological hedonism, that is, the view that beings like us cannot
|
||
help but seek pleasure. But that is to hold, in effect, that pleasure
|
||
is what is good without explaining why the good is good in the sense
|
||
that it ought to exist. It would only explain why hedonistic beings
|
||
like us inevitably pursue it. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Furthermore,
|
||
hedonism does not explain moral goodness, for it does not explain why
|
||
we ought to do what morality requires when it does not maximize our
|
||
expected pleasure, that is, when it is not in our self-interest. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nor is the
|
||
goodness of morality explained by theories, like Hume's, that take
|
||
human nature to include a moral sentiment, which inclines one to do
|
||
what is moral when it conflicts with self interest. Such a
|
||
psychological disposition may explain why human beings are moral, but
|
||
not why they ought to be.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><i>Non-cognitivism.
|
||
</i></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">The
|
||
other traditional naturalistic attempt to explain the phenomenon of
|
||
goodness is to hold that it is an illusion. The appearance that there
|
||
is an objective difference between good and bad could comes from
|
||
projecting our feelings about things onto the world, so that they
|
||
appear to be properties of the objects themselves. This view has had
|
||
many defenders in the Twentieth Century (such as </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Ayer"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Ayer</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">).</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">These
|
||
ways of answering the challenge of goodness are, once again, what has
|
||
given materialist reductionism a bad name. They do not convince
|
||
everyone, and those who continue to believe in a real difference
|
||
between good and bad, in which the good really ought to exist
|
||
regardless what we may happen to (or be determined to) believe about
|
||
it, will accuse materialists of leaving something out of their
|
||
supposedly complete explanation of the world. Thus, although
|
||
materialism is the simplest ontological explanation of the natural
|
||
world, the empirical method cannot force us to accept it as true as
|
||
long it cannot explain goodness as something that beings like us find
|
||
in the natural world. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
|
||
order to explain the phenomenon of goodness, it may be argued that
|
||
naturalists must postulate teleological substances of some kind, such
|
||
as Aristotle did by holding that there are final causes as well as
|
||
efficient causes at work in nature. To suppose that forces of any
|
||
kind are responsible for the goals pursued by biological organisms
|
||
generally or by human beings would be to hold that there are
|
||
substances that somehow guide change in nature to bring about certain
|
||
states or goals. They could not be material substances, because
|
||
substances whose essential natures are described by the basic laws of
|
||
physics do not have such forward-looking effects (unless, of course,
|
||
they have very special initial and boundary conditions as parts of
|
||
mechanisms, which would need to be explained). In order to account
|
||
for final causation, for example, Aristotle postulated essential
|
||
forms as a component of each particular substance in space. Indeed,
|
||
the actualization of the essential form that exists potentially in
|
||
substances of its natural kind was supposed to be the end for the
|
||
sake of which "natural change" takes place. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nor was it
|
||
just their role in final causation that made them immaterial
|
||
substances. Though essential forms are located in space and time as a
|
||
component, along with matter, of the particular substances that have
|
||
them, the same essential form must be able to exist simultaneously in
|
||
different particular substances with different locations in space at
|
||
the same time. Thus, they are universals, not concrete material
|
||
substances. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It may be
|
||
possible to materialize teleological causation (as " vitalists"
|
||
like Hans Driesch did) by postulating "entelechies"
|
||
(instead of essential forms and final causes) and holding that each
|
||
entelechy can exist at only one location in space at a time. But
|
||
still, any substances exerting teleological forces would be unlike
|
||
the substances that materialists accept, because in order to guide
|
||
motion and interaction toward certain goals, they would have to work
|
||
in more complex ways than provided by the basic laws of physics. And
|
||
even if they did, making what is good objective, it would still be
|
||
necessary to show how that explains why the goals pursued are good. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
defense of teleological substances has been rare ever since the
|
||
discovery earlier in this century that Darwin was on the right track
|
||
in explaining natural teleology as a result of evolution. Darwin
|
||
showed how the natural selection of random variations in reproducing
|
||
organisms could explain why change seems to occur for the sake of
|
||
ends in them. The existence of traits serving specific functions was
|
||
a result of the differential survival and reproduction of organisms
|
||
having the traits, while other organisms, lacking the traits, died
|
||
out. In other words, it is merely an adaptation to the environment.
|
||
And when the role of genes in the inheritance of traits became clear,
|
||
it was even harder to believe that immaterial substances were
|
||
responsible for the goal-directed traits of biological organisms --
|
||
and harder still when DNA molecules were found to be playing the role
|
||
of genes. Since nothing but efficient causes are involved in the
|
||
mechanism of inheritance and their evolution by natural selection, it
|
||
was no longer plausible to believe in the existence of teleological
|
||
substances. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">This
|
||
evolutionary explanation of the goal-directedness of biological
|
||
traits is not, however, an explanation of the phenomenon of goodness.
|
||
The consensus among contemporary Darwinists is that Darwin’s theory
|
||
has nothing to do with progressive evolution. As we mentioned
|
||
earlier, they believe that the cause of natural selection is
|
||
externally caused changes in the environment, which makes the course
|
||
of evolution seem accidental. What is more, since organisms must make
|
||
do with whatever random variations turn up when the environment
|
||
changes, it also suggests that evolved traits are not generally the
|
||
best way to serve the functions required, but merely what enabled
|
||
them to survive difficult periods. (For a fuller discussion of
|
||
contemporary Darwinism, see </span></font></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtkCbGeRAccidentalism.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Accidentalism.</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">)
|
||
Thus, to those who believe that there is a real difference between
|
||
good and bad, one that explains why the good ought to exist, the
|
||
contemporary Darwinist explanation of the ends pursued by organisms
|
||
seems more like an attempt to debunk their belief in goodness than an
|
||
explanation of its nature.</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Goodness
|
||
remains, therefore, a source of doubt about materialism. Though
|
||
materialism may be part of the simplest explanation of the natural
|
||
world, there will be naturalists who do not accept it, as long as it
|
||
cannot explain why things are good in the sense that they ought to
|
||
exist. They have reason to believe that teleological substances of
|
||
some kind are required to explain this phenomena. The tradeoff
|
||
between simplicity and scope prevents the empirical method from
|
||
deciding.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
|
||
order to hold that the empirical method requires naturalists to
|
||
believe that materialism is true, therefore, and that there are no
|
||
immaterial substances in space, it will be necessary to explain the
|
||
phenomenon of goodness to the satisfaction of those who believe in an
|
||
objective difference between good and bad. That is, it will be
|
||
necessary to give an explanation of the goals pursued by beings like
|
||
us (and by other organisms) that explains why those goals ought to be
|
||
pursued. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
|
||
order to establish this foundation for ontological philosophy,
|
||
therefore, we must take out a third mortgage on the necessary truths
|
||
supported by it. Not only must spatiomaterialism explain the truth of
|
||
Einstein's two relativity theories and the nature of consciousness,
|
||
but it must also explain the nature of goodness. And if it turns out
|
||
that we cannot pay off these mortgages, it will not be clear that
|
||
spatiomaterialism is the best ontological explanation of the natural
|
||
world. We will not be entitled to claim that any truths founded on
|
||
its are necessary relative to what is ordinarily believed. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">It
|
||
will, however, turn out that spatiomaterialism can pay off this
|
||
mortgage. There is a better explanation of the difference between
|
||
good and bad than contemporary Darwinists offer, and ironically, what
|
||
makes it possible is the recognition that space is a substance. The
|
||
key, once again, is how substantivalism about space entails the
|
||
ontological necessity of global regularities, for evolution is the
|
||
"</span></font></font><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCbGeR.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Reproductive
|
||
Global Regularity</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">."</span></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>S<img src="" name="OdfSSpirit_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="25" height="161" border="0">piritual
|
||
substances. </b></i>The final reason for doubting that materialism
|
||
(or we are assuming, spatiomaterialism) is the best ontological
|
||
explanation of the natural world is what we called the phenomenon of
|
||
"holiness," which leads people to believe in the existence
|
||
of a transcendent God. Though, as naturalists, we must deny the
|
||
existence of a transcendent God, the phenomenon that gives rise to
|
||
belief in God calls for explanation, and if we cannot explain why
|
||
people believe that is something worthy of worship without
|
||
postulating spiritual or other immaterial substances in space, the
|
||
empirical method will not force naturalists to accept
|
||
spatiomaterialism. There will again be a tradeoff between simplicity
|
||
and greater scope that makes it unclear whether spatiomaterialism or
|
||
some from of immaterialism is the better ontological of the natural
|
||
world.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
|
||
this case, once again, a common materialist response to the challenge
|
||
is to hold that what needs explaining is not the phenomenon of
|
||
holiness, but rather the belief in God itself. Thus, people are said
|
||
to have a psychological need to believe in God, either as a result of
|
||
conditioning (behaviorism), psycho-sexual development (Freudianism),
|
||
an instinct selected for other functions (sociobiology), or some
|
||
other irrational cause. This is materialist reductionism in the
|
||
pejorative sense. It does not take seriously the source of the belief
|
||
in the sacred, at least, not in the eyes of those who believe there
|
||
is something worthy of worship. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
|
||
sort of explanation is not required by naturalism, that is, the
|
||
denial of supernaturalism, for religious people can be naturalists.
|
||
Though naturalists cannot believe in the existence of a transcendent
|
||
God of any kind, they can insist that there is something immaterial
|
||
in the natural world that is worthy of worship. It is not obvious,
|
||
after all, that what is holy must exist outside space and time. It
|
||
could be a spiritual substance in space, if not the world itself. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
existence of spiritual substances is not, however, compatible with
|
||
materialism. A spiritual substance must have effects that are
|
||
different from what happens as bits of matter move and interact
|
||
according to the basic laws of physics, for otherwise there would be
|
||
no reason to believe that a spiritual substance exists, much less
|
||
that it is worthy of worship. Thus, it must not be a material
|
||
substance in our sense. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Nor
|
||
is it sufficient to declare that the world itself is worthy of
|
||
worship. There must be something about the world that makes it holy,
|
||
and naturalists have never explained what it is. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #cccccc; border-top: 6.75pt double #000000; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #000000; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Spinoza's
|
||
pantheism was rejected by traditional theists for this reason. His
|
||
metaphysics explained why goals are pursued by beings in the world,
|
||
but it denied that pursuing them was a result of free will and it
|
||
failed to explain why those goals are good. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
|
||
may not seem necessary, in the case of holiness, to take out a fourth
|
||
mortgage to establish spatiomaterialism as the foundation for a new
|
||
way of doing philosophy, because if spatiomaterialism can explain
|
||
everything but how there is something worthy of worship in the
|
||
natural world, it could be argued that what we have discovered is
|
||
that there is nothing sacred in space. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">However,
|
||
that would not work, if there were naturalists who continued to
|
||
believe in the sacred, because they would insist that it can be
|
||
explained by some kind of immaterialism. And if they were not just
|
||
being willful or arbitrary, but argued with us, giving reasons for
|
||
believing in spiritual substances of some kind, we could not claim
|
||
that the empirical method forces naturalists to believe that
|
||
spatiomaterialism is true. There would be a tradeoff between the
|
||
simplicity of materialism and the scope of immaterialism, and we
|
||
could not, in good conscience, defend any of the necessary truths of
|
||
ontological philosophy. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Thus,
|
||
we will take out a fourth mortgage on the foundation needed to do
|
||
philosophy in this new way. It may seem wildly optimistic at this
|
||
point, or even foolish, to promise an explanation of holiness. But as
|
||
we shall see, spatiomaterialism does show that there is something in
|
||
or about the natural world that is worthy of worship. This fourth
|
||
mortgage will be paid back in the sense that either the religiously
|
||
inclined will agree that it explains what they are getting at, or
|
||
else we will have sufficient grounds for holding that they are not
|
||
being fully rational about all the relevant issues in rejecting it.
|
||
The dispute may continue at that point, but it will be about their
|
||
rationality, not about whether spatiomaterialism is the foundation
|
||
for a new way of doing philosophy. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
|
||
completes the construction of the foundation of ontological
|
||
philosophy, though we carry quite a burden with us as we take up the
|
||
project of using spatiomaterialism as a foundation for necessary
|
||
truths. In order to hold that spatiomaterialism is the best
|
||
ontological explanation of the natural world, we must explain why
|
||
Einsteinian relativity is true, why beings like us are conscious, how
|
||
there is a real difference between good and bad, and how there is
|
||
something in the natural world that is worthy of worship. If we can
|
||
pay off those mortgages, however, the edifice that we shall construct
|
||
on that foundation will stand. What spatiomaterialism implies about
|
||
the world will hold necessarily relative to science and our ordinary
|
||
ways of reasoning about what to believe, including empirical science,
|
||
ethics, and the whole gamut of ordinary cognitive endeavors. And the
|
||
use of an empirical naturalistic ontology as a foundation for
|
||
necessary truths will have proved itself to be a new way of doing
|
||
philosophy. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<div id="sdendnote1">
|
||
<p class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
|
||
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote1sym" href="#sdendnote1anc">i</a>It
|
||
might be argued that ontological philosophy relies on only one
|
||
assumption, naturalism, because the other two assumptions might be
|
||
shown to be consequences of it. We are defining naturalism as the
|
||
assumption that the world is just what exists in space and time.
|
||
Since that is an ontological definition, we might already be
|
||
committed to explaining the natural world by substances and the
|
||
relations among them, for we will need self-subsistent entities of
|
||
some kind to explain its existence. Thus, naturalists already
|
||
accept, in effect, the validity of ontological explanation. And
|
||
since the world of objects in space and time we mean is the one that
|
||
is disclosed to us by perception, we might already be committed to
|
||
using what is perceived as evidence in choosing what to believe
|
||
about it. Thus, naturalists already accept the empirical method,
|
||
assuming that the standard of the best explanation is implicitly in
|
||
the nature of the explanation being given. Hence, naturalism might
|
||
be said to be the sole assumption for the foundation of ontological
|
||
philosophy. But the argument is not put that way here, because to
|
||
start by trying to defend a way of knowing about the world (or a way
|
||
of explaining it) as implicit in naturalism would obscure the
|
||
difference between ontological and epistemological philosophy. In
|
||
the present context, it is better simply to distinguish the three
|
||
assumptions and make them independently, since they are all equally
|
||
plausible.</p>
|
||
</div>
|
||
<div id="sdendnote2">
|
||
<p class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
|
||
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote2sym" href="#sdendnote2anc">ii</a><span lang="en-US">It
|
||
may seem that there is a way to for the perdurance theory to explain
|
||
the present without dismissing the phenomenon of the present as an
|
||
illusion, and it is relevant to mention it here, because it was
|
||
first suggested by </span><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Weyl"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Hermann
|
||
Weyl </u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">([1921]</span><span lang="en-US"><i>,
|
||
</i></span><span lang="en-US">p. 217) in defense of the perdurance
|
||
theory entailed by taking spacetime to be a substance. Einsteinian
|
||
relativity had led, as we shall see in the next section, to the
|
||
belief that what exists is a spacetime world in which the momentary
|
||
substances making up permanent substances are spacetime events, and
|
||
Weyl said, "The great advance in our knowledge . . . consists
|
||
in recognizing that the scene of action of reality is not a
|
||
three-dimensional Euclidean space but rather a </span><span lang="en-US"><b>four-dimensional
|
||
world in which space and time are linked together indissolubly</b></span><span lang="en-US">.
|
||
However deep the chasm may be that separates the intuitive nature of
|
||
space from that of time in our experience, nothing of this
|
||
qualitative difference enters into the objective world which physics
|
||
endeavors to crystallize out of direct experience. It is a
|
||
four-dimensional continuum, which is neither “time” nor “space”.
|
||
Only the consciousness that passes on in one portion of this world
|
||
experiences the detached piece which comes to meet and passes behind
|
||
it, as </span><span lang="en-US"><b>history </b></span><span lang="en-US">that
|
||
is, as the process that is going forward in time and takes place in
|
||
space." </span>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="sdendnote-western">Weyl is assuming that empirical
|
||
falsification of substantivalism about spacetime can be avoided by
|
||
holding that the present is just how spacetime and the spacetime
|
||
events it contains <i>appear </i>to “consciousness”. Though such
|
||
a response may be acceptable in epistemological philosophy, it leads
|
||
to an ontology that is decidedly inferior to the endurance theory,
|
||
because it is more complex and problematic. To assume that
|
||
consciousness “passes on” is to assume that <i>it </i>undergoes
|
||
real change, and thus, to follow Weyl is to postulate, in addition
|
||
to spacetime and the spacetime events that it contains, some
|
||
substance that does endure through time, always existing at each
|
||
moment as it is present, namely, consciousness. If consciousness is
|
||
postulated as a subjective substance, spacetime substantivalism will
|
||
not only be more complex (now postulating three basic kinds of
|
||
substances), but it will also face a serious ontological problem,
|
||
for it must then be explained how enduring substances can be related
|
||
to non-temporal substances. Indeed, it would be an ontology with two
|
||
different concepts of time, one that is part of the structure of
|
||
spacetime and another that characterizes the existence of
|
||
consciousness (as a substance enduring through time). That twofold
|
||
use of time complicates the perdurance theory in a way that makes it
|
||
not only more complex simpler, but also far more problematic.
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="sdendnote-western"><span lang="en-US">Weyl's approach is
|
||
still a common response, however. For example, see </span><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Penrose"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Penrose
|
||
</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">[1989], pp. 442ff. And
|
||
though McCall [1994] is only trying to rescue the openness of the
|
||
future, his ontology (or “model of the universe’) is also made
|
||
more complex and problematic by requiring both these concepts of
|
||
time.</span></p>
|
||
</div>
|
||
<div id="sdendnote3">
|
||
<p class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
|
||
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote3sym" href="#sdendnote3anc">iii</a><span lang="en-US">To
|
||
hold that only the present exists is to take sides with the
|
||
so-called “tensed theory of time” in a current dispute in the
|
||
philosophy of language (</span><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#OaklanderSmith"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Oaklander
|
||
and Smith</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">, [1994]), but
|
||
that does not mean that the perdurance theory can be defended by
|
||
endorsing the “tenseless theory of time”. The endurance theory
|
||
would hold that the tensed theory of time is correct in holding that
|
||
statements about past, present and future say something about the
|
||
world that is not implied by tenseless descriptions of before- and
|
||
after-relations that hold among events (or by analyzing the truth
|
||
conditions of such statements as indexical references to the moment
|
||
of their utterance) The tenseless theory must deny that only the
|
||
present exists, for otherwise it would have to admit that statements
|
||
about past, present, and future are something more than descriptions
|
||
of an event’s before or after relations to the moment of their
|
||
utterance. Such statements uttered at present would also be (true)
|
||
descriptions of how the event is </span><span lang="en-US"><i>related
|
||
to what exists</i></span><span lang="en-US">. And those uttered at
|
||
other moments would have </span><span lang="en-US"><i>no </i></span><span lang="en-US">truth
|
||
value, for they wouldn’t exist at all.</span></p>
|
||
<p class="sdendnote-western">There may be a standoff between these
|
||
two views in the philosophy of language. But that is not relevant
|
||
here, because our reason for preferring the endurance theory is not
|
||
based on analyzing truth conditions of statements about the past,
|
||
present and future. It is an argument in <i>empirical ontology</i>.
|
||
I am arguing that the best ontological explanation of the world
|
||
disclosed by perception, including the observation of real change,
|
||
is to postulate only enduring substances.
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p class="sdendnote-western"><a name="WilliamsC"></a><span lang="en-US">The
|
||
tensed theory has not been defended in this way in the recent
|
||
debate. Appealing to </span><span lang="en-US"><i>what we observe </i></span><span lang="en-US">is
|
||
not the same as appealing to phenomenology, as in Part III of
|
||
</span><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#OaklanderSmith"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Oaklander
|
||
and Smith</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US"> [1994]. The
|
||
former argument is not refuted by pointing out that the observation
|
||
would have the same causal connections on the timeless view, for it
|
||
is about the </span><span lang="en-US"><i>content </i></span><span lang="en-US">of
|
||
the observation, not its </span><span lang="en-US"><i>causal role</i></span><span lang="en-US">.
|
||
And though this view implies that there are properties of
|
||
“presentness”, “pastness” and “futureness”, their
|
||
meanings are explained in terms of existence: the present is what
|
||
exists, while the past and future do not, albeit for opposite
|
||
reasons. Thus, contrary to </span><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#WilliamsC"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Williams
|
||
</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">[1994], there is a basic
|
||
disanalogy between “presentness” and “hereness”, for what is
|
||
opposed to the former (past and future) does not exist, whereas what
|
||
is opposed to the latter (what is over there) does exist.</span></p>
|
||
<p class="sdendnote-western">Nor is a theory that explains how the
|
||
present is different from the past and future by its existence
|
||
plagued by the paradoxes that are supposed to undo the tensed theory
|
||
of time. For example, it avoids McTaggart’s paradox about time,
|
||
for it is not committed to there being events that have first the
|
||
property of being future, then the property of being present, and
|
||
finally the property of being past, for nothing exists but what
|
||
exists at present. Nor are there sentences about past, present and
|
||
future changing truth values, for the only sentences that exist (and
|
||
are capable of being either true or false) are in the present.</p>
|
||
</div>
|
||
<div id="sdendnote4">
|
||
<p class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
|
||
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote4sym" href="#sdendnote4anc">iv</a>Thus,
|
||
the acceptance of Einstein's theories was not merely the result of
|
||
empiricist skepticism about unobservable, theoretical entities. The
|
||
prevailing empiricism in the philosophy of science may have been
|
||
what inspired Einstein to formulate the special theory of
|
||
relativity, as is widely believed, but what led to its acceptance
|
||
was the scientific method. If absolute space and time had been just
|
||
unobservable entities mentioned by scientific theories, they would
|
||
have survived the philosophical doubts engendered by logical
|
||
positivism. After all, logical positivism did not convince
|
||
physicists to give up such unobservable theoretical entities,
|
||
including electrons, neutrinos, quarks, force fields and the like.
|
||
Doubt about the reality of absolute space and time came from their
|
||
<i>not </i>being mentioned by the best scientific theory of the
|
||
relevant phenomena. That is, there was no way to test, even
|
||
indirectly, whether or not they exist, because unlike theoretical
|
||
entities, they made no difference at all to what happens in the
|
||
world. It was the scientific method that led to their denial. In
|
||
other words, absolute space and absolute time were more like
|
||
metaphysical entities of the kind that the logical positivists had
|
||
originally and more justifiably intended to exclude from empirical
|
||
science, such as immaterial minds, immortal souls, and angels.</p>
|
||
</div>
|
||
<div id="sdendnote5">
|
||
<p class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
|
||
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote5sym" href="#sdendnote5anc">v</a><span lang="en-US">This
|
||
kind of emergentism is implied by </span><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Searle"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Searle</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
in </span><span lang="en-US"><i>The Rediscovery of Mind</i></span><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
though his confusion about ontological issues would probably lead
|
||
him to deny it. For a less confused discussion of the difference
|
||
between emergentism and epiphenomenalism, see </span><a class="western" href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Caston"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Caston</u></span></font></a></p>
|
||
</div>
|
||
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|
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