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Brian Fay: 2 The Basic Scheme of Critical Social Science
In this chapter I try to provide a relatively full and detailed picture of the components and structure of critical social science. I begin by discussing in section 2.1 the various elements which go to make up a critical theory. Then, in section 2.2., I combine these elements into a model of critical social science; I call this model the basic scheme. In section 2.3 I offer an example of how this scheme can be instantiated in a particular critical theory by discussing Marx's theory of capitalism. Lastly, in section 2.4, I show how the Basic Scheme satisfies the fundamental criteria for a social science to be critical, namely, that it be at once scientific, critical, practical, and non-idealistic.
2.1 The Elements of Critical Social Science
A critical theory wants to explain a social order in such a way that it becomes itself the catalyst which leads to the transformation of this social order. How can an explanatory theory accomplish this?
Assume for a moment that a society is marked by fundamental structural conflict and that this conflict produces deep suffering in its members. Indeed, assume further that this conflict has reached such a proportion that it threatens to lead to the breakdown of the society — that, in other words, the society is in crisis. Moreover, assume that one of the causes of this situation is the systematic ignorance that the members of this society have about themselves and their society — that, in other words, one of the causes of the crisis and its attendant suffering is what has been traditionally called the false-consciousness of some or all of its members. Furthermore, assume that the sufferers themselves wish their suffering could cease. Lastly, assume that the social order is such that if the sufferers came to have a different understanding of themselves, they would be able to organize themselves into an effective group with the power to alter their basic social arrangements and thereby to alleviate their suffering. Now this situation provides the perfect ground for a critical social scientist. Such a scientist could focus on the social crisis and explain it as in part the result of the false consciousness of the members of the society in question. Such an explanation would constitute a critique of themselves and their society at least for the sufferers, and, if offered in the proper manner, could lead to a change in their consciousness and subsequently to the transformation of this society itself.
Of course, not all crises are at least in part caused by the false consciousness of those experiencing them. Not all conflicts develop to the point of crisis either. Moreover, not all instances of false consciousness are amenable to the education I described. Nor will the elimination of false consciousness always yield the requisite changes in lifestyle and social condition that are needed to eliminate the suffering that is at issue. And even if such changes did occur, they might yield a greater amount of net suffering than the original position contained. If any or all of these were to be the case, the scenario for a critical social science that I portrayed would be undermined. Why, then, did I pick this particular scenario as the one appropriate for describing how a social scientific theory might be suitably critical? Answering this question will provide a good way of revealing the elements which comprise any critical theory.
The place to begin is with the fact that any critical theory is propagated with the idea that it will itself be the catalytic agent in the overthrow of a given social order. Now this means that a critical theory requires that liberation from a social order occur partly as the result of the absorption of itself by its audience — that liberation result from 'the enlightenment of the subjects of critical theory' (to use a phrase often found in the literature). Such a process of enlightenment is sometimes called 'raising the consciousness' of the oppressed.
What sort of enlightenment is involved here? The crucial element is providing the means whereby the members of its audience can come to see themselves in a radically different way from their current self-conception. Critical theorists do this by offering a theory which explains why these people are frustrated and unsatisfied, why they are doomed to continue in this condition, given their conception of themselves and their social order; and why it is that they have these conceptions. By doing this, critical theorists want to show them that as long as they conceive of their capacities and interests as they do, and as long as they understand their The Basic Scheme of Critical Social Science 29 social order as they do, they will remain thwarted. Moreover, this essentially negative tack is combined with a more positive one. For critical theorists will also offer to their audience an alternative conception of who they are, providing them with a new and radically different picture of their psychic economy and their social order.
But of course enlightenment by itself is not enough. Liberation requires that a group not only come to understand itself in a new way, but that it galvanize itself into revolutionary activity in which its oppressors are overthrown. To have the practical force it requires, critical theory must become an enabling, motivating resource for its audience — it must, in short, empower them. This empowerment has emancipation as its goal. The whole point of a critical theory is to redress a situation in which a group is experiencing deep but remedial suffering as a result of the way their lives are arranged. Its aim is to overturn these arrangements and to put into place another set in which people can relate and act in fuller, more satisfying ways.
The practical intent of critical social science is thus achieved only when all three phases of the tripartite process of enlightenment, empowerment, and emancipation are completed. But for this to happen, the arrangements which are responsible for the suffering of a group addressed by a critical theory must partly depend on the ignorance of the members of this group — otherwise, how could the learning of a mere theory have the desired effect? This in turn means that what I have called a group's false consciousness must be a causal factor in sustaining these arrangements. This is why in my scenario for a critical theory I made false consciousness causally operative in maintaining the social order at hand.
But why, when describing this scenario, speak of social crises rather than, say, social conflict? The answer to this question cannot be given strictly in terms of the idea of such a science. But it can be fashioned out of this idea combined with some quite plausible assumptions about human motivation. In the first place, in order for a critical theory to fulfill its practical task it must be the case that the people whom it is supposed to liberate will at some stage be willing — indeed ready — to listen and to act on its message. But it is highly unlikely that this will be the case unless the level of discontent they are experiencing is really quite high; otherwise, what might be called the 'natural resistance' to fundamental change will act as a counterweight to the desire for change, and will induce these people to accommodate themselves to the discontent they are suffering. But there must be more than just a high level of discontent. Anthropologists have described certain sorts of societies in which there is deep conflict built right into the very structure of these societies, but in such a way that at critical moments when it threatens to blow the society apart there are mechanisms to moderate the tension and so preserve the social order as a whole.' Such societies are indeed quite stable, even though marked by high levels of discontent. Such situations are not fertile ground for a critical social science; what is needed is a situation in which some sort of choice is forced on people because they are no longer able to function as they have done in the past. In a crisis situation, people cannot resist change and continue with the 'old ways'. It is likely that only when this sort of situation occurs can a critical theory gain a foothold, because only in this kind of choice-demanding situation will its potential audience be primed for it.
But what about a situation in which a critical social theory would lead to a radical change in a society and which, as a result, would alleviate the suffering once characteristic of it, but would do so by producing another sort of society with a new and worse form of suffering? A critical social theory would be inappropriate in this sort of situation precisely because the idea of such a theory demands that it produce an amount of net good greater than or equal to that of the original situation it seeks to explain and alter. The reason it must do this derives from the idea of critique which is central to the notion of critical social science. Any critique worthy of the name must claim that the situation it is criticizing is a relatively evil one. It thus would make no sense for a critical social scientist to condemn a social arrangement and call for its alteration, while at the same time admitting that the alternate arrangements which would emerge will be worse than the original.
Thus, I think it ought to be clear why I chose the scenario I did to introduce the notion of critical social science. For a social theory to be critical and practical as well as scientifically explanatory, the conditions described in it must be met. Specifically, these are: first, that there be a crisis in a social system; second, that this crisis be at least in part caused by the false consciousness of those experiencing it; third, that this false consciousness be amenable to the process of enlightenment I described; and fourth, that such enlightenment lead to emancipation in which a group, empowered by its new-found self-understanding, radically alters its social arrangements and thereby alleviates its suffering. It is only when this set of conditions occurs that a social science can be truly critical.
Knowing this scenario provides the basis for ascertaining the various elements which a critical theory would have to contain in order to fulfill its aspirations. In particular, such a theory would have to offer a critique of the self-understandings of the members of its audience; an explanation of why these self-understandings, though in some sense false, continue to be employed by these members; an account of why these understandings now can be undermined and how this can specifically be done in present circumstances; an alternative interpretation of the identity — the capacities and real interests — of this audience; a demonstration of the crisis nature of the workings of the society under discussion; and an identification of those aspects of this society which need to be changed if the crisis is to be resolved in a positive way for its audience. By offering this complex set of analyses to the relevant group at the appropriate time in the appropriate setting, a social theory can legitimately hope not only to explain a social order but to do so in such a way that this order is overthrown.
With this somewhat rough sketch of what is involved in a social theory being critical, perhaps I can now offer a somewhat more formal model which outlines its structure in a sharper if more abstract way.
2.2 The Basic Scheme
Taking together the elements of critical social science, it is evident that any social scientific theory which tries to be scientific, critical, practical, and non-idealistic all at once must consist of a complex of theories which are systematically related to one another. Specifically, a fully developed critical theory would comprise all of the following:
A theory of false consciousness which
1 demonstrates the ways in which the self-understandings of a group of people are false (in the sense of failing to account for the life experiences of the members of the group), or incoherent (because internally contradictory), or both. This is sometimes called an `ideology-critique';
2 explains how the members of this group came to have these selfmisunderstandings, and how they are maintained;
3 contrasts them with an alternative self-understanding, showing how this alternative is superior.
A theory of crisis which
4 spells out what a social crisis is;
5 indicates how a particular society is in such a crisis. This would require examining the felt dissatisfactions of a group of people and showing both that they threaten social cohesion and that they can32 The Basic Scheme of Critical Social Science not be alleviated given the basic organization of the society and the self-understandings of its members;
6 provides an historical account of the development of this crisis partly in terms of the false consciousness of the members of the group and partly in terms of the structural bases of the society. III A theory of education which
7 offers an account of the conditions necessary and sufficient for the sort of enlightenment envisioned by the theory;
8 shows that given the current social situation these conditions are satisfied.
A theory of transformative action which
9 isolates those aspects of a society which must be altered if the social crisis is to be resolved and the dissatisfactions of its members lessened;
10 details a plan of action indicating the people who are to be the `carriers' of the anticipated social transformation and at least some general idea of how they might do this.
Laid out in this way, one can see that a critical theory of society must actually consist of four different theories which, when unpacked, are comprised of ten sub-theories. Moreover, these theories must not only be consistent with one another, but must also be systematically related. By `systematically related' I mean that the elements of one theory or sub-theory must be employed in the other theories or sub-theories when appropriate. Thus, by way of example, the false consciousness of sub-theory no. 1 must be invoked in the historical account of sub-theory no. 6, addressed by sub-theory no. 7, and figure prominently in sub-theory no. 9.
This organization of four primary theories comprising ten sub-theories is the basic structure of critical social science. It is only when all of these elements are present and are related to each other in a consistent and systematic way that a theory of (some aspect of) social life can properly be called 'critical'. This is the case because it is only when the entire structure is intact that a theory can explain, criticize, and mobilize in the way a critical social science must.
The scheme of critical social science developed in this section is useful not only as an explication of the idea of such a science. It can also serve as a standard against which to compare various particular theories either to see that they are not genuine critical theories or where they are deficient.
Thus a theory might be intended as a critical theory and might meet some of the requirements of the scheme but not all of them. For example, Habermas's theory of late capitalism as sketched in Legitimation Crisis seems to fulfill the tasks set for a critical social science except those of providing sub-theories no. 8 and no. 10. Though apparently a small part of the critical scheme, such a lack is crucial from the viewpoint of critical social science because it is only when these sub-theories are provided that one can have an idea of how a theory can be truly practical. Thus, it is no accident that one of the most frequent criticisms of Habermas is that his theory has no bearing on our actual political life, that it is academic and utopian in the bad sense of these terms.
Moreover, the scheme is useful in helping to specify exactly in what ways theories which are critical in some respects are not in others. Thus, by way of example, Nietzsche's theory of modern morality (I am thinking here of On the Genealogy of Morals) is very much like the theories of critical social science.2 It contains one of the most lucid and arresting theories of false consciousness ever developed; it also proposes, in its remarks on the tendency toward nihilism of life organized around slave morality, what might be called a theory of crisis. But Nietzsche's is not a critical theory precisely because it does not propose — in fact, it positively disposes of— a theory of education, nor does it put forward a theory of transformative action. Nietzsche did not believe that the health of the species could be established through enlightenment or revolutionary social change; indeed, he felt that such beliefs were themselves symptoms of the sickness of the modern period with its overweening pride in thought and its theory rooted in the ascetic denial of instinct.3
2.3 An Example: Marx's Theory of Capitalism
Are there any social scientific theories which fit the critical scheme I have given? As I wrote in the Introduction, I think there are a number of social and psychological theories of the past hundred years that meet all or most of its requirements. Perhaps the most notable of them is Marx's theory of capitalist society if it is suitably construed. I say 'suitably construed' because there are a number of different ways of understanding his theory, not all of which see it as critical. Marx has had interpreters who have cast his thought in a much more 'scientific' and materialist mold; they thus have discounted the causal role ideas play in his theories and have proposed a different, essentially instrumentalist account of the way his theories are supposed to be useful in transforming society.4
Nor is interpretation made any easier by the fact that Marx himself was inconsistent in the way he conceived his work. Sometimes he claimed to be `scientific' in a fairly narrow, essentially positivist sense of the term; at other times, eager to place his work in the context of revolutionary activity, he asserted that his theories were scientific in a new and radically different way.5 He certainly wanted to achieve the epistemological standing accorded to natural science — he wanted to prevent his work from being thought pseudo-scientific or 'metaphysical.' The question was, therefore, how to understand the epistemological requirements for an endeavor to be scientific, and to this question he gave different and incompatible answers at different times.6
However, it is possible to reconstruct Marx's theory of capitalism as an instance of critical social science.' In terms of the scheme I have given, such a construal would look like this:
Marx's Critical Theory of Capitalist Society
- The theory of alienation and the critique of political economy. Here the self-understandings of people in capitalist society are shown to be illusions in which they take forms of their own self-activity — such as God, the market, or the state — to be objects independent of themselves and which they must obey; and wherein the thought of economists and other social scientists mirrors this alienation by reifying social relations. The theory of alienation is a development of the theory of human society developed in sub-theory no. 3.
- The theory of ideology. Here the relation between the capitalist social order and the illusions discussed in sub-theory no. I is recounted, showing how this order causes these illusions and how, in turn, these illusions are functional for the maintenance of this order.
- The theory of homo faber and the communist society. Here the proper understanding of humans as praxis animals who create themselves in the process of recreating the material and social conditions of their own existence is presented. It is shown how only in a communist society is this praxis activity given full, free, self-conscious expression.
- The theory of social contradictions. Here a general account of crisis is provided, employing the concepts of the forces of production and the relations of production
- The theory of capitalist crisis. Here the general account of sub-theory no. 4 is applied to capitalist society in terms of the laws of the falling rate of profit and the polarization of classes — which are themselves due to the increasing pauperization of the working class and the monopolization of capital.
- The theory of capitalist accumulation and the theory of class. Here an historical account of the crisis discussed in sub-theory -no. 5 is provided, utilizing the broad notions of capital and labor and the classes associated with them. Central to this account is the emergence of commodity production, the production of surplus-value, the creation of profit, and the antagonism of the classes found in the political, economic, and cultural spheres.
- The theory of class consciousness. Here is given a description of the process whereby the members of the working class will come to see themselves as members of this class and, as such, in direct opposition not only to members of the bourgeoisie but to capitalism itself. This description contains a discussion of the educative role of the members of the Communist Party.
- The theory of socialization Here the changing conditions of capitalist organization are shown to make possible the development of class consciousness discussed in sub-theory no. 7. These conditions include the emergence of joint-stock companies, workers' cooperatives, unions, and the mechanization of production, as well as the general collapse of the economic system as presented in sub-theory no. 5.
- The theory of revolutionary praxis. Here the aspects of capitalist society which must be altered in order to create the Communist society are spelled out. Specifically, the institutions of private property, the market, and the state must be eliminated, and new forms of cooperative and consciously directed labor must replace them.
- The theory of the party and political action Here the relation between those already enlightened by the theory who have formed themselves into a social institution (the Communist Party), the potential audience for the theory (the members of the working class), and the forces of domination (including the state) is portrayed. Such a portrayal contains some rough guidelines as to the sorts of strategy to be employed by the Party in order to achieve the education of the working class discussed in sub-theory no. 7 and the revolutionary praxis discussed in sub-theory no. 9.
If Marx's theory of capitalism is indeed a critical theory which seeks not only to interpret the world but to change it through 'revolutionary praxis', then the basic scheme of critical social science which I have presented enables one to grasp exactly the special nature of this sort of theory. To say that Marx's theory — or any theory, for that matter — is 'critical' means precisely that it is composed of four primary theories (of false-consciousness, crises, education, and transformative action) which are themselves comprised of ten sub-theories. In terms of these, Marx's theory is well qualified.
Of course, I hasten to add, it does not follow that just because a social scientific theory is an instance of critical social science it is therefore true, any more than its being a properly natural scientific theory would thereby make it true. Marxist social theory can be a good example of a critical social science and still be utterly false as a theory of contemporary capitalist societies. To be an instance of a certain sort of social science is one thing; to be a true theory giving a correct picture of how a society works (or can work) is quite another.
2.4 How the Basic Scheme is Scientific, Critical, and Practical
How does the scheme outlined in section 2.2 meet the criteria for a science to be genuinely critical? That is, how are theories formed on the basis of this scheme scientific, critical, and practical all at once, and how are they so in a non-idealistic way?
Earlier I defined as 'scientific' those explanatory endeavors which seek The Basic Scheme of Critical Social Science 37 to account for a wide range of phenomena on the basis of a few theoretical principles, and which do so in a way which is responsive to public, empirical evidence. Given this definition, the basic scheme of critical social science calls for theories which are indeed scientific.
In the first place, it is obvious from the scheme that it calls for theories which are genuinely explanatory. Each of the four major theories of the model is intended to explain a particular aspect of a social situation: the first explains the causes of the self-(mis)understandings of a group of people; the second explains the causes and nature of the crisis in which a social system is caught; the third explains the conditions sufficient for the sort of enlightenment envisioned by the theory; and the fourth explains the conditions which must be altered if the social crisis is to be resolved in the requisite manner: Moreover, these four theories must not only be consistent with one another, but must be systematically related such that elements of one of them are employed in the others when appropriate. This means that they are not four separate theories but four interrelated parts of a single theory.
This single theory meets the criterion that it explains a wide range of phenomena on the basis of a few principles. Evidently the range of phenomena is wide: it covers the basic conflicts within a society; the dissatisfactions of (some of) the members of this society; the contents and conditions of the basic ideas shared by these members; and the conditions for change in basic self-perception and in social organization. Moreover, these disparate phenomena are related by showing how they are the manifestations of a relatively simple underlying process, namely, the interplay between a (false) self-understanding on the part of a group combined with the existence of certain social practices and institutions — some of which are coercive.
Of course, the detailing of this process in the ten sub-theories results in a theory of some complexity. This complexity derives not just from the large number of sub-theories required to do the job, but also from the rich assortment of explanatory devices which are employed to provide an account of the phenomena in question. Some of these devices are straightforwardly causal in character (thus, sub-theory no. 7 solicits a general causal account of the conditions sufficient for enlightenment); others are narrative-historical (thus, sub-theory no. 3 calls for an historical story of how the members of a group came to have the self-understandings they have); some are interpretive (thus, sub-theory no. 1 requires a specification of the meanings of the various self-understandings of a particular group); some are structural (thus, sub-theory no. 4 demands a general picture of what a crisis in a social system is); still others are broadly functional (thus, sub-theory no. 5 seeks an etiology of the dissatisfactions of the members of a group which sees them as part of an ongoing system of social relations); and some are competence - theoretic in character (thus subtheory no. 7 prescribes a theory designed to elucidate the capacities of rational human beings to reflect on and alter their character). An arsenal of diverse weapons is employed to achieve the goal of understanding a society in order to transform it.
However, none of these explanatory devices is unique to the critical model I have outlined. Indeed, all of them are to be found in ordinary social scientific endeavor. This leads me to the second criterion for a theory's being scientific, namely, that it be subject to public, empirical evidence. For in so far as the critical model calls for theories which are of the same sort as are found in social sciences which are generally recognized to be responsive to intersubjectively available facts, there is no reason to believe that the critical model is any less scientifically responsible than they are.
If one examines the various theories and their component sub-theories, one will find nothing mystical or occult about them. They make predictions which are as testable as any others in the social sciences. True, they involve mental states such as the beliefs of people, institutions such as the market, and cultural objects such as religious doctrines, none of which is observable in the way straightforwardly physical objects are. Nevertheless, explanations and descriptions of these are not thereby uncontrollable because they all relate ultimately to the observation of behavior.
Of course, in a critical social science the evidence will not be free from the theoretical commitments of the scientist, nor is the relationship between the evidence and the critical theory a simple, one-to-one relationship. But then neither of these is the case in the other social sciences or, for that matter, in the natural sciences. One would think that these characteristics made critical theory unscientific because unverifiable or unfalsifiable only on the most rigid, and now largely discredited, positivist construal of theory and evidence.
Given that a theory which realized the basic scheme of critical social science would be scientific, how would such a theory be critical? It would be critical both in a direct and in an indirect but more powerful way. The direct way can be seen by looking at sub-theories no. 1 and 3. In them the critical theorist attempts to show that the self-understandings of a group of people are false, and to provide them with another conception which is superior. In other words, the critical theorist criticizes a group of people's pictures of themselves and their world. In this straightforward sense, a critical theory is critical.
But it is critical in a more indirect but important manner. A critical theory is propounded with the specific end in mind of providing people with a systematic critique of their own self-understandings and social practices in order to provide them with the knowledge on the basis of which they can change the way they live. It does this because it is rooted in the belief that there is something wrong with the way these people are living, that theirs is an improper form of existence. The whole point of a critical theory is to offer an assessment of a way of life which shows how it is inadequate because frustrating and unsatisfying to those who suffer it. It is in this sense that the critical scheme I detailed is critical. It is a more indirect sense because this element of its critical dimension, unlike the element I discussed above, is not found in the theory itself, but in the purpose the theory serves.
What of the scheme's practicality? Here the answer is simple and clear: both the theory of education and the theory of transformative action are bearers of the practical aspirations of critical social science. The theory of education tries to spell out the mechanism whereby the enlightenment of the audience it seeks to foster can occur. The theory of transformative action attempts to reveal to this audience those aspects of their lives which they must change to free themselves from their dissatisfactions, and it also provides an action-plan indicating how and by whose action this change is to take place.
And lastly, what of the non-idealism of the scheme? Recall from chapter 1 that 'idealism' has three different meanings. Idealism r claims that peoples' ideas are of sole importance in causing social behavior. Idealism II asserts that for people to alleviate their dissatisfactions all they must do is change their ideas about what they are doing. Idealism in assumes that people are generally willing to change their ideas on the basis of educative enlightenment, that they will listen to rational analyses and act on them. Given the role that 'false consciousness', 'enlightenment', and 'education' play in critical science, it might well appear that it is idealist in all three senses. But this appearance is deceiving.
Thus, a critical social theory exemplifying the basic scheme need not claim that peoples' ideas are the sole factor in causing their behavior, for it assigns just as important a role in this to the social conditions in which people live. Indeed, in sub-theory no. 6 it even claims that people have the ideas they do as a result of their social situation. The basic scheme tries to synthesize the idealist and the epiphenomenalist positions by allowing that ideas can be a function of social conditions but also that they can in turn play a causal role in creating and sustaining particular social structures. It permits there to be more than a unilinear and onedirectional causal relationship between ideas and structure, and in fact encourages one to see the relationship as dialectical in which changes in social structure help promote changes in ideas which in turn help to foster a new sort of social structure and so on. (Of course, how this actually occurs in concrete detail and what the specific causal relationships are is the job for a particular critical theory to spell out.) In this way the basic scheme avoids idealism I.
In the second place, it is not the case that the basic scheme commits one to the proposition that in order for people to alleviate their dissatisfactions all they must do is change their ideas about what they are doing. A critical theory claims — in sub-theory no. 9 — that people must also change their mode of living if a genuinely satisfactory solution to their problems is to result. A critical social theory constructed according to the basic scheme is bound to say that people must change their ideas; but it must also say that these people must change their behavior and their social institutions. In claiming this, such a theory escapes idealism II.
In the third place, a suitably developed critical theory will not be idealist because it will not naively assume that people are so rational and open-minded that all reformers need do is to propagate their theory in order for it to be effective. In sub-theories nos. 7 and 8 the conditions in which people will be responsive to critical analysis, and thus the conditions in which enlightenment can occur, are spelled out. In this way idealism in is eschewed by the basic scheme.
Thus, the scheme I presented avoids being idealistic in all three senses of the term. This, together with what I have already said about its scientific, critical, and practical standing, leads me to conclude that the basic scheme meets the general criteria of being scientific, critical, practical, and non-idealistic. However, I must concede that there remain difficult questions about the scheme's ability to satisfy these criteria. Some of these are: how is the falsity of false consciousness to be construed, and on what basis can a judgement of this sort be rationally made? What is the relationship between the truth of a critical theory and the reaction of its audience, such that both its scientific and practical aspirations can be achieved? How are the depth interpretations which play such a central role in critical theories subject to empirical evidence? What scientific sense can there be to such terms as 'real interests'? If certain values are presupposed by a critical science, does this make it non-scientific? On what basis can the values of critical social science be rationally defended? In its practical guise, critical science seems to be committed to denying that social behavior is law-governed; but in its scientific guise, does it not need to discover scientific laws? In light of the continuing exigency of these questions, all that can be said is that my basic scheme only prima facie meets the criteria of being scientific, critical, practical, and non-idealistic.
However, this is sufficient for my purposes, and thus I do not need to pursue these outstanding questions any further.8 My aim in this book is to uncover and criticize the foundations of critical social science, not to articulate a fully acceptable version of it which would unquestionably satisfy the criteria I have laid out. That is, my purpose is not so much an investigation of the detailed workings of critical science as it is an explication and criticism of the ground upon which this sort of science is constructed. Given this purpose, the basic scheme that I have outlined is sufficient to provide an adequate basis for an examination of the assumptions which lie hidden in the idea of such a science. It is thus to the task of unearthing these assumptions that I now turn, commencing in chapter 3 with the metaphysical beliefs about humans and their societies presupposed by critical science.
The open society and it's enemies
End of chapter 20 and chapter 21
Both AI and Bitcoin are improvements to capital
Digital Minimalism by Cal Newport
Chapter 3 is where the method is really