FEAT: Harden Shell Actuator and implement formal safety tests

This commit is contained in:
2026-04-11 15:24:46 -04:00
parent 9497a5955c
commit b2acd9c702
5 changed files with 204 additions and 22 deletions

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@@ -42,6 +42,30 @@ Interfaces for secure system calls. State is event-driven via the core kernel bu
(defun execute-shell-safely (action)
"Verifies command against whitelist and captures diagnostics.")
(defun trigger-skill-shell-actuator (context)
"Monitors for shell-response events.")
** 3. Success Criteria
*** DONE Whitelist Enforcement
- Verified that only `*allowed-commands*` can be executed.
- Added a strict `*shell-metacharacters*` check to block command injection.
*** DONE Diagnostic Capture
- Verified that STDOUT, STDERR, and Exit Codes are correctly captured and re-injected.
*** DONE Result Analysis Loop
- The `:neuro` component successfully formats command results for Sovereign review.
* Phase B: Blueprint (PROTOCOL)
:PROPERTIES:
:STATUS: SIGNED
:END:
** 1. Architectural Intent
Interfaces for secure system calls. State is event-driven via the core kernel bus.
** 2. Semantic Interfaces
#+begin_src lisp
(defun execute-shell-safely (action)
"Verifies command against whitelist and metacharacter blacklist, then captures diagnostics.")
(defun trigger-skill-shell-actuator (context)
"Monitors for shell-response events.")
@@ -53,21 +77,41 @@ Interfaces for secure system calls. State is event-driven via the core kernel bu
** Whitelisting & Execution
#+begin_src lisp :tangle ../src/shell-logic.lisp
(in-package :org-agent)
(defparameter *allowed-commands* '("ls" "git" "rg" "grep" "date" "echo" "cat" "node" "python3" "sbcl"))
(defparameter *shell-metacharacters* '(#\; #\& #\| #\> #\< #\$ #\` #\\ #\!)
"Characters that are banned in shell commands to prevent injection.")
(defun shell-command-safe-p (cmd-string)
"Returns T if the command string contains no dangerous metacharacters."
(not (some (lambda (char) (find char cmd-string)) *shell-metacharacters*)))
(defun execute-shell-safely (action context)
(let* ((cmd-string (getf (getf action :payload) :cmd))
(executable (car (uiop:split-string cmd-string :separator '(#\Space)))))
(if (member executable *allowed-commands* :test #'string=)
(multiple-value-bind (stdout stderr exit-code)
(uiop:run-program cmd-string :output :string :error-output :string :ignore-error-status t)
(org-agent:inject-stimulus
`(:type :EVENT :payload (:sensor :shell-response :cmd ,cmd-string :stdout ,(or stdout "") :stderr ,(or stderr "") :exit-code ,exit-code))
:stream (getf context :reply-stream)))
(org-agent:inject-stimulus
`(:type :EVENT :payload (:sensor :shell-response :cmd ,cmd-string :stdout "" :stderr "ERROR - Command not in security whitelist." :exit-code 1))
:stream (getf context :reply-stream)))))
(executable (car (uiop:split-string (string-trim " " cmd-string) :separator '(#\Space)))))
(cond
;; 1. Metacharacter check (Injection prevention)
((not (shell-command-safe-p cmd-string))
(org-agent:inject-stimulus
`(:type :EVENT :payload (:sensor :shell-response :cmd ,cmd-string :stdout "" :stderr "ERROR - Security Violation: Dangerous metacharacters detected." :exit-code 1))
:stream (getf context :reply-stream)))
;; 2. Whitelist check
((not (member executable *allowed-commands* :test #'string=))
(org-agent:inject-stimulus
`(:type :EVENT :payload (:sensor :shell-response :cmd ,cmd-string :stdout "" :stderr "ERROR - Command not in security whitelist." :exit-code 1))
:stream (getf context :reply-stream)))
;; 3. Safe Execution
(t
(multiple-value-bind (stdout stderr exit-code)
(uiop:run-program cmd-string :output :string :error-output :string :ignore-error-status t)
(org-agent:inject-stimulus
`(:type :EVENT :payload (:sensor :shell-response :cmd ,cmd-string :stdout ,(or stdout "") :stderr ,(or stderr "") :exit-code ,exit-code))
:stream (getf context :reply-stream)))))))
#+end_src
(defun execute-sandboxed-script (action context)
"Executes a synthesized script (Python/Lisp/JS) in a controlled directory.
This enables SOTA-level Tool Synthesis and Iterative Fixing."