passepartout/skills/org-skill-bouncer.org

SKILL: Bouncer (org-skill-bouncer.org)

• Overview
• Implementation
  • Security Configuration — network whitelist
  • Privacy filter tags (bouncer-privacy-tags)
  • Protected file paths (bouncer-protected-paths)
  • Content exposure patterns (bouncer-exposure-patterns)
  • Shell safety — timeout
  • Shell safety — output limit
  • Shell safety — blocked patterns
  • Secret Path Check (bouncer-check-secret-path)
  • Content Exposure Scanner (bouncer-scan-exposure)
  • Vault Secret Scanning (bouncer-scan-secrets)
  • Privacy Tag Check (bouncer-check-privacy-tags)
  • Lisp Validation Gate (bouncer-check-lisp-valid)
  • REPL Verification Gate (bouncer-check-repl-verified)
  • Shell Safety Check (bouncer-check-shell-safety)
  • Network Check (bouncer-check-network-exfil)
  • Main Security Gate (bouncer-check)
  • Approval Processing (bouncer-process-approvals)
  • Flight Plan Creation (bouncer-create-flight-plan)
  • Gate Logic (bouncer-deterministic-gate)
  • Skill Registration

Overview

The Bouncer Skill is the physical security layer of OpenCortex. It enforces operational security checks on all proposed actions.

Implementation

Security Configuration — network whitelist

Domains that the Bouncer considers safe for outbound connections. Network calls to unlisted domains are blocked or queued for approval.

(defvar *bouncer-network-whitelist*
  '("api.telegram.org" "matrix.org" "googleapis.com" "openai.com" "anthropic.com")
  "Domains the Bouncer considers safe for outbound connections.")

Privacy filter tags (bouncer-privacy-tags)

List of tag strings that mark content as private. Content with these tags is filtered from the LLM context window. Configurable via PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS env var.

(defvar bouncer-privacy-tags
  (let ((env (uiop:getenv "PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS")))
    (if env
        (uiop:split-string env :separator '(#\,))
        '("@personal")))
  "Tags marking content as private. Set via PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS.")

Protected file paths (bouncer-protected-paths)

Path patterns (with * wildcards) that are blocked from file reads. Covers SSH keys, PEM/PGP files, credentials, tokens, env files, and cloud configs.

(defvar bouncer-protected-paths
  '(".env" ".env.example" ".env.local" ".env.production"
    "*credentials*" "*cred*"
    "*id_rsa*" "*id_dsa*" "*id_ecdsa*" "*id_ed25519*"
    "*.pem" "*.key" "*.p12" "*.pfx" "*.asc" "*.gpg" "*.pgp"
    "secring.*" "pubring.*" "private-keys-v1.d/*"
    "token*" "*secret*" "*token*"
    ".netrc" ".git-credentials" "auth.json"
    ".aws/credentials" ".aws/config"
    ".kube/config" "kubeconfig"
    "*.cert" "*.crt" "*.csr"
    "*password*" "*passwd*")
  "Path patterns blocked from file reads.")

Content exposure patterns (bouncer-exposure-patterns)

Named regex patterns for scanning content for secret exposure. Each entry is a (name regex) pair. Matches are reported by name so downstream code can act on specific categories.

(defvar bouncer-exposure-patterns
  '((:pem-key "-----BEGIN +(RSA|DSA|EC|OPENSSH|PGP) +PRIVATE +KEY *-----")
    (:pgp-key "-----BEGIN +PGP +PRIVATE +KEY +BLOCK-----")
    (:pgp-public "-----BEGIN +PGP +PUBLIC +KEY +BLOCK-----")
    (:openai-key "sk-[A-Za-z0-9-]{20,}")
    (:google-key "AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}")
    (:github-token "gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}")
    (:slack-token "xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{24,}")
    (:env-assignment "[A-Z_]+=[A-Za-z0-9+/=_\\-]{20,}")
    (:generic-secret "(api|secret|password|token)[ ]*[:=][ ]*[\"']?[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]{16,}"))
  "Named regex patterns for secret exposure detection.")

Shell safety — timeout

Maximum seconds a shell command is allowed to run before being killed.

(defvar *bouncer-shell-timeout* 30
  "Maximum seconds for a shell command before timeout.")

Shell safety — output limit

Maximum characters of shell command output to capture. Prevents memory exhaustion from infinite output.

(defvar *bouncer-shell-max-output* 100000
  "Maximum characters of shell output to capture.")

Shell safety — blocked patterns

Destructive and injection patterns that are blocked in shell commands. Covers rm -rf /, dd, mkfs, shred, backtick injection, and $() subshell injection.

(defvar *bouncer-shell-blocked-patterns*
  '((:destructive-rm    "\\brm\\s+-rf\\s+/")
    (:destructive-dd    "\\bdd\\s+if=")
    (:destructive-mkfs  "\\bmkfs\\.")
    (:destructive-format "\\bmformat\\b")
    (:disk-wipe         "\\bshred\\s+/dev/")
    (:disk-wipe-b       "\\bwipefs\\s+/dev/")
    (:injection-backtick "`[^`]+`")
    (:injection-subshell "\\$\\([^)]+\\)"))
  "Destructive and injection patterns blocked in shell commands.")

Secret Path Check (bouncer-check-secret-path)

(defun bouncer-wildcard-match (pattern path)
  "Matches PATH against PATTERN where * matches any characters."
  (let ((regex (cl-ppcre:regex-replace-all
                "\\*" (cl-ppcre:quote-meta-chars pattern) ".*")))
    (cl-ppcre:scan regex path)))

(defun bouncer-check-secret-path (filepath)
  "Returns the matching pattern if FILEPATH matches a protected path, nil otherwise."
  (when (and filepath (stringp filepath))
    (some (lambda (pattern)
            (when (bouncer-wildcard-match pattern filepath)
              pattern))
          bouncer-protected-paths)))

Content Exposure Scanner (bouncer-scan-exposure)

(defun bouncer-scan-exposure (text)
  "Scans TEXT for patterns matching known secret formats.
Returns a list of matched category keywords."
  (when (and text (stringp text) (> (length text) 0))
    (let ((matches nil))
      (dolist (entry bouncer-exposure-patterns)
        (let ((name (first entry))
              (regex (second entry)))
          (when (cl-ppcre:scan regex text)
            (push name matches))))
      matches)))

Vault Secret Scanning (bouncer-scan-secrets)

(defun bouncer-scan-secrets (text)
  "Scans TEXT for known secrets from the vault."
  (when (and text (stringp text))
    (let ((found-secret nil))
      (maphash (lambda (key val)
                 (when (and val (stringp val) (> (length val) 5))
                   (when (search val text)
                     (setf found-secret key))))
               *vault-memory*)
      found-secret)))

Privacy Tag Check (bouncer-check-privacy-tags)

(defun bouncer-check-privacy-tags (tags-list)
  "Returns T if any tag in TAGS-LIST matches a privacy filter tag."
  (when (and tags-list (listp tags-list))
    (some (lambda (tag)
            (some (lambda (private)
                    (or (string-equal tag private)
                        (search private tag :test #'string-equal)))
                  bouncer-privacy-tags))
          tags-list)))

(defun bouncer-check-text-for-privacy (text)
  "Scans TEXT for leaked privacy-tagged content."
  (when (and text (stringp text))
    (let ((lower (string-downcase text)))
      (some (lambda (tag)
              (search (string-downcase tag) lower))
            bouncer-privacy-tags))))

Lisp Validation Gate (bouncer-check-lisp-valid)

(defun bouncer-extract-org-lisp-blocks (content)
  "Extracts concatenated Lisp code from #+begin_src lisp blocks in an Org string."
  (when (and content (stringp content))
    (let ((lines (uiop:split-string content :separator '(#\Newline)))
          (in-block nil)
          (code ""))
      (dolist (line lines)
        (let ((clean (string-trim '(#\Space #\Tab) line)))
          (cond
            ((search "#+begin_src lisp" clean)
             (setf in-block t))
            ((search "#+end_src" clean)
             (setf in-block nil))
            (in-block
             (setf code (concatenate 'string code line (string #\Newline)))))))
      (when (> (length code) 0) code))))

(defun bouncer-check-lisp-valid (filepath content)
  "Validates Lisp syntax when writing .lisp files or Org files with lisp blocks.
Returns the validation result plist or nil if not applicable."
  (when (and content (stringp content) (> (length content) 0))
    (let ((to-validate
           (cond
             ((uiop:string-suffix-p filepath ".lisp") content)
             ((uiop:string-suffix-p filepath ".org") (bouncer-extract-org-lisp-blocks content))
             (t nil))))
      (when to-validate
        (multiple-value-bind (valid-p err) (ignore-errors
                                            (let ((*read-eval* nil))
                                              (with-input-from-string (s (format nil "(progn ~a)" to-validate))
                                                (loop for form = (read s nil :eof) until (eq form :eof)))
                                              (values t nil)))
          (unless valid-p
            (list :status :error :reason err)))))))

REPL Verification Gate (bouncer-check-repl-verified)

(defun bouncer-org-contains-defuns-p (content)
  "Returns T if the Org content contains any #+begin_src lisp blocks with defuns."
  (when (and content (stringp content))
    (search "defun " content :test #'char-equal)))

(defun bouncer-check-repl-verified (action filepath content)
  "Warns if writing a defun to an Org file without :repl-verified metadata."
  (let ((repl-verified (getf action :repl-verified)))
    (when (and filepath
               (uiop:string-suffix-p filepath ".org")
               (bouncer-org-contains-defuns-p content)
               (not repl-verified))
      (list :type :LOG
            :payload (list :level :warn
                           :text (format nil "Lint: Writing defun to ~a without :repl-verified flag. Did you prototype this in the REPL first?" filepath))))))

Shell Safety Check (bouncer-check-shell-safety)

(defun bouncer-check-shell-safety (cmd)
  "Checks a shell command for destructive patterns and injection vectors.
Returns a list of matched pattern names or nil if safe."
  (when (and cmd (stringp cmd) (> (length cmd) 0))
    (let ((matches nil))
      (dolist (entry *bouncer-shell-blocked-patterns*)
        (let ((name (first entry))
              (regex (second entry)))
          (when (cl-ppcre:scan regex cmd)
            (push name matches))))
      matches)))

Network Check (bouncer-check-network-exfil)

(defun bouncer-check-network-exfil (cmd)
  "Detects if CMD attempts to contact an unwhitelisted external host."
  (when (and cmd (stringp cmd))
    (multiple-value-bind (match regs)
        (cl-ppcre:scan-to-strings "(http|https|ftp)://([\\w\\.-]+)" cmd)
      (declare (ignore match))
      (when regs
        (let ((domain (aref regs 1)))
          (not (some (lambda (safe) (search safe domain))
                    *bouncer-network-whitelist*)))))))

Main Security Gate (bouncer-check)

(defun bouncer-check (action context)
  "Security gate for high-risk actions.
Vectors: lisp validation, secret path, secret content, vault secrets,
privacy tags, privacy text, shell safety, network exfil, high-impact approval."
  (declare (ignore context))
  (let* ((target (proto-get action :target))
         (payload (proto-get action :payload))
         (text (or (proto-get payload :text) (proto-get action :text)))
         (filepath (or (proto-get payload :filepath)
                       (when (equal (proto-get payload :tool) "read-file")
                         (proto-get (proto-get payload :args) :filepath))
                       (when (equal (proto-get payload :tool) "write-file")
                         (proto-get (proto-get payload :args) :filepath))))
         (content (when filepath (proto-get (proto-get payload :args) :content)))
         (cmd (or (proto-get payload :cmd)
                  (when (and (eq target :tool) (equal (proto-get payload :tool) "shell"))
                    (proto-get (proto-get payload :args) :cmd))))
         (approved (proto-get action :approved))
         (tags (proto-get payload :tags))
         (lisp-valid (when (and filepath content (not approved))
                       (bouncer-check-lisp-valid filepath content)))
         (repl-lint (when (and filepath content (not approved))
                     (bouncer-check-repl-verified action filepath content))))
    (cond
      (approved action)

       ;; Vector 0: REPL verification lint (warn, don't block)
      (repl-lint
       (harness-log "BOUNCER: ~a" (proto-get repl-lint :text))
       action)

       ;; Vector 1: Lisp syntax validation (block bad lisp writes)
      ((and lisp-valid (eq (getf lisp-valid :status) :error))
       (harness-log "LINT VIOLATION: Blocked write — lisp syntax error in ~a: ~a" filepath (getf lisp-valid :reason))
       (list :type :LOG
             :payload (list :level :error
                            :text (format nil "Lisp syntax error in ~a: ~a. The write was blocked. Fix the parenthesis balance and retry." filepath (getf lisp-valid :reason)))))

      ;; Vector 2: File read to a protected secret path
      ((and filepath (bouncer-check-secret-path filepath))
       (let ((matched (bouncer-check-secret-path filepath)))
         (harness-log "SECURITY VIOLATION: Blocked read of protected path '~a' (matched: ~a)" filepath matched)
         (list :type :LOG
               :payload (list :level :error
                              :text (format nil "Action blocked: Attempted read of protected path '~a'" filepath)))))

      ;; Vector 3: Content contains secret patterns
      ((and text (bouncer-scan-exposure text))
       (let ((matched (bouncer-scan-exposure text)))
         (harness-log "SECURITY VIOLATION: Content contains secret patterns: ~a" matched)
         (list :type :LOG
               :payload (list :level :error
                              :text "Action blocked: Content contains potential secret exposure."))))

      ;; Vector 4: Content contains vault secrets
      ((and text (bouncer-scan-secrets text))
       (let ((secret-name (bouncer-scan-secrets text)))
         (harness-log "SECURITY VIOLATION: Blocked potential leak of secret '~a'" secret-name)
         (list :type :LOG
               :payload (list :level :error
                              :text (format nil "Action blocked: Potential exposure of '~a'" secret-name)))))

      ;; Vector 5: Privacy-tagged content in action
      ((and tags (bouncer-check-privacy-tags tags))
       (harness-log "PRIVACY VIOLATION: Action contains privacy-tagged content")
       (list :type :LOG
             :payload (list :level :warn
                            :text "Action blocked: Content tagged with privacy filter.")))

      ;; Vector 6: Text leaks privacy tag names
      ((and text (bouncer-check-text-for-privacy text))
       (harness-log "PRIVACY WARNING: Text may contain leaked private content")
       (list :type :LOG
             :payload (list :level :warn
                            :text "Action blocked: Text may reference private content.")))

       ;; Vector 7: Shell destructive/injection patterns
      ((and cmd (bouncer-check-shell-safety cmd))
       (let ((matched (bouncer-check-shell-safety cmd)))
         (harness-log "SHELL VIOLATION: Destructive or injection pattern in command: ~a" matched)
         (list :type :LOG
               :payload (list :level :error
                              :text (format nil "Shell command blocked: contains unsafe pattern ~a" matched)))))

      ;; Vector 8: Network exfiltration
      ((and (or (eq target :shell)
                (and (eq target :tool) (equal (proto-get payload :tool) "shell")))
            (bouncer-check-network-exfil cmd))
        (harness-log "SECURITY WARNING: External network call detected. Queuing for approval.")
        (list :type :EVENT :payload (list :sensor :approval-required :action action)))

      ;; Vector 8: High-impact action approval
      ((or (member target '(:shell))
           (and (eq target :tool) (member (proto-get payload :tool) '("shell" "repair-file") :test #'string=))
           (and (eq target :emacs) (eq (proto-get payload :action) :eval)))
       (harness-log "SECURITY: High-impact action requires approval: ~a" (or (proto-get payload :tool) target))
       (list :type :EVENT :payload (list :sensor :approval-required :action action)))
      (t action))))

Approval Processing (bouncer-process-approvals)

(defun bouncer-process-approvals ()
  "Scans for APPROVED flight plans and re-injects them."
  (let ((approved-nodes (list-objects-with-attribute :TODO "APPROVED"))
        (found-any nil))
    (dolist (node approved-nodes)
      (let* ((attrs (org-object-attributes node))
             (tags (getf attrs :TAGS))
             (action-str (getf attrs :ACTION)))
        (when (and (member "FLIGHT_PLAN" tags :test #'string-equal) action-str)
          (harness-log "BOUNCER: Found approved flight plan '~a'. Re-injecting..." (org-object-id node))
          (let ((action (ignore-errors (read-from-string action-str))))
            (when action
              (setf (getf action :approved) t)
              (inject-stimulus action)
              (setf (getf (org-object-attributes node) :TODO) "DONE")
              (setq found-any t))))))
    found-any))

Flight Plan Creation (bouncer-create-flight-plan)

(defun bouncer-create-flight-plan (blocked-action)
  "Creates a Flight Plan node for manual approval."
  (let ((id (org-id-new)))
    (harness-log "BOUNCER: Creating flight plan node '~a'..." id)
    (list :type :REQUEST :target :emacs
          :payload (list :action :insert-node :id id
                         :attributes (list :TITLE "Flight Plan: High-Risk Action"
                                           :TODO "PLAN" :TAGS '("FLIGHT_PLAN")
                                           :ACTION (format nil "~s" blocked-action))))))

Gate Logic (bouncer-deterministic-gate)

(defun bouncer-deterministic-gate (action context)
  "Main deterministic gate for the Bouncer skill."
  (let* ((payload (getf context :payload))
         (sensor (getf payload :sensor)))
    (case sensor
      (:approval-required
       (bouncer-create-flight-plan (getf payload :action)))
      (:heartbeat
       (bouncer-process-approvals)
       (if action (bouncer-check action context) action))
      (otherwise
       (if action (bouncer-check action context) action)))))

Skill Registration

(defskill :skill-bouncer
  :priority 150
  :trigger (lambda (ctx) (declare (ignore ctx)) t)
  :deterministic #'bouncer-deterministic-gate)