- Split competitive-analysis-2026-05.org → TOC + 9 competitor files in ideas/competitors/. Dropped date from filename. All competitor UUIDs generated, TOC keeps original UUID for backlink continuity. - Deleted passepartout-economics.org archive (replaced by 27-node KB). - Inlined 5 'See also' blocks into natural prose (compliance-index, first-mover-window, revenue-table, orders-of-magnitude-time, native-org-knowledge-base). - Linked 7 orphan compliance pages back to compliance index + finished truncated sentences. - Linked all 14 Agora requirement docs from topic-relevant pages (identity→lisp-machine-security, infrastructure→compute-marketplace, social-space→growth-strategy, exchange→agora-contracts, etc.). - Linked ai-industry-impact from investment-thesis, sufficiency-flip, verification-appliance, effects-growth-flywheel (up from 1 to 10+ pages). - Fixed CREATED timestamps to use git commit dates instead of today. - Made all links absolute from root (no port inheritance). - Removed stale agora/docs/ duplicate content.
23 lines
1.4 KiB
Org Mode
23 lines
1.4 KiB
Org Mode
:PROPERTIES:
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:ID: e929ff32-28d8-4a29-bf74-d55babc040d1
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:CREATED: [2026-05-22 Thu]
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:END:
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#+title: Codex CLI — OpenAI AI Coding Agent
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#+filetags: :passepartout:strategy:competitive:codex:
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OpenAI's open-source coding agent. Rust, ~950K lines, sandboxed.
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Architecture: ~116 crate Rust workspace with a protocol layer (SQ/EQ session types), sandbox manager (macOS Seatbelt, Linux nsjail), multi-provider support, configurable TUI.
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Safety model: Most sophisticated safety system of any coding agent analyzed. Multi-layer: process hardening (macOS Seatbelt with 4 profile tiers), execution policy engine, sandboxing via nsjail/Seatbelt, Guardian module for tool permission gating. No prompt-based safety — all deterministic through policy definitions.
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Data model: Protocol-defined session types. Structured request/response models. Config through TOML files with schema validation.
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Self-modification: Protected by sandbox — the agent cannot escape to modify its own binary or config without explicit policy override.
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Verification: None (no proof system).
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Key gap vs Passepartout: No knowledge graph, no persistent memory model, no deterministic gate stack for agent behavior (only OS-level sandboxing), no ACL2/prover, no neurosymbolic architecture. Strongest sandbox but weakest cognitive architecture.
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See the full [[id:3aa22300-2f25-57b0-8787-9f199cc978b1][competitive analysis]] for the landscape view and comparison.
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