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Org Mode
73 lines
4.1 KiB
Org Mode
#+TITLE: Innovation and Society :academia:UoN:@personal:
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#+FILETAGS: :atomic:note:
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* Innovation and Society :academia:UoN:@personal:
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:PROPERTIES:
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:CREATED: bfc9d640-45fb-4b42-a06f-d3440490a8d2
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:SOURCE: /home/user/memex/daily/2016-12-01.org
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:END:
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:CREATED: [2016-12-01 Thu 12:12]
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:MODIFIED: [2016-12-01 Thu 13:49]
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:IMPORTED: [2023-02-08 Wed 19:22]
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Industrial: own large resources
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Platform: rent large resources
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Distributed: own/rent small resources
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The platforms are not really decentralising production. They are replacing existing central platforms or creating new digital central platforms. The pressure is on old models and on middle-men.
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Truly decentralised platforms will not have central points of failure. Compare Napster to Bittorrent.
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AMR is not, however, merely a future threat—the present human and economic costs of AMR already amount to thousands of casualties each year, increase the infectious disease burden around the world and leads to billions of dollars in direct health costs and lost productivity CDC, 2013; Smith and Coast, 2013;
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Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, 2014).
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The problem of AMR is so dire that people are predicting that the era of antibiotics may be coming to an end, ushering in a ‘post-antibiotic’ era in which we will be as vulnerable to bacterial infections as we once were before Fleming’s discovery (Brown, 1994).
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AMR: Challenge, Threat or Disaster?
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It is indisputable that AMR is a major threat to individual and public health.
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In light of AMR’s severity and the risk it poses to public health, it appears intuitively plausible to describe it as a disaster.
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Nevertheless, given the nature of the problem of AMR, it seems prima facie plausible that it might qualify as a disaster.
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For instance, even if the concept of disaster does not currently count AMR as a disaster per se, it does not mean AMR does not present an extremely serious threat that government policy and individual action should take measures to mitigate or prevent right now.
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Concomitantly, it also means that the fact that AMR should be a top priority that requires urgent action need not automatically qualify it as a disaster either.
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Unlike an event such as an earthquake or a terrorist attack, the emergence of AMR is not a distinct, specifiable event that occurs and immediately causes us to go from a time of normalcy to a time of disaster.
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It then looks like we would have to have some specific threshold
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level of resistance at which AMR would become a reality.
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In this sense, the problem of AMR will be one of constant vigilance—trying to keep the slowly emerging aspects of the disaster at bay
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This would not constitute a replacement of existing strategies to develop new drugs and technologies to counter AMR, but rather
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an acknowledgement that, ceteris paribus, existing strategies fail to halt or reverse the trend towards more extensive drug resistance.
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In addition, understanding AMR as a predictable and unavoidable slowly emerging disaster—for which we can only mitigate consequences, rather than eliminate its causes—should lead us to
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rethink the often implausible rhetoric of combating and eradicating infectious diseases.
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Existing policies on AMR are usually restricted to a national or regional context, and to very specific groups of stakeholders.
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However, given AMR’s global impact, which cannot be managed
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within the confines of national borders, broader efforts at the international level to address the challenge are necessary (Laximinarayan et al., 2013).
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Understanding AMR as a slowly emerging disaster may also help to conceptualize the problem in a way that is more accessible to the general public—a stronger focus on the inevitability of its occurrence, and an emphasis of the fact that AMR can affect anyone could be useful to engage the general public to a greater extent than is currently the case.
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Since the current scale of AMR is a human-caused problem and its further spread can be influenced by human action, it would be
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counterproductive to conjure up an image that suggests the impending disaster is inevitable.
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* Backlinks
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- Source: [[file:/home/user/memex/daily/2016-12-01.org][2016-12-01.org]]
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