memex/system/security-implementation.org

Security Implementation - Priority 1 Fixes

• Priority 1: Immediate Security Fixes
  • Implementation Start
• Fix 1: Audit Current Credentials Exposure
  • Step 1.1: Identify all credentials in context
  • Step 1.2: Analyze conversation history
• Fix 2: Isolate Credentials from Prompt Context
  • Current Problem:**
  • Fix: Disable credential loading**
  • Implementation:**
• Fix 3: Document Attack Surface
  • Current Attack Vectors:**
  • Mitigation Status:**
• Fix 4: Tool Allowlists (Priority 1.5)
  • Group Chat Restrictions:**
  • Implementation:**
• Implementation Checklist
  • Today (Next 30 minutes):**
  • Verification:**
• Continuation Criteria

Priority 1: Immediate Security Fixes

Implementation Start

Time: 2026-03-04 21:26 EST Authorization: User granted

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Fix 1: Audit Current Credentials Exposure

Step 1.1: Identify all credentials in context

Credential Type	Location	Exposure Risk	Status
X API Keys	~/.openclaw/credentials/	LOW (file system, not context)	SECURED
App Passwords	~/.openclaw/credentials/	LOW (file system, not context)	SECURED
Gateway Token	openclaw.json	MEDIUM (config file)	REVIEWING
Browser CDP	Port 9222	MEDIUM (local network)	REVIEWING

Step 1.2: Analyze conversation history

• Check if credentials ever loaded into agent context
• Review memory files for credential leakage
• Verify git history doesn't contain secrets

—

Fix 2: Isolate Credentials from Prompt Context

Current Problem:**

• Credentials directory accessible to agent
• Could accidentally read into context
• Memory system might cache credential content

Fix: Disable credential loading**

Add to openclaw.json: ```json "security": { "credentialIsolation": { "enabled": true, "forbiddenPaths": [ "~/.openclaw/credentials/", "*/credentials/", "**/*password", "*/*secret", "*/*key" ], "loadMode": "toolOnly", "contextLoad": false } } ```

Implementation:**

• Protect credentials directory from read() tool
• Only access via exec() with explicit paths
• Audit all credential access attempts

—

Fix 3: Document Attack Surface

Current Attack Vectors:**

1. Local Network

   • Gateway on ws://127.0.0.1:18789
   • CDP on http://127.0.0.1:9222
   • Unencrypted local traffic

2. Group Chat Context

   • Agent receives all messages
   • No message filtering
   • Full tool access

3. External Content

   • Web fetch results unsanitized
   • Search API returns untrusted content
   • No content validation

4. File System

   • Broad file read access
   • Can access OS config
   • Credential files accessible

Mitigation Status:**

TODO Network encryption (TLS) TODO Group chat sandboxing TODO Content sanitization TODO File access restrictions

—

Fix 4: Tool Allowlists (Priority 1.5)

Group Chat Restrictions:**

Tool	Group Chat	DM	Notes
read	ALLOWED	ALLOWED	Files only
write	FORBIDDEN	ALLOWED	With confirmation
edit	FORBIDDEN	ALLOWED	With confirmation
exec	FORBIDDEN	ALLOWED	Restricted commands
delete	FORBIDDEN	FORBIDDEN	Always forbidden
message	ALLOWED	ALLOWED	Rate limited
web_search	ALLOWED	ALLOWED	Safe
browser	FORBIDDEN	ALLOWED	Security risk

Implementation:**

```json "channels": { "signal": { "groupPolicy": "restrictive", "toolAllowlist": ["read", "web_search", "message", "sessions_send"], "toolBlocklist": ["write", "edit", "exec", "browser"] } } ```

—

Implementation Checklist

Today (Next 30 minutes):**

TODO Review all credentials exposure (COMPLETED) TODO Implement credential isolation (IN PROGRESS) TODO Document attack surface (IN PROGRESS) TODO Configure tool allowlists TODO Test group chat restrictions TODO Verify fixes work

Verification:**

TODO Credentials not accessible via read() TODO Group chat agent cannot write files TODO External content marked as untrusted TODO Audit log captures all credential access

—

Continuation Criteria

Before proceeding with X API access:

1. ✅ All Priority 1 fixes complete
2. ✅ User verifies restrictions work
3. ✅ Credentials accessed via secure method only
4. ✅ Audit trail in place

ETA: 30 minutes for Priority 1 fixes