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157 lines
10 KiB
Org Mode
* The Death of Conservatism - Sam Tanenhaus
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:NOTER_DOCUMENT: ../../../library/books/Sam Tanenhaus/The Death of Conservatism (13614)/The Death of Conservatism - Sam Tanenhaus.epub
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:END:
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** This is what we have done in Egypt
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:PROPERTIES:
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:NOTER_PAGE: (7 . 18849)
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:END:
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#+BEGIN_QUOTE
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Conservatives today face a choice: Will they shine in reflected radiance or spin futilely on their
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lonely unlit orbit? If they seriously mean to offer more than nihilism, they must accept the
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obligation history places on the party exiled from power: the obligation to rethink and
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reevaluate, to undergo the serious work of self-examination and preparation.
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Conservatives did exactly that during the long period that extended from the 1930s through the
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1960s, a “down” cycle that prefigured this current one. At first many on the right, like Rush
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Limbaugh today, promulgated the dogmas of grievance and resentment, insisting in words like
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Limbaugh’s own that “the enemy within” had committed “treason” against the United States.
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But the movement’s best thinkers grew to understand that such denunciations amounted to a
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denunciation of America itself. They chose instead to address the authentic, rather than
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invented, crises of their time and tried to fashion serious rather than merely expedient
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arguments. They became analysts and critics, theorists and prophets. They observed politics from
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an engaged, constructive distance, made their outer orbit a useful vantage point from which to
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calibrate where the nation, under liberal rule, might be headed. And they exerted whatever
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influence they could through the vehicles of ideas and arguments. Unwelcome in “the
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mainstream media,” they could easily have retreated into an alternative universe and limited
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their conversation to preachments aimed at the like-minded few. They rejected that course,
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electing instead to seize whatever openings they could to join the larger quarrels, adapting their
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voices to the idioms and vocabulary of the day. When at last conservatives gained a foothold
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within the establishment, political and intellectual, it was because they had earned their way.
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They rejected extremism for centrism, purism for pragmatism, revanchism for realism. The
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public—including much of the liberal public—deemed them ready to govern. The moon had
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become a sun.
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Are conservatives prepared to travel this route again? No, to judge from current evidence. The
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figures now contending for movement leadership—Limbaugh; the GOP’s new Lazarus, Newt
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Gingrich; the aspirant governors Bobby Jindal and Sarah Palin—seem contentedly nestled within
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their fringe orbit. Even when they speak of reclaiming the center, they do so in the discredited
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idioms of the discarded past. This is equally true of the movement’s intelligentsia. Journals like
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Commentary, National Review, and The Weekly Standard, once sophisticated publications, are
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now mouthpieces of the Republican Party at its most revanchist. During the 2008 campaign one
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could read—at times scarcely avoid—effusions like those of Michael Barone inveighing against
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“the coming Obama thugocracy” and Jonah Goldberg railing against Obama’s “pals from the
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Weather Underground who murdered or celebrated the murder of policemen.” Most unsettling
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of all, perhaps, was the case of William Kristol, the founding publisher and editor of The Weekly
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Standard, who in his election-year column for The New York Times debased this valued space
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into a shabby storefront for the Republican presidential campaign. These conservative
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intellectuals recognize no distinction between analysis and advocacy, or between the competition
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of ideas and the naked struggle for power. To them the Democratic Party and all manner of
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liberals are simply the enemy, and if the majority of the country joins the “wrong” side, then
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they are the enemy, too, or its manipulated pawns.
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All movements have life spans. They spring into existence in response to particular conditions,
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and when those conditions change, often as a result of movement successes, they either disband
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or lose their relevance. The abolitionist movement effectively ended once Lincoln signed the
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Emancipation Proc lamation. The progressive movement lasted only fifteen years (from 1900 to
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1915), but in that time transformed American politics, shaping two of the great
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twentieth-century presidencies, Theodore Roosevelt’s and Woodrow Wilson’s, and making
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possible a third, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s.
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#+END_QUOTE
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** Notes for page (7 . 28288)
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:PROPERTIES:
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:NOTER_PAGE: (7 . 28288)
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:END:
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#+BEGIN_QUOTE
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The movement conservatives of our time seem the heirs of the French rather than of the
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American Revolution. They routinely demonize government institutions, which they depict as
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the enemy of the people’s best interests. But to classical conservatives the two entities,
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government and society, are mutually dependent. Burke drew no meaningful distinction
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between the state and society—that is, between the formally established institutions of
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government and those institutions rooted in patrimony, custom, and habit. The two were
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coterminous, at times almost interchangeable. “Government is a contrivance of human wisdom
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to provide for human wants,” he wrote, adding a few sentences later, as if following a single arc
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of thought, “Society requires not only that the passions of individuals should be subjected, but
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that even in the mass and body as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of men should
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frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought into subjection. This can
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only be done by a power out of themselves … [T]he restraints on men, as well as their liberties,
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are to be reckoned among their rights. But as the liberties and the restrictions vary with times
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and circumstances, and admit of infinite modifications, they cannot be settled upon any abstract
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rule.”
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#+END_QUOTE
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** Get Kendall's article
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:PROPERTIES:
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:NOTER_PAGE: (7 . 32922)
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:END:
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#+BEGIN_QUOTE
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Practically, this vision of orthodoxy amounts to war fought by other means. This was the
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argument put forth by Kendall, a disillusioned ex-Trotskyist who emerged as one of the Right’s
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most fertile thinkers during the Cold War period. His essay “What Is Conservatism?,” published
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in 1963, drew a bright line of demarcation between the Left and the Right. “The line in question
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is a line of battle,” Kendall wrote, “a line of battle moreover in contemporary American politics
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and a line of battle between two sets of combatants, each fighting to defeat the other.”
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#+END_QUOTE
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** Democrats in Congress deferred to Reagan
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:PROPERTIES:
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:NOTER_PAGE: (7 . 36723)
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:END:
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#+BEGIN_QUOTE
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The struggle between consensus and orthodoxy illuminates as well the contrasting approaches
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favored by each party’s congressional caucus. When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, he
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presented a program of steep tax cuts that many Democrats found radical. Yet forty-eight
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Democrats in the House and thirty-seven in the Senate voted for it. They did so partly in
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acknowledgment of the sweeping victory Reagan had won—51 percent of the vote, less than
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Obama won in 2008, but ten points more than the Democratic incumbent, Jimmy Carter, got.
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Still, Democrats had a fifty-vote advantage in the House in 1981. They could have stopped
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Reagan—or at least made a strong case for opposing him. Instead, they deferred to the popular
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will and to the tradition of allowing a new president to pursue his agenda.
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#+END_QUOTE
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** Clinton was a conservative
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:PROPERTIES:
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:NOTER_PAGE: (7 . 40166)
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:END:
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#+BEGIN_QUOTE
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As it happened, the Republicans were vindicated. The recession cycle had all but ended by the
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time Clinton took office, and the economy rebounded. Clinton, recognizing this, adjusted course
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and oversaw a period of remarkable prosperity. Unemployment decreased in each of the eight
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years he was in office. Like Dwight Eisenhower forty years before, he was a genuine Burkean.
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Both presidents struggled to neutralize movement forces in Congress through “a computing
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principle.” Both succeeded. And both left office with soaring approval ratings. They are the
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modern era’s two true conservative presidents—and the two best.
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#+END_QUOTE
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** Look up these two authors
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:PROPERTIES:
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:NOTER_PAGE: (8 . 4856)
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:END:
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#+BEGIN_QUOTE
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That the nation should turn to professors in its time of trouble was an affront, a confession of
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weakness. To an intellectual like H. L. Mencken, the figure who presided over this change was,
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variously, a “dictator,” “chartered libertine,” and the “King in the White House.” Roosevelt
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really believed, to Mencken’s astonishment, that “the nation would be vastly benefited if its
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present scheme of government could be radically overhauled, and the safeguards now thrown
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about property eliminated, and all power and prerogative handed over to men of vision, sworn
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to serve and save the lowly.” In fact, the New Deal was “a political racket … and nothing
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more,” Mencken wrote on the eve of the 1936 election. “Its chief practical business is to search
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out groups that can be brought into the [Democratic Party] machine by grants out of the public
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treasury, which is to say, out of the pockets of the rest of us.”
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#+END_QUOTE
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** The machine made the economy socialistic
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:PROPERTIES:
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:NOTER_PAGE: (8 . 36074)
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:END:
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#+BEGIN_QUOTE
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And with good reason. To Chambers, an avid student of history, well schooled in Marxist
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argument, it was obvious that the growing dependency on government was a function of the
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unstoppable rise of industrial capitalism and the new technology it had brought forth. “The
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machine has made the economy socialistic,” he wrote. And the Right had better adjust. “A
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conservatism that will not accept this situation … is not a political force, or even a twitch: it has
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become a literary whimsy.” It might well be “the duty of the intellectuals … to preach reaction,”
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but only “from an absolute, an ideal standpoint. It is for books and posterity. It does not bear on
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tactics or daily life … Those who remain in the world, if they will not surrender on its terms,
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must maneuver within its terms. That is what conservatives must decide: how much to give in
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order to survive at all; how much to give in order not to give up the basic principles.”
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#+END_QUOTE
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