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193 KiB
HTML
1976 lines
193 KiB
HTML
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
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<html>
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<head>
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<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
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<title>Properties</title>
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<meta name="generator" content="LibreOffice 4.2.8.2 (Linux)">
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<meta name="author" content="Amr Gharbeia">
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<body lang="en-GB" text="#99ccff" link="#0000ff" dir="ltr" style="background: transparent">
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font color="#ff0000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>P<img src="" name="OdhPProp_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="100" height="40" border="0">roperties.</b></font></font>
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Among the necessary truths about <i>what is </i>that follow from
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spatiomaterialism, the first set has to do with the nature of
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properties. Its main significance for issues in traditional
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philosophy is how it offers naturalists a solution to the problem of
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mind. By "consciousness," I mean the the fact that
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experience has an appearance to the subject, or that it is like
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something to be the subject. It cannot be explained without
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substances having phenomenal properties as well as physical
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properties, and ontological philosophy offers an explanation of
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phenomenal properties which entails that they have a necessary
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relationship to physical properties. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">This
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implication of our ontology does not depend on recognizing the
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existence of space, but would follow from any form of materialism
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that took ontology to be explanatory and used the concept of
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substance introduced in </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtdO04.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Ontology:
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Substances</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.
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That makes it unique among the implications of ontological philosophy
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concerning the issues raised by traditional philosophical issues, for
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the rest depend on substantivalism about space. </span></font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
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the case of phenomenal properties, the implications depend on our
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definition of the nature of substance, and the reason contemporary
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naturalists have overlooked this explanation is that materialism (or
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physicalism) is understood as realism about the theories of
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contemporary physics. Materialists posit the existence of whatever is
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required for the truth of the theories they believe, but they do not
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think much further about the nature of substances and properties.
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Thus, they take properties to be as ontologically basic as material
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substances, and that makes the relationship between physical and
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phenomenal properties seem puzzling. </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Let
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us consider first what ontological philosophy implies about the
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nature of basic properties and their kinds before we take up the
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problem that follow from taking properties as just objects of
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knowledge.</font></font></font></p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font color="#800000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>P<img src="" name="OdhPAsAs_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="103" height="36" border="0">roperties
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as aspects of substances.</b></font></font> We have already seen how
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properties are related to the substances postulated by an explanatory
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ontology. They are <i>aspects </i>of substances, or part of what is
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assumed by postulating them which reason can pick out. We leave open
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questions about how rational beings like us are able to distinguish
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one aspect from another (until we discuss how reason comes to exist
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in a spatiomaterialist world like ours and see how reason depends on
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spatial imagination). </font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><b>T<img src="" name="OdhPBasic_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="93" height="32" border="0">he
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basic properties of substances. </b></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">We
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have already seen that substances, as substances, have two basic
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aspects, existence and essence. That is, they have the property of
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existence as well as an essential aspect to their nature. (See
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</span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtdO05.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Ontology:
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Nature of substance</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.)
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But at this point, we must recognize two further aspects that may be
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involved in the essential aspect of the nature of substance as
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substance. </span></font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><i><b>E<img src="" name="OdhPExist_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="62" height="23" border="0">xistence.</b></i></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
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</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">We
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have already seen how the existential aspect of substance as
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substance (or its property of existing) includes two properties,
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particularity and temporality. In other words, to say that a
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substance exists is to say that it has an existence that is distinct
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from other substances in the world (particularity) and that it
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endures through time temporality). (We take the temporal aspect to be
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endurance, because we have seen that endurance is the best
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ontological explanation of the nature of time, including both change
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and what makes the present different from past and future than
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perdurance. See </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtfS06.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Spatiomaterialism:
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Best explanation of time</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.)
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</span></font></font></font>
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</p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>E<img src="" name="OdhPEssence_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="61" height="22" border="0">ssence.
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</b></i>Each substance must have an essential aspect in addition to
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its existential aspect, because in order to exist at all, it must
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exist in some determinate way. This was our reason for holding that
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substances have two basic aspects to their natures as substances, not
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only existence, but also an essence. It makes no sense to hold that
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something exists and to deny that it has any further aspect to its
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nature. But there may be two aspects to the essential aspect of the
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nature of substance as substance.</font></font></font></p>
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<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
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<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>I<img src="" name="OdhPIntrinsi_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="50" height="21" border="0">ntrinsic
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nature.</i> This most basic aspect of its essential nature will be
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called its "intrinsic" essential property, for it is the
|
||
kind of essential property that a substance has in virtue of existing
|
||
as something distinct from all the other substances in the world. It
|
||
is what the substance is <i>in itself</i>, or its way of existing on
|
||
its own. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>E<img src="" name="OdhPExtrinsi_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="50" height="20" border="0">xtrinsic
|
||
nature.</i> But its intrinsic essential nature is not all there is to
|
||
the essential nature of a substance, if the substance is part of the
|
||
same world as other substances (and the existence of other substances
|
||
is not entailed by its essential nature, as in the case of parts of
|
||
space). Insofar as the world is made up of substances that exist
|
||
independently of one another, and insofar as those substances are
|
||
related to one another in some way other than simply being parts of
|
||
the same world, each substance must also have extrinsic essential
|
||
properties relative to those other substances. It may have different
|
||
extrinsic essential properties relative to each kind of substance to
|
||
which it is related, but its essential nature must have some such
|
||
aspects. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus, the
|
||
essential aspect of the nature of substance as substance includes two
|
||
kinds of essential properties: an <i>intrinsic </i>essential property
|
||
and <i>extrinsic </i>essential properties. In other words, each
|
||
substance must <i>exist some way in itself </i>and it must also <i>exist
|
||
some way for other substances</i> that exist independently of it as
|
||
part of the same world. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The
|
||
<i>intrinsic </i>and <i>extrinsic </i>aspects of the essential
|
||
natures of substance can certainly be distinguished by reason. The
|
||
world is made up of substances, and we can think about each distinct
|
||
substance <i>as it is in itself</i>, whatever that may turn out to
|
||
be, because in order to exist at all, it must exist in some
|
||
determinate way. And if there are other substances whose existence
|
||
does not depend on what it is in itself, we can also think about <i>what
|
||
it is for other substances</i>, assuming that it is related to other
|
||
substances in some determinate way in addition to merely being part
|
||
of the same world with them (and that relation is not part of its
|
||
intrinsic essential nature, as in the case of parts of space relative
|
||
to one another). </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">What a
|
||
substance is in itself cannot be reduced to what it is for other,
|
||
independent substances, because if its extrinsic essential nature
|
||
were all there is to its essential nature, there would be nothing to
|
||
be related to other substances. Relations need <i>relata,</i> or
|
||
something that already exists. The <i>relata </i>are substances, and
|
||
since every substance has an essential aspect to its nature as well
|
||
as an existential aspect, each <i>relatum </i>has an intrinsic
|
||
essential aspect. Since substances already have intrinsic essential
|
||
natures, their relationships to other, independent substances must be
|
||
a further aspect of the essential aspects of their natures as
|
||
substances. Thus, each substance must have properties of both kinds,
|
||
though different kinds of substances making up the same world may
|
||
have different kinds of intrinsic and extrinsic essential natures.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>T<img src="" name="OdhPOfBasic_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="92" height="35" border="0">he
|
||
basic properties of the two basic substances.</b></font>
|
||
Spatiomaterialism postulates the existence of two basic substances,
|
||
matter and space, and it assumes that each bit of matter coincides
|
||
with some part of space or other. But as we have seen, matter and
|
||
space have opposite natures as parts of the world. Though in both
|
||
cases, it makes sense to think of the substances as consisting of
|
||
many particular substances, their parts are related to one another in
|
||
opposite ways. Bits of matter can exist independently of one another,
|
||
but no part of space can exist without all the other parts of space.
|
||
That is, space has a unique kind of wholeness about it, which matter
|
||
lacks. The parts of space are dependent on one another, whereas the
|
||
parts of matter are independent of one another. Being opposite in
|
||
this way is crucial to their roles in making up the natural world,
|
||
for nearly every new necessary truth that is supported by ontological
|
||
philosophy comes from how space contains all the bits of matter. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Matter
|
||
and space are, however, different basic substances. The existence of
|
||
one does not entail the existence of the other. We do not know what
|
||
bits of matter would be like, if they did not coincide with space, or
|
||
even if that is possible. But each has an existence that is distinct
|
||
from the other. That is the basic assumption of spatiomaterialism.
|
||
That is, there would be a difference between parts of space with
|
||
which bits of matter coincide and parts with which no bits of matter
|
||
coincide, even if that never actually happens, given what physics
|
||
implies about the nature of matter. (As we will see, however, space
|
||
can be empty.) </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Both
|
||
space and matter must, therefore, have all the basic properties that
|
||
entities must have to be substances at all, including both kinds of
|
||
existential properties and both kinds of essential properties. Space
|
||
and matter have existential properties in the same way. But since
|
||
each basic substance is made up of parts in opposite ways, each has
|
||
intrinsic and extrinsic essential properties in different ways. To
|
||
make this clear, let us generate a catalogue of all their basic
|
||
properties, starting with matter. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>B<img src="" name="OdhPMatter_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="62" height="23" border="0">asic
|
||
properties of matter. </b></i>Matter is a basic kind of substance,
|
||
and since it is related to every other substance (of both basic
|
||
kinds) in a determinate way, it must have both an intrinsic and
|
||
extrinsic aspect to the essential aspect to its nature as substance. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>I<img src="" name="OdhPIntrinsi_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="50" height="21" border="0">ntrinsic
|
||
nature of matter</i>. Matter must have an intrinsic nature, even if
|
||
matter cannot actually exist without being contained by space,
|
||
because it must exist in itself in a determinate way in order to have
|
||
an existence that is distinct from space. (That intrinsic nature may,
|
||
therefore, be what matter is in itself as it coincides with space,
|
||
but it is nevertheless different from the aspect of matter by which
|
||
it is related to space.) What is more, however, matter comes in
|
||
particular substances that exist independently of one another, and
|
||
thus, each material substance must have an intrinsic property
|
||
independently of all the other bits of matter. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
intrinsic property of each bit of matter is simply whatever it is in
|
||
itself, that is, as something that has an existence distinct from
|
||
every other substances. This could be anything a substance might be
|
||
in itself (though as we shall see, it is the aspect of the essential
|
||
nature of matter that makes it possible to explain phenomenal
|
||
properties.) Since there may be different forms of matter, with
|
||
different essential natures, the intrinsic properties of matter may
|
||
be various. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>E<img src="" name="OdhPExtrinsi_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="50" height="20" border="0">xtrinsic
|
||
nature of matter. </i>Each bit of matter must also have an extrinsic
|
||
aspect to its essential nature, because it is related to other
|
||
substances which exist independently of it as parts of a single
|
||
world. But according to spatiomaterialism, the substances that exist
|
||
independently of each bit of matter include both space and other bits
|
||
of matter, and thus, each bit of matter can have two fundamentally
|
||
different kinds of extrinsic essential properties: one by which it is
|
||
related to space, and aspect, which presumably depends on the former,
|
||
by which it is related to other bits of matter.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>E<img src="" name="OdhPToSpace_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="45" height="17" border="0">xtrinsic
|
||
nature of matter relative to space. </i>One kind of extrinsic
|
||
essential property of matter is how it is related to space. Every bit
|
||
of matter must be capable of coinciding with some part of space or
|
||
other, since that is what spatiomaterialism assumes the basic
|
||
relationship between matter and space to be. Given the essential
|
||
nature of space, as we have seen, that gives each bit of matter
|
||
certain spatial relations (in three dimensions) to every other part
|
||
of space. And since every other bit of matter coincides with some
|
||
part(s) of space or other, coinciding with space also gives each bit
|
||
of matter certain spatial relations to every other bit of matter in
|
||
space. They are all contained by space. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Each
|
||
bit of matter coincides with a part </span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><i>or
|
||
parts </i></span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">of
|
||
space. No assumption has been made about how much space bits of
|
||
matter can coincide with. There may be different forms of matter
|
||
contained by space, and different forms of matter may coincide with
|
||
larger or smaller areas of space. Bits of matter may even be spread
|
||
out in space unevenly. It depends on further aspects of the extrinsic
|
||
essential nature of matter relative to space which will be discussed
|
||
later (in </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtkCaL07.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Contingent laws of physics</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">),
|
||
when we take up the ontological explanation of physics and how space
|
||
and matter endure through time. All we assume here is that each bit
|
||
of matter has, at the moment of its existence, a unity about it, so
|
||
that it exists as a whole distinct from all other bits of matter. </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Furthermore,
|
||
since both matter and space endure through time, there may also be a
|
||
temporal aspect to the extrinsic essential nature of matter relative
|
||
to space. For example, it is possible that part of the extrinsic
|
||
essential nature of bits of matter relative to space is that they
|
||
move across space in some determinate way.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>E<img src="" name="OdhPToMatter_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="46" height="16" border="0">xtrinsic
|
||
nature of matter relative to matter. </i>Simply being contained by
|
||
space gives each bit of matter determinate spatial relations to every
|
||
other bit of matter, but that is not a basic part of its extrinsic
|
||
essential nature, because it is entailed by its extrinsic nature
|
||
relative to space, being contained by space, and the nature of space.
|
||
But since other bits of matter in space exist independently of it,
|
||
there can be a basic extrinsic aspect to its essential nature that is
|
||
relative to other bits of matter is space. For example, if one bit of
|
||
matter coincides with a particular part(s) of space, it may not be
|
||
possible for other bits of matter to be located there, or not
|
||
possible for bits of matter of certain other kinds to be contained by
|
||
that part of space. Furthermore, if motion is an aspect of the
|
||
extrinsic essential nature of bits of matter relative to space, their
|
||
spatial relations may change over time, and there may be regularities
|
||
about how their motions affect one another (that is, they may exert
|
||
forces by which they change one anothers motion). Indeed, if there
|
||
are different forms of matter, there may be ways that bits of matter,
|
||
because of their relative locations and motion, affect one another’s
|
||
forms. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This is how
|
||
<i>physical properties </i>are explained ontologically. The basic
|
||
laws of physics describe regularities in the motion and interaction
|
||
of basic particles, and the properties they must mention in order to
|
||
predict or control what happens are called "physical
|
||
properties." Hence, the truth of the basic laws of physics can
|
||
be explained ontologically by the extrinsic essential natures of bits
|
||
of matter relative to space and relative to other bits of matter,
|
||
since their extrinsic properties include how the bits of matter move
|
||
and interact with one another. Indeed, that is how spatiomaterialism
|
||
will explain the basic laws of physics. In other words, physical
|
||
properties will turn out to be extrinsic aspects of the essential
|
||
nature of matter with respect to space, with respect to matter, or
|
||
with respect to both. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It should
|
||
be noticed, however, that this way of explaining physical laws makes
|
||
a distinction between two different aspects of the extrinsic
|
||
essential aspect of matter, implying that there is a difference
|
||
between two kinds of physical properties. The physical properties
|
||
having to do with spatial relations and motion are different from
|
||
those having to do with interactions, because the extrinsic essential
|
||
natures of matter relative to space is different from their extrinsic
|
||
essential natures relative to other bits of matter. Indeed, this is,
|
||
as shall see, the beginning of a deeper (that is, ontological)
|
||
explanation of the truth of the basic laws of physics.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>B<img src="" name="OdhPSpace_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="63" height="22" border="0">asic
|
||
properties of space. </b></i>Space is also a substance enduring
|
||
through time, and since, as a substance, it exists independently of
|
||
matter, it must also have two aspects to its essential nature: an
|
||
intrinsic and an extrinsic essential aspect to its nature as a
|
||
substance. That distinction arises for space because of its
|
||
relationship to matter, and unlike bits of matter, no such
|
||
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties can be made in
|
||
the case of parts of space. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Space
|
||
has an opposite nature from matter. It has a unique wholeness,
|
||
because its parts cannot exist at all unless they are all related to
|
||
one another geometrically in three dimensions. They are not
|
||
independent substances. Since their relations to one another are part
|
||
of the essential nature of each part of space, they do not need any
|
||
further aspect of their essential natures by which to account for the
|
||
relations to one another. Their essential natures include their
|
||
relations to one another, and thus, there is no way to distinguish
|
||
between an intrinsic and extrinsic aspect to their essential natures.
|
||
</font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The reason
|
||
for distinguishing an extrinsic from the intrinsic aspect of the
|
||
essential nature of a substance was that when a substance exists
|
||
together with other substances as parts of the same world, it needs
|
||
some way of being related to them (beyond merely being parts of the
|
||
same world). But since that was to assume that the substances exist
|
||
independently of one another, we excluded substances whose essential
|
||
natures entailed the existence of other substances, for they must
|
||
already have relations to those other substances as part of their
|
||
essential nature. That holds in the case of the parts of space. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To be sure,
|
||
each part of space has an existence that is distinct from every other
|
||
part of space. But they all have the same kind of essential nature,
|
||
for they each have the same kind of relations to all the other parts
|
||
of space. What makes the parts of space different from one another is
|
||
the <i>particular parts of space </i>to which they have those
|
||
relations. And since their relations to one another are part of their
|
||
essential nature, they need only their essential natures to be
|
||
related to all the other parts of space. That is why the existence of
|
||
any part of space entails the existence of all the other parts of
|
||
space.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is
|
||
possible to put this point paradoxically. Since the intrinsic nature
|
||
of a substance is what it is in itself and its extrinsic nature is
|
||
what it is for other substances, one might say that the intrinsic
|
||
nature of each part of space relative to other parts of space entails
|
||
its extrinsic nature, because what it for other parts of space is
|
||
just what it is in itself as a part of space. But the paradox just
|
||
emphasizes that no distinction can be made between the intrinsic and
|
||
extrinsic natures of parts of space relative to one another. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">In
|
||
the case of space, therefore, the essential nature of each part of
|
||
space as a part of space includes all its relations to other parts of
|
||
space. That is the wholeness of space, and though it means that there
|
||
is no distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of the
|
||
essential nature of each part of space <i>relative to other parts of
|
||
space</i>, it also has implications for both the intrinsic and
|
||
extrinsic essential nature of space <i>relative to matter</i>. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>I<img src="" name="OdhPIntrinsi_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="50" height="21" border="0">ntrinsic
|
||
essential nature of space relative to matter. </i>To exist
|
||
independently of matter as its container, space must be something in
|
||
itself. It must exist in a determinate way apart from space. That is
|
||
the intrinsic essential nature of space relative to matter. But it is
|
||
a nature that space can have only as a whole. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
essential aspect of the nature of space as a whole includes its being
|
||
made up of parts with geometrical relations to one another in three
|
||
dimensions, that is, being made up of all the locations in three
|
||
dimensional space. This interdependence of the parts of space means
|
||
that the essential nature of each part of space includes having
|
||
geometrical relations to every other part of space. In both cases,
|
||
the essential nature is the aspect the substances have in virtue of
|
||
<i>how </i>they exist, and since the parts of space necessarily make
|
||
up the whole of space, it is the same aspect of these substances that
|
||
characterizes the essential nature of both part and whole. That
|
||
aspect of the essential nature of space is the intrinsic nature of
|
||
space. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">There is,
|
||
however, a part-whole relation involved in the essential nature of
|
||
space. That is, the part is not identical to the whole, because it is
|
||
only part of the whole. The whole is identical to all the parts.
|
||
Thus, the existence of space as a whole entails the existence of each
|
||
of its parts. But since all the parts must exist, if any one of them
|
||
exists, the existence existence of any part of space also entails the
|
||
existence of the whole. (Though there is a necessary relationship
|
||
between them, it is, at this point, true because of what we mean by
|
||
the terms used, that is, an analytic truth, not an ontologically
|
||
necessary truth. It is an ontologically necessary truth about the
|
||
world only if spatiomaterialism is the best possible ontological
|
||
explanation of the world.) </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Neither
|
||
part nor whole is prior to the other. Space cannot be explained
|
||
ontologically as a collection of parts of space, because no part of
|
||
space can exist without the whole. Likewise the parts of space cannot
|
||
be explained ontologically by the whole, because the whole of space
|
||
is just all the parts of space. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">What makes
|
||
the parts of space different from one another is not their essential
|
||
natures, but the particular parts of space to which each part has the
|
||
geometrical relations entailed by its essential nature. This is to
|
||
assume that all the parts of space have the same kind of essential
|
||
nature, and that is the assumption we are making, since it is the
|
||
simplest assumption we can make about the nature of space. But it
|
||
does imply that space is infinite, both in its divisibility and its
|
||
extent, and thus, the essential nature of space (or its intrinsic
|
||
essential nature relative to matter) is an aspect of something that
|
||
is infinite. (Of course, if it were to turn out that space is finite,
|
||
as contemporary cosmology assumes, a much more complex assumption
|
||
would have to be made about space, because if space has edges, the
|
||
parts of space would have to have different essential natures. But
|
||
space would presumably still have an essential nature that
|
||
characterizes both part and whole equally, since they would still
|
||
entail one another, and that would be its intrinsic nature relative
|
||
to matter..) </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
part-whole relation that holds for space is the unique wholeness of
|
||
space, and since it is an assumption of spatiomaterialism, there is
|
||
no genuine ontological explanation of it. But it is a remarkable
|
||
essential nature, and since it is so basic to the spatiomaterialist
|
||
explanation of the world (including its explanation of many further
|
||
part-whole relations, as we shall see), a few comment might make it
|
||
easier to grasp what is involved in taking space to be a substance. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The parts
|
||
of space are puzzling. Mathematicians call them points because the
|
||
simplest parts of space have no spatial dimensions. But since they
|
||
make up space as a whole, there are infinitely many of them in any
|
||
finite distance. That is called the "continuousness" of
|
||
space, or its infinite divisibility. But since it has been assumed as
|
||
part of the essential nature of space, there is no ontological
|
||
explanation of it in spatiomaterialism. It is just another aspect of
|
||
the wholeness of space.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">As
|
||
explained above, the wholeness of space implies that parts of space
|
||
do not have extrinsic essential natures relative to one another. This
|
||
is because what forces us to recognize that any substance has an
|
||
extrinsic nature is that it can exist independently of other
|
||
substances and is nevertheless related to them in some more
|
||
determinate way than simply being parts of the same world with them.
|
||
An extrinsic essential property characterizes what the substance is
|
||
<i>for </i>the other substance, or what it contributes to how they
|
||
are related. But since parts of space cannot exist independently of
|
||
one another, they lack extrinsic essential natures as parts relative
|
||
to other parts of space. Their relations to one another are part of
|
||
their essential natures. The existence of one part of space entails
|
||
the existence of all the others. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To say that
|
||
the parts of space lack extrinsic essential natures relative to other
|
||
parts of space makes it seem that they do have intrinsic essential
|
||
natures relative to other parts of space. After all, since each part
|
||
of space does have an existence that is distinct from every other
|
||
part of space, it must have something in itself. But since what it is
|
||
in itself includes it geometrical relations to every other part of
|
||
space, its intrinsic nature seems to be just its essential nature as
|
||
a part of space. Thus, it is less misleading to say that no
|
||
distinction can be made between extrinsic and intrinsic natures of
|
||
parts of space relative to other parts of space. That is just the
|
||
unique part-whole relation about space.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It is the
|
||
unique wholeness of space that makes it odd to think of space as a
|
||
substance. Space does not seem to be a substance because it is
|
||
everywhere. That makes it seem like nothing to us, because we are, as
|
||
rational beings, parts of the world (that is, located in space), and
|
||
we use the structure of space as a way of thinking about the world.
|
||
We think of material objects as what is substantial about the world,
|
||
and we take for granted that such substances have have spatial
|
||
relations to one another, because that is also a most basic aspect of
|
||
our way of thinking about the world. (That is, spatial imagination is
|
||
built into every perception). But the appearance that space is
|
||
nothing is just the essential nature of space (both part and whole).
|
||
That is just its intrinsic nature relative to matter. And it is
|
||
because the parts of space exist in such a way that they make up a
|
||
three dimensional whole that the bits of matter that coincide with
|
||
parts of space are related to one another. Thus, to see as nothing
|
||
is, in effect, to grasp its intrinsic nature relative to matter. That
|
||
is how it appears from "inside space," so to speak. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">On the
|
||
other hand, to think of space as a substance is, in effect, to see
|
||
space from the outside, rather than from the inside. It gives us the
|
||
same angle on space that space itself gives us on material objects,
|
||
because it provides a context in which we can see how space is
|
||
related to other things, most relevantly, how it is related to bits
|
||
of matter. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It may
|
||
help, therefore, to step back a bit and think about what we are doing
|
||
in taking space to be a substance. We are recognizing that space is
|
||
an ontological cause of the things that are found in the natural
|
||
world that is different from matter, that is, as a separate
|
||
principle, along with matter, in explaining everything. Space is
|
||
something self-subsistent that helps constitute the world. It may not
|
||
be possible to have a deeper understanding of the intrinsic essential
|
||
nature of space relative to matter than what we know by its role,
|
||
along with matter, in explaining the world ontologically. That is the
|
||
step that is required, as I have suggested, to see the world from the
|
||
outside. But "from the outside" is itself a spatial
|
||
metaphor. You cannot see space from the outside, for taken literally,
|
||
the outside of anything is always inside space itself. Thus, as I
|
||
have suggested, it may be better to think of substantivalism about
|
||
space as what we must assume in order to have a God’s Eye View of
|
||
the world. After all, space is something that God would have had to
|
||
create, along with matter, in order to create the natural world. But
|
||
neither can that description be taken literally, since, as
|
||
naturalists we deny that there is any being that transcends the
|
||
world. Thus, the best we can do is, perhaps, just to recognize that
|
||
the existence of space as a substance enduring though time is just an
|
||
independent, basic assumption of the most complete ontological
|
||
explanation that we can give of the world. Everything else in the
|
||
world is located within the three dimensions of space. That is the
|
||
bottom of our understanding of the nature of the world, according to
|
||
ontological philosophy.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>E<img src="" name="OdhPExtrinsi_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="50" height="20" border="0">xtrinsic
|
||
essential nature of space. </i>Just as bits of matter have an
|
||
extrinsic essential nature that allows them to coincide with space
|
||
space, so space must have an extrinsic essential nature that allows
|
||
it to coincide with bits of matter. But since space is a whole with
|
||
parts that differ from one another as different locations in its
|
||
three dimensional structure, it is not clear whether this extrinsic
|
||
essential property characterizes the essential aspect of space as a
|
||
whole or its parts. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Particular
|
||
bits of matter clearly coincide with particular parts of space. But
|
||
if any bit of matter coincides with more than one part of space,
|
||
coinciding with bits of matter is also clearly something that parts
|
||
of space must do jointly. Furthermore, it is only because many
|
||
different bits of matter are all contained by the same whole space
|
||
that coinciding with space gives them spatial relations to one
|
||
another. Thus, what coincides with them seems to be space as a whole
|
||
as well as its parts. That is, bits of matter are contained by space </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">On
|
||
the other hand, coinciding with bits of matter is something space
|
||
does to each bit of matter separately, not how space relates to
|
||
matter as a whole, because matter is not a whole, but just all the
|
||
bits that exist. To be sure, space coincides with all the bits of
|
||
matter in the world. But that is just the spatiomaterialist
|
||
assumption about how these two basic substances exist together as a
|
||
world, not something that characterizes the essential natures of
|
||
space as a whole and matter as a whole. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">What
|
||
makes the nature of space problematic is its unique wholeness, or how
|
||
space is made up of parts and yet is still one. For our purposes,
|
||
therefore, it is enough to recognize that the capacity to contain
|
||
bits of matter is the extrinsic essential nature of space, both whole
|
||
and part, though each bit of matter coincides with some part (or
|
||
contiguous parts) of space or other(s). And if different varieties of
|
||
material substances are contained by space in different ways, it must
|
||
have all the extrinsic essential properties required to do so. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Furthermore,
|
||
space must also have extrinsic essential properties corresponding to
|
||
all the extrinsic essential properties of bits of matter relative to
|
||
space. That is, it must give bits of matter motion through space, if
|
||
that is how they coincide with space, and it must enable them to
|
||
interact in all the ways that are involved in the extrinsic essential
|
||
natures of various kinds of bits of matter relative to other bits of
|
||
matter. These are also extrinsic essential properties that space both
|
||
has as a whole and in each part. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nor is that
|
||
necessarily all there is to the extrinsic essential nature of space
|
||
(though relativistic physics holds, in effect, that it is). Since
|
||
space is a substance, which exists independently of matter, it is
|
||
possible for space to interact with bits of matter in other ways.
|
||
Indeed, that is what we shall need to assume in order to explain
|
||
ontologically how Einstein’s special and general theories of
|
||
relativity are true. The basic assumption of our ontological
|
||
explanation of relativity will be is that light always has a
|
||
determinate velocity relative to space itself, and in explaining
|
||
special relativity, we will hold that space imposes certain (Lorentz)
|
||
distortions on material objects moving through space with high
|
||
velocity. In the case of general relativity, we will assume, further,
|
||
that the accumulation of large quantities of matter in space alters
|
||
the velocity at which light moves in nearby regions of space. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">This
|
||
is to hold that the parts of space can contain bits of matter in
|
||
different ways in the regions around centers of gravity But that is
|
||
not to say that are any changes in the relations among the parts of
|
||
space itself. It is only to say that there is a change in how bits of
|
||
matter coincide with space in those regions. In short, the assumption
|
||
we shall make in explaining Einsteinian relativity is that space has
|
||
an absolute, uniform Euclidean three dimensional structure, and that
|
||
that structure is not changed even though the extrinsic essential
|
||
nature of space includes interactions with matter that change the
|
||
state of certain parts of space and, thereby, change how bits of
|
||
matter coincide with space in those regions. (See </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCaLbStr.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Special theory of relativity</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">and
|
||
</span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCaLcGtr.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
General theory of relativity</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">.)
|
||
</span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">In
|
||
a more speculative way, I will suggest that space also plays a role
|
||
in explaining the truth of quantum mechanics, the basic particles
|
||
recognized by physics, and certain issues in cosmology. Those roles
|
||
would characterize further the extrinsic essential nature of space,
|
||
both part and whole. (See </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCaLdQm.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Quantum mechanics</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US">and
|
||
</span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCaLeCos.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Cosmology</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US">.)</span></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0; page-break-before: always">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font color="#800000"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>P<img src="" name="OdhPAsOb_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="102" height="36" border="0">roperties
|
||
as Objects of Knowledge. </b></font></font>Ontological philosophy
|
||
explains properties as aspects of the substances it postulates. But
|
||
when philosophers begin their argument from the point of view of the
|
||
cognitive subject by reflecting on how they know, they see properties
|
||
as objects of knowledge, and that gives rise to philosophical
|
||
problems, including problems about the nature of properties. To take
|
||
properties as objects that are known in some way is, in effect, to
|
||
see them as more basic than substances, because the objects that have
|
||
them seem to be nothing but something that has properties of certain
|
||
kinds that are present to the subject and to which he can refer. This
|
||
is the source of the problem of mind. It can be seen that there is a
|
||
difference between two basic kinds of essential properties (which
|
||
ontological philosophy explains as the difference between intrinsic
|
||
and extrinsic essential properties), but epistemological philosophy
|
||
has no way to explain how they are related to one another because it
|
||
takes properties to be basic. In its contemporary form, as we shall
|
||
see, it infects materialism. But let us begin by seeing how the
|
||
problem of mind arises.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>T<img src="" name="OdhPProblem_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="81" height="33" border="0">he
|
||
Problem of mind. </b></font>The problem of mind arises when
|
||
naturalists discover that there is a basic difference between
|
||
properties which was not obvious at first. In our naive or natural
|
||
attitude toward the world, we take the natural world to be simply
|
||
what we perceive, as if the objects in space, including our own
|
||
bodies, were simply what they appear to be. This is a form of
|
||
realism, because it is to assume that those objects in space would
|
||
exist even if we were not perceiving them. But it is naive, because
|
||
it assumes that the objects being perceived actually have the
|
||
properties that they appear to have in perception, including not only
|
||
their locations, shapes, and dispositional properties (such as how
|
||
they move and interact), but also their colors, odors, sounds and
|
||
tactile properties, such as hot and cold, wet and dry. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
latter properties are distinctive, for they are qualitative
|
||
properties, or properties that are simply a quality of some kind that
|
||
is immediately present to the perceiver. When I perceive that a leaf
|
||
is green, for example, the surface of the leaf appears green, and the
|
||
greenness is an object of my immediate awareness. What I mean by
|
||
"green" is <i>that kind of quality </i>that seems to inhere
|
||
in the surface of the leaf, and I cannot define "green" any
|
||
more precisely than that, because what I mean is something that is
|
||
intrinsic to the object I am aware of. The quality is what makes it
|
||
the kind of object it is. Such qualitative properties are now often
|
||
called "qualia," and they are involved in everything we
|
||
perceive, including not only the colors that objects have to vision,
|
||
but also the odors they have to smell, the sounds they have to
|
||
hearing, and certain tactile properties they have to touch. Such
|
||
qualities, or qualia, also characterize one’s own body, but one’
|
||
own body has additional qualities that are perceived in a different
|
||
way, such as pains, tickles, itches, and the like, for they are not
|
||
perceivable by others.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
problem of mind arises when it is recognized that the qualia that are
|
||
immediately present to us in perception are not located in the
|
||
objects we perceive in the space in and around our bodies, but are
|
||
somehow part of us as subjects, most closely connected to our brains.
|
||
That is, the mind become a problem with the acceptance of critical
|
||
realism. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Naturalists
|
||
are forced to recognize that qualia are subjective in this sense when
|
||
they discover that perception is a physical process in which the
|
||
objects stimulate sensory organs and that somehow gives rise to the
|
||
qualia we have. In each sensory modality, what causes the experience
|
||
is a chain of causes and effects that starts in the object being
|
||
perceived, proceeds through the body, making events occur in the
|
||
brain, and the qualia come at the end of that causal chain. Thus,
|
||
qualia must somehow be part of one’s brain. And if we follow this
|
||
argument to its conclusion, naturalists also come to recognize that
|
||
the space in which sensory qualia seem to be located is itself also
|
||
merely phenomenal and, thus, distinct from the space in which the
|
||
physical objects actually exist. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">This
|
||
discovery about perception is called "critical realism" (or
|
||
"representative realism"). It is realism, because it holds
|
||
that the objects being perceived really do exist in physical space as
|
||
the causes of the appearances we have in perceiving, including our
|
||
bodies. But it is critical, because it does not take the qualia that
|
||
make up those appearances to be properties in the objects that give
|
||
rise to them, but rather as parts of the subject, where their
|
||
function is apparently to represent those properties in the material
|
||
objects in real space to the subject. Likewise, it is critical
|
||
because it recognizes that the spatial relations that appear to hold
|
||
among the qualia in perception are different from the spatial
|
||
relations that hold among the material objects in real space. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus,
|
||
critical realism about perception makes it clear that objects with
|
||
physical properties in real space exist somehow "beyond"
|
||
the (complex) phenomenal properties we have. Since material objects
|
||
in real space have physical properties, it is to discover that we
|
||
must distinguish the qualia and their configurations in phenomenal
|
||
space from physical properties. They are what we call "phenomenal
|
||
properties."</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Critical
|
||
realism gives rise to the so-called problem of mind, for it seems
|
||
that the subject to whom the configurations of qualia appear is a
|
||
radically different kind of entity from the material objects in real
|
||
space. Material objects have physical properties, including not only
|
||
the physical dispositions that make them causes of the qualia that
|
||
appear in perception, but also relations in real space. But the
|
||
subject is radically different, because he is something to which
|
||
phenomenal properties appear. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">When we
|
||
reflect on the perceptual appearances we have as perceiving subjects,
|
||
furthermore, we recognize that they play distinctive roles in our
|
||
processes of knowing and doing. There are other appearances similar
|
||
to perceptual appearances, albeit fainter and less detailed, which
|
||
play other roles. Traditionally, the former are called "ideas of
|
||
perception," and the latter are called "ideas of memory and
|
||
imagination." But they, and perhaps other appearances that our
|
||
mental processes have to us in thinking and feeling emotions, are all
|
||
<i>phenomenal properties</i>. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To
|
||
acknowledge this fundamental difference from material objects, the
|
||
subject calls himself "mind" and contrasts it with his
|
||
body, which is just an object in space (albeit a special one, since
|
||
it is the one through which he acts). The mind-body is problem is how
|
||
the mind and body can be parts of the same world, that is, what are
|
||
their natures and how are they related to one another. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Verdana, sans-serif"><b>T<img src="" name="OdhPTheories_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="80" height="33" border="0">heories
|
||
of mind. </b></font>This problem about the nature of mind is arguably
|
||
the source of all the problems encountered in modern philosophy, and
|
||
it arises in contemporary philosophy as the problem about the
|
||
relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. The question
|
||
is how to explain the natures of the two radically different kinds of
|
||
properties that are known from the point of view of the critical
|
||
realist as parts of the same world. There is not much of a problem
|
||
for ontological philosophy, and so let us consider why before we
|
||
derive the various positions on the nature of mind defended by
|
||
traditional, epistemological philosophy.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>O<img src="" name="OdhPOnto_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="94" height="24" border="0">ntological
|
||
theories of mind. </b></i>A solution to the problem of mind would pay
|
||
back one of the mortgages we took out on spatiomaterialism, for it
|
||
would explain how beings like us are conscious. And it can be found
|
||
in the differences among the basic properties that are entailed by
|
||
spatiomaterialism, or indeed, that are entailed by any materialism
|
||
that accepts our notion of substance and takes ontology to be
|
||
explanatory. Physical properties are different from phenomenal
|
||
properties as the extrinsic essential natures of bits of matter are
|
||
different from the intrinsic essential natures of matter.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Material
|
||
objects in space with their physical properties present no problem,
|
||
for they are precisely what a naturalistic ontology is intended to
|
||
explain, and though we will put off the detailed ontological
|
||
explanation of physical properties, we have already seen how they
|
||
will be explained as aspects of the extrinsic essential natures of
|
||
bits of matter in space. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">As
|
||
naturalists, we assume that the subjects who perceive the world are
|
||
themselves material objects in the world. And we have good reason to
|
||
believe that they are rather special material objects, for they are
|
||
animals with complex brains. Spatiomaterialism will throw much light
|
||
on how the brain is responsible for the behavior and cognitive
|
||
processes that we ordinarily believe take place in experiencing
|
||
subjects like ourselves. (See </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCbGeRRS06.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Evolutionary stage 6</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">and
|
||
following.) But they are basically explanations of how the brain is a
|
||
machine that enables subject to have the beliefs, desires, and
|
||
behavior that we do, and for now, let us take it for granted that
|
||
there is such an explanation.</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">Assuming,
|
||
therefore, that the brain can account for the behavior and cognitive
|
||
capacities of subjects like us in the natural world, all that is
|
||
needed to solve the problem about mind is an explanation of the
|
||
existence of phenomenal properties that shows how it is possible for
|
||
material objects to have them. The obvious explanation of the nature
|
||
of phenomenal properties, given the kinds of basic properties that
|
||
substances have, is that they are the intrinsic essential aspect of
|
||
the nature of some bits of matter that help make up the brain. That
|
||
would mean that phenomenal properties are related of physical
|
||
properties as the intrinsic essential nature is related to the
|
||
extrinsic essential nature of some bits of matter that help make up
|
||
the cognitive subject. Since bits of matter must have both kinds of
|
||
essential properties, this ontological explanation would imply that
|
||
there is an ontologically necessary relationship between physical and
|
||
phenomenal properties. That explanation of how the connection is
|
||
necessary is what solves the problem about mind that plagues
|
||
contemporary philosophy, as we shall see below: </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/OthPC.htm#32" target="Objects"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Properties:
|
||
Ontological theory of the necessary connection</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.)</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">This
|
||
is enough to show that consciousness is possible, if
|
||
spatiomaterialism is true, though it depends, of course, on showing
|
||
that there is a form of matter that helps to constitute the conscious
|
||
subject whose intrinsic essential nature can plausibly account for
|
||
all the phenomenal properties. Since they include not only sensory
|
||
qualia, but the complex configurations of them in phenomenal space,
|
||
there is more to the explanation of consciousness than this
|
||
ontological explanation of the basic properties of substances. To
|
||
explain those complex phenomenal properties is to explain what I will
|
||
call the "unity of consciousness." We cannot do that,
|
||
however, until we have considered the forms of matter entailed by
|
||
spatiomaterialism (as we shall in </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtkCaL07.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Contingent laws of physics</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">),
|
||
and explained how the brain works (in we shall in </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCbGeRRS06.htm"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Evolutionary stage 6</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">and
|
||
following). For the spatiomaterialist explanation of the unity of
|
||
mind, see </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtkCbGeRRS06Unity.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Unity of consciousness</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.)</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">In order to
|
||
suggest how such an explanation is plausible, however, let me just
|
||
say here without further defense that the relevant form of matter
|
||
will turn out to be the photons that are generated by the active
|
||
mammalian brain. That is, the firing of neurons involves the rapid
|
||
acceleration of charged objects (ions), and since in mammals, many
|
||
such neurons fire in a synchronized way (throughout the projection
|
||
from the thalamus to the neocortex), the whole brain is like a
|
||
complex antenna generating photons with a very complex structures in
|
||
space and time. The intrinsic essential aspect of the nature of those
|
||
bits of matter can explain phenomenal properties, including not only
|
||
the simple qualia but also how they appear to be configured in
|
||
phenomenal space, not to mention the differences between perception
|
||
and memory and imagination.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i><b>E<img src="" name="EpistCmt" align="right" hspace="5" width="202" height="20" border="0">pistemological
|
||
theories of mind. </b></i>Epistemological philosophy does not attempt
|
||
to explain things ontologically, except as an afterthought to an
|
||
argument that attempts to justify knowledge of some kind, that is, as
|
||
realism about the objects of which it tries to show that we have
|
||
knowledge. Instead, it uses reflection on how we know to introduce a
|
||
theory about the nature of reason, and and starting with some kind of
|
||
knowledge that is taken as unproblematic by that theory, it tries to
|
||
justify knowledge of something else. Success is realism, but realism
|
||
leads to metaphysical dualism, that is, an ontology that postulates
|
||
kinds of substances that are so utterly different from one another
|
||
that it is not possible to explain how they are related to one
|
||
another at all. And the ontological problems of realism lead, as we
|
||
have noted, to anti-realism, the denial that we have the kind of
|
||
knowledge defended (which may entail it own distinctive metaphysics).
|
||
</font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Though
|
||
both modern and contemporary philosophy start by reflecting on how we
|
||
know, the problem of mind took different forms for each period,
|
||
because they had different explanations of how we know, that is,
|
||
different theories about the nature of reason. Modern philosophers
|
||
had a theory about the nature of reason that was based on reflecting
|
||
on how individual minds know, and so its realism led to mind-body
|
||
dualism. Contemporary philosophers had a theory about the nature of
|
||
reason that was based on reflecting on knowledge as an
|
||
intersubjective process, and so its realism led to property dualism
|
||
(and puzzles about the relationship between physical and phenomenal
|
||
properties). Let us consider each in turn.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">I
|
||
will give a brief account of the problem of mind in modern philosophy
|
||
in order to provide a context in which to understand the approach of
|
||
contemporary philosophy. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>M<img src="" name="OdhPModern_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="87" height="21" border="0">odern
|
||
philosophy. </i>Though the ancient atomists were critical realists,
|
||
naive realism otherwise dominated ancient and medieval philosophy. It
|
||
was the rise of modern science that led to the rediscovery of
|
||
critical realism. Modern science presupposed an ontology that
|
||
ascribed only physical properties to objects in nature, and it
|
||
implied that perception depends on a chain of causes and effects
|
||
starting in the object and ending somewhere in the brain. Though
|
||
modern scientists and philosophers alike recognized that sensory
|
||
qualia are parts of the subject, it was Descartes who first saw how
|
||
to use it to pursue a new form of epistemological philosophy.
|
||
Descartes so-called method of doubt was to deny everything that it
|
||
was possible to doubt. As a critical realist, that led him to doubt
|
||
the existence of his own body and the natural world in which it
|
||
exists. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">R<img src="" name="OdhPMindBody_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="59" height="40" border="0">ealism
|
||
about the external world: mind-body dualism. </font>Descartes could
|
||
not doubt that he was having ideas, and thus, he argued that he had
|
||
indubitable knowledge of his own existence. Descartes affirmed the
|
||
certainty of this knowledge by asserting, "I think, therefore I
|
||
am." From this foundation, Descartes introduced a theory about
|
||
the nature of reason that implied that any ideas that are equally
|
||
clear and distinct are true, and thus, he set out to show that we
|
||
could know both the existence and nature of the external world. Given
|
||
his goal, the success of modern realism was realism about the world
|
||
of material objects in space. Descartes' plan was to justify modern
|
||
science philosophically, that is, from a foundation that is prior to
|
||
what science learns about what happens in the natural world from
|
||
observation. But apart from other difficulties in his argument, his
|
||
project foundered on the problem of mind-body dualism.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">The
|
||
rational method he used was discussed in </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOteM.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Method</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
and the dualistic ontology to which it led was discussed in </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/LoOtdO.htm" target="Lo"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Ontology</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.
|
||
Descartes' dualism of mind and body was the problem of mind in modern
|
||
philosophy. Critical realism made it clear that physical properties
|
||
are fundamentally different from phenomenal properties, and that made
|
||
it seem that the objects with those properties were substances with
|
||
opposite kinds of essential natures, namely, mind and body. As
|
||
Descartes saw it, body is always divisible into smaller parts,
|
||
whereas mind has a unity that does not permit division, because all
|
||
the qualia that seem to be located in space have an appearance for
|
||
the subject at the same time. And whereas mind can think in this
|
||
sense, body cannot, for it has only the properties that physics
|
||
ascribes to it (which Descartes thought came down to extension, that
|
||
is, geometrical properties). The difference in their essential
|
||
natures left no plausible explanation of how they interact, and
|
||
attempts to solve it (such as Spinoza’s claim that substance can
|
||
have two opposite essential natures and Leibniz’s claim that
|
||
nothing exists but minds, or "monads," as he called them)
|
||
were embarrassing failures.</span></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">A<img src="" name="OdhPIdealism_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="66" height="41" border="0">nti-realism
|
||
about the external world: idealism. </font>The inability to explain
|
||
how mind and body are related as parts of a single world doomed
|
||
attempts to justify knowledge of the natural world, and the British
|
||
empiricists (Locke, Berkeley and Hume) followed the skeptical
|
||
argument to its conclusion, doubting in the end that the natural
|
||
world is anything but perceptual ideas (or impressions of sensation,
|
||
as Hume put it). Locke did not recognize that the principle of
|
||
empiricism (that all our knowledge about the natural world comes from
|
||
experience) leads to skepticism about the existence of the natural
|
||
world, but Berkeley embraced this skeptical conclusion ontologically
|
||
and defended idealism explicitly. However, Hume and the subsequent
|
||
tradition of empiricism merely dismissed all attempts to explain the
|
||
natural world ontologically as meaningless metaphysics (though
|
||
idealism is all that empiricism has to offer to those who look for a
|
||
theory about what exists). </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
second phase of modern philosophy struggled with the problem of mind
|
||
in a different way. Kant held that science has knowledge only of the
|
||
phenomenal world, and thus, he was not a realist. But he was still a
|
||
dualist, because he believed that, in addition to mind, there are
|
||
things in themselves in addition to the phenomenal world. Hegel
|
||
sought to overcome Kant's dualism and defend the claim of reason to
|
||
know the real nature of what exists, but the only way he could do was
|
||
by defending absolute idealism (that is, by holding that everything,
|
||
including the natural world, can be reduced, dialectically, of
|
||
course, to an idea at the bottom).</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Spinoza
|
||
stands out among modern philosophers, because his way of denying
|
||
mind-body dualism was to deny that body is a different substance from
|
||
mind. He took mind and body to be related as two attributes of the
|
||
same substance. (That is close to the implication of ontological
|
||
philosophy, except that Spinoza believed that the world is a single
|
||
substance. He could not explain the relationship between the
|
||
attributes of thought and extension as the relationship between the
|
||
intrinsic and extrinsic essential aspects of substances, because
|
||
there are no relationships among substances in his view.) </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0; page-break-before: always">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>C<img src="" name="OdhPCont_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="88" height="22" border="0">ontemporary
|
||
philosophy. </i>Naturalism is the attitude of contemporary
|
||
philosophy. In the twentieth century, continuing advancement by
|
||
science in explaining the natural world, discovering laws of nature
|
||
and various mechanisms embodying them, made the abstruse and
|
||
inconclusive arguments of philosophy of modern philosophy seem
|
||
fundamentally misguided. Philosophers abandoned the Cartesian method
|
||
and its metaphysical problems in favor of an explanation of how we
|
||
know that derives from reflecting on knowledge as an intersubjective
|
||
process, and that brought with it a commitment to naturalism. And
|
||
contemporary philosophers accepted natural science, with some
|
||
reservations, as the most adequate way of knowing we have. Thus, the
|
||
problem that mind poses for contemporary philosophers can be seen as
|
||
a question about <i>how a science of consciousness is possible</i>.
|
||
Contemporary philosophers assume, as naturalists, that what modern
|
||
philosophers called "mind" must somehow be part of the
|
||
natural world, and though they could dismiss mind-body dualism, it
|
||
was harder to deny the difference between physical and phenomenal
|
||
properties. Those who affirm the existence of phenomenal properties
|
||
as well as physical properties are called "property dualists."
|
||
For naturalists, therefore, the question became how phenomenal
|
||
properties can be included as something characterizing the natural
|
||
world being explained by science, even though science refers only to
|
||
physical properties. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">For present
|
||
purposes, let us take "physical properties" to include
|
||
functional properties, such as "being a clock" or
|
||
"conveying signals." They may not be reducible to physical
|
||
properties, but since no one denies that they "supervene,"
|
||
at least, on physical properties, all the causal connections in
|
||
particular cases come down to basic physical properties. And the
|
||
issue is how phenomenal properties are related to physical or
|
||
functional properties. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Contemporary
|
||
philosophers have taken great care to show that phenomenal properties
|
||
are different from physical properties, for example, in famous
|
||
arguments by Thomas Nagel, Frank Jackson, and Saul Kripke. By asking
|
||
what it is like to be a bat, </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Nagel"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Nagel</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">(1979,
|
||
1986) was pointing to a subjective aspect of experience that cannot
|
||
be known by the "view from nowhere", that is, by natural
|
||
science. </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Jackson"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Jackson</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">(1982)
|
||
made it clear that phenomenal qualities, or qualia, are themselves
|
||
objects of knowledge by pointing out that Mary, a neurophysiologist
|
||
who studied the physical mechanism of color perception in a
|
||
laboratory devoid of red objects, would come to know something more
|
||
about the perception of red when she left the room and actually saw
|
||
something red, namely, how red appears to the subject. And </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Kripke"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Kripke</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">(1980)
|
||
showed that properties rigidly designated by how they appear to
|
||
subjects cannot be identical to physical properties because the
|
||
connection is not metaphysically necessary, as it would have to be,
|
||
if they were identical. </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">For
|
||
those who are inclined to take natural science as revealing the basic
|
||
nature of the world, the problem of mind is how there can be a
|
||
science of consciousness. It is most obviously problematic when
|
||
science is understood as using a method that bases its conclusions on
|
||
observation in one way or another. This reliance on observation is a
|
||
basic tenet of its empirical method as traditionally understood, for
|
||
example, by empiricists, logical positivists and most practicing
|
||
scientists. (Though there are well known problems in the philosophy
|
||
of science about the theory-ladenness of observation statements, it
|
||
is agreed on all sides that observation depends on perception, that
|
||
is, on the use of our sensory organs to discover the states of
|
||
objects in space.) </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">The reason
|
||
that this tenet of the empirical method makes consciousness a problem
|
||
for science is that phenomenal properties are apparently knowable
|
||
only by reflection. We have seen how the difference between physical
|
||
and phenomenal properties was discovered -- that is, by reflecting on
|
||
the causal explanation of perception from the point of view of the
|
||
perceiving subject. But it also seems that our <i>only </i>"evidence"
|
||
that psychological states involve phenomenal properties comes from
|
||
each of us reflecting on our own psychological states. The nature of
|
||
simple qualia, for example, what red qualia are like, is not revealed
|
||
to observation. They are private to each individual subject. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">There are
|
||
ways of observing the brain in operation, and new ways are being
|
||
developed. But no one has found a way of using such observations to
|
||
demonstrate that brain states involve phenomenal properties. Indeed,
|
||
neurophysiologists don’t expect their methods ever to show either
|
||
the existence of phenomenal properties or how qualia appear. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">To be sure,
|
||
there is evidence for the existence of phenomenal properties in what
|
||
people say about their psychological states. But that evidence
|
||
depends on scientists interpreting the other’s talk of qualia and
|
||
phenomenal properties as references to objects of the same sorts they
|
||
each know privately by reflection on their own phenomenal properties.
|
||
The verbal behavior itself does not seem to depend on anything but
|
||
physical causes. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
difference between reflection and perception makes it doubtful,
|
||
therefore, that science will ever be able to know about phenomenal
|
||
properties. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">A<img src="" name="OdhPElim_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="67" height="39" border="0">nti-realism
|
||
about phenomenal properties: eliminative materialism. </font>One
|
||
quick way of dealing with this problem is simply to deny there are
|
||
any phenomenal properties. This is, in effect, anti-realism about
|
||
phenomenal properties from the point of view of science, though it is
|
||
usually called "eliminative materialism," by the kind of
|
||
ontology it defends. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">In
|
||
one version, eliminative materialism holds that the need for talk of
|
||
phenomenal properties will eventually be eliminated, at least from
|
||
science, as science explains all the phenomena relevant to psychology
|
||
in its own terms. That would show that our traditional talk about
|
||
phenomenal properties (and psychological states, such as perceptions,
|
||
beliefs, desires, and the like) is just a mis-description of what
|
||
really exists, which is fully described by physical properties. (See
|
||
</span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Churchland"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Churchland</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">1995.)
|
||
</span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">It
|
||
is also possible to argue that we are fooling ourselves to think that
|
||
traditional talk about phenomenal properties is meaningful in the
|
||
first place. (See </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Dennett"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Dennett</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">1991
|
||
and </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Rorty"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Rorty</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">1979.)
|
||
</span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">But
|
||
eliminative materialism does not show how a science of consciousness
|
||
is possible. Rather, it holds that a science of consciousness is not
|
||
necessary because there is nothing to be explained. The problem of
|
||
mind arises only for those who are realists about phenomenal
|
||
properties and believe that they exist in addition to physical
|
||
properties.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif">R<img src="" name="OdhPPropDual_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="61" height="40" border="0">ealism
|
||
about phenomenal properties: property dualism. </font>During most of
|
||
the century, empiricism in psychology took the form of behaviorism,
|
||
the attempt to explain human beings in terms of laws describing their
|
||
observable behavior. Consciousness was thereby banished from science.
|
||
But that is puzzling to contemporary naturalists, for they expect
|
||
natural science to explain <i>everything </i>in the natural world,
|
||
and they know, as reflective beings, that they themselves are
|
||
conscious. They are realists about phenomenal properties, and that
|
||
makes them property dualists, because they recognize the existence of
|
||
phenomenal as well as physical properties. And the problem of mind
|
||
can be seen at the attempt to show how science can study
|
||
consciousness, that is, how it can justify theories that refer to the
|
||
phenomenal properties of psychological states. There are several
|
||
possibilities.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><i>E<img src="" name="OdhPEmerg_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="115" height="18" border="0">mergentism.
|
||
</i></font>The most obvious way for science to include consciousness
|
||
would be to take mind to be an immaterial substance that is located
|
||
in space along with bits of matter. Or if we call everything located
|
||
in space "matter," it is to hold that some bits of matter
|
||
have phenomenal properties that play a causal role in the natural
|
||
world. If phenomenal properties of bits of matter did somehow make a
|
||
difference to what happens in nature, they would be not only effects
|
||
of physical causes, but they would themselves be efficient causes,
|
||
and their existence could be detected empirically. Science could know
|
||
about them in the same way it knows about other unobservable
|
||
entities, such as electrons and force fields. Bits of matter with
|
||
phenomenal properties would have to be mentioned by the best
|
||
explanations of what can be observed through perception alone.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
|
||
is conceivable, at least, that phenomenal properties would have to be
|
||
introduced by some branch of science, such as neurophysiology. The
|
||
mechanisms found in the brain might provide no way of explaining, for
|
||
example, why human beings say that they have phenomenal properties or
|
||
why they call certain sensations green and others red. If all
|
||
possible physical explanations were ruled out, the best explanation
|
||
might be to hold that reports about phenomenal properties depend
|
||
causally on how psychological states appear to the subject having
|
||
them, which would mean that phenomenal properties are efficient
|
||
causes. Phenomenal properties would then be unobservable entities of
|
||
neurophysiology. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Any
|
||
such neurophysiological discovery would, however, have serious
|
||
implications for physics. The grounds for believing that there are
|
||
phenomenal properties playing a causal role would be that no physical
|
||
mechanism can explain certain verbal behaviors, and that would imply
|
||
that there are efficient causes at work in brains that are not
|
||
physical properties. This would be shocking, for physics is thought
|
||
to be causally complete, in the sense that physical properties are
|
||
sufficient, in principle, to explain every kind of event that happens
|
||
to what is located in space. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">It might be
|
||
argued that the reason physics has not noticed the causal role played
|
||
by phenomenal properties is that they are emergent and make a
|
||
difference only in highly complex physical objects, such as brains,
|
||
which evolve (or in complex functional systems generally). But in
|
||
order for phenomenal properties to be effective in brains,
|
||
neurophysiology would have to predict something different from what
|
||
physics would predict for the same situations on the basis of
|
||
physical properties. Thus, physics would have to come to believe that
|
||
some material objects have properties in addition to the physical
|
||
properties that it has already recognized and that these new
|
||
properties affect how physical entities move or interact in certain
|
||
situations. In other words, this kind of emergentism would be causal.
|
||
Such a discovery would contradict physics as we know it. At a
|
||
minimum, it would show that physics is not causally complete. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">A
|
||
science of consciousness could, therefore, be established by a
|
||
scientific discovery of the kind that even the most hidebound
|
||
defender of the traditional view of the empirical method could not
|
||
deny. That would be a scientific solution to what has heretofore
|
||
seemed to be a philosophical problem about mind. There is, however,
|
||
no evidence at present suggesting that phenomenal properties should
|
||
be introduced as unobservable (that is, not directly perceivable)
|
||
theoretical entities of neurophysiology. It seems quite unlikely to
|
||
contemporary naturalists, considering how radically physics would
|
||
have to be mistaken. And if phenomenal properties are, as ontological
|
||
philosophy suggests, the intrinsic essential properties of certain
|
||
kinds of matter involved in the function of the brain, they have no
|
||
causal role. All the causal roles are played by extrinsic essential
|
||
properties, that is, the physical properties already recognized by
|
||
science.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><i>E<img src="" name="OdhPEpiphen_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="115" height="19" border="0">piphenomenalism.
|
||
</i></font>Another way founding a science of consciousness would be
|
||
to accept reflection as a form of observation in science. Though
|
||
reflection has long been the province of philosophy, this avenue is
|
||
open to naturalists who think of philosophy as "continuous with"
|
||
science. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">This
|
||
trend in recent philosophy of science explicitly abandons
|
||
epistemology in the traditional sense of providing an </span></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><i>a
|
||
priori</i></span></font></font><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">foundation
|
||
for the justification of science and its method (</span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Kitcher"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Kitcher</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">1992;
|
||
</span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Rosenberg"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Rosenberg</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">1994).
|
||
Instead of "first philosophy," it proposes to use the
|
||
results of science itself to justify and improve the methods of
|
||
science, which has given it the name "naturalized epistemology"
|
||
(after </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Quine"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Quine</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">1969).
|
||
For example, scientific discoveries about the mechanisms of human
|
||
cognition could be used to improve evidence gathering methods in
|
||
science as much as discoveries about the accuracy of any measuring
|
||
instrument. But those same human beings have a capacity for
|
||
reflection as well as perception, and thus their reflection on
|
||
phenomenal properties could be considered a way of gathering evidence
|
||
about the natural world which is just as legitimate as their
|
||
perception of physical properties. To naturalists of this kind,
|
||
therefore, it may seem there is no obstacle to a science of
|
||
consciousness. Indeed, these days, cognitive scientists often use
|
||
reports about reflection on phenomenal properties as evidence, a
|
||
practice recently defended by </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Goldman"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Goldman</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">(1997).</span></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">To
|
||
recognize reflection, including what can be known only by reflection,
|
||
as part of the data base of natural science is, however, a trivial
|
||
solution to the problem of mind. It overcomes the epistemological
|
||
obstacle to a science of consciousness by, in effect, redefining
|
||
"science" to include a form of knowledge that has
|
||
traditionally been taken as the foundation of by philosophy. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">It
|
||
will not be acceptable to naturalists who cleave to a more
|
||
traditional notion of empirical science as based on observation by
|
||
perception. They will dig in their heals from fear of opening the
|
||
door to other forms of private knowledge in science, such as the
|
||
intuitions by which rationalists justified their metaphysical
|
||
systems. And attempts to draw a new line of demarcation between
|
||
science and philosophy that will include reflection on phenomenal
|
||
properties but exclude the supposed certainty of clear and distinct
|
||
ideas would seem like mere gerrymandering.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Even
|
||
if there were no epistemological objections to reflection, however,
|
||
this avenue to a science of consciousness would lead to ontological
|
||
problems for science. It would complicate the scientific view of the
|
||
natural world in a way that is quite problematic, for it would be to
|
||
acknowledge the existence of properties that simply do not fit
|
||
together intelligibly with the properties already recognized by
|
||
science. The latter come down to properties mentioned by physics.
|
||
Specifically, physical (and functional) properties seem to be
|
||
responsible for all the behavior and internal processes found in
|
||
complex organisms like us. Thus, to acknowledge the existence of
|
||
phenomenal properties on the grounds that they can be "observed"
|
||
in nature through reflection on what experience is like would be to
|
||
recognize that some natural objects, human beings, at least, have
|
||
properties of a fundamentally different kind from those already
|
||
recognized by natural science. And if physicists are correct in
|
||
believing it to be possible, in principle, to explain everything that
|
||
happens in nature by the efficient causes picked out by physical
|
||
properties, two facts about these properties follow. One is that
|
||
phenomenal properties are somehow effects of the physical (or
|
||
functional) properties of such organisms. The other is that having
|
||
phenomenal properties cannot itself have any effect, in turn, on
|
||
physical or functional properties. In other words, phenomenal
|
||
properties would be <i>epiphenomenal </i>relative to physical (and
|
||
functional) properties. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Epiphenomenalism
|
||
is, at best, an inelegant ontology. It takes phenomenal properties to
|
||
be "nomological danglers," in </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Feigl"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Feigl</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">’</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">s
|
||
(1958) famous terms. Epiphenomenalists can insist, of course, that
|
||
there is a causal necessity about the connection between physical
|
||
(and/or functional) properties and phenomenal properties. But it
|
||
would be just an assumption, for they have no explanation of why
|
||
physical (or functional) properties give rise to phenomenal
|
||
properties. Nor any explanation of why phenomenal properties should
|
||
be impotent. </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Thus,
|
||
if the goal of science is to discover all the most basic laws of
|
||
nature, epiphenomenalism would mean that those most fundamental laws
|
||
include not only the basic laws of physics, which describe
|
||
efficient-cause connections, but also psychophysical laws, which
|
||
describe a regular connection between physical (and/or functional)
|
||
properties and phenomenal properties. (For example, see </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Chalmers"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Chalmers</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">1996,
|
||
pp. 87, 170-1, 274-5.) </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">Or,
|
||
to use </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Kripke2"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Kripke</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">’</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">s
|
||
(1980, p. 153-5) famous metaphor, God, in creating such a world,
|
||
would have to go back, after creating all the physical objects and
|
||
putting them together as a natural world, and tack on the phenomenal
|
||
properties. The extra effort required belies their odd status. No one
|
||
finds epiphenomenalism satisfactory. (It repels even </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Chalmers"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Chalmers</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">1996,
|
||
p. 160.)</span></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><i>N<img src="" name="OdhPNecCon_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="115" height="18" border="0">ecessary
|
||
connection between physical and phenomenal properties. </i></font>Ontological
|
||
philosophy provides, as we have seen, a way of avoiding the problem
|
||
of epiphenomenalism. Though it accepts property dualism, it reveals a
|
||
necessary connection between physical and phenomenal properties, and
|
||
that would found a science of consciousness, because it would show
|
||
that phenomenal properties are already part of what exists according
|
||
to science. Contemporary philosophers recognize that demonstrating a
|
||
necessary connection between physical and phenomenal properties would
|
||
solve the problem with epiphenomenalism (and thus, the most basic
|
||
aspect of the problem of mind), but they have not been able to take
|
||
this avenue all the way to a science of consciousness, because cannot
|
||
see how it is possible to show that phenomenal properties are
|
||
necessarily connected to something science already mentions in its
|
||
physical (and/or functional) descriptions. The obstacle they
|
||
encounter comes from the epistemological approach to philosophy,
|
||
which contemporary naturalists have inherited, for in this case,
|
||
ontology as mere realism makes it seem that properties are more basic
|
||
than substances. Let us see how they fail to find any way to
|
||
demonstrate a necessary connection between physical and phenomenal
|
||
properties before we compare epistemological to ontological
|
||
philosophy.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>N<img src="" name="OdhPOfEpist_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="74" height="20" border="0">ecessity
|
||
in Epistemological Philosophy. </i>Contemporary analytic philosophy
|
||
offers various ways in which a necessary connection might be
|
||
established. Let us consider them. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>A
|
||
priori necessity. </i>The original form of necessary truth in
|
||
contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophy was analytic truth,
|
||
or propositions that are true by virtue of the meanings of the terms
|
||
involved. That would bean <i>a priori</i> connection between physical
|
||
and phenomenal properties, but it is not a possible foundation for a
|
||
science of consciousness, for the inability to see an intelligible
|
||
connection between them is the very problem of consciousness. What we
|
||
mean by "phenomenal properties" is so different from what
|
||
we mean by "physical properties" (or by "functional
|
||
properties," for that matter) that it seems almost absurd even
|
||
to compare them. That makes it easy to conceive of possible worlds
|
||
that are physically like our own, but which lack phenomenal
|
||
properties altogether. That is, there could be a world of zombies, or
|
||
beings that are physically and functionally indistinguishable form us
|
||
except for not being conscious. It is also possible to conceive of
|
||
worlds with phenomenal properties but no physical properties, for
|
||
that is the view that was defended in modern philosophy as idealism.
|
||
Hence, no necessary connection can be established <i>a priori.</i> </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Causal
|
||
necessity. </i>Any necessary connection between physical and
|
||
phenomenal properties must, therefore, be <i>a posteriori. </i>It
|
||
must be something we can somehow <i>discover </i>about the world from
|
||
experience<i>.</i> But it cannot be a mere <i>causal necessity </i>of
|
||
the sort that laws of nature are supposed to have. That sort of
|
||
necessity would reduce either to causal emergentism or to
|
||
epiphenomenalism, depending on which causal connections phenomenal
|
||
properties were supposed to have (that is, being effects of physical
|
||
properties that are also causes of them, or else being effects that
|
||
are not causes). It is their inadequacy that forces naturalists to
|
||
look for a metaphysically necessary connection.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Theoretical
|
||
identification. </i>The more popular model for discovering necessary
|
||
connections is theoretical identification in science, such as the
|
||
discovery that water is identical to masses of H<sub>2</sub>O
|
||
molecules. Thus, just as the solidity of ice was discovered to be
|
||
identical to the stability of the crystal structure formed by weak
|
||
hydrogen bonds among adjacent H<sub>2</sub>O molecules when their
|
||
kinetic energy fall below a certain point, so phenomenal properties
|
||
might turn out to be identical to physical properties of some other
|
||
kind. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">However,
|
||
physical and phenomenal properties cannot be related in this way,
|
||
because theoretical identification is a necessary connection. As
|
||
</span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Kripke3"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Kripke</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">(1980)
|
||
showed, in order for two (rigidly designated) properties to be
|
||
identical, it must be impossible to conceive one without the other.
|
||
For example, if the solidity of ice is identical to a certain kind of
|
||
crystalline structure of H</span></font></font><font color="#000000"><sub><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">2</span></font></sub></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">O
|
||
in the actual world, then the identity must hold in any possible
|
||
world where either exists. It is not, however, impossible to conceive
|
||
of worlds in which beings physically and functionally like us lack
|
||
phenomenal properties altogether. No scientific theory can identify
|
||
the two kinds of properties, and so a world of zombies is still
|
||
possible. </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>Supervenience.</i>
|
||
If the reduction involved in theoretical identification does not
|
||
provide an avenue to a science of consciousness, science does not
|
||
offer many other models for showing a necessary connection between
|
||
physical and phenomenal properties. One possibility is supervenience,
|
||
which is a weaker relation than the complete reduction involved in
|
||
the theoretical identification of apparently different physical
|
||
properties. What has forced philosophers to recognize supervenience
|
||
is the existence of functional properties. Though a functional
|
||
property may be identical to certain physical properties in
|
||
particular cases or classes of cases, there are many other ways that
|
||
the same functional property can be realized by physical properties
|
||
and, thus, no general identity between properties at the two levels.
|
||
For example, there are many kinds of physical mechanisms that can
|
||
function as clocks. And physical properties that do are said to
|
||
"realize" a clock. But supervenience cannot be how
|
||
phenomenal properties are related to physical properties, for that
|
||
would require phenomenal properties to be identical to physical
|
||
properties <i>in particular cases</i>, and that is what does not seem
|
||
to be the case. Thus, a zombie world still seems possible. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">A
|
||
process of elimination leads to the conclusions that, if there is a
|
||
metaphysically necessary connection between physical and phenomenal
|
||
properties that can be discovered by experience, it must a new kind
|
||
of relationship, not previously recognized by science. That is what
|
||
ontological philosophy offers, and though it is beyond the reach of
|
||
epistemological philosophy, David Charlmers comes close.</font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Chalmers2"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Chalmers
|
||
</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">(1996,
|
||
p. 135) considers the possibility that "there are properties
|
||
essential to the physical constitution of the world that are not
|
||
accessible to physical investigation." The existence of such
|
||
intrinsic properties is plausible to him, because all the properties
|
||
mentioned by physics are basically relational, characterizing
|
||
entities by their causal connections and other relations to one
|
||
another. Even physical properties that seem to be inherent in the
|
||
objects that have them, such as mass, energy, spin, and charge, are
|
||
measured by the causal relations they have to one another. Thus,
|
||
whatever has physical properties could also have an intrinsic nature.
|
||
</span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">However,
|
||
Chalmers has no way to understand how they might be related to
|
||
physical properties, because he does not think of substances as
|
||
anything more than the properties they have. That makes properties
|
||
ontologically basic, and so he tries to describe the relationship by
|
||
saying that intrinsic properties might " ‘realize’ the
|
||
extrinsic physical properties, and that the laws connecting them
|
||
might realize physical laws" (155). And describing the
|
||
significance of discovering some such relationship, he says that, if
|
||
intrinsic properties were "constitutive of physical properties"
|
||
(136), then even though a zombie world may seem to be physically
|
||
identical to ours, it would actually be different physically, for it
|
||
would lack some "inaccessible essential properties, which are
|
||
also the properties that guarantee consciousness" (135). This is
|
||
the view of phenomenal properties to which Chalmers himself inclines
|
||
(153-156), though it has also been suggested by others.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote1anc" href="#sdendnote1sym"><sup>i</sup></a></sup></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; background: #66ccff; border-top: 6.75pt double #000080; border-bottom: 6.75pt double #808080; border-left: 6.75pt double #808080; border-right: 6.75pt double #808080; padding: 0.28cm 0.46cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">As Chalmers
|
||
recognizes, however, to <i>suggest </i>that intrinsic properties are
|
||
a special kind of phenomenal (or proto-phenomenal) property underling
|
||
all physical (and functional) properties is not to show that there is
|
||
a <i>necessary </i>connection between intrinsic and physical
|
||
properties. It is merely to point to a possibility. Chalmers (135)
|
||
rightly calls it "speculative metaphysics." Though it may
|
||
be coherent, it is no more than speculation, because without the
|
||
concept of substance to explain the nature of properties, it is just
|
||
a vague possibility. And since nothing makes it inconceivable that a
|
||
world physically like our own would lack intrinsic properties, this
|
||
view reduces to property dualism — a point that Chalmers makes by
|
||
invoking Kripke’s metaphor: "After ensuring that a world
|
||
identical to ours from the standpoint of out physical theories, God
|
||
has to expend further effort to make that world identical to ours
|
||
across the board" (136). Zombies are still possible.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote2anc" href="#sdendnote2sym"><sup>ii</sup></a></sup></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<br><br>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><i>M<img src="" name="OdhPOfOnto_up" align="right" hspace="5" width="72" height="20" border="0">etaphysical
|
||
Necessity in Ontological Philosophy. </i>What keeps epistemological
|
||
philosophy from discovering a necessary relationship between physical
|
||
and phenomenal properties that would found an empirical science of
|
||
consciousness is the implicit assumption that properties are basic.
|
||
What enables ontological philosophy to show that phenomenal
|
||
properties are an essential part of the natural world investigated by
|
||
science is reducing properties to substances. Physical properties, as
|
||
we have seen, characterize the extrinsic essential natures of all
|
||
forms of material substances, and if phenomenal properties
|
||
characterize the intrinsic essential nature of some form of matter
|
||
that helps constitute the conscious subject, phenomenal and physical
|
||
properties would be related as intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of the
|
||
essential natures of the substances constituting the world. That
|
||
relationship does seem to be metaphysically necessary in the sense
|
||
relevant in this debate, though in our terms it is an ontologically
|
||
necessary truth, since the necessity of its truth comes from its
|
||
being an implication of the ontology we have found to be true on
|
||
empirical grounds. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Metaphysically
|
||
necessary truths are understood as holding in every possible physical
|
||
world, and the connection proposed by ontological philosophy is
|
||
necessary in that sense, for it would hold <i>in any possible
|
||
physical world </i>in which the basic laws of physics are
|
||
descriptions of how elementary material substances move and interact.
|
||
Their basically relational nature indicates that physical properties
|
||
characterize the extrinsic essential natures of those substances. But
|
||
since substances cannot have such properties unless they have some
|
||
<i>way </i>of existing apart from the relations, they must also have
|
||
an intrinsic essential nature. Thus, Zombies would be impossible. Any
|
||
being with all the same physical (and functional) properties would
|
||
necessarily also have intrinsic properties. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">To
|
||
use </span></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Kripke4"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Kripke</u></span></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">’</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><span lang="en-US">s
|
||
(1980, 153-4) vivid image, God would not have to go back and tack on
|
||
intrinsic properties after he had created the physical world, for if
|
||
God had created the world by combining many material substances in
|
||
the first place, those substances would already have intrinsic
|
||
natures of some kind or other. In fact, it would not be possible for
|
||
God to create a physical world out of multiple substance without
|
||
intrinsic properties, even if he wanted to. </span></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
|
||
is not to say, however, that there is no possible physical world
|
||
without intrinsic properties. It is possible for a world to have all
|
||
the same physical (and functional) properties as our own and yet to
|
||
lack intrinsic properties. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">That would
|
||
be the case, for example, in a physical world that is not constituted
|
||
by substances at all, as the empiricists’ so-called "bundle
|
||
theory" of substances would have it. (That is, however, just the
|
||
form of idealism that one finds when one looks in empiricism for a
|
||
theory of what exists.) </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Even if the
|
||
physical world must be constituted by substances of some kind in
|
||
order to exist independently, it could lack intrinsic properties, for
|
||
it could be constituted by substances that are mere substrata for
|
||
physical properties (assuming that it is coherent to suppose there
|
||
can be substances without any inherent properties at all). </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Nor would
|
||
intrinsic properties be needed if the world were constituted by a
|
||
single substance in which particular properties have spatiotemporal
|
||
locations.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
necessity of the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic
|
||
properties depends, in other words, on an ontological assumption that
|
||
is not itself necessary, namely, that the world is constituted by
|
||
many particular substances existing together in some way. There was
|
||
no such condition on the kind of metaphysical necessity that Kripke
|
||
discussed, for he was considering only the possibility of properties
|
||
being identical. That is, if phenomenal and physical properties were
|
||
identical, there would be no possible physical world without
|
||
phenomenal properties. But the way in which ontological philosophy
|
||
demonstrates a metaphysically necessary connection does not come from
|
||
discovering the identity of two apparently different properties. It
|
||
comes from discovering that material substances must have two aspects
|
||
to the essential aspect of the nature as substances. That is, it
|
||
depends on a theory about the nature of the substances constituting
|
||
the world that can be justified empirically. (As we have seen, the
|
||
foundation of ontological philosophy is established by accepting
|
||
naturalism, taking ontology to be explanatory, and using the
|
||
empirical method to decide which possible ontological explanation is
|
||
true.) </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Kripke's
|
||
model for identifying properties with one another comes from
|
||
discoveries in science that physical properties picked out on the
|
||
macro-level (such as the solidity of ice) are identical to physical
|
||
properties picked out on the micro-level (such as the hydrogen bonds
|
||
among H<sub>2</sub>O molecules under certain temperature and pressure
|
||
conditions). </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Ontological
|
||
philosophy, by contrast, discovers how properties characterizing one
|
||
aspect of the essential nature of substances (their <i>extrinsic
|
||
</i>essential nature) are related to another aspect of the essential
|
||
nature that such substances must have (their <i>intrinsic </i>essential
|
||
nature). The nature of material substances is what connects them.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Moreover,
|
||
this ontological explanation of properties is what realists about
|
||
physics would have to accept, if they took up the ontological issue
|
||
about their nature at all, for the assumption that there are
|
||
substances whose aspects are properties is certainly more plausible
|
||
than any of the alternative theories about substances: the bundle
|
||
theory, the substratum theory, or the assumption that the whole world
|
||
is a single substance. And if physical properties are simply the
|
||
extrinsic essential aspects of the various material substances making
|
||
up the actual world, naturalists will come to recognize that every
|
||
possible physical world is made of multiple substances and, hence,
|
||
that material substances have intrinsic properties in every possible
|
||
physical world.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">This
|
||
ontological explanation of the necessary connection between physical
|
||
and phenomenal properties is not <i>a priori</i>, but <i>a
|
||
posteriori, </i>because it is discovered. As Kripke agues, that means
|
||
that it must be possible for it to appear that there are possible
|
||
world in which it does not hold. Kripke showed how such an appearance
|
||
of contingency is caused in the case of theoretical identification.
|
||
But it is also possible on this ontological explanation of phenomenal
|
||
properties to explain how it is possible for it to appear that there
|
||
are possible worlds in which this ontologically connection does not
|
||
hold. The illusion of contingency about their relationship comes from
|
||
failing to recognize that the physical world is constituted by
|
||
multiple substances and seeing how properties are reducible to them.
|
||
That is why Chalmers dismisses the belief in intrinsic properties as
|
||
mere speculation.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote3anc" href="#sdendnote3sym"><sup>iii</sup></a></sup></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">Relative
|
||
to a necessary connection established by the identity of properties,
|
||
the connection established by this ontological argument for its
|
||
necessity is limited. From the ontological necessity of the
|
||
connection between intrinsic and extrinsic essential natures of
|
||
substances it does <i>not </i>follow that there is a ontologically
|
||
necessary connection between phenomenal and physical properties, not
|
||
even if phenomenal properties are a kind of intrinsic essential
|
||
nature of certain substances in our world. Since intrinsic and
|
||
extrinsic properties characterize different aspects of the essential
|
||
aspect of substances, it is conceivable that in another possible
|
||
physical world made of multiple substances, substances would have the
|
||
same physical properties as ours, <i>and yet have different kinds of
|
||
intrinsic properties</i>. That is, different worlds could be
|
||
constituted by different kinds of material substances. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Thus,
|
||
beings that are physically similar to us in another world constituted
|
||
by multiple substances might have phenomenal properties with, for
|
||
example, an inverted spectrum of color qualia. Or they might have
|
||
more radically different kinds of intrinsic natures. All that is
|
||
ontologically necessary is that beings like us physically in any
|
||
possible world made of substances have intrinsic natures <i>of some
|
||
kind</i>. Though a zombie world is not ontologically possible, an
|
||
inverted spectrum world is. </font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 3.81cm; margin-right: 2.03cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif">Despite
|
||
this limit to what is necessarily true, however, it is still possible
|
||
to found a science of consciousness on this ontological explanation
|
||
of properties, for it implies that, in any possible physical world
|
||
made of <i>the same kinds of substances as those constituting our
|
||
world</i>, there are no beings physically and functionally like us
|
||
that do not also have phenomenal properties like ours. That is enough
|
||
to found a science of consciousness, because our science is about the
|
||
<i>actual world</i>. It would be gratuitous to hold that physically
|
||
indistinguishable material substances in the actual world are
|
||
different kinds of substances in this sense, especially since they
|
||
are convertible into one another. Thus, the kinds of phenomenal
|
||
properties on which one reflects will be the same as those on which
|
||
other subjects reflect, if the relevant physical properties in the
|
||
brain are the same.</font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">This
|
||
ontological explanation of phenomenal properties also explains how
|
||
they are objects of knowledge. It phenomenal properties are the
|
||
intrinsic essential nature of some form of matter making up conscious
|
||
subjects, we can explain why there is something more for </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Mary"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Mary</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">to
|
||
learn about perception when she leaves the black and white
|
||
neurophysiology laboratory in which she has spent her life and
|
||
finally sees something red. When she sees something red, the process
|
||
she has been studying all her life is for the first time </span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><i>embodied
|
||
in her</i></span></font></font></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.
|
||
Some bit of matter that helps constitute Mary herself has an
|
||
intrinsic essential nature of a kind whose extrinsic essential nature
|
||
has been one of the objects of her study. Thus, Mary learns what it
|
||
is like to be a certain bit of the matter involved in that process. </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">The
|
||
property that Mary discovers is, however, an epiphenomenal property
|
||
on this theory. If phenomenal properties are kinds of intrinsic
|
||
properties, they are never the efficient cause of anything that
|
||
happens in the world. The efficient causes are all properties
|
||
characterizing the extrinsic essential natures of substances, and
|
||
since they determine what happens, they determine the kinds of bits
|
||
of matter that exist and, thereby, all the intrinsic properties in
|
||
the world. But phenomenal properties are not mere "nomological
|
||
danglers," because intrinsic properties earn their claim to
|
||
reality for natural science by being necessary aspects of the same
|
||
substances whose extrinsic essential natures are physical
|
||
properties.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" name="sdendnote4anc" href="#sdendnote4sym"><sup>iv</sup></a></sup></font></font></font></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">Finally,
|
||
this ontological reduction of properties also solves </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Mary"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Nagel’s
|
||
problem</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><span lang="en-US">
|
||
</span></font><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">about
|
||
the relationship between the "view from nowhere" and the
|
||
subjective aspect of experience, or "what it is like." By
|
||
the "view from nowhere," Nagel means the scientific view of
|
||
the natural world, and if this ontological interpretation of physics
|
||
is correct, that is the view of the world as being made up of
|
||
material substances related spatially as parts of the same world. The
|
||
problem, as Nagel sees it, is that the scientific view leaves out the
|
||
subjective aspect of experience. </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 2.54cm; margin-right: 1.27cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt">That
|
||
problem is solved, however, if the world is made up of substances in
|
||
the sense assumed here, for the subjective aspect of experience turns
|
||
out to be the intrinsic aspect of the essential nature of certain
|
||
elementary material substances making up the subject as an organism
|
||
in nature. What is left out of the "view from nowhere" is
|
||
not the <i>existence </i>of phenomenal properties, but only their
|
||
<i>nature</i>. To know their nature, it is necessary to <i>be </i>the
|
||
substances making up the subject, because what it is like for the
|
||
subject <i>is </i>the kind of intrinsic essential nature of the
|
||
relevant bit of matter. </font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="western" align="left" style="margin-left: 1.27cm; margin-right: 2.54cm; margin-top: 0.49cm; margin-bottom: 0.49cm; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0">
|
||
<font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">It
|
||
is still necessary, however, to explain another aspect of the nature
|
||
of consciousness, namely, its unity, or why so many different kinds
|
||
of qualia all appear to the same subject and that same time in
|
||
perception. That is explained in Change: </span></font></font></font><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtkCbGeRRS06Unity.htm"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US"><u>Unity
|
||
of Consciousness</u></span></font></font></font></a><font color="#000000"><font face="Times New Roman, serif"><font size="3" style="font-size: 12pt"><span lang="en-US">.
|
||
But that depends on the implication of spatiomaterialism for science,
|
||
and before taking up science, we must explain why mathematics is
|
||
true. </span></font></font></font>
|
||
</p>
|
||
<div id="sdendnote1">
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
|
||
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote1sym" href="#sdendnote1anc">i</a><span lang="en-US">Some
|
||
such view was also suggested by </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Russell"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Russell</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1927) as "neutral monism" and more recently by </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Lockwood"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Lockwood</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1989, pp. 156-171). It was also suggested by </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Feigl"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Feigl</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1958), </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Maxwell"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Maxwell</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1978), and </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Robinson"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Robinson</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1982).</span></p>
|
||
</div>
|
||
<div id="sdendnote2">
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
|
||
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote2sym" href="#sdendnote2anc">ii</a>Chalmers
|
||
considers another possibility, which he calls "strong
|
||
metaphysical necessity." It holds that there is a difference
|
||
between logical and metaphysical possibility, so that some of what
|
||
seems to be logically possible is not metaphysically possible. If
|
||
the range of metaphysically possible worlds is smaller than the
|
||
range of logically possible worlds, it may turn out that even though
|
||
there are logically possible worlds in which zombies exist, there is
|
||
no metaphysically possible world in which they exist.
|
||
</p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western"><a name="Loar"></a><a name="Chalmers97"></a>
|
||
<span lang="en-US">The obstacle to this approach is making the
|
||
premise about the range of metaphysically possible worlds more than
|
||
an </span><span lang="en-US"><i>ad hoc</i></span><span lang="en-US">,
|
||
dogmatic assertion. And Chalmers cannot see how that is possible.
|
||
Thus, in a subsequent response to his critics, </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Chalmers97"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Chalmers</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1997), uses </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Loar"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Loar</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1997) as an example of this strategy, and his refutation of Loar
|
||
belies the error both are making in taking properties to be basic.
|
||
He interprets Loar as taking the identity of physical and phenomenal
|
||
properties to be a metaphysical truth and then trying to explain why
|
||
this property seems to be two different properties by a difference
|
||
in the </span><span lang="en-US"><i>concepts</i></span><span lang="en-US">
|
||
we use to refer to it. The concept of physical properties involves
|
||
the use of theories and observational evidence for their
|
||
application, whereas we have a "recognitional concept" of
|
||
phenomenal properties (that is, our concept depends on how they
|
||
appear to us in reflection). But in order to make good on this view,
|
||
Loar must explain how such different concepts could be concepts of
|
||
the same properties, and Chalmers’ objection is that Loar does not
|
||
provide it. Ever since Kripke, the usual way of explaining how
|
||
concepts can refer to the same property and yet be cognitively
|
||
distinct is to show that one of the concepts picks out its property
|
||
by way of a contingent fact, such as its causal role. But that is
|
||
not what Loar does. On the contrary, Loar (p. 608) holds that the
|
||
recognitional concept of phenomenal properties "expresses"
|
||
the essential nature of phenomenal properties and that the concept
|
||
of physical properties "expresses" the essential nature of
|
||
physical properties. This undercuts the credibility of his claim
|
||
that that these concepts refer to the same property, for it is hard
|
||
to see how one and the same </span><span lang="en-US"><i>property
|
||
</i></span><span lang="en-US">could have </span><span lang="en-US"><i>two
|
||
different essences</i></span><span lang="en-US">. And to insist that
|
||
it does because it is metaphysically necessary is to beg the
|
||
question. It is to assert dogmatically that an identity is
|
||
metaphysically necessary.</span></p>
|
||
</div>
|
||
<div id="sdendnote3">
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
|
||
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote3sym" href="#sdendnote3anc">iii</a><span lang="en-US">Chalmers
|
||
(1996) takes the grounds of physical properties to be intrinsic
|
||
properties, rather than substances that also have intrinsic
|
||
properties. The omission of substance is also implicit in his
|
||
definition of "materialism" as "the doctrine that the
|
||
physical facts about the world exhaust all the facts, in that every
|
||
positive fact is entailed by the physical facts" (p. 124). The
|
||
same reason also keeps Russell and Lockwood from even suspecting
|
||
that the connection is necessary. </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Russell27"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Russell
|
||
</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">(1927) is explicitly
|
||
skeptical about the existence of substances, preferring to reduce
|
||
substances to sets of physical events located in spacetime. Thus, he
|
||
sees the intrinsic properties to which physical events are connected
|
||
as mental events with the same locations in spacetime, a view he
|
||
calls "neutral monism." </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Lockwood3"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Lockwood
|
||
</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">(1989) is a "causal
|
||
realist" who takes the physical properties to refer to
|
||
"whatever it is that occupies the relevant positions within a
|
||
certain causal structure" (160), and so the door is open for
|
||
him to hold that they are occupied by intrinsic properties.</span></p>
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western"><span lang="en-US">The
|
||
connection between intrinsic and extrinsic properties can be seen as
|
||
an example of what </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Chalmers96B"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Chalmers
|
||
</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">(1996, 137) calls "</span><span lang="en-US"><i>strong
|
||
metaphysical necessity</i></span><span lang="en-US">" as
|
||
opposed to the "</span><span lang="en-US"><i>weak metaphysical
|
||
necessity </i></span><span lang="en-US">introduced by the Kripkean
|
||
framework," for it holds that there are "fewer
|
||
metaphysically possible worlds than logically possible worlds."
|
||
But it is not the dogmatic position that Chalmers assumes it must
|
||
be, for we are merely restricting possible physical worlds to those
|
||
in which the elementary bits of mass and energy described by physics
|
||
are substances. This is a far cry from insisting dogmatically that
|
||
phenomenal properties are metaphysically identical to physical
|
||
properties, as </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Chalmers97B"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Chalmers</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1997) accuses </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/ObjText/#Loar5"><font color="#0000ff"><span lang="en-US"><u>Loar</u></span></font></a><span lang="en-US">
|
||
(1997) of doing. Loar’s way is mere "ontological
|
||
stipulation." But instead of holding that properties are
|
||
identical, we are reducing properties to the substances that
|
||
constitute the existence of the world and explaining the
|
||
relationship between physical and phenomenal properties as different
|
||
aspects that the essential natures of certain forms of material
|
||
substances must have.</span></p>
|
||
</div>
|
||
<div id="sdendnote4">
|
||
<p lang="en-US" class="sdendnote-western" style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.25cm">
|
||
<a class="sdendnotesym" name="sdendnote4sym" href="#sdendnote4anc">iv</a><span lang="en-US">Indeed,
|
||
if phenomenal properties are the intrinsic essential natures of the
|
||
photons generated by the active brain, as I will argue later, they
|
||
are epiphenomenal is a twofold sense, for in addition to being
|
||
intrinsic essential properties of matter, the bits of matter they
|
||
are intrinsic properties of are not themselves the efficient causes
|
||
of what happens in the brain. That depends on how the neurons affect
|
||
one another locally, not on the photons they generate jointly. For a
|
||
discussion of what this implies about the nature of out knowledge of
|
||
phenomenal properties, see the discussion in </span><a href="/F:/Philosophy/Existentialism/The%20Wholeness%20Of%20the%20World/www.twow.net/Lo/L/LoOtkCbGeRRS06Unity.htm"><font color="#0000ff"><font face="Arial, sans-serif"><span lang="en-US"><u>Change:
|
||
Unity of Consciousness</u></span></font></font></a><span lang="en-US">.</span></p>
|
||
</div>
|
||
</body>
|
||
</html> |