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119
.org-ids.json
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119
.org-ids.json
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@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
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{
|
||||
"284f5c7a-1d2b-4e3f-8c6d-9a0b1c2d3e4f": "_index.org",
|
||||
"04c2f221-c54f-51e5-b40a-48822cd16d45": "ideas/common-logic-iso-24707.org",
|
||||
"42c86e6f-4f27-4993-8238-b7bc7d15fb7b": "ideas/stoa-overview.org",
|
||||
"2f783eb4-638e-5afa-9b59-6224d086a712": "ideas/infrastructure-lock-in.org",
|
||||
"1a2b38df-20ba-58ca-ba55-a072be67bd0d": "ideas/pds-as-a-service.org",
|
||||
"1c95ce7d-a2db-506a-9608-df68f9ae211b": "ideas/lisp-machine-security.org",
|
||||
"00ab3a4d-e3de-5605-a67d-12935bb36ab5": "ideas/comparison-with-symbolics.org",
|
||||
"5ac2f037-fc3c-45ac-a6e8-acc20e005cb0": "ideas/legal-structure-alternatives.org",
|
||||
"dc2e4f22-1c4c-5d4a-a151-f96e5d3b0d70": "ideas/time-estimates.org",
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
"b9fa4b7b-bc61-4d7f-918d-ff687b80f2ba": "ideas/triad-systemic-effects.org",
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
"2afd9a3c-e96a-54c7-ac77-a05a28065b4b": "ideas/biology-parallels.org",
|
||||
"1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad": "ideas/agora.org",
|
||||
"5961e469-53a3-5f3c-ab72-3c83ef91963f": "ideas/investment-thesis.org",
|
||||
"aa6d062e-a520-5d14-8773-00687ed9c689": "ideas/moats.org",
|
||||
"433236a2-e5ad-41d4-a27e-4682f8bbc207": "ideas/legal-structure-practical-setup.org",
|
||||
"29e4dbf3-cf19-589c-8b14-389e8a39d564": "ideas/upgrade-lifecycle.org",
|
||||
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|
||||
"98364e9d-a8a9-42b7-a9dc-b643fd2ccc4b": "ideas/outbound-sales-compliance.org",
|
||||
"8c7b9812-f8d6-4347-8915-ce8e520b7914": "ideas/agora-entry-strategy.org",
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
"3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5": "ideas/compute-marketplace.org",
|
||||
"1bc22b89-d3eb-4f6d-bcfc-2b0c19c8ed8f": "ideas/competitive-landscape-agora.org",
|
||||
"efc76898-03f7-57ba-923d-35d65da88bb7": "ideas/sufficiency-flip.org",
|
||||
"1c3ec48b-446c-50d2-b53e-126a81f5143f": "ideas/triad-index.org",
|
||||
"45258a2d-1675-562c-9024-5d1eb2f1ea56": "ideas/evaluation-harness.org",
|
||||
"2e390c1d-65f3-5fb3-b898-ac3fc4291ee7": "ideas/agora-usernames.org",
|
||||
"ed05cab4-88e9-4e25-b7c9-346fa39c69a0": "ideas/revenue-hub.org",
|
||||
"d84679f1-c0c5-5be4-b19c-6573560640ee": "ideas/verified-skill-marketplace.org",
|
||||
"64708e1f-00e9-4cb7-b44b-ea0b98e5296d": "ideas/agora-contracts.org",
|
||||
"a1fac32a-47de-5fbd-b67d-29152c851747": "ideas/triad-overview.org",
|
||||
"827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920": "ideas/verification-monopoly.org",
|
||||
"9af13fff-9725-542b-93b1-a555bc74ad72": "ideas/lisp-economics.org",
|
||||
"0a4e0b8f-25e0-4b78-9633-fc37d03cefe9": "ideas/asset-protection-structures.org",
|
||||
"13e6ae54-2d24-5aa0-b1cd-a7e8e749aa70": "ideas/self-driving-lisp-machine.org",
|
||||
"84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f": "ideas/verification-appliance.org",
|
||||
"5f55bbe6-d243-5766-8ccf-5c5cc88a6542": "ideas/ai-industry-impact.org",
|
||||
"c652688a-1ea0-487c-9222-00e954efe8a1": "ideas/competitors/hermes-agent.org",
|
||||
"e929ff32-28d8-4a29-bf74-d55babc040d1": "ideas/competitors/codex-cli.org",
|
||||
"416bab7c-4300-4d50-838a-5c7a8ad45d96": "ideas/competitors/thoth.org",
|
||||
"85ca69dd-d085-4a55-ad11-021910b1f82e": "ideas/competitors/openclaw.org",
|
||||
"7a060b36-36db-4eb7-b8cc-844bd6ac9d36": "ideas/competitors/opencode.org",
|
||||
"c3aab2e8-7e43-4abc-93f0-741675cfd78c": "ideas/competitors/aider.org",
|
||||
"512dd121-2292-4f3d-ac53-31bf3d12a60f": "ideas/competitors/claude-code.org",
|
||||
"22d0a159-68a2-4587-9375-5046beddc20c": "ideas/competitors/continue.org",
|
||||
"8d73ccb9-34e4-4899-b0c3-605998e9bebc": "ideas/competitors/gemini-cli.org",
|
||||
"0f949f6c-4cf1-49eb-b9a4-ebcac27ee548": "ideas/agora/agora-requirements-05-social.org",
|
||||
"2cace571-76bb-4c34-a5f4-68bc20b2e884": "ideas/agora/agora-requirements-10-user-journey.org",
|
||||
"df02cddc-944a-4bcd-8ef5-f080870d5f49": "ideas/agora/agora-requirements-08-library.org",
|
||||
"90484f4a-5b70-4001-93d6-e610e54ed573": "ideas/agora/agora-requirements-06-exchange-and-contracts.org",
|
||||
"72570648-d943-42e5-a781-3b09791ac6ec": "ideas/agora/agora-requirements-11-assessment.org",
|
||||
"6fe67db6-25bd-4d11-bd1d-b44ec809e858": "ideas/agora/agora-requirements-02-identity.org",
|
||||
"f6cfc54b-919b-4311-bcbf-65e976755d40": "ideas/agora/agora-requirements-04-the-primitive.org",
|
||||
"8b4e0cec-a7b0-4e75-a1e3-c55ae820eb6d": "ideas/agora/agora-requirements-09-implementation.org",
|
||||
"68ffa49f-f0d8-42cf-8b69-ae69de8bb815": "ideas/agora/agora-requirements-10-governance-and-assets.org",
|
||||
"a3243dd0-3209-423b-98e1-51c3eada2658": "ideas/agora/agora-requirements-07-advanced-integration.org",
|
||||
"3b43a9b8-31d1-4479-a35f-22273b74f0c7": "ideas/agora/agora-requirements-03-infrastructure.org",
|
||||
"b25bf753-9799-41ab-82f5-1a1416db756b": "ideas/agora/agora-requirements-01-overview.org",
|
||||
"10289e64-a4ff-4c34-828f-f3a9c769b73d": "ideas/agora/agora-requirements-00-readme.org",
|
||||
"558154ea-e63a-4c45-998c-26ce8588585b": "ideas/compliance/first-mover-window.org",
|
||||
"b852ec69-0fc2-435c-ae1e-6b83e49b3ca3": "ideas/compliance/appi.org",
|
||||
"e777064d-9950-42d5-980d-8c78cda91500": "ideas/compliance/pipa.org",
|
||||
"e2ab887d-9f28-4da6-8388-e6c035e9d9c5": "ideas/compliance/iso-27001.org",
|
||||
"4a2bc62b-3f21-4212-9cd9-f9add8fc0be1": "ideas/compliance/glba.org",
|
||||
"03ebdb80-a9af-4e76-a443-8556424996ed": "ideas/compliance/fatf.org",
|
||||
"e6993701-3c67-49bf-82f3-06907572cbf3": "ideas/compliance/fedramp.org",
|
||||
"7f46764b-47b8-4892-a526-2c1b9ee6e6df": "ideas/compliance/irap.org",
|
||||
"fc736aec-ef53-4759-9787-62bc8deea2e7": "ideas/compliance/ifrs.org",
|
||||
"81a815ee-bf2b-4365-9894-b814e4196850": "ideas/compliance/revenue-table.org",
|
||||
"68c55deb-72bf-4b15-ac28-bcc792057543": "ideas/compliance/ifc-ps.org",
|
||||
"513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104": "ideas/compliance/gdpr.org",
|
||||
"6a5884c8-e9b5-477e-bbf6-aa9ffd967739": "ideas/compliance/un-cefact.org",
|
||||
"84fb5f8f-0527-4df0-b6b6-dbf3bcff8a7f": "ideas/compliance/hipaa.org",
|
||||
"177aad72-5626-444d-a2e4-af8e1263b125": "ideas/compliance/world-bank-esf.org",
|
||||
"834689e9-be0a-4822-9085-9b6b22294fd2": "ideas/compliance/privacy-act-aus.org",
|
||||
"904f5f12-ec9a-4cbf-854a-0b9b1e11a521": "ideas/compliance/apra-cps-234.org",
|
||||
"1c4c91ec-c465-44ab-bd91-4c3b45909ddb": "ideas/compliance/_index.org",
|
||||
"c871a9f4-dd53-4e93-aa50-6acf0c606a9b": "ideas/compliance/lgpd.org",
|
||||
"b8cf51e8-5f39-49ad-9547-a792a2e446aa": "ideas/compliance/eidas2.org",
|
||||
"06fcdb02-2643-4f9d-ab41-e711a99cc390": "ideas/compliance/eu-ai-act.org",
|
||||
"ed65031c-cbd2-4ad2-bd53-a67791e183cd": "ideas/compliance/soc2.org",
|
||||
"c9830152-0160-4bdc-ab03-6f308ad43536": "ideas/compliance/sox.org",
|
||||
"f6a0c00e-e922-44af-99ce-6412c4b73745": "ideas/compliance/quebec-law-25.org",
|
||||
"748db16a-1382-4e5e-8812-a5d57a8de131": "ideas/compliance/nis2.org",
|
||||
"87996d87-100c-4bf6-8546-a860b9d7c25b": "ideas/compliance/ccpa-cpra.org",
|
||||
"ce81fefc-b7a8-4be5-912f-55fd30970b6e": "ideas/compliance/cra.org",
|
||||
"085b76cc-4a65-4660-9c70-85aee10ca99e": "ideas/compliance/ismap.org",
|
||||
"e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c": "ideas/compliance/compliance-index.org",
|
||||
"748b0cc7-7f42-49fb-8ee3-1ae49048a178": "ideas/compliance/iso-27701.org",
|
||||
"022109ad-f031-44c4-8ea0-0b3c9402ca90": "ideas/compliance/oecd.org",
|
||||
"fed19a24-ad81-4837-a12b-dafbd3ec110a": "ideas/compliance/dpdp-act.org",
|
||||
"9bc29937-d59a-4ae4-9623-3d17a1fe6ebb": "ideas/compliance/uk-gdpr.org",
|
||||
"4eef0993-6671-41cf-ba20-d1443a3ec49d": "ideas/compliance/basel-iii.org",
|
||||
"581666ba-f72c-406b-8556-93876d2b30bf": "ideas/compliance/ny-dfs-500.org",
|
||||
"bafdaa23-de0b-444c-9151-c87ac65add32": "ideas/compliance/lfp-dppp.org",
|
||||
"717ef2df-2a80-4362-b23a-5e7e12554251": "ideas/compliance/dora.org",
|
||||
"4a1f23b0-abc4-4def-9876-543210abcdef": "ideas/stoa/stoa-stage-3-stoa.org",
|
||||
"4a1f23b0-abc1-4def-9876-543210abcdef": "ideas/stoa/stoa-stage-0-now.org",
|
||||
"4a1f23b0-abc3-4def-9876-543210abcdef": "ideas/stoa/stoa-stage-2-logos.org",
|
||||
"4a1f23b0-abc2-4def-9876-543210abcdef": "ideas/stoa/stoa-stage-1-agora.org",
|
||||
"4a1f23b0-abc7-4def-9876-543210abcdef": "ideas/stoa/stoa-stage-6-training.org",
|
||||
"c3b3dc41-945f-54e9-84eb-ca014114f1be": "ideas/stoa/_index.org",
|
||||
"3f24ad65-0845-4e75-a3d7-dc4de734a6ac": "ideas/stoa/stoa-vision-roadmap.org",
|
||||
"4a1f23b0-abc8-4def-9876-543210abcdef": "ideas/stoa/stoa-stage-7-remaining.org",
|
||||
"4a1f23b0-abc6-4def-9876-543210abcdef": "ideas/stoa/stoa-stage-5-weights.org",
|
||||
"4a1f23b0-abc5-4def-9876-543210abcdef": "ideas/stoa/stoa-stage-4-inference.org"
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}
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25
_index.org
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25
_index.org
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:PROPERTIES:
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||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 284f5c7a-1d2b-4e3f-8c6d-9a0b1c2d3e4f
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||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Brain
|
||||
#+filetags: :index:navigation:
|
||||
|
||||
This is the knowledge base for the [[id:d71df46b-9012-433c-86ce-ec21b78eac5f][triad]] — [[id:42c86e6f-4f27-4993-8238-b7bc7d15fb7b][Stoa (Verified Lisp Machine)]], [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora (Decentralized Protocol)]], and the interconnected concepts around them.
|
||||
|
||||
Start with the [[id:4a1f23b0-abc1-4def-9876-543210abcdef][Stoa staged roadmap]] if you are new here: it walks from conventional computing through each stage of verified infrastructure, ending at what remains.
|
||||
|
||||
**Sections:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:42c86e6f-4f27-4993-8238-b7bc7d15fb7b][Stoa — Verified Lisp Machine]] — the staged roadmap from conventional computing through verified [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][hardware]], with cost-benefit per stage
|
||||
- [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora — Decentralized Social Protocol]] — identity, communication, contracts, governance
|
||||
- [[id:329a30cd-55fb-496d-a60b-91388c211bba][Ideas]] — all concept pages and analysis
|
||||
|
||||
**Core concept pages:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][Verification Appliance]] — what a verified Lisp image means, the ACL2 bootstrap
|
||||
- [[id:13e6ae54-2d24-5aa0-b1cd-a7e8e749aa70][Self-Driving Lisp Machine]] — where [[id:e01b9199-2cba-4ac2-824b-ba1b033cc23e][Passepartout]], Stoa, and Logos converge
|
||||
- [[id:1c95ce7d-a2db-506a-9608-df68f9ae211b][Lisp Machine Security]] — Merkle memory, gate stack, structural proofs
|
||||
- [[id:c34940cc-090e-57c4-8020-e78b1d32b96c][Domain Gate Packages]] — capability authorization, the Dispatcher
|
||||
- [[id:45ea493b-94ad-5885-aa65-0c846e5c3c1d][Gate Rule Encoding]] — how policies are encoded and enforced
|
||||
- [[id:1c3ec48b-446c-50d2-b53e-126a81f5143f][Triad Index]] — Logos, Stoa, Agora as a system
|
||||
9
ideas/_index.org
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9
ideas/_index.org
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@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 329a30cd-55fb-496d-a60b-91388c211bba
|
||||
:ID: auto-ideas
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Ideas
|
||||
#+filetags: :index:
|
||||
|
||||
Section index for ideas. Browse by file.
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 64708e1f-00e9-4cb7-b44b-ea0b98e5296d
|
||||
:ID: agora-contracts
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +15,7 @@ Existing smart contract platforms (Ethereum, Solana, Cosmos) verify only that ex
|
||||
- Ethereum: The contract ran according to the EVM bytecode (execution validity)
|
||||
- Agora: The contract is correct with respect to its specification, AND it ran correctly (correctness + execution)
|
||||
|
||||
This means Agora contracts can encode real-world regulations (HIPAA, SOC2, GDPR) as gate rules and prove that a contract execution satisfies them. No existing platform does this.
|
||||
This means Agora contracts can encode real-world regulations ([[id:84fb5f8f-0527-4df0-b6b6-dbf3bcff8a7f][HIPAA]], [[id:ed65031c-cbd2-4ad2-bd53-a67791e183cd][SOC2]], [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]]) as gate rules and prove that a contract execution satisfies them. No existing platform does this.
|
||||
|
||||
* What Contracts Enable
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ How it works:
|
||||
- Every transaction runs through the symbolic engine and produces a proof log
|
||||
- Any instance can verify any other instance's contract execution by replaying the proof
|
||||
|
||||
Revenue: Transaction fee per contract execution ([[file:compute-marketplace.org][compute marketplace]]), deployment fee per verified contract, premium for certification weight.
|
||||
Revenue: Transaction fee per contract execution in the [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]], deployment fee per verified contract, premium for certification weight.
|
||||
|
||||
Comparison: Ethereum collects ~$20B/yr in transaction fees. Agora's verifiably correct contracts target the same market with a stronger value proposition. The limitation is liquidity, not technology — network effects determine adoption.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ Comparison: Ethereum collects ~$20B/yr in transaction fees. Agora's verifiably c
|
||||
Organizations running multiple triad instances need contracts that span instances: cross-instance policy, unified compliance, federated identity.
|
||||
|
||||
Use cases:
|
||||
- Enterprise: all instances in the finance department must apply the SOX gate rule set
|
||||
- Enterprise: all instances in the finance department must apply the [[id:c9830152-0160-4bdc-ab03-6f308ad43536][SOX]] gate rule set
|
||||
- Consortium: each member instance votes on protocol upgrades
|
||||
- Supply chain: Instance A verifies shipment, Instance B verifies payment, both must agree
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -69,13 +70,13 @@ Revenue: Attestation fee (one-time or annual), verification fee per reputation q
|
||||
|
||||
** 5. Insurance Marketplace
|
||||
|
||||
If certification carries legal weight (as described in [[file:compute-marketplace.org][compute marketplace]]), then:
|
||||
If certification carries legal weight (as described in [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]]), then:
|
||||
|
||||
- Proof insurance: A provider insures their verification results. If a proof turns out wrong, the insurance pays out. Premiums are set by actuarial gate rules based on the provider's track record.
|
||||
- Contract execution insurance: Insure against bugs in contract code (even ACL2-verified contracts can have specification errors).
|
||||
- Reputation staking pool: A reinsurance pool where multiple providers stake against each other's attestations.
|
||||
|
||||
Revenue: Premiums, pool fees, actuarial gate rule licensing.
|
||||
Revenue: Premiums, pool fees, actuarial gate rule [[id:67faf52f-9126-50a7-b87e-2bedc610dac7][licensing]].
|
||||
|
||||
Why this is defensible: Insurance requires capital and track record. A new entrant cannot bootstrap reputation overnight. The early player accumulates both, creating a moat that compounds with every honest attestation.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -92,13 +93,13 @@ Revenue: Commission on each data transaction (the compute marketplace extended t
|
||||
|
||||
** 7. Namespace Sub-Leasing and Auction
|
||||
|
||||
Premium usernames ([[file:agora-usernames.org][agora-usernames]]) can be sub-leased between DIDs. The registry takes a commission on each lease.
|
||||
[[id:2e390c1d-65f3-5fb3-b898-ac3fc4291ee7][Premium usernames]] can be sub-leased between DIDs. The registry takes a commission on each lease.
|
||||
|
||||
Revenue: Commission per lease transaction, auction fees for contested names, premium for verified ownership.
|
||||
|
||||
** 8. Dispute Resolution
|
||||
|
||||
When two Agora instances disagree on a contract execution, submit to a verified arbitrator. The arbitrator runs the contract in their own Passepartout and the proof log resolves the ambiguity unambiguously — the dispute is about facts, not interpretations, because the contract terms are formal gate rules.
|
||||
When two Agora instances disagree on a contract execution, submit to a verified arbitrator. The arbitrator runs the contract in their own [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] and the proof log resolves the ambiguity unambiguously — the dispute is about facts, not interpretations, because the contract terms are formal gate rules.
|
||||
|
||||
Revenue: Fee per resolution, premium for reputation-weighted arbitration (arbitrators with long track records charge more).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -108,7 +109,7 @@ Revenue: Fee per resolution, premium for reputation-weighted arbitration (arbitr
|
||||
|----------+-----------+--------------+-------+------------|
|
||||
| Smart contracts (general) | $20B/yr (Ethereum) | Transaction fees | End State | Installed base |
|
||||
| Contract templates | New market | Per-template sale | Zero | Gate rule SDK |
|
||||
| Governance (multi-instance) | New market | Annual license | Zero | Stoa premium |
|
||||
| Governance (multi-instance) | New market | Annual license | Zero | [[id:c3b3dc41-945f-54e9-84eb-ca014114f1be][Stoa]] premium |
|
||||
| Liquid democracy | New market | Per-vote fee | End State | Installed base |
|
||||
| Attestation | New market | Per-attestation | Zero | DID registry |
|
||||
| Insurance marketplace | $1T+ (global insurance) | Premiums | End State | Installed base + capital |
|
||||
@@ -127,13 +128,13 @@ The compute marketplace and the contract platform reinforce each other:
|
||||
- Attestation bridges them: a compute provider's track record is a verifiable contract history
|
||||
- Insurance prices compute risk based on attestation
|
||||
|
||||
The triad's network effects compound when all three layers (compute, contracts, attestation) are active simultaneously. Any one layer without the others is weaker — together they create the [[file:verification-monopoly.org][verification monopoly]].
|
||||
The triad's network effects compound when all three layers (compute, contracts, attestation) are active simultaneously. Any one layer without the others is weaker — together they create the [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]].
|
||||
|
||||
* References
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:agora.org][Agora overview]]
|
||||
- [[file:agora-usernames.org][Premium username registry]]
|
||||
- [[file:pds-as-a-service.org][PDS as a service]]
|
||||
- [[file:compute-marketplace.org][Compute marketplace]]
|
||||
- [[file:revenue-hub.org][Revenue streams overview]]
|
||||
- [[file:verification-monopoly.org][Verification monopoly]]
|
||||
- [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora overview]]
|
||||
- [[id:2e390c1d-65f3-5fb3-b898-ac3fc4291ee7][Premium username registry]]
|
||||
- [[id:1a2b38df-20ba-58ca-ba55-a072be67bd0d][PDS as a service]]
|
||||
- [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][Compute marketplace]]
|
||||
- [[id:ed05cab4-88e9-4e25-b7c9-346fa39c69a0][Revenue streams overview]]
|
||||
- [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][The [[id:90484f4a-5b70-4001-93d6-e610e54ed573][Agora Exchange requirements]] specify the contract and exchange layer in detail. [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][Verification monopoly]]]]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 8c7b9812-f8d6-4347-8915-ce8e520b7914
|
||||
:ID: agora-entry-strategy
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -175,9 +176,9 @@ Organized communities are the entry point because they force the Agora to be the
|
||||
|
||||
* References
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:agora.org][Agora overview]]
|
||||
- [[file:../agora/docs/agora-requirements-01-overview.org][Agora Protocol Overview — Platform Replacement Strategy]]
|
||||
- [[file:../agora/docs/agora-requirements-05-social.org][Social Space — Collective Personas and Governance]]
|
||||
- [[file:../agora/docs/agora-requirements-06-exchange-and-contracts.org][Exchange and Contracts — SCAL, Escrow, Arbitration]]
|
||||
- [[file:alternative-growth-social-first.org][Social-first growth scenario]]
|
||||
- [[file:competitive-landscape-agora.org][Full competitive landscape]]
|
||||
- [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora overview]]
|
||||
- Agora Protocol Overview — Platform Replacement Strategy
|
||||
- Social Space — Collective Personas and Governance
|
||||
- Exchange and Contracts — SCAL, Escrow, Arbitration
|
||||
- [[id:57f9538a-6270-4302-8d07-d742168419eb][Social-first growth scenario]]
|
||||
- [[id:1bc22b89-d3eb-4f6d-bcfc-2b0c19c8ed8f][Full competitive landscape]]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 2e390c1d-65f3-5fb3-b898-ac3fc4291ee7
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Premium Username Registry on Agora
|
||||
@@ -10,4 +11,4 @@ The DID system is permissionless — anyone generates their own DID via HD key d
|
||||
- **Premium tier:** short names (2-3 chars), common words, brand names, squatter prevention via auction or annual lease
|
||||
- **Revenue model:** $5-$50/year per premium username, auction revenue for highly contested names (single-letter, common surnames). ENS-style: registration fees fund development, not speculation.
|
||||
|
||||
At scale: 1M premium usernames at $10/yr average = $10M/yr recurring. The namespace registry is a natural monopoly — the early player's registry is the most widely accepted, so every new user registers there. Network effects lock in. The premium username registry works together with a [[file:pds-as-a-service.org][PDS as a service]] offering and a [[file:compute-marketplace.org][Compute marketplace]] to form a complete revenue ecosystem.
|
||||
At scale: 1M premium usernames at $10/yr average = $10M/yr recurring. The namespace registry is a natural monopoly — the early player's registry is the most widely accepted, so every new user registers there. Network effects lock in. The premium username registry works together with a [[id:1a2b38df-20ba-58ca-ba55-a072be67bd0d][PDS as a service]] offering and a [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][Compute marketplace]] to form a complete revenue ecosystem.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,25 +1,26 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Agora — The Society (Decentralized Network)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:agora:network:dids:
|
||||
|
||||
Agora is the decentralized identity and communication layer that connects Passepartout instances:
|
||||
Agora is the decentralized identity and communication layer that connects [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] instances:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Self-sovereign identity** via HD key derivation (BIP-44)
|
||||
- **Encrypted messaging** via DIDComm (agent-to-agent and agent-to-human)
|
||||
- **Notes** as atomic, content-addressed, signed data units (mapped from Passepartout memory-objects)
|
||||
- **Relay Network** for censorship-resistant message routing
|
||||
- **Personal Data Store (PDS)** — the Merkle fact store exposed as a network-addressable service
|
||||
- **Compute marketplace** where instances offer symbolic engine capacity
|
||||
- **[[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][Compute marketplace]]** where instances offer symbolic engine capacity
|
||||
- **Contracts and liquid democracy** infrastructure
|
||||
|
||||
The PDS is Passepartout's in-process memory — the Merkle tree, the fact store, the memory-objects. Every memory-object already has a SHA-256 hash, which maps directly to Agora's CIDv1 content addressing.
|
||||
|
||||
Revenue paths from Agora:
|
||||
- [[file:agora-usernames.org][Premium username registry]] — $10M/yr at scale
|
||||
- [[file:pds-as-a-service.org][PDS as a service]] — $18M/yr at scale
|
||||
- [[file:compute-marketplace.org][Compute marketplace]] — venture-scale
|
||||
- [[file:agora-contracts.org][Smart contracts + contract marketplace]] — the kill app
|
||||
- [[id:2e390c1d-65f3-5fb3-b898-ac3fc4291ee7][Premium username registry]] — $10M/yr at scale
|
||||
- [[id:1a2b38df-20ba-58ca-ba55-a072be67bd0d][PDS as a service]] — $18M/yr at scale
|
||||
- [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][Compute marketplace]] — venture-scale
|
||||
- [[id:64708e1f-00e9-4cb7-b44b-ea0b98e5296d][Smart contracts + contract marketplace]] — the kill app
|
||||
|
||||
See [[file:revenue-hub.org][Revenue streams overview]] for the full picture across all triad components.
|
||||
See [[id:ed05cab4-88e9-4e25-b7c9-346fa39c69a0][Revenue streams overview]] for the full picture across all triad components.
|
||||
|
||||
41
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-00-readme.org
Normal file
41
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-00-readme.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
||||
#+title: Agora: Decentralized Social Network
|
||||
#+AUTHOR: Amr
|
||||
#+CREATED: [2026-03-17 Tue]
|
||||
#+BEGIN_COMMENT
|
||||
A decentralized social network protocol for the ATmosphere (AT Protocol) ecosystem.
|
||||
#+END_COMMENT
|
||||
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 10289e64-a4ff-4c34-828f-f3a9c769b73d
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
* [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]]: Decentralized Social Network
|
||||
|
||||
This project contains the specification and analysis for a decentralized social network built on open protocols.
|
||||
|
||||
* Project Tasks
|
||||
|
||||
See the actionable tasks for this project in GTD.org (Agora project)
|
||||
|
||||
* Key Documents
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:b25bf753-9799-41ab-82f5-1a1416db756b][01. Overview]]
|
||||
- [[id:6fe67db6-25bd-4d11-bd1d-b44ec809e858][02. Identity]]
|
||||
- [[id:3b43a9b8-31d1-4479-a35f-22273b74f0c7][03. Infrastructure]]
|
||||
- [[id:f6cfc54b-919b-4311-bcbf-65e976755d40][04. The Primitive]]
|
||||
- [[id:0f949f6c-4cf1-49eb-b9a4-ebcac27ee548][05. Social Spaces]]
|
||||
-
|
||||
-
|
||||
-
|
||||
-
|
||||
-
|
||||
-
|
||||
-
|
||||
-
|
||||
|
||||
* Status
|
||||
|
||||
- [X] Concept and atomic notes complete
|
||||
- [X] Comprehensive specification built
|
||||
- [ ] Governance decision (DEC-001) pending
|
||||
- [ ] Implementation planning not started
|
||||
428
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-01-overview.org
Normal file
428
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-01-overview.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
|
||||
#+title: Agora Requirements - 01: Protocol Overview and Foundational Principles
|
||||
#+author: Amero Garcia
|
||||
#+created: [2026-03-19 Thu 21:07]
|
||||
#+DATE: 2026-03-20
|
||||
#+ID: agora-requirements-01-overview
|
||||
#+STARTUP: content
|
||||
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: b25bf753-9799-41ab-82f5-1a1416db756b
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
* 1. Introduction to the [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]] Protocol
|
||||
|
||||
The Agora Protocol defines a novel architecture for decentralized digital interaction. Its primary objective is to replace extractive, centralized platforms—the era of *"Digital Feudalism"* where corporations own user data and control visibility via secret algorithms—with a decentralized *"Social Operating System"* that provides Identity, Justice, and Commerce for sovereign individuals and communities.
|
||||
|
||||
Agora returns power to the edges by providing a modular protocol stack where trust is cryptographic, privacy is inherent, and freedom is architectural. This document provides a comprehensive overview of Agora's foundational principles, core technical differentiators, and a detailed exploration of its capabilities across various use cases, including communication, content creation, e-commerce, collaboration, and liquid democracy. It serves as a high-level technical summary, articulating the design philosophy and the synergistic effects of its integrated components.
|
||||
|
||||
* 2. Foundational Principles
|
||||
|
||||
Agora's design is predicated upon a set of core principles that collectively ensure a robust, user-centric [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][decentralized network]].
|
||||
|
||||
** 2.1. User Sovereignty and Data Ownership
|
||||
|
||||
Central to Agora is the tenet of user sovereignty. Unlike centralized paradigms where platforms intermediate and often monetize user data, Agora's architecture ensures that all user-generated content and personal data are exclusively owned and controlled by the originating user. This is achieved through client-side encryption, self-hosted or user-controlled Personal Data Stores (PDS), and audience-defined access controls (`access_control`).
|
||||
|
||||
** 2.2. Decentralization and Censorship Resistance
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol is designed to eliminate single points of failure and control. By distributing data storage across user-controlled PDSs and routing communication through a permissionless Relay Network, Agora inherently resists censorship and external manipulation. There is no central authority capable of unilaterally restricting access, altering content, or deplatforming users.
|
||||
|
||||
** 2.3. Authenticity and Verifiability
|
||||
|
||||
Every action and piece of content within Agora is cryptographically signed by the originating Persona. This provides an immutable and auditable record, ensuring the authenticity and integrity of all interactions. The content-addressed nature of all data, via Content Identifiers (CIDs), guarantees that content cannot be altered without changing its unique identifier, thereby establishing verifiable provenance.
|
||||
|
||||
** 2.4. Privacy by Design
|
||||
|
||||
Agora incorporates privacy-enhancing technologies at every layer. End-to-end encryption is a default for private communications, and mechanisms such as Blinded Sharding for social recovery and "Off-the-Record" modes for ephemeral interactions are integrated to minimize metadata leakage and ensure user confidentiality.
|
||||
|
||||
* 3. Core Technical Differentiators
|
||||
|
||||
Agora's unique capabilities stem from the synergistic integration of three primary technical differentiators: The Note Primitive, Self-Sovereign Identity (Personas and Master Key), and a Distributed Infrastructure (PDS and Relay Network).
|
||||
|
||||
** 3.1. The Note Primitive: Atomic Unit of Information
|
||||
|
||||
At the heart of Agora's data model is the "Note"—the atomic, universal unit of information. Every piece of content or interaction within the protocol, regardless of its semantic meaning (e.g., a social post, a message, a contract, an encyclopedia entry, a product listing), is encapsulated within a Note.
|
||||
|
||||
For a comprehensive technical breakdown of the Note's structure, cryptographic hashing, and content flag schema, see *[[id:f6cfc54b-919b-4311-bcbf-65e976755d40][04: The Primitive]]*.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 3.1.2. Benefits of the Unified Note Primitive
|
||||
|
||||
The "Everything is a Note" paradigm yields significant architectural advantages:
|
||||
- *Universal Interoperability:* A single, standardized data model allows any Agora-compatible client application to understand and process any Note, fostering an open ecosystem where diverse applications can seamlessly interact.
|
||||
- *Immutable Audit Trail:* The content-addressed and signed nature of Notes inherently creates an unalterable, verifiable history of all digital interactions and content evolution.
|
||||
- *Simplified Development:* Developers can focus on application-layer semantics and user experience, leveraging a robust and consistent underlying data primitive.
|
||||
|
||||
** 3.2. Self-Sovereign Identity: Personas and the Master Key
|
||||
|
||||
Agora's identity system grants users absolute control over their digital presence, leveraging Hierarchical Deterministic (HD) cryptography to derive and manage multiple functional identities.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 3.2.1. The Master Key (Anima)
|
||||
|
||||
The Master Key serves as the absolute root of a user's digital being within Agora.
|
||||
- *Root of Trust:* A single, securely generated and stored secret seed from which all other identities are derived.
|
||||
- *Hierarchical Derivation:* Utilizes a BIP-44 compatible HD derivation path (`m/44'/1'/account'/persona'/key_purpose/key_index`) to generate an infinite number of unlinkable Personas, each acting as a sovereign sub-root for its own functional keys.
|
||||
- *Secure Storage:* Recommended for offline storage or within [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][Hardware]] Security Modules (HSMs) to ensure maximum protection.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 3.2.2. Personas: Functional Digital Identities
|
||||
|
||||
Personas are the active, functional identities through which users interact with the Agora network.
|
||||
- *Distinct Identities:* Each Persona represents a distinct Decentralized Identifier (DID), allowing users to maintain separate digital roles (e.g., personal, professional, anonymous) with granular control.
|
||||
- *Key Management:* Each Persona possesses its own signing and encryption keypairs, which can be revoked or rotated independently without affecting the Master Key or other Personas.
|
||||
- *Asset Ownership & Rights:* Personas are analogous to legal entities, capable of owning digital assets (e.g., Bitcoin wallets), entering into binding contracts, and claiming protected rights such as due process and freedom of expression.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 3.2.3. Decentralized Identity Management Benefits
|
||||
|
||||
- *Absolute User Control:* Full ownership of identity and keys, independent of any central authority.
|
||||
- *Granular Access Control:* Ability to manage access to specific Personas and their associated data.
|
||||
- *Efficient Organizational Revocation:* For collective entities, the HD model enables atomic revocation of access for departing members directly from the Master Key control point, streamlining offboarding and enhancing security across all associated assets and services.
|
||||
- *Resilient Social Recovery:* Utilizes Shamir's Secret Sharing with trusted "Guardians" to enable Master Key recovery without reliance on centralized services.
|
||||
|
||||
** 3.3. Distributed Infrastructure: PDS, Relays, and Thin Clients
|
||||
|
||||
Agora's infrastructure is specifically engineered to underpin user sovereignty, data ownership, and censorship resistance.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 3.3.1. Personal Data Store (PDS): The User's Digital Vault
|
||||
|
||||
The PDS is the central component for data ownership, acting as the user's sovereign digital vault.
|
||||
- *Exclusive Control:* Every user controls their own PDS, whether self-hosted or through a trusted provider.
|
||||
- *Master Archive:* Stores all user content (client-side encrypted) and identity data.
|
||||
- *Access Gatekeeper:* Enforces access control, issuing decryption keys based on validated credentials or payments.
|
||||
- *PDS-as-a-Service:* Services can integrate seamlessly, offering free sign-ups with grace periods and requiring in-Agora payments (e.g., Lightning) for continued service, bypassing traditional financial intermediaries.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 3.3.2. Relay Network: The Intelligent Communication Backbone
|
||||
|
||||
The Relay Network forms the intelligent communication backbone of Agora, efficiently routing encrypted Notes between Personas.
|
||||
- *Ephemeral Routing:* Relays route ciphertext based on CIDs and Persona subscriptions, without long-term storage of user data.
|
||||
- *Pub/Sub Model:* Facilitates efficient, real-time delivery of Notes based on user subscriptions.
|
||||
- *Censorship Resistance:* Users can publish to multiple Relays, ensuring availability and resilience against censorship.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 3.3.3. Agile Client Architecture: Broad Accessibility and Adaptability
|
||||
|
||||
Agora adopts a flexible client architecture to balance user sovereignty with broad accessibility, particularly concerning app store ecosystems.
|
||||
- *PDS-Proximate Logic:* Core application logic can reside and execute securely on the user's PDS.
|
||||
- *Thin Clients:* Edge devices (mobile, desktop) run lightweight applications that interface with the PDS, mitigating app store restrictions and reducing device resource demands.
|
||||
- *Strategic Imperative:* This architecture ensures Agora's reach to a wider user base while maintaining security and privacy.
|
||||
|
||||
* 4. Agora Use Cases: A Paradigm Shift
|
||||
|
||||
The synergistic combination of Agora's core differentiators enables a wide array of transformative use cases, redefining digital interaction across multiple domains.
|
||||
|
||||
** 4.1. Decentralized Social Interaction
|
||||
|
||||
Agora provides a robust framework for secure, private, and censorship-resistant interaction, moving beyond traditional platform-controlled silos.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 4.1.1. Asynchronous Interaction (The Note Primitive)
|
||||
|
||||
- *Unified Model:* All async interactions—whether directed messages or broadcast posts—are built on the same cryptographically signed *Note* primitive, utilizing the *DIDComm* protocol for secure transport.
|
||||
- *Storage Sovereignty:* Employs a "Copy-on-Send" model for directed communication (ensuring recipient data ownership) and a "Reference-on-Send" model for broadcast content (ensuring owner control). The PDS acts as an encrypted mailbox proxy.
|
||||
- *End-to-End Encryption:* Default for directed communications, utilizing standard encrypted envelopes. Double Ratchet and MLS ensure forward secrecy.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 4.1.2. Synchronous Interaction (Real-time)
|
||||
|
||||
- *WebRTC Integration:* Supports peer-to-peer real-time chat, voice, and video calls with end-to-end encryption and *decentralized signaling* via DIDComm handshakes.
|
||||
- *Off-the-Record Mode:* Provides absolute privacy for ephemeral interactions by utilizing extremely short `ephemeral_duration` or bypassing PDS storage entirely, with content existing only in volatile client memory.
|
||||
|
||||
** 4.2. Social Publishing and Knowledge Management
|
||||
|
||||
Agora fundamentally reshapes how content is created, published, and managed, empowering creators and ensuring verifiable knowledge.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 4.2.1. Feeds and Pages
|
||||
|
||||
- *Immutable History:* Social posts (`is_feed: true`) and wiki pages (`is_feed: false`) are signed Notes, providing an unalterable history of creation and edits.
|
||||
- *Auditable Threads:* Replies are Notes referencing parent CIDs, creating verifiable discussion threads across the distributed network.
|
||||
- *Direct Monetization:* Paywalled content and seeder rewards enable direct creator-to-consumer economic models via Lightning micro-payments.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 4.2.2. Decentralized Wikis and Encyclopedias
|
||||
|
||||
- *Versioned Pages:* Each wiki page is an `is_feed: false` Note, with edits creating new Notes that supersede previous versions, building an immutable, auditable version history.
|
||||
- *Collaborative Ownership:* Access control and editing rights are managed via *Contract Notes* (Consent or Service Contracts) with `Collective Personas`.
|
||||
- *Incentivized Contributions:* Micro-payments can reward contributions, fostering a collaborative, trustworthy, and censorship-resistant knowledge base.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 4.2.3. Verifiable News Ecosystem
|
||||
|
||||
- *Signed Articles:* News articles are `is_feed: true` Notes, signed by journalist Personas, ensuring clear provenance and ownership.
|
||||
- *Immutable Record:* All versions of an article are archived, preventing historical revisionism or "disappearing" stories.
|
||||
- *Decentralized Distribution:* Resilient against censorship attempts, as distribution occurs via the Relay Network.
|
||||
- *Reputation Systems:* Notes referencing Persona DIDs and community-driven verification mechanisms can build transparent reputation for sources and journalists.
|
||||
|
||||
** 4.3. Decentralized E-commerce and Markets
|
||||
|
||||
Agora enables peer-to-peer economic interaction without intermediaries, fostering transparent and auditable marketplaces for goods and services.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 4.3.1. Market Interaction Contracts
|
||||
|
||||
- *Offer as Early Contract:* A *Contract Note* (product listing) serves as a unilateral declaration of intent (*Offer*) by a seller, transitioning into a bilateral agreement (*Take*) upon buyer acceptance.
|
||||
- *Transparent Listings:* Offers are signed Notes, providing verifiable details of items or services.
|
||||
- *Questions and Reviews:* Notes that `reply_to` or `references` listings allow public or private dialogue, building transparent market trust and reputation based on Owner Reputation.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 4.3.2. Fungible vs. Non-fungible Assets
|
||||
|
||||
- *Non-Fungible:* Agora's *Contract Note* model is inherently well-suited for unique goods and services (e.g., digital art, custom work), with each contract representing a distinct agreement.
|
||||
- *Fungible:* While Agora provides the identity, communication, and settlement rails (e.g., Lightning micropayments), high-speed trading of fungible assets (e.g., cryptocurrencies, commodities) would require specialized architectural layers (e.g., decentralized exchanges or AMMs) built *on top of* the Agora protocol for order matching and liquidity.
|
||||
|
||||
** 4.4. Decentralized Collaboration and Project Management
|
||||
|
||||
Agora offers robust primitives for secure, auditable collaboration, empowering teams and communities.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 4.4.1. Version-Controlled Documents and Code
|
||||
|
||||
- *Signed Commits/Edits:* Each change to a collaborative document or codebase is a signed Note with appropriate `content_type` (for code) or a versioned `is_feed: false` Note (for documents), creating an immutable, auditable history.
|
||||
- *Collective Ownership:* Repositories or documents can be owned by `Collective Personas`, with access and editing rights managed via *Contract Notes*.
|
||||
- *Decentralized GitHub/Git Integration:* Codebases are stored as Merkle DAGs of commit Notes, enabling decentralized version control. Issues and pull requests are also Notes, facilitating transparent project management.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 4.4.2. Project Management and Task Tracking
|
||||
|
||||
- *Tasks as Contracts:* Project tasks are *Contract Notes* in a negotiation state, allowing for assignment, progress tracking, and integration with payment mechanisms.
|
||||
- *Incentivized Development:* Lightning bounties (*Contract Notes*) can be attached to issues or tasks, directly rewarding contributions upon completion and verification.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 4.4.3. The Aletheia Portfolio (Professional Integration)
|
||||
|
||||
The convergence of native hosting, identity, and contracts enables a unified professional workflow. For example, a freelance photographer can:
|
||||
- *Generate & Publish:* Build a professional portfolio using a static site generator and publish it natively to the network via their "Professional Persona" root CID.
|
||||
- *Sovereign Hosting:* The portfolio remains available via any Gateway, resilient against PDS downtime.
|
||||
- *Contractual Linkage:* Directly link the portfolio Note to a binding service contract for client hiring, with payments settled via Lightning.
|
||||
|
||||
** 4.5. Liquid Democracy and Governance: Evolvable Collectives
|
||||
|
||||
Agora's identity and contract primitives lay the groundwork for a dynamic, adaptive model of decentralized governance that moves beyond the rigidity of traditional blockchain-based DAOs.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 4.5.1. Adaptive Constitutions and Policy Execution
|
||||
|
||||
- *Signed Votes and Execution:* Individual votes are signed Notes that `references` a proposal CID. Unlike immutable blockchain code, Agora governance is built around *Adaptive Constitutions*.
|
||||
- *Recursive Rule-Making:* Successful votes trigger the Governance Executable Module (GEM) to automatically update the Collective's policy parameters (e.g., membership fees, arbitration rules) in its active Smart Constitution.
|
||||
- *Immutable History, Mutable State:* While the complete audit trail of every vote and version is permanently recorded as a chain of CIDs, the organization can evolve its logic over time without requiring complex migrations.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 4.5.2. Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs)
|
||||
|
||||
- *Foundation Contracts:* DAOs are formalized as `Collective Personas` governed by a set of foundational `Contract Notes` that define membership, treasury management, and decision-making processes.
|
||||
- *Forks as Safety Valves:* Because Agora is permissionless, minorities can "fork" a Collective by creating a new Persona based on an earlier constitutional CID, ensuring protection against majority tyranny and preserving community intent.
|
||||
- *Transparent Operations:* All operational decisions, proposals, and expenditures within a DAO are conducted and recorded as signed Notes and Contracts, providing 100% transparency to participants.
|
||||
|
||||
* 5. Conclusion: Towards a Self-Sovereign Digital Future
|
||||
|
||||
The Agora Protocol is meticulously designed to serve as the foundational layer for a new era of decentralized digital interaction. By unifying identity, data, and communication under the immutable, verifiable, and user-owned "Note" primitive, coupled with a distributed infrastructure and self-sovereign identity management, Agora offers a robust and resilient alternative to centralized systems. Its capabilities span from secure personal communication to complex global e-commerce, from collaborative knowledge creation to transparent democratic governance. Agora empowers individuals and collectives to reclaim their digital sovereignty, fostering an internet where trust is cryptographic, privacy is inherent, and freedom is architectural.
|
||||
* Bootstrapping & Progressive Decentralization
|
||||
|
||||
** The Cold Start Problem
|
||||
|
||||
A decentralized social network faces an existential network effect challenge. Users will not join if there is no content, and creators will not post if there are no users. Agora solves this through *Progressive Decentralization*.
|
||||
|
||||
** Bootstrap Sequence
|
||||
|
||||
The system MUST provide a smooth onboarding experience, especially in the first five minutes:
|
||||
|
||||
1. *Persona Selection:* A simple UI for selecting a "Persona Alias" (e.g., `@amr`).
|
||||
2. *Key Generation:* High-speed, hardware-backed key derivation (BIP-32) happens in the background.
|
||||
3. *PDS Selection:* Users are prompted to choose between *"Managed Hosting"* or *"Self-Hosting"*.
|
||||
4. *Relay Discovery:* The client automatically connects to a set of high-reputation, geographic "Bootstrap Relays" to fetch initial content.
|
||||
5. *Interest Capture:* Users select topics/interests to seed initial content recommendations.
|
||||
6. *Migration Option:* Offer to import from Twitter, Reddit, Mastodon, etc. to bootstrap social graph.
|
||||
|
||||
** Interest Capture
|
||||
|
||||
*** Purpose
|
||||
Reduce "empty feed" problem by immediately showing relevant content based on user interests.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Implementation
|
||||
- *Explicit Selection:* Users pick from curated categories (Technology, Art, Politics, Science, etc.).
|
||||
- *Implicit Extraction:* If user imports from centralized platforms, parse their follows/history to infer interests.
|
||||
- *AI Assistance:* Sub-Agent can analyze imported content to suggest interest categories.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Content Seeding
|
||||
- Client fetches popular public content in selected interest areas.
|
||||
- Initial feed populated with high-quality, diverse content from selected topics.
|
||||
- Users can refine interests over time (feedback loop).
|
||||
|
||||
** Migration and Social Graph Bootstrap
|
||||
|
||||
*** Supported Platforms
|
||||
- *Twitter/X:* Import followed accounts via archive export or API.
|
||||
- *Reddit:* Import subscribed subreddits and frequent communities.
|
||||
- *Mastodon/ActivityPub:* Native federation, direct import of follows.
|
||||
- *LinkedIn:* Professional connections import.
|
||||
- *Blog/RSS:* Import RSS subscriptions as interest sources.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Privacy Considerations
|
||||
- Migration is *opt-in*, not mandatory.
|
||||
- Users choose which platforms to import from.
|
||||
- Imported data is stored locally; only new Agora follows are public.
|
||||
- Users can audit and remove imported suggestions before
|
||||
confirming follows.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Discovery Expansion
|
||||
- Suggest high-reputation personas in imported interest areas.
|
||||
- Show "Your Twitter follows on Agora" for easy reconnecting.
|
||||
- Surface collectives matching imported community memberships.
|
||||
|
||||
** The "Four Orders of [[id:26f3e845-5eb4-4bcd-9cff-28e219934841][Growth]]" (Scaling Sequence)
|
||||
|
||||
Scaling a decentralized network requires shifting from "Hand-holding" to "Protocol Incentives." Agora follows a strictly defined orders-of-magnitude [[id:26f3e845-5eb4-4bcd-9cff-28e219934841][growth strategy]]:
|
||||
|
||||
*** Order 1: The First 1,000 (The "Founders")
|
||||
- *Target:* Technical enthusiasts, privacy advocates, and niche professional guilds (e.g., decentralized AI devs).
|
||||
- *Tactics:* Manual onboarding. We seed the first Arbitration Guilds.
|
||||
- *Success Metric:* First successful civil contract signed and settled via HODL invoice.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Order 2: The 10,000 (The "Communities")
|
||||
- *Target:* Small NGOs, local trade groups, and content creator "Swarms."
|
||||
- *Tactics:* Launch the Community PDS templates. Enable "One-Click Hub" setup so a leader can host their entire group.
|
||||
- *Success Metric:* The emergence of "Community Algorithms"—feeds curated by these 10k users that provide unique value.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Order 3: The 100,000 (The "Marketplace")
|
||||
- *Target:* Freelancers, gig workers, and "Etsy-style" digital sellers in regions with weak rule of law.
|
||||
- *Tactics:* Focus on Mobile UX. The app must feel "normal." Introduce Automated Key Rotation so non-tech users don't fear losing their phones.
|
||||
- *Success Metric:* $1M+ in peer-to-peer transaction volume via SCAL contracts.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Order 4: The 1M+ (The "Ecosystem")
|
||||
- *Target:* The general public.
|
||||
- *Tactics:* The Algorithm Marketplace becomes the draw. People join because "The Scientific Lens" or "The Family Lens" on Agora provides a better mental health experience than the addictive AI of centralized apps.
|
||||
- *Success Metric:* Total P2P bandwidth (Seeding) exceeds the capacity of a mid-sized centralized CDN.
|
||||
|
||||
** Progressive Decentralization Phases
|
||||
|
||||
*** Phase 1: Managed Service (Days 1-100)
|
||||
- *Centralized Experience:* The initial developers provide high-performance, managed PDS and Relay services to ensure a seamless "Twitter-like" experience.
|
||||
- *Focus:* User acquisition and content density in specific "Alpha" collectives (e.g., AI/Dev communities).
|
||||
|
||||
*** Phase 2: Hybrid (Year 1)
|
||||
- *Self-Hosting Options:* Users are encouraged to move to their own PDS or third-party providers as the ecosystem matures.
|
||||
- *Social Graph Interoperability:* Enabling users to "Follow" personas across different PDS providers.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Phase 3: Full Decentralization (Year 3+)
|
||||
- *No Central Authority:* The original developers become just one of many PDS and Relay providers.
|
||||
- *Protocol Stability:* The V1.0 spec is finalized, and development is driven by the *Agora Governance Model*.
|
||||
|
||||
** Incentivized Growth
|
||||
|
||||
- *Referral Satoshis:* Early users can be rewarded in satoshis for successful referrals that lead to high-reputation personas.
|
||||
- *Micro-Grant Bounties:* Funding developers to build "Must-Have" Agora apps through the economic layer.
|
||||
|
||||
* Strategic Positioning
|
||||
|
||||
** Platform Replacement Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
Rather than positioning Agora as an existential threat to Big Tech (Apple, Google, Meta), Agora should first target underserved communities and platforms with clear pain points:
|
||||
|
||||
*** Phase 1: Niche Community Platforms
|
||||
|
||||
** Forums (Reddit, phpBB, vBulletin)
|
||||
- *Pain Point:* Centralized moderation, censorship, data mining.
|
||||
- *Agora Advantage:* Sovereign moderation, portable identity, no platform lock-in.
|
||||
- *Target Communities:* Developer forums, hobbyist communities, support forums.
|
||||
|
||||
** Visual Discovery (Pinterest)
|
||||
- *Pain Point:* Algorithmic manipulation, advertising-driven discovery.
|
||||
- *Agora Advantage:* User-chosen discovery algorithms, no surveillance capitalism.
|
||||
|
||||
** Professional Communities (LinkedIn, corporate intranets)
|
||||
- *Pain Point:* Professional data exploitation, platform-controlled networking.
|
||||
- *Agora Advantage:* Sovereign professional identity, portable reputation.
|
||||
|
||||
** Creator Platforms (Medium, Substack)
|
||||
- *Pain Point:* Platform fees (10-50%), censorship risk, no portability.
|
||||
- *Agora Advantage:* Near-zero fees, content ownership, subscriber portability.
|
||||
|
||||
** Marketplaces (eBay, Etsy)
|
||||
- *Pain Point:* High fees (10-15%), centralized dispute resolution, account bans.
|
||||
- *Agora Advantage:* Low fees (<5%), transparent reputation, sovereign stores.
|
||||
|
||||
** Adult Content (Pornhub, OnlyFans)
|
||||
- *Pain Point:* Censorship, payment processor discrimination, lack of privacy.
|
||||
- *Agora Advantage:* Censorship-resistant, Lightning-native payments, pseudonymous.
|
||||
|
||||
** Specialized Communities (QRZ, Logbook of the World)
|
||||
- *Pain Point:* Aging infrastructure, lack of modern features, centralization.
|
||||
- *Agora Advantage:* Modern protocol, extensible, community-governed.
|
||||
|
||||
** Decentralized Communities (Nostr, Fediverse)
|
||||
- *Pain Point:* Fragmentation, lack of economic layer, UI/UX challenges.
|
||||
- *Agora Advantage:* Unified protocol, Lightning integration, polished UX.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Phase 2: Horizontal Expansion
|
||||
|
||||
Once established in niche communities:
|
||||
- *Bridge to Big Tech:* Migration tools for Twitter, Instagram, etc.
|
||||
- *Enterprise Adoption:* Sovereign collaboration tools for companies.
|
||||
- *Mass Market:* Only after protocol stability and network effects proven.
|
||||
|
||||
** Big Tech Analysis (Long-term)
|
||||
|
||||
While not the immediate focus, Agora's architecture eventually threatens Big Tech:
|
||||
|
||||
*** Meta/Facebook
|
||||
- *Risk:* Portable identity undermines social graph lock-in.
|
||||
- *Timing:* Year 3+ after network effects established.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Apple
|
||||
- *Opportunity:* Privacy alignment, hardware security integration.
|
||||
- *Risk:* App Store policies may restrict Agora clients.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Google
|
||||
- *Risk:* Search dominance challenged by social-graph-first discovery.
|
||||
- *Opportunity:* Federated search, open data standards.
|
||||
|
||||
** The "Trojan Horse" Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
- *Start Small:* Win over frustrated communities on Reddit, forums, Discord.
|
||||
- *Build Bridges:* ActivityPub/Mastodon integration, Twitter migration tools.
|
||||
- *Demonstrate Value:* Show "You trade 2 seconds for freedom" is worth it.
|
||||
- *Let Giants React:* By the time Big Tech notices, Agora is entrenched.
|
||||
|
||||
** Strategic Assessment
|
||||
|
||||
- *Cold Start Problem:* The most significant hurdle. Requires aggressive bootstrapping in the first year.
|
||||
- *Success Probability:* 30-50% for 100K users; 10-20% for 1M users (within 3 years).
|
||||
- *The "Unstoppable" Factor:* Once the protocol is decentralized and the first million users are on-boarded, it becomes nearly impossible to shut down.
|
||||
|
||||
* Legal & Regulatory
|
||||
|
||||
** The Jurisdictional Challenge
|
||||
|
||||
As a decentralized protocol with no central authority, Agora is designed to operate across international jurisdictions.
|
||||
|
||||
** Content Moderation & Liability
|
||||
|
||||
*** The "Dumb Pipe" Strategy
|
||||
- *Relays as Carriers:* Relays act as dumb, ephemeral conduits for encrypted CIDs. Their legal standing is similar to ISPs or postal services.
|
||||
- *PDS Sovereignty:* The user (the PDS owner) is the only entity with the ability to decrypt and view the content.
|
||||
|
||||
*** The CSAM Challenge
|
||||
- *Zero Tolerance Policy:* Agora's governance model includes protocol-level consensus for universally illegal content.
|
||||
- *Network-Level Blocking:* High-reputation Relays can block CIDs associated with CSAM.
|
||||
- *Fundamental Tension:* The trade-off between total privacy (E2EE) and the ability to detect illegal content.
|
||||
|
||||
** Financial Regulation & AML
|
||||
|
||||
- *Micro-Payments:* Lightning Network payments generally fall below traditional AML/KYC thresholds.
|
||||
- *Non-Custodial:* Agora is non-custodial. Users control their own keys and funds.
|
||||
|
||||
** Data Privacy ([[id:c0fdec00-8a44-43f0-ac81-e8dc61411865][GDPR]]/CCPA)
|
||||
|
||||
- *The "Right to be Forgotten":* In a CID-based system, data is not "deleted" but can be "un-indexed" or its decryption keys revoked.
|
||||
- *Sovereign Control:* Users have absolute control over their own data in their PDS.
|
||||
|
||||
** Strategy for Resistance
|
||||
|
||||
- *Legal Defense Collective:* Establishing a legal defense fund (Collective Persona) to support Relay and PDS operators.
|
||||
- *Transparency Reports:* High-reputation Relays and PDS providers should publish transparent reports on compliance.
|
||||
|
||||
* Game Theory & Economic Attacks
|
||||
|
||||
** Attack Vectors
|
||||
|
||||
- *Sybil Attacks:* Creating millions of fake personas.
|
||||
- *Relay Censorship:* Majority of Relays blocking specific content.
|
||||
- *Economic Spam:* Paying minimal fees to flood the network.
|
||||
- *Governance Capture:* Attempting to take over protocol governance.
|
||||
|
||||
** Defenses
|
||||
|
||||
- *Reputation Systems:* Economic and social costs of attack increase with reputation requirements.
|
||||
- *Multi-Home Relays:* Users can always switch to uncensored Relays.
|
||||
- *Fee Markets:* Dynamic pricing makes spam economically unviable.
|
||||
- *Fork Threat:* Credible threat of fork prevents governance capture.
|
||||
|
||||
* Related Documents
|
||||
|
||||
- Agora Strategic Positioning
|
||||
- Agora Legal & Regulatory Strategy
|
||||
617
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-02-identity.org
Normal file
617
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-02-identity.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,617 @@
|
||||
#+title: Identity: The Genesis of Your Digital Being
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 6fe67db6-25bd-4d11-bd1d-b44ec809e858
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
* [[id:750876d3-0cf8-4818-a323-a4f974870f4f][Identity: The Genesis of Your Digital Being]]
|
||||
|
||||
** Master Key (Psyche)
|
||||
|
||||
The Master Key, often referred to as "Psyche" (Latin for soul or animating principle), is the absolute foundation of your digital identity in [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]]. It serves as your unassailable root of trust, from which every other functional identity (your Personas) is cryptographically derived. This section meticulously outlines the Master Key's core requirements, elucidates how it empowers flexible organizational structures, and details the robust mechanisms for its secure management and resilient recovery. It is the ultimate key to your self-sovereignty.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Requirements & The Root of Trust
|
||||
|
||||
- The system MUST cryptographically decouple identity from the master cryptographic material, ensuring that derived keys can be managed independently while retaining the Master Key as the root of authority.
|
||||
- Users MUST possess one Master Key (the "Seed") that is generated and stored securely, ideally never exposed to the network or a general-purpose operating system.
|
||||
- All functional identities (Personas) MUST be derived from this single Master Key seed using Hierarchical Deterministic (HD) derivation, providing an organized and secure structure for digital identities.
|
||||
- The Master Key MUST be generated from a minimum of 256 bits of high-quality, cryptographically secure entropy.
|
||||
- The Master Key MUST be encoded as a BIP-39 mnemonic phrase (typically 24 words) for human-readable, offline backup and disaster recovery.
|
||||
- The Master Key MUST be stored offline (e.g., on paper, engraved metal) or within a tamper-resistant [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][hardware]] security module (HSM) for maximum protection against compromise.
|
||||
- The system MUST utilize a custom HD derivation path: `m/44'/1'/account'/persona'/key_purpose/key_index`, uniquely identifying Agora's identity structure within the broader BIP-44 ecosystem. (*Note: Index `1'` is utilized for the experimental/testnet phase; a unique permanent index will be registered for the Agora Mainnet via SLIP-0044.*)
|
||||
- This path allows each Persona to act as a "Sub-Root," deriving its own autonomous functional keys (e.g., for Bitcoin, Lightning, PGP, or SSH) without requiring access to the Master Key once the Persona's extended private key (xpriv) is provisioned to a device.
|
||||
- Each `persona'` index within this derivation path MUST represent a distinct DID (Decentralized Identifier), ensuring global uniqueness and unlinkability.
|
||||
- The system MUST allow a single Master Key seed to generate an infinite number of unique, unlinkable personas, providing unparalleled flexibility for different digital roles.
|
||||
- Each Persona MUST possess its own distinct Ed25519 keypair for cryptographic signing and an X25519 keypair for robust encryption.
|
||||
- The system MUST enable the revocation and rotation of individual Persona keys without compromising the integrity of the Master Key or affecting other derived Personas, offering granular control and enhanced security.
|
||||
- The identity lifecycle MUST be managed via *KERI (Key Event Receipt Infrastructure)*, ensuring identities remain persistent regardless of key rotations.
|
||||
- All key rotations and membership changes MUST be recorded in an append-only, verifiable *Key Event Log (KEL)*.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Master Key Interaction Protocol: Derivation vs. Action
|
||||
|
||||
It is critical to distinguish between the Master Key's role in *Persona derivation* and a Persona's role in *network actions*.
|
||||
|
||||
- *Master Key for Derivation (Creation of New Identities):* The Master Key is the sole cryptographic origin for generating new Accounts and Personas. Any creation of a new Persona (or Account) in your identity tree requires interaction with the Master Key. This ensures a clear, auditable, and cryptographically sound chain of custody from your single root to every Persona. While this might occasionally require accessing a hardware wallet for a new Persona setup, it safeguards the integrity of your entire identity graph.
|
||||
|
||||
- *Persona Keys for Actions (Interacting with the Network):* Once a Persona is created, it becomes a fully independent, active agent in the Agora network. All subsequent actions—signing messages, publishing content, entering into contracts (including Foundation Contracts), acting as a guardian for social recovery, or joining an organization—are performed using the Persona's own distinct keypairs. *The Master Key is explicitly *not* needed for these daily operational activities.* This design minimizes the Master Key's exposure, keeping it safely offline and dramatically reducing the frequency of hardware wallet interactions for routine tasks.
|
||||
|
||||
This clear separation ensures that your Master Key functions as a secure, infrequent-use root for identity creation and recovery, while your Personas are empowered to execute all network interactions autonomously.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Master Key Recovery: The Offline Root Seed
|
||||
|
||||
**** Shamir's Secret Sharing: Distributed Trust
|
||||
|
||||
If a user loses access to their offline Master Key, Agora's Social Recovery mechanism provides a decentralized, self-sovereign solution:
|
||||
1. Master Key is cryptographically pre-split into N shards using Shamir's Secret Sharing.
|
||||
2. These shards are securely distributed to M-of-N "Guardians" (trusted friends or professional services).
|
||||
3. Recovery only requires M guardians to recombine their shards, rebuilding the Master Key offline.
|
||||
4. This elegantly avoids reliance on centralized "Account Recovery" services, keeping you in control.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Social Recovery Privacy (Blinded Sharding)
|
||||
|
||||
***** Blinded Sharding Concept
|
||||
Standard Shamir's Secret Sharing reveals which guardians hold shards when shards are stored on the PDS. *Blinded Sharding* hides this information from the PDS while still enabling recovery.
|
||||
|
||||
***** How Standard Shamir Reveals Guardians
|
||||
|
||||
- Shards stored as: `(index, shard_value)` pairs
|
||||
- PDS sees: "Guardian #1 has this shard, Guardian #2 has that shard"
|
||||
- Reveals: Who the user's trusted contacts are (social graph)
|
||||
|
||||
***** Blinded Sharding Solution
|
||||
|
||||
Instead of storing `(index, shard)` directly, use *cryptographic blinding*:
|
||||
|
||||
****** Step 1: Generate Mask
|
||||
- Random mask `m` for each shard
|
||||
- Mask is encrypted to Guardian's public key
|
||||
- Only Guardian can unmask the shard
|
||||
|
||||
****** Step 2: Store Blinded Shard
|
||||
```
|
||||
Stored on PDS:
|
||||
- Blind = hash(shard || guardian_pubkey)
|
||||
- Shard encrypted to Guardian's key (X25519 + AES-GCM)
|
||||
- Guardian ID: NOT stored in plaintext, only hash
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
****** Step 3: Recovery
|
||||
- Guardian sends encrypted shard response
|
||||
- User decrypts using their private key
|
||||
- Verifies shard validity via Shamir reconstruction
|
||||
- PDS never learns which Guardians participated
|
||||
|
||||
***** Implementation
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src typescript
|
||||
interface BlindedShard {
|
||||
// Public, stored on PDS
|
||||
shardHash: string; // hash(shard || guardian_pubkey)
|
||||
encryptedShard: string; // X25519 + AES-GCM encrypted
|
||||
|
||||
// Not stored: Guardian ID
|
||||
// Guardian identified by: can decrypt `encryptedShard`
|
||||
// (only valid Guardian has private key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface GuardianConfig {
|
||||
guardianDID: string; // Known to user, NOT to PDS
|
||||
guardianPublicKey: X25519PublicKey;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Shard creation
|
||||
function createBlindedShard(
|
||||
shard: Buffer,
|
||||
guardianConfig: GuardianConfig
|
||||
): BlindedShard {
|
||||
const shardId = hash(sha256, [shard, guardianConfig.guardianPublicKey]);
|
||||
const encrypted = x25519_encrypt(shard, guardianConfig.guardianPublicKey);
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
shardHash: shardId,
|
||||
encryptedShard: encrypted
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reconstruction
|
||||
async function recoverShard(
|
||||
blindedShard: BlindedShard,
|
||||
guardianPrivateKey: X25519PrivateKey
|
||||
): Promise<Buffer> {
|
||||
// Guardian decrypts
|
||||
const decrypted = x25519_decrypt(
|
||||
blindedShard.encryptedShard,
|
||||
guardianPrivateKey
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify not corrupted
|
||||
if (hash(sha256, [decrypted, guardianPublicKey]) !== blindedShard.shardHash) {
|
||||
throw new Error("Shard verification failed");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return decrypted;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
***** Security Properties
|
||||
|
||||
1. *PDS doesn't know Guardians:* Only sees random hashes and ciphertexts
|
||||
2. *PDS can't correlate:* Different users' Guardians appear as different random data
|
||||
3. *Guardian anonymity:* Recovery can happen without PDS knowing who responded
|
||||
4. *Integrity verified:* Hash check prevents corrupted shards
|
||||
|
||||
**** Shamir's Secret Sharing Parameters
|
||||
|
||||
***** Standard Parameters
|
||||
|
||||
- *Scheme:* Shamir's Secret Sharing over GF(2^256)
|
||||
- *Threshold (M):* 3 (minimum to reconstruct)
|
||||
- *Total Shares (N):* 5 (total generated)
|
||||
- *Security:* 256-bit security (same as Bitcoin private keys)
|
||||
|
||||
***** Share Distribution
|
||||
|
||||
- *Guardian 1:* Trusted friend, geographically distant
|
||||
- *Guardian 2:* Family member
|
||||
- *Guardian 3:* Professional service (optional)
|
||||
- *Guardian 4:* Personal cloud/HSM backup
|
||||
- *Guardian 5:* Safety deposit box (physical)
|
||||
|
||||
***** Recovery Probability
|
||||
|
||||
- *1 guardian fail:* Still recoverable (4 of 5 remaining)
|
||||
- *2 guardians fail:* Still recoverable (3 of 3 remaining)
|
||||
- *3+ guardians fail:* Unrecoverable (design choice)
|
||||
|
||||
** HD Derivation
|
||||
*** HD Derivation Architecture (BIP-32/44)
|
||||
- Agora uses a custom derivation path to ensure interoperability: `m/purpose'/persona_index'/profile_index/key_type`.
|
||||
- The `persona_index'` MUST be hardened to prevent correlation attacks between different personas.
|
||||
- Each `persona_index'` MUST represent a distinct DID (Decentralized Identifier).
|
||||
- This allows a single seed to generate infinite, unlinkable personas.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Decoupled Key Provisioning & Watch-Only Master
|
||||
To minimize the exposure of the Master Seed, client applications MUST support decoupled key strategies:
|
||||
- *Subkey Injection:* The client MUST allow importing a standalone extended private key (xpriv) or raw private key for a specific `persona_index'`. The app operates strictly within the scope of that imported key and cannot derive sibling personas.
|
||||
- *Multi-Device Sync:* Users can securely provision a secondary device (e.g., a mobile phone) by injecting a Persona-level subkey, keeping the Master Seed in a physical hardware vault.
|
||||
- *Watch-Only Master:* The client MAY allow storing the Master Extended Public Key (xpub). This creates an "Auditor View," enabling the device to monitor all derived Personas and balances without possessing the private keys necessary to authorize transactions or sign events.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Cross-Persona Interaction (The "Bridge")
|
||||
The system MUST allow a user to prove relationships between their own Personas without publicly linking them to a single Master Seed.
|
||||
- *Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP):* A user can "Attest" that a specific capability or badge belongs to them across personas. For example, a "Pseudonymous Developer" Persona can use a ZKP to prove it holds a "Verified Citizen" badge issued to its associated "Legal Persona," proving citizenship without revealing *which* citizen they are.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Index Management (Gap Limit Protocol)
|
||||
|
||||
**** Concept
|
||||
Clients must efficiently discover active personas derived from a Master Seed without performing an exhaustive scan of the entire index space. The Gap Limit Protocol defines the search window and criteria for identifying active personas during recovery or sync.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Specification
|
||||
- *Gap Limit (L):* The number of consecutive unused persona indices to check before stopping the scan. The default Agora gap limit is *20*.
|
||||
- *Active Persona Detection:* A persona index is considered "active" if it has:
|
||||
1. A registered name in the Tier 2 Global Registry.
|
||||
2. Any Content Objects published to a PDS/Relay.
|
||||
3. Any incoming attestations from other personas.
|
||||
- *Scan Window:* Clients scan indices in increments of L. If any index within $[i, i+L-1]$ is active, the window shifts to $[i+L, i+2L-1]$.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Recovery Workflow
|
||||
1. Derive Master Key.
|
||||
2. For each account index (starting from 0'):
|
||||
a. Scan persona indices 0 through L-1.
|
||||
b. If any active persona is found, continue scanning the next window of L.
|
||||
c. If no active personas are found in the window, stop scanning this account.
|
||||
3. If no active personas are found in the first window (0 through L-1) of an account, stop scanning accounts.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Centralized Revocation Efficiency: The Atomic Kill Switch for Organizations
|
||||
|
||||
**** Comparison to Traditional Systems
|
||||
|
||||
- *Traditional:* Partner leaves → Manually update 50+ passwords, revoke individual access rights across numerous platforms (email, bank, cloud storage, code repos, etc.). High risk of oversight and residual access.
|
||||
- *Agora:* Partner leaves → One managed revocation at the Master Key level (or their specific Persona's access derivation is severed) → Instant, automatic severance of access across all derived keys (company Bitcoin, PGP, SSH, etc.).
|
||||
|
||||
This mechanism ensures that the collective's assets remain secure and under the control of the remaining authorized members, providing a robust solution for organizational identity management.
|
||||
|
||||
** Accounts
|
||||
*** Account-Level Strategy: Organizing Your Digital Life
|
||||
|
||||
**** Derivation Path with Accounts
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
m/44'/1'/0'/0' # Account 0, Persona 0 (default personal)
|
||||
m/44'/1'/0'/1' # Account 0, Persona 1
|
||||
m/44'/1'/1'/0' # Account 1, Persona 0 (work account)
|
||||
m/44'/1'/1'/1' # Account 1, Persona 1 (work, second persona)
|
||||
m/44'/1'/2'/0' # Account 2, Persona 0 (anonymous/account-specific)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**** Account Separation Strategies
|
||||
|
||||
***** Personal vs Work
|
||||
- *Account 0:* Personal life, friends, family
|
||||
- *Account 1:* Professional identity, colleagues
|
||||
- Each account has its own set of personas (persona index within account)
|
||||
|
||||
***** Anonymous vs Primary
|
||||
- *Account 0:* Primary public identity
|
||||
- *Account 2+:* Anonymous or temporary accounts
|
||||
- Easy rotation: revoke entire account, create new account index
|
||||
|
||||
***** Organizational Accounts
|
||||
- *Account 3+/Specific Values:* Could be assigned for specific organizations
|
||||
- Each organization gets its own account namespace
|
||||
|
||||
**** Account Naming and Metadata
|
||||
|
||||
- *Account Aliases:* User-defined labels ("Personal", "Work", "Anonymous")
|
||||
- *Account Icons:* Visual distinction in client UI
|
||||
- *Account Metadata:* Not stored on-chain, local to client
|
||||
- *Account Lock/Unlock:* Separate authentication for each account
|
||||
|
||||
**** Account-Specific Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
- *Default PDS:* Each account can use different PDS providers
|
||||
- *Default Relays:* Account-specific relay preferences
|
||||
- *Contact Isolation:* Contacts in one account not visible in others (by default)
|
||||
- *Content Visibility:* Cross-account content visibility configurable
|
||||
|
||||
**** Cross-Account Operations
|
||||
|
||||
- *Account Switching:* Quick switch without re-entering Master Key
|
||||
- *Cross-Account References:* "Share from Work to Personal" with privacy controls
|
||||
- *Unified Inbox:* Optional aggregation of notifications across accounts
|
||||
- *Backup Strategy:* Account-level backup (export all personas in account)
|
||||
|
||||
**** Security Considerations
|
||||
|
||||
- *Same Master Key:* All accounts derived from same seed—compromise of Master Key compromises all accounts.
|
||||
- *Different Lock Codes:* Each account can have its own unlock PIN/biometric.
|
||||
- *Plausible Deniability:* Hidden accounts possible (account index not sequential).
|
||||
|
||||
**** Developer Implementation
|
||||
|
||||
To generate a new Persona:
|
||||
1. Load Master Seed.
|
||||
2. Derive path `m/44'/1'/0'/N'` where N is the next available index.
|
||||
3. Generate Ed25519 keypair from the derived entropy.
|
||||
4. Construct the DID: `did:agora:<pubkey_multibase>`.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Account-Level Technical Specification: The Blueprint for Digital Organization
|
||||
|
||||
The Account-Level Strategy is built upon a robust technical foundation that rigorously adheres to and extends industry standards for cryptographic key derivation. This specification ensures predictable, secure, and interoperable management of multiple digital identities from a single Master Key.
|
||||
|
||||
***** BIP-44 Derivation Path Structure: Agora's Standard
|
||||
|
||||
Agora meticulously follows the established BIP-44 standard for hierarchical deterministic key derivation paths. This standardized structure guarantees compatibility and logical organization of your digital identities.
|
||||
|
||||
`m / purpose' / coin_type' / account' / persona' / key_purpose / key_index`
|
||||
|
||||
In Agora's context, this is specifically mapped as:
|
||||
|
||||
`m / 44' / 1' / account' / persona' / key_purpose / key_index`
|
||||
|
||||
- *Purpose (44'):* This is a hardened derivation, as prescribed by BIP-44, signifying that the derived keys are cryptographically isolated from the Master Key.
|
||||
- *Coin Type (1'):* This is a hardened derivation, and `1'` is the officially registered SLIP-0044 index specifically allocated for the Agora Protocol.
|
||||
- *Account (account'):* This is a hardened derivation. It provides independent, cryptographically isolated persona namespaces, enabling users to manage distinct organizational or contextual groupings of Personas.
|
||||
- *Persona (persona'):* This is a hardened derivation. Each index represents a distinct, autonomous digital identity (DID). Hardening ensures that compromising one Persona's keys cannot compromise sibling Personas or the Master Key.
|
||||
- *Key Purpose (key_purpose):* This non-hardened layer allows a single Persona to act as a "Sub-Root" to derive autonomous functional keys for specific tasks without requiring the Master Key. Examples:
|
||||
- `0`: Primary Identity/Signing Key (Ed25519)
|
||||
- `1`: General Encryption Key (X25519 for DIDComm)
|
||||
- `2`: Bitcoin/Lightning Node Key
|
||||
- `3`: Stablecoin/EVM Wallet
|
||||
- *Index (key_index):* This is a non-hardened, incremental index used to generate multiple unique keys of a specific purpose (e.g., generating new receive addresses for a Bitcoin wallet).
|
||||
|
||||
*Note: This structure ensures that once a Persona's xpriv is loaded on a mobile device, that device can derive all necessary sub-wallets autonomously without re-accessing the Master Key.*
|
||||
|
||||
***** Account Types and Reserved Indices: Standardized Compartmentalization
|
||||
|
||||
While the choice of account indices is technically arbitrary, Agora recommends the following conventions. These standardized assignments ensure client interoperability and provide a common language for managing distinct digital compartments.
|
||||
|
||||
- *0': Primary Account.* This is the default account for a user's primary personal identity, social interactions, and other everyday personas.
|
||||
- *1': Professional Account.* This account is dedicated to professional identity, credentials, work-related personas, and business interactions.
|
||||
- *2': Anonymous/Testing Account.* Designed for high-churn, disposable, or experimental personas where anonymity or frequent rotation is desired.
|
||||
- *100'+: Organization/Collective Accounts.* These indices are reserved for managing personas specifically associated with organizational entities, such as companies, DAOs, or other collective structures.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Client-Side Management Rules: Enforcing Security and Privacy
|
||||
|
||||
Client applications interacting with Agora's identity system MUST adhere to a strict set of rules to ensure the security, privacy, and integrity of user accounts.
|
||||
|
||||
1. *Account Discovery (Gap Limit):* Clients MUST implement a "Gap Limit" (a heuristic search window, typically 20) for account discovery. During recovery or initial synchronization, the client scans accounts 0' through `N'` (where `N'` is determined by the gap limit and activity) for active personas. If an active account is found, the scan window is intelligently shifted forward.
|
||||
2. *Context Isolation:* Data associated with different accounts (e.g., contact lists, encryption keys, local indexes) MUST be stored in cryptographically isolated database partitions or encrypted with account-specific salts. This prevents accidental data leakage between contexts.
|
||||
3. *Cross-Account Privacy:* Clients MUST NOT leak the relationships or activities between personas residing in different accounts unless explicitly authorized by the user (e.g., through a signed cross-account attestation Note).
|
||||
4. *Independent Authentication:* Clients SHOULD allow users to set distinct local authentication requirements (e.g., PINs, biometric scans) for sensitive accounts (e.g., 1' Professional or 100' Organization accounts), providing an additional layer of security for critical digital identities.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Technical Implementation (Pseudocode)
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// Example: Account derivation from a Master Node (representing the Master Key)
|
||||
const accountIndex = 0; // Defines the specific account (e.g., Primary)
|
||||
const accountNode = masterNode.derivePath(`m/44'/1'/${accountIndex}'`);
|
||||
|
||||
// Example: Persona derivation within the chosen account
|
||||
const personaIndex = 0; // Defines the specific persona within the account
|
||||
const personaNode = accountNode.derivePath(`0/${personaIndex}`);
|
||||
|
||||
// Example: Key Generation for the derived Persona
|
||||
// Ed25519 for secure digital signatures
|
||||
const signingKey = ed25519.generateKeyPair(personaNode.privateKey);
|
||||
// X25519 for robust cryptographic encryption
|
||||
const encryptionKey = x25519.generateKeyPair(personaNode.privateKey);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
** Personas
|
||||
*** Personas: Your Active Digital Selves
|
||||
|
||||
*** Persona Keys
|
||||
- Each Persona has its own Ed25519 keypair for signing and an X25519 keypair for encryption.
|
||||
- Persona keys MUST be derived within the secure hardware (Secure Enclave/Keystore) when possible.
|
||||
- Private keys MUST NEVER be exposed to application memory in plaintext.
|
||||
- If a Persona key is compromised, it can be revoked and rotated without affecting the Master Key or other Personas.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Persona Governance & Operational Recovery
|
||||
While the Master Key is an offline seed, Personas are active network agents governed by their own rules, smart contracts, and DID Documents. Operational recovery, succession, and governance occur at this layer and are defined via *Inception Policies* established at the moment the identity is created.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Recovery Guardian Dynamics: Natural Persons vs. Collectives
|
||||
|
||||
Agora distinguishes between the dynamics of recovery for individual "natural person" Personas and "collective" or organizational Personas (e.g., companies, DAOs) when it comes to social recovery.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Natural Person Persona: The "Dictator with Safety Nets"
|
||||
For a human, the design goal is Ultimate Sovereignty. You are the "Root." Even if you have "Recovery Friends," they should have no power over you unless you are incapacitated.
|
||||
- *The Logic:* The Persona's primary operational key holds absolute priority weight (e.g., Weight 100). The "Recovery Friends" group has a collective weight of 100, but their actions are restricted by time-locks.
|
||||
- *Unilateral Action:* A natural person Persona retains the right to change their recovery "friends" (guardians) even if those guardians do not explicitly consent to be "rotated out."
|
||||
- *Mechanism:* Any rotation signed by the primary key is effective immediately. Rotation signed by the Escrow Group (Guardians) requires a 72-hour `Pending State` (Time-Lock) and can be cancelled by the user at any time. This ensures you can "fire" your recovery team instantly without asking for permission, as your weight alone meets the threshold.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Collective Persona: The "Protected Quorum"
|
||||
For an LLC or NGO, the goal is Mutual Defense and preventing "hostile takeovers" where one founder kicks out others.
|
||||
- *The Logic (Consensus Required):* All shareholder keys have defined, often equal weights (e.g., 3 shareholders, weight of 33 each).
|
||||
- *The Rotation Rule (Governance Gate):* Thresholds for different actions are defined at inception. For example, a simple majority (51%) might be sufficient for daily operations, but changing the board or quorum requires a supermajority (e.g., 75% or 3-of-3 unanimity).
|
||||
- *Veto Power:* The identity may designate a specific "Founder Key" that possesses Veto Power. This key must be among the required editors for *any* rotation event to be valid, making that individual impossible to remove without their own signature.
|
||||
- *Protection:* This prevents a single member from seizing the company identity. Removing a member requires signatures from the quorum (e.g., 3-of-4), ensuring that "consent" is baked into the math of the threshold.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Identity Succession & Minors
|
||||
Agora handles the lifecycle of identity across generations.
|
||||
- *Minor Onboarding:* For a minor, a parent or guardian Persona can "Co-sign" the identity inception event.
|
||||
- *Succession Logic:* This link creates a pre-authorized recovery path where the parent holds a dormant weight that can be activated to rotate keys if the minor loses access, transitioning to full independence at a defined maturation date.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Legal Override & The "Break-Glass" Escrow (For Legal Entities)
|
||||
|
||||
To handle situations like the death of a sole founder, a lost key, or a binding court order without creating a central back door, Agora implements a "Dormant Escrow" pattern specifically designed for Collective Personas or High-Value single Personas.
|
||||
|
||||
- *The Dormant Key:* At inception, the Persona's governance structure includes a "Public Key" belonging to a Neutral Third Party (e.g., a decentralized notary or a legal escrow service). This key is assigned a weight of `0` for daily operations.
|
||||
- *Multi-Party (M-of-N) Escrow:* To prevent a single corrupt entity from hijacking an identity, Agora utilizes a *Recovery Council*. For instance, a rotation might require 2-of-3 signatures from designated entities (e.g., a Notary, a Law Firm, and a Decentralized Oracle).
|
||||
- *The Trigger:* The identity’s governing logic includes a rule: "If a certified Legal Attestation (e.g., signed by the local Court's Public Key) is presented, the Escrow Key's weight jumps to the necessary quorum threshold (e.g., 100) for a single Rotation Event."
|
||||
- *Observer-First Transparency:* Any change to the master key—including a legal override—must be published to the *Key Event Log (KEL)*. This ensures it's impossible for an agent to "quietly" take over an account; every user device and hired "watchdog" service is alerted immediately.
|
||||
- *The Veto Window (Time-Locking):* Any rotation event initiated by an Escrow Key triggers a mandatory 72-hour `Pending State`. If the primary owner still possesses their key (i.e., the agent is acting maliciously), they can sign a *Veto & Revoke* message. Because the Owner Key has absolute priority, this instantly kills the pending rotation and can strip the escrow agent of future rights. If the owner is incapacitated, they won't sign a veto, and after 72 hours, the change becomes final.
|
||||
- *Empowerment through Pre-authorization:* This allows the law to intervene technically—not through "hacking," but via a pre-authorized, transparent mechanism agreed upon during the identity's inception.
|
||||
|
||||
**** The "Dead Man's Switch" (Protocol Level Recovery)
|
||||
|
||||
To prevent assets from being "lost forever" if a user disappears unexpectedly:
|
||||
- *The Watcher:* A smart contract or a "Guardian Persona" monitors the user's on-chain and network activity.
|
||||
- *The Trigger:* If the Persona DID has zero "Key Activity" for a defined period (e.g., 12 months), a pre-designated Inheritance Key is authorized to initiate a recovery rotation.
|
||||
- *The Safety:* The user receives a "Warning Notification" (via DIDComm) every month leading up to the trigger. A single "Heartbeat" signature from their active phone resets the 12-month clock.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Against Founder Malice
|
||||
|
||||
- *Time-Locked Contracts:* Maturation date is immutable in Foundation Contract; founders cannot delay or prevent it.
|
||||
- *Social Accountability:* Public attestations of maturation create social pressure against interference.
|
||||
- *Legal Recourse:* Blockchain evidence of maturation provides evidence in legal disputes.
|
||||
- *Fork Option:* If founders refuses to release keys, Persona can generate new identity and attest to the connection publicly.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Recovery During Stages
|
||||
|
||||
****** Before Key Introduction
|
||||
- Founders fully control recovery (regenerate Persona keys).
|
||||
- User SHOULD have Shamir shards among trusted guardians.
|
||||
|
||||
****** After Key Introduction, Before Maturation
|
||||
- User holds own root backup; can recover independently.
|
||||
- Founders can still recover if user loses key.
|
||||
- *Both paths available:* Dual recovery for safety.
|
||||
|
||||
****** After Maturation
|
||||
- Standard social recovery (Shamir's Secret Sharing with chosen guardians).
|
||||
- No founder backup; full self-sovereignty.
|
||||
- User SHOULD have hardware backups before maturation.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Wallet Integration (Ownership & Contracts)
|
||||
Each Persona in Agora is analogous to a legal person, possessing the inherent right and capability to own property, enter into contracts, and claim protected rights (freedom of speech, due process). Therefore, every Persona will have its own associated wallets (e.g., for BTC, Lightning, stablecoins, other digital assets). These wallets are controlled by the Persona's derived keypairs, making cryptographic ownership an integral part of its functional identity. Personas are thus fully enabled to manage digital assets and participate in the Agora economy.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Delegated Authoring & AI Personas
|
||||
|
||||
**** Owner DID vs. Editor DID: The Mechanism of Agency
|
||||
Agora distinguishes between the identity that owns the content and the identity that cryptographically signs it. While these are identical in most personal interactions, their separation enables complex organizational and recovery workflows.
|
||||
- *Owner DID:* The source of authority, reputation, and ownership. This is the Persona "speaking" or "publishing." All social weight and historical context accrue to this DID.
|
||||
- *Editor DID:* The cryptographic actor performing the signature, recorded within the Note's `proof` object. This is the entity "signing" the data. The network verifies that the Editor holds a valid Delegation Certificate or is an authorized recovery key for the Owner. If omitted from the `proof`, it defaults to the Owner DID (self-signed).
|
||||
|
||||
***** Key Use Cases for Separation
|
||||
1. *Organizational Delegation (The Assistant Model):* An NGO (Owner DID) issues a Delegation Certificate to an employee, Alice (Editor DID). Alice publishes updates using her own keys, but the network attributes them to the NGO.
|
||||
2. *AI Agent Accountability:* A Human (Owner DID) authorizes their personal AI Bot (Editor DID) to act on their behalf. Users can verify that a message is from the human while knowing it was technically generated and signed by their AI agent.
|
||||
3. *Legal Override & Recovery:* When a user loses their keys, a pre-authorized Recovery Council (Editor DID) signs a Key Rotation Event for the Incapacitated User (Owner DID), restoring their digital presence.
|
||||
4. *Guardianship:* A Parent (Editor DID) manages and signs events for a Minor (Owner DID) until a pre-defined maturation date.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Technical Benefits
|
||||
- *Accountability:* Provides a transparent audit trail of the physical signers acting on behalf of an identity.
|
||||
- *Granular Revocation:* An Owner can revoke an Editor's access instantly without needing to change their own identity or rotate master keys.
|
||||
- *Reputation Portability:* Content history and social relationships stay with the Owner DID, regardless of which specific human or bot was authorized to sign at the time.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Cryptographic Delegated Signatures
|
||||
To allow multiple individuals (e.g., employees) or autonomous agents to act on behalf of a single Persona (e.g., an LLC or a brand account) without sharing the Master Key, Agora employs Delegated Signatures.
|
||||
- *The Delegation Certificate:* The "Owner" Persona signs a special `Delegation Certificate` granting specific capabilities to a "Delegate" DID for a defined period.
|
||||
- *Example Constraint:* "Delegate X can publish `is_feed: true` Notes on behalf of Owner Y, but cannot sign `contract` Notes."
|
||||
- *The Signature:* When the Delegate acts, they sign the Note with their *own* private key and append the Delegation Certificate. The network validates the certificate against the Owner's public key.
|
||||
- *Instant Revocation:* The Owner can instantly revoke the delegation by publishing a revocation event, cutting off the Delegate without needing to change passwords or rotate the Owner's keys.
|
||||
|
||||
**** AI Agent Personas (AAP)
|
||||
Agora treats Artificial Intelligence not as a backend feature, but as a first-class participant.
|
||||
- *Agent DIDs:* An AI Agent is assigned its own derived Persona DID, completely separated from the human's primary identity.
|
||||
- *Capabilities-Based Security:* Using the Delegation mechanism above, the human owner grants the AI Agent restricted capabilities (e.g., "Authorized to spend up to 5000 sats/month" or "Authorized to draft responses but not publish them").
|
||||
- *Verifiable Origins:* Because the AI signs with its own DID, all network participants can instantly and cryptographically verify whether a piece of content was authored by a human or an AI.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Naming & Registry
|
||||
|
||||
**** Naming Tiers
|
||||
|
||||
***** The Local Alias (Tier 1)
|
||||
- *Client-Side Only:* Every client allows users to assign private nicknames to DIDs in their contact list.
|
||||
- *Privacy:* 100%. No one else knows what you call them.
|
||||
- *Scope:* Private to the user.
|
||||
|
||||
***** The Global Registry (Tier 2)
|
||||
- *Decentralized Ledger:* A name-to-DID mapping stored on a decentralized ledger (e.g., a simple L2 or a high-reputation PDS/Relay coalition).
|
||||
- *Zooko's Triangle:* Agora attempts to achieve names that are *Human-Readable*, *Secure*, and *Decentralized*.
|
||||
- *First-Come, First-Served:* Names are registered by the first persona to claim them, with small micro-fees (1000+ satoshis) to prevent squatting.
|
||||
|
||||
***** The Subdomain Model (Tier 3: The "Default" Handle)
|
||||
- *Domain-Based Names:* If a user doesn't own a custom domain, their PDS provider (e.g., a community hub) grants them a subdomain.
|
||||
- *Format:* `username.provider.org` (e.g., `alice.aletheia.social`).
|
||||
- *Handle Resolution Protocol:* The system MUST support multiple methods for resolving a human-readable handle to a DID:
|
||||
- *Method A (DNS TXT):* The client queries the DNS for a TXT record at `_atproto.alice.aletheia.social`.
|
||||
- *Method B (HTTPS Well-Known):* The client fetches the DID from `https://alice.aletheia.social/.well-known/atproto-did`.
|
||||
- *Cross-Namespace Resolution:* The network's Search Indexers MUST implement a "Resolver Bridge" to handle other ecosystems. For example, if a search matches a `.eth` name, the indexer queries the ENS Smart Contract on Ethereum to find the associated DID.
|
||||
- *Validation:* To prevent "spoofing," the DID document returned by the PDS MUST contain a back-link to the handle.
|
||||
- *Sovereignty:* If you move your PDS to your own custom domain, you take your name with you.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Multi-Persona Naming Convention
|
||||
Because users manage multiple Personas (Legal, Professional, Anonymous) derived from a single Master Seed, clients SHOULD implement a Persona-Suffix convention to distinguish them clearly within the Subdomain Model:
|
||||
- *Primary/Legal:* `name.provider.org` (e.g., `john.aletheia.social`)
|
||||
- *Professional:* `name-pro.provider.org` (e.g., `john-pro.aletheia.social`)
|
||||
- *Anonymous/Alt:* `alias.provider.org` (e.g., `night-owl.aletheia.social`)
|
||||
|
||||
**** Web3 Naming Services (e.g., ENS)
|
||||
For users who want a username entirely untethered from a specific PDS provider's domain, Agora supports Decentralized Naming Services like Ethereum Name Service (ENS).
|
||||
- *How it works:* The user registers a base name (e.g., `yourname.eth`). They can then generate unlimited subnames for their various Personas for free (e.g., `work.yourname.eth`, `social.yourname.eth`).
|
||||
- *Portability:* If the user migrates their data to a new PDS, the `.eth` name stays with them. They simply update the "Content Hash" record on the blockchain to point to the new PDS location, ensuring unbreakable ownership of the handle.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Naming Registry Implementation
|
||||
|
||||
**** Implementation Options
|
||||
|
||||
***** Option 1: Simple L2 on Bitcoin/Lightning
|
||||
- *Architecture:* Dedicated Lightning channel for name registration (similar to Lightning Addresses).
|
||||
- *Process:* User sends 1000 sats + desired name to a specific "Name Registrar" Persona. Registrar publishes signed attestation (name -> DID) to a public PDS.
|
||||
- *Verification:* Clients verify attestation against Registrar's DID.
|
||||
- *Pros:* Low cost, high speed, leverages existing infrastructure.
|
||||
- *Cons:* Registrar still a single point of failure for initial registration.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Option 2: Federated Registrar Network
|
||||
- *Architecture:* M-of-N multi-sig collective of Name Registrar Personas.
|
||||
- *Process:* User pays fee; M of N registrars sign attestation.
|
||||
- *Pros:* Decentralized, more robust against single point of failure.
|
||||
- *Cons:* Higher latency, more complex setup.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Option 3: Sidechain/Drivechain
|
||||
- *Architecture:* Dedicated sidechain for name registrations.
|
||||
- *Process:* Transaction on sidechain maps name to DID.
|
||||
- *Pros:* High throughput, specialized functionality.
|
||||
- *Cons:* New trust assumptions, requires sidechain security.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Decision: Option 1 (Simple L2 Registrar) for V1.0
|
||||
|
||||
- Prioritizes speed and simplicity for initial rollout.
|
||||
- Recognizes that full decentralization of the Global Registry is a complex problem.
|
||||
- Clients can choose their registrar.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Registrar Persona Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- *DID:* Must be a well-known, high-reputation Persona.
|
||||
- *API:* Standard API for name registration/lookup.
|
||||
- *Fees:* Transparent and auditable fee structure.
|
||||
- *Availability:* High uptime and low latency.
|
||||
- *Audit:* Publicly auditable log of all name registrations.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Identity Linking
|
||||
|
||||
*** Verification Objects
|
||||
- *Verification Objects:* A persona can publish a signed *Verification Object* linking their Agora DID to other identities (e.g., a PGP key, a personal domain, or even a centralized social profile).
|
||||
- *Proof-of-Domain:* Proving ownership of a domain (via DNS record) is the gold standard for high-trust identity verification in Agora.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) & Selective Disclosure
|
||||
The system allows a user to "Attest" that two Personas belong to the same human (or hold the same credentials) *without revealing the Master Seed or creating a public cryptographic link*.
|
||||
- *The Problem:* Your "Anonymous Developer" Persona wants to prove it has a "Verified Citizen" badge issued to your "Legal Name" Persona.
|
||||
- *The ZKP Solution:* Using a Zero-Knowledge Proof, the user can cryptographically prove they hold the private key for the "Legal Name" DID (which holds the badge) and assert a statement on behalf of the "Anonymous" DID.
|
||||
- *Privacy Preservation:* The resulting proof verifies the credential is valid but explicitly hides *which* specific Legal Name DID generated the proof.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Attribute-Based Predicate Proofs
|
||||
Agora extends ZKP capabilities beyond cross-persona linking to support *Selective Disclosure* and *Predicate Proofs* using Verifiable Credentials (VCs) with advanced cryptographic schemas (e.g., BBS+ signatures or AnonCreds). This allows Personas to prove attributes about their physical or financial reality without leaking metadata or underlying identifiers.
|
||||
- *Age/Date Verification:* A Persona can cryptographically prove a predicate like `Age > 18` to access age-restricted content or contracts without revealing their actual date of birth.
|
||||
- *Financial Ability:* A Persona can prove `Wallet Balance > 10,000 sats` or `Monthly Income > X` to serve as collateral or qualify for a service contract without revealing their exact balance or transaction history to the counterparty.
|
||||
- *Citizenship & Residence:* A Persona can prove membership in a specific geographic jurisdiction (e.g., "Resident of New York") for local governance voting or tax-compliant commerce without disclosing their legal name or specific home address.
|
||||
- *Asset Ownership:* A Persona can prove ownership of a specific Physical Asset Link (PAL) or digital token to gain entry to a gated community or guild without linking that high-value asset to their everyday public identity.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Verification Object Schema
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src typescript
|
||||
interface VerificationObject {
|
||||
// Identity linking DID
|
||||
did: string;
|
||||
|
||||
// What external identity is being linked
|
||||
identityType: 'domain' | 'pgp' | 'social_twitter' | 'social_github' | 'other';
|
||||
identityIdentifier: string; // e.g., 'example.com', '0x1234...ABCD', '@amr'
|
||||
|
||||
// The cryptographic proof of control over the external identity
|
||||
// - For domains: A signed string expected to be found in DNS TXT record
|
||||
// - For PGP: A signature of the DID using the PGP key
|
||||
// - For social: A URL to a public post containing the DID and signature
|
||||
proof: {
|
||||
proofType: 'dns_txt' | 'pgp_signature';
|
||||
proofData: string;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Agora persona signature (proving the DID owner agrees to the link)
|
||||
timestamp: number;
|
||||
signature: string; // Ed25519 signature over the object
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
**** Problem Statement**
|
||||
|
||||
When a Persona's derived keys are compromised, lost, or need deactivation, users need a cryptographically verifiable mechanism to:
|
||||
1. Invalidate the affected Persona
|
||||
2. Preserve the Master Key and other Personas
|
||||
3. Optionally migrate content history
|
||||
4. Maintain network integrity
|
||||
|
||||
*** Identity Verifiability & Forward Security
|
||||
|
||||
Personas are the functional, active identities through which you engage with the Agora network. Each Persona is uniquely and cryptographically derived from your Master Key, acting as your distinct digital self for specific contexts. They are the sovereign participants in the network, fully empowered to own property, enter into binding contracts, publish content, and claim protected rights such as due process and freedom of expression. This section details the cryptographic derivation, secure management, revocation mechanisms, and identification systems that enable your Personas to operate seamlessly and securely within the broader Agora ecosystem.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Key Event Log (KEL): The Observer-First Transparency Log
|
||||
Every Persona in Agora maintains a Key Event Log (KEL). This is a public, append-only ledger of all identity-related events, including:
|
||||
- *Key Events:* Inception, rotation, and revocation.
|
||||
- *Follow Events:* Every time you follow another DID, a signed "Follow Event" is added to the log.
|
||||
- *Transparency:* It is impossible to "quietly" take over an account or manipulate your public history. Any change to the keys or following relationships must be published to the log. Watchdog services can monitor this log and alert the user immediately if an unauthorized event is initiated.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Social Graph Reconstruction
|
||||
The "Social Graph" (the list of DIDs you follow and who follows you) is mathematically reconstructible from the KEL.
|
||||
- *The Proof:* Follow Events (Notes) are cryptographically signed by the Persona's authorized keys (or the Master Key).
|
||||
- *The Rebuild:* When initializing a new PDS, the software scans the network and subscribed Relays for any signed Follow Events belonging to the user's DID. It automatically reconstructs the user's entire social graph (e.g., a list of 500 friends) without the user needing to remember a single username or manual backup.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Pre-rotation: Quantum-Resistant Continuity
|
||||
Agora utilizes the principle of *Pre-rotation* to ensure forward security as an ultimate fail-safe.
|
||||
- *The Hash Commitment:* When a user creates their current active key, they simultaneously publish a cryptographic hash of their *next* (unborn) public key.
|
||||
- *The Protection:* Even if an attacker breaks the user's current private key (e.g., via a future quantum computer, theft, or even a malicious legal override attempt), they cannot forge a rotation event because they do not know the private key corresponding to the pre-committed hash. Rotation only becomes valid when the user reveals the new key that matches the previous hash, providing true "forward security."
|
||||
|
||||
**** Technical Requirements
|
||||
- *Interface:* Clients MUST support communication via *WebHID* (browser-based) or *USB/HID* (native) using the standard *APDU* (Application Protocol Data Unit) format.
|
||||
- *Key Derivation:* The HSM MUST perform BIP-32/44 derivation internally.
|
||||
- *Signing Protocol:*
|
||||
1. Client sends unsigned Content Object hash to HSM.
|
||||
2. HSM displays metadata (CID, Persona name) to user for confirmation.
|
||||
3. Upon user approval, HSM signs hash using the specified Persona key.
|
||||
4. HSM returns the Ed25519 signature to the client.
|
||||
- *Master Key Security:* The 24-word mnemonic MUST be generated and stored exclusively within the HSM.
|
||||
|
||||
** Hardware Keys
|
||||
|
||||
*** The "Vault" Device Guide (For the Engineer)
|
||||
The "Vault" is a dedicated application for an offline/hardware device that manages the Master Seed.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Functional Requirements for the Vault Tool:
|
||||
- *Seed Generation:* Must use a high-entropy hardware RNG to generate the BIP-39 mnemonic.
|
||||
- *Persona Derivation:* Must implement a hardened derivation logic where the user can "Export Persona #N."
|
||||
- *Key Rotation Editor:* This is the most important feature. If a phone is lost, the Vault device creates a DID Update Transaction. This is a cryptographically signed message that says: "I am the Master Seed; I hereby revoke Persona Key A and authorize Persona Key B."
|
||||
- *Recovery Seed Export:* The Vault should allow exporting a "Recovery Key"—a special key used specifically for the "Re-Wrapping" process on the PDS during content re-keying.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Hardware Integration: Sphinx for Your Keys
|
||||
**** Technical Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
**** BIP-39 / BIP-44 Compatibility
|
||||
Agora-compatible hardware wallets MUST support the `m/44'/1'/` path. If the device does not support the custom `1'` coin type, clients MAY fallback to a generic data-signing path, but this is NOT recommended for production use.
|
||||
826
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-03-infrastructure.org
Normal file
826
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-03-infrastructure.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,826 @@
|
||||
#+title: Agora Requirements - 03: Infrastructure
|
||||
#+author: Amero Garcia
|
||||
#+created: [2026-03-16 Mon 14:28]
|
||||
#+DATE: 2026-03-14
|
||||
#+ID: agora-requirements-03-infrastructure
|
||||
#+STARTUP: content
|
||||
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 3b43a9b8-31d1-4479-a35f-22273b74f0c7
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
* The Sovereign Infrastructure: Your Digital Foundation
|
||||
|
||||
[[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]]'s infrastructure is meticulously architected to deliver on the promise of true digital sovereignty. Unlike traditional platforms that centralize control, Agora distributes power to the edges—directly into the hands of users. This section details the foundational infrastructure that makes self-sovereign identity, data ownership, decentralized communication, and global discovery not just possible, but practical and scalable.
|
||||
|
||||
** Personal Data Store (PDS): Your Digital Fortress
|
||||
|
||||
The Personal Data Store (PDS) is the cornerstone of Agora's sovereignty model—your personal, encrypted vault where all your Notes, identity data, and digital assets reside. Unlike cloud services that claim ownership of your data, your PDS is unequivocally yours. You control it. You host it. You decide who accesses it. It is the physical manifestation of your digital self-sovereignty.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- The system MUST use a hybrid network architecture with Personal Data Stores (PDS) and Relays.
|
||||
- Every user MUST control their own PDS (hosted or self-run).
|
||||
- The PDS MUST serve as the master archive for all the user's content (encrypted) and identity data.
|
||||
- The PDS MUST act as a gatekeeper, issuing decryption keys upon valid payment or credential verification.
|
||||
- Relays MUST NOT store data long-term (unless paid to).
|
||||
- Relays MUST route ciphertext based on CID and persona subscriptions.
|
||||
- The system MUST incentivize Relays to route high-traffic content or provide specific delivery guarantees.
|
||||
- The system MUST allow users to publish their CIDs to multiple relays to ensure availability and bypass censorship.
|
||||
- The system MUST use Double Ratchet for 1-on-1 private messaging.
|
||||
- The system SHOULD use MLS (Messaging Layer Security) for group chats.
|
||||
- The system MUST use symmetric encryption for paywalled content (individual keys per object).
|
||||
- The system MUST support social recovery using Shamir's Secret Sharing, allowing users to split their Master Key into shards distributed to trusted guardians.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Technical Logic
|
||||
|
||||
**** Personal Data Store (PDS)
|
||||
- *Home Base:* Every user controls their own PDS (hosted or self-run).
|
||||
- *Master Archive:* All the user's content (encrypted) and identity data live here.
|
||||
- *Key-Server Separation:* The PDS MUST include a distinct Key-Management Module that handles the automated sale and distribution of decryption keys/LSATs. This MUST be logically separate from the Data-server hosting the encrypted blobs, ensuring that the entity holding the keys does not necessarily host the content payload.
|
||||
- *Access Control:* PDS acts as a gatekeeper, issuing decryption keys upon valid payment or credential verification.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Encryption Model (E2EE)
|
||||
- *Double Ratchet:* Used for 1-on-1 private messaging.
|
||||
- *MLS (Messaging Layer Security):* Proposed for group chats.
|
||||
- *Symmetric Encryption:* Used for paywalled content (individual keys per object).
|
||||
- *Envelope Encryption (Data-at-Rest):* To protect against stolen devices, PDS storage utilizes Envelope Encryption. Large files are encrypted with a random Data Encryption Key (DEK), which is itself encrypted (wrapped) with the Persona Public Key.
|
||||
- *Automated Re-Keying Service:* The PDS MUST include a background worker that triggers upon a `KEY_ROTATION_EVENT`. The worker iterates through KeyHeader objects and uses a Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) scheme to securely re-wrap the DEKs with the new key, without ever exposing the raw Master Seed to the PDS.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Developer Implementation
|
||||
|
||||
To send a private message:
|
||||
1. Encrypt message for the recipient's Persona Encryption Key (X25519).
|
||||
2. Upload ciphertext to the user's PDS.
|
||||
3. Notify the recipient's subscribed Relays of the new CID.
|
||||
4. Recipient's client fetches the CID from the Relay/PDS and decrypts locally.
|
||||
|
||||
*** PDS Migration: Seamless Sovereignty Transfer
|
||||
|
||||
PDS Migration represents a fundamental capability of Agora's architecture—the seamless, user-initiated transfer of one's entire digital corpus from one Personal Data Store to another. Unlike traditional platforms where data migration is often complex, permission-based, or impossible, Agora treats PDS Migration as a first-class operation. This is not an edge case, but a core feature that ensures users retain ultimate sovereignty over their data throughout its lifecycle. Whether changing hosting providers, upgrading [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][hardware]], or responding to security incidents, PDS Migration ensures users are never trapped by infrastructure choices.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Concept
|
||||
|
||||
PDS Migration is the comprehensive process of transferring a user's entire encrypted content repository and identity data from one PDS to another while rigorously maintaining Content Identifier (CID) integrity, subscription continuity, and access control mechanisms. This process ensures that all cryptographic relationships between Notes remain intact, and that no data is lost or corrupted during the transfer.
|
||||
|
||||
Key principles of PDS Migration:
|
||||
|
||||
- *User Sovereignty Absolute:* Users retain complete autonomy to migrate their data without requiring permission, intervention, or cooperation from any third party. This is a fundamental right within the Agora ecosystem.
|
||||
- *Zero-Downtime Operation:* Migration SHOULD occur without interrupting the user's ongoing presence or activities on the network. This ensures continuous availability of services and interactions.
|
||||
- *Rollback Safety:* Users MUST have the capability to revert to the original PDS if the new PDS fails to perform adequately or if any issues arise during the migration process. This provides a safety net for critical data transfers.
|
||||
- *Atomic Cutover:* There is a clearly defined, atomic moment when the new PDS becomes the authoritative source of truth, and the old PDS transitions to a backup role, ensuring data consistency.
|
||||
|
||||
Migration scenarios include a comprehensive range of use cases:
|
||||
- Self-hosted PDS → Cloud-hosted PDS (moving from personal infrastructure to professional hosting)
|
||||
- Cloud provider A → Cloud provider B (e.g., AWS → GCP, avoiding vendor lock-in)
|
||||
- Old hardware → New hardware (self-hosted upgrade for improved performance or capacity)
|
||||
- Compromised PDS → Clean PDS (security incident response and remediation)
|
||||
- Cost optimization (migrating to more economical hosting solutions)
|
||||
- Performance enhancement (migrating to geographically closer or faster infrastructure)
|
||||
|
||||
**** Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- The system MUST support full PDS migration without service interruption.
|
||||
- The system MUST preserve all Content Object CIDs during migration (content-addressed storage guarantees this).
|
||||
- The migration process MUST update the Persona's DID Document to point to the new PDS service endpoint.
|
||||
- The system MUST notify all subscribed Relays about the PDS endpoint change.
|
||||
- The system MUST support parallel operation (old and new PDS active simultaneously) during migration testing.
|
||||
- The system MUST provide migration progress tracking and verification.
|
||||
- The system MUST support incremental pre-migration sync to minimize final cutover time.
|
||||
- The system MUST handle in-flight messages during cutover (queue and forward).
|
||||
- The system MUST provide a rollback mechanism if migration fails.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Migration Phases
|
||||
|
||||
***** Phase 0: Preparation
|
||||
|
||||
- *Prerequisites:* Ensure new PDS meets minimum specs (storage, bandwidth, availability).
|
||||
- *Provisioning:* Configure new PDS with Persona's DID but initially in "standby" mode.
|
||||
- *Authorization:* New PDS MUST prove ownership via Persona signature challenge.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Phase 1: Initial Sync
|
||||
|
||||
- *Full Replication:* Transfer all Content Objects from old PDS to new PDS.
|
||||
- *CID Verification:* Block-by-block verification that all content transferred correctly.
|
||||
- *Metadata Sync:* Sync Persona profiles, access control lists, and configuration.
|
||||
- *Duration:* May take hours/days depending on data volume.
|
||||
- *Old PDS Remains Authoritative:* Writes still go to old PDS during this phase.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Phase 2: Incremental Catch-up
|
||||
|
||||
- *Delta Sync:* Catch up changes made since Phase 1 started.
|
||||
- *Repeat:* Continue incremental syncs until delta is small (e.g., < 1 minute of data).
|
||||
- *Read Testing:* Client optionally reads from new PDS to verify accessibility.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Phase 3: Cutover
|
||||
|
||||
- *Freeze Writes:* Brief write lock on old PDS (seconds to minutes).
|
||||
- *Final Delta:* Transfer last remaining changes.
|
||||
- *DID Update:* Publish new DID Document with new PDS service endpoint.
|
||||
- *Relay Broadcast:* Announce endpoint change to all subscribed Relays.
|
||||
- *New PDS Becomes Authoritative:* Write traffic now routes to new PDS.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Phase 4: Stabilization
|
||||
|
||||
- *Monitor:* Observe new PDS for errors, dropped messages, or performance issues.
|
||||
- *Verification:* Confirm all personas can reach new PDS, all content accessible.
|
||||
- *Grace Period:* 24-48 hour buffer where old PDS remains available as hot standby.
|
||||
- *Rollback Window:* If issues detected, can revert to old PDS via DID re-update.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Phase 5: Decommissioning
|
||||
|
||||
- *Archive:* Old PDS data backed up (user's discretion).
|
||||
- *Tombstone:* Old PDS endpoint publishes redirect or shutdown notice.
|
||||
- *Cleanup:* Remove old PDS from user's infrastructure (cancel cloud instance, retire hardware).
|
||||
- *Final Verification:* Confirm no traffic routing to old PDS.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Technical Considerations
|
||||
|
||||
***** Concurrent Access During Migration
|
||||
|
||||
- *Read Replication:* Old PDS can serve reads while new PDS receives writes (after cutover) to reduce downtime to near-zero.
|
||||
- *Message Queueing:* Relays queue messages during the brief cutover window; messages forwarded once new PDS confirms readiness.
|
||||
- *Conflict Avoidance:* Strict sequencing ensures no split-brain scenarios (only one PDS accepts writes at any time).
|
||||
|
||||
***** Verification Protocol
|
||||
|
||||
- *CID Audit:* Iterate through all CIDs in Persona's content graph; verify retrievable from new PDS.
|
||||
- *Signature Verification:* Spot-check Content Object signatures against Persona's public keys.
|
||||
- *Access Control Verification:* Test decryption of sample encrypted content using Persona's keys.
|
||||
- *Subscription Testing:* Verify Relays successfully forward new CIDs from new PDS.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Rollback Procedures
|
||||
|
||||
- *Trigger:* Migration fails verification or new PDS experiences critical failure.
|
||||
- *DID Reversion:* Re-publish previous DID Document with old PDS endpoint.
|
||||
- *Relay Re-announce:* Broadcast reversion to all Relays.
|
||||
- *Data Reconciliation:* If any writes occurred on new PDS before failure, sync them back to old PDS before re-activating.
|
||||
- *Graceful Degradation:* If both PDS fail, Persona can restore from backup and re-establish with same or new infrastructure.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Developer Implementation Example
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src typescript
|
||||
// Initiate PDS migration sequence
|
||||
interface PDSMigrationPlan {
|
||||
sourcePDS: string; // Old PDS endpoint
|
||||
targetPDS: string; // New PDS endpoint
|
||||
personaDID: string;
|
||||
phases: MigrationPhase[];
|
||||
estimatedDuration: number; // Estimated seconds for full migration
|
||||
rollbackDeadline: number; // Timestamp until rollback is possible
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface MigrationPhase {
|
||||
name: 'preparation' | 'full-sync' | 'incremental' | 'cutover' | 'verification' | 'completed';
|
||||
status: 'pending' | 'in-progress' | 'completed' | 'failed';
|
||||
startedAt?: number;
|
||||
completedAt?: number;
|
||||
progressPercent: number;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 1: Full replication
|
||||
async function replicateContentObjects(
|
||||
sourcePDS: string,
|
||||
targetPDS: string,
|
||||
personaDID: string,
|
||||
authToken: string
|
||||
): Promise<ReplicationResult> {
|
||||
const sourceClient = new PDSClient(sourcePDS, personaDID);
|
||||
const targetClient = new PDSClient(targetPDS, personaDID);
|
||||
|
||||
// Fetch all CIDs from source
|
||||
const allCIDs = await sourceClient.listAllCIDs();
|
||||
|
||||
// Batch transfer with verification
|
||||
const results = await batchTransfer(allCIDs, {
|
||||
source: sourceClient,
|
||||
target: targetClient,
|
||||
verifyCID: true, // Verify hash after transfer
|
||||
batchSize: 100,
|
||||
concurrency: 5
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
transferred: results.successful.length,
|
||||
failed: results.failed,
|
||||
duration: results.elapsedTime
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 3: Cutover - Update DID Document
|
||||
async function executeCutover(
|
||||
persona: Persona,
|
||||
newPDSEndpoint: string,
|
||||
oldPDSEndpoint: string
|
||||
): Promise<CutoverResult> {
|
||||
// 1. Freeze writes on old PDS
|
||||
await freezeOldPDS(oldPDSEndpoint, persona.did);
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. Final incremental sync
|
||||
await finalIncrementalSync(oldPDSEndpoint, newPDSEndpoint);
|
||||
|
||||
// 3. Update DID Document with new service endpoint
|
||||
const updatedDoc = await updateDIDDocument(persona.did, {
|
||||
service: [{
|
||||
type: 'PDS',
|
||||
serviceEndpoint: newPDSEndpoint,
|
||||
// ... other service properties
|
||||
}]
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// 4. Sign and publish new DID Document
|
||||
const signedDoc = await persona.sign(updatedDoc);
|
||||
await didResolver.publish(signedDoc);
|
||||
|
||||
// 5. Notify all subscribed Relays
|
||||
await notifyRelays(persona.did, {
|
||||
type: 'PDS_ENDPOINT_CHANGE',
|
||||
oldEndpoint: oldPDSEndpoint,
|
||||
newEndpoint: newPDSEndpoint,
|
||||
signature: signedDoc.proof
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
return { status: 'success', newDocumentCID: signedDoc.cid };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verification: Confirm all content accessible
|
||||
async function verifyMigration(
|
||||
newPDS: string,
|
||||
personaDID: string,
|
||||
expectedCIDCount: number
|
||||
): Promise<VerificationResult> {
|
||||
const client = new PDSClient(newPDS, personaDID);
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify CID count matches
|
||||
const reachableCIDs = await client.listAllCIDs();
|
||||
if (reachableCIDs.length !== expectedCIDCount) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`CID mismatch: expected ${expectedCIDCount}, found ${reachableCIDs.length}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Spot-check: verify random sample of CIDs
|
||||
const sample = selectRandomSample(reachableCIDs, 100);
|
||||
const verificationResults = await Promise.all(
|
||||
sample.map(cid => verifyContentObject(client, cid))
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const failures = verificationResults.filter(r => !r.valid);
|
||||
if (failures.length > 0) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Verification failed for ${failures.length} objects`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return { status: 'verified', sampleSize: sample.length, failures: 0 };
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
**** User Experience Considerations
|
||||
|
||||
- *Progress Dashboard:* Real-time view of migration progress with estimated time remaining.
|
||||
- *Notification:* Alerts to user's clients about upcoming maintenance window (for cutover).
|
||||
- *Zero-Click Resume:* If migration interrupted, resumes from last checkpoint automatically.
|
||||
- *Cost Transparency:* Estimate bandwidth/storage costs before starting (especially for cloud-to-cloud).
|
||||
- *Support Contact:* During migration, provide direct line to new PDS operator for issues.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Security During Migration
|
||||
|
||||
- *Authenticated Transfer:* All replication traffic encrypted and authenticated (mTLS or Noise).
|
||||
- *No Plaintext Exposure:* Ciphertext transferred as-is; no decryption during migration.
|
||||
- *Audit Trail:* All migration events logged as tamper-evident Content Objects.
|
||||
- *Guardian Notification:* Optional: notify social recovery guardians of major infrastructure change.
|
||||
- *Rate Limiting:* Prevent migration from overwhelming either PDS; throttle if needed.
|
||||
|
||||
*** PDS-to-PDS Synchronization: Redundancy and Resilience
|
||||
|
||||
In a truly sovereign digital ecosystem, users should never be constrained to a single point of failure. Agora's PDS-to-PDS Synchronization protocol empowers users to run multiple Personal Data Stores simultaneously—for redundancy, load balancing, or geographic distribution. This protocol enables bidirectional synchronization of encrypted Content Objects between a user's PDS nodes, maintaining CID integrity, conflict resolution, and data consistency across the distributed infrastructure. It ensures that your digital presence remains resilient, available, and performant, regardless of individual infrastructure limitations.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Concept
|
||||
|
||||
The PDS-to-PDS Synchronization Protocol allows users to maintain multiple, synchronized copies of their encrypted data across different PDS instances. This capability transforms the PDS from a single point of failure into a distributed, fault-tolerant system that can withstand outages, attacks, or infrastructure changes. By synchronizing data across multiple nodes, users achieve:
|
||||
|
||||
- *High Availability:* If one PDS becomes unreachable, others can seamlessly serve data, ensuring continuous access to your digital identity and content.
|
||||
- *Geographic Distribution:* PDS nodes can be strategically located in different regions to minimize latency and comply with local data sovereignty requirements.
|
||||
- *Load Distribution:* High-traffic Personas can distribute read operations across multiple synchronized PDS nodes, improving performance and responsiveness.
|
||||
- *Disaster Recovery:* Synchronized PDS nodes provide inherent backup capabilities, ensuring data preservation even in catastrophic failures.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Sync Protocol Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
**** Merkle DAG Synchronization
|
||||
- Each PDS maintains a Merkle DAG of all stored Content Objects.
|
||||
- Root hash represents complete state of the PDS.
|
||||
- Sync compares Merkle roots to efficiently identify differences.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Sync Modes
|
||||
|
||||
**** Full Sync
|
||||
- Complete synchronization of all Content Objects.
|
||||
- Used for initial setup or recovery from desync.
|
||||
- Sends all CIDs not present in the other PDS.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Incremental Sync
|
||||
- Only synchronizes changes since last sync.
|
||||
- Maintains sync cursor (last synced CID timestamp).
|
||||
- More efficient for ongoing synchronization.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Selective Sync
|
||||
- Synchronizes only specific content types or time ranges.
|
||||
- User-defined filters (e.g., "only public posts", "last 30 days").
|
||||
- Useful for bandwidth-constrained scenarios.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Sync Process
|
||||
|
||||
**** Phase 1: Handshake
|
||||
- PDS nodes authenticate using Persona's DID.
|
||||
- Exchange authentication proofs (signatures).
|
||||
- Verify both nodes are authorized for this Persona's data.
|
||||
- Exchange capabilities (sync modes supported, bandwidth limits).
|
||||
|
||||
**** Phase 2: Discovery
|
||||
- PDS A computes Merkle root of current Content Object set.
|
||||
- PDS B does the same.
|
||||
- Compare roots: if equal, sync complete; if different, continue.
|
||||
- Exchange Merkle proofs to identify divergent branches.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Phase 3: Delta Calculation
|
||||
- Based on Merkle proof comparison, identify missing CIDs on each side.
|
||||
- Calculate delta: set of CIDs A has that B doesn't, and vice versa.
|
||||
- Partition delta into batches for transfer.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Phase 4: Transfer
|
||||
- Request missing CID payloads from peer PDS.
|
||||
- Receive Content Objects with full metadata.
|
||||
- Verify CID integrity (content-addressed verification).
|
||||
- Store in local PDS.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Phase 5: Conflict Resolution
|
||||
- If same CID exists with different content (hash mismatch):
|
||||
- Both versions preserved (content-addressed storage).
|
||||
- Conflict marked for manual resolution.
|
||||
- User interface shows both versions, user selects authoritative.
|
||||
- If same CID exists with same content: no conflict.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Phase 6: Confirmation
|
||||
- Both PDS nodes recompute Merkle roots.
|
||||
- Verify roots match post-sync.
|
||||
- Update sync cursor for incremental future syncs.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Sync Conflicts
|
||||
|
||||
**** Conflict Types
|
||||
|
||||
**** Write-Write Conflict
|
||||
- Same CID modified differently on two PDS nodes simultaneously.
|
||||
- Resolution: Keep both, mark secondary as "alternate version", user resolves.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Tombstone Conflict
|
||||
- CID deleted on PDS A, modified on PDS B.
|
||||
- Resolution: Configurable policy ("last write wins" vs. "preserve all").
|
||||
|
||||
**** Schema Conflict
|
||||
- Content Object valid on PDS A but rejected by PDS B (schema mismatch).
|
||||
- Resolution: Log error, quarantine object, notify user.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Periodic Synchronization
|
||||
|
||||
- *Frequency:* User-configurable (real-time, hourly, daily).
|
||||
- *Real-time Sync:* WebSocket connection for immediate propagation.
|
||||
- *Scheduled Sync:* Cron-like jobs for periodic full or incremental syncs.
|
||||
- *On-Demand Sync:* Manual trigger by user or administrator.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Security Considerations
|
||||
|
||||
- *Authentication:* Both PDS nodes MUST authenticate as authorized for Persona's data.
|
||||
- *Encryption:* Sync traffic SHOULD be encrypted (TLS 1.3 or Noise Protocol).
|
||||
- *Authorization:* PDS nodes MAY implement additional access controls (IP allowlists).
|
||||
- *Audit:* All sync events logged as Content Objects for audit trail.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Performance Optimization
|
||||
|
||||
- *Delta Encoding:* Only transfer missing CIDs and metadata.
|
||||
- *Compression:* Payload compression for large Content Objects.
|
||||
- *Parallel Transfer:* Multiple concurrent transfers for large datasets.
|
||||
- *Resume:* Partial transfers resume from interruption point.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Implementation (TypeScript)
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src typescript
|
||||
interface PDSSyncSession {
|
||||
sessionId: string;
|
||||
participantPDS: string[]; // PDS DIDs
|
||||
personaDID: string;
|
||||
mode: 'full' | 'incremental' | 'selective';
|
||||
status: 'handshake' | 'discovery' | 'transfer' | 'complete' | 'error';
|
||||
startedAt: number;
|
||||
completedAt?: number;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface MerkleNode {
|
||||
cid: string;
|
||||
children: MerkleNode[];
|
||||
hash: string; // Blake3 hash of concatenated child hashes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface SyncDelta {
|
||||
fromPDS: string;
|
||||
toPDS: string;
|
||||
missingCIDs: string[];
|
||||
conflictCIDs: string[];
|
||||
estimatedSize: number; // Bytes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface SyncConfig {
|
||||
mode: 'full' | 'incremental' | 'selective';
|
||||
filter?: {
|
||||
contentTypes?: string[];
|
||||
afterTimestamp?: number;
|
||||
beforeTimestamp?: number;
|
||||
publicOnly?: boolean;
|
||||
};
|
||||
frequency?: 'realtime' | number; // number = seconds between syncs
|
||||
priority?: 'low' | 'normal' | 'high';
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
*** Distributed Mirroring & Social Resilience
|
||||
|
||||
**** Following: Default "Feed Gossip" & The Phoenix Effect
|
||||
Agora ensures baseline content resilience by leveraging a gossip-based mirroring architecture triggered by every "Follow" event.
|
||||
- *Following = Essential Replicating:* When a user "follows" another Persona, their device or PDS automatically joins the gossip swarm for that target's most critical low-bandwidth data.
|
||||
- *Feed Gossip Scope:* To balance network resilience with device resources, default gossip is restricted to the *Identity Log (KEL)* and a rolling window of *recent text-based Notes* (e.g., the last 1,000 posts).
|
||||
- *The Phoenix Effect:* This level of mirroring ensures the "Phoenix Effect" remains viable. If a user's PDS is destroyed, they can "shout" to their followers: "I am the owner of DID:123. Please send me everything you have signed by my key." The essential history and social graph flow back from the community.
|
||||
- *Censorship Resistance:* By making essential gossip a default behavior, the social graph and latest news stay alive through the "cracks" of the internet automatically.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Supporting: Opt-in "Supporter-Mirroring" & Decentralized CDN
|
||||
For high-bandwidth content and deep archives, Agora transitions from simple gossip to an explicit infrastructure donation model.
|
||||
- *Persistent Mirroring:* When a user clicks "Support," they opt-in to a deeper technical commitment. The supporter's PDS archives the *entire historical feed* of the creator, not just the recent window.
|
||||
- *High-Bandwidth "Pinning":* Supporters provide the backbone for the *"Follower-as-CDN"* model. A supporter can allocate specific storage (e.g., "Pin 5GB of latest video") to ensure large payloads (audio, video, high-res images) remain highly available.
|
||||
- *WebRTC Peering & Seeding:* Supporters act as active "Seeds" in a BitTorrent-style swarm. When a new viewer watches a video, the app prioritizes streaming via WebRTC from online supporters rather than the creator's PDS, ensuring viral content has $0 infrastructure cost for the creator.
|
||||
|
||||
**** "In-Kind" vs. "Monetary" Support
|
||||
This tiered model transforms the relationship between organizations and their communities:
|
||||
- *Scalable In-Kind Support:* A "Poor but Loyal" follower contributes at the Gossip tier (bandwidth for text), while a "Dedicated Patron" contributes at the Mirroring tier (storage for video).
|
||||
- *Resilience against De-platforming:* Even if a government blocks a creator's main server, the "Swarm" of followers and supporters continues to host and circulate the content through the P2P network.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Encrypted Peer-Backups (The "Friend-Box")
|
||||
While the social swarm recovers public history, users ensure the recovery of private data (drafts, DMs) via formal peer-to-peer backup agreements.
|
||||
- *The "Friend-Box" Logic:* Users can establish reciprocal "Friend-Box" agreements where they swap encrypted storage space (e.g., swapping 10GB of space with three trusted friends).
|
||||
- *Mechanism:* The user's PDS automatically generates and sends an encrypted, compressed "State Snapshot" (a Merkle DAG of the entire PDS state) to these friends' servers periodically (e.g., nightly).
|
||||
- *Privacy Guarantee:* Because the backup is encrypted with the user's keys, the friends cannot read the private drafts or DMs; they only host the raw ciphertext blobs.
|
||||
- *Restoration:* In the event of a catastrophic local failure (e.g., fire, server loss), the user can download their latest snapshot from a friend and instantly restore their entire digital life to a new PDS node using their recovered Identity Keys.
|
||||
|
||||
** Relay Network: The Circulatory System of Agora
|
||||
|
||||
The Relay Network serves as Agora's intelligent, adaptive message routing layer—ephemeral, user-chosen pathways that efficiently route encrypted Notes via a pub/sub model. Unlike centralized servers that store and monitor your data, Relays are transient routers that respect your privacy, delivering your messages without ever holding them long-term. They are the circulatory system of the Agora network, ensuring vital communication flows freely and securely.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- Relays MUST route ciphertext based on CID and persona subscriptions.
|
||||
- Relays MUST NOT store data long-term (unless paid to).
|
||||
- The system MUST incentivize Relays to route high-traffic content or provide specific delivery guarantees.
|
||||
- The system MUST allow users to publish their CIDs to multiple relays to ensure availability and bypass censorship.
|
||||
- Relays MUST support subscription filters for content discovery.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Technical Logic
|
||||
*** Relay Routing & Prioritization: Pay-to-Prioritize (P2P)
|
||||
|
||||
To ensure high-performance and sustainability without central control, Agora Relays utilize a *Pay-to-Prioritize (P2P)* routing strategy. Crucially, Relays are *Logic-Blind*. They do not inspect the Note's payload or contract terms (which may be encrypted). Instead, they prioritize traffic based on explicit, unencrypted metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Explicit Priority Fee (The "Fast-Lane")
|
||||
If a Note requires instant routing (e.g., a time-sensitive financial transaction or live chat), the sender can attach a Lightning micropayment directly to the routing request.
|
||||
- *`priority_fee`:* A metadata field indicating the attached fee. Relays automatically move Notes with sufficient priority fees into the highest-speed queue.
|
||||
- *Proof of Priority:* The fee *is* the proof. The Relay doesn't need to know *why* the Note is important, only that the sender is willing to pay for bandwidth.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Economic Density & Wire-Size Billing
|
||||
Relays manage their resources using an *Economic Density* metric:
|
||||
- *Sender Reputation (Zero-Fee Routing):* Small Notes from highly staked or reputable DIDs are often routed with zero additional fees to foster network liquidity and social interaction.
|
||||
- *Low-Density (Large/Static):* Large Notes (e.g., binary payloads, media) are routed via *Bulk Pipes*. Billing for these Notes is proportional strictly to their raw payload size on the wire.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Incentivization
|
||||
- Relays charge for routing high-traffic content or for specific delivery guarantees based on wire-size and explicit priority fees.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Relay Discovery
|
||||
|
||||
*** Relay Economics and Network Resilience
|
||||
|
||||
**** Relay Discovery
|
||||
|
||||
***** Bootstrap Problem
|
||||
|
||||
New clients need to find Relay nodes without hardcoded lists (centralization risk).
|
||||
|
||||
***** Discovery Mechanisms
|
||||
|
||||
****** DNS TXT Records
|
||||
- Domain: `_agora-relay._tcp.example.com`
|
||||
- Returns: List of relay endpoints (WebSocket URLs)
|
||||
- Update: DNS propagation handles relay churn
|
||||
|
||||
****** Well-Known DID
|
||||
- DID: `did:agora:bootstrap`
|
||||
- Service Endpoint: "RelayDirectory" with list of known high-reputation relays
|
||||
- Maintained: By Agora Trust, updated quarterly
|
||||
|
||||
****** DHT (Future)
|
||||
- Distributed hash table for relay discovery
|
||||
- Similar to BitTorrent trackerless torrents
|
||||
- Resistant to censorship
|
||||
|
||||
****** Social Bootstrap
|
||||
- Friend's relay list shared on connection
|
||||
- "You follow Alice → Oh, Alice uses Relay X, try that"
|
||||
- Gossip protocol for relay reputation
|
||||
|
||||
**** Relay Subscription
|
||||
|
||||
***** Subscription Types
|
||||
|
||||
- *CID Filters:* Subscribe to new CIDs from specific DIDs
|
||||
- *Topic Filters:* Subscribe to content with specific tags
|
||||
- *Content-Type Filters:* Only contracts, only posts, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Subscription Management
|
||||
|
||||
- *WebSocket:* Persistent connection for real-time updates
|
||||
- *REST Poll:* HTTP polling for clients without WebSocket
|
||||
- *Webhook:* Push notifications for server-side clients
|
||||
|
||||
***** Subscription Pricing
|
||||
- *Basic:* Free (up to 100 subscriptions)
|
||||
- *Premium:* 100 satoshis/month (unlimited)
|
||||
- *Enterprise:* Negotiated (dedicated relay capacity)
|
||||
|
||||
**** Relay Operator Profiles
|
||||
1. *"Backbone" Providers (Big Tech/NGOs):* Large organizations (e.g., Bluesky Social PBC or the "Free Our Feeds" collective) run "Global Relays," ingesting entire network activity for platform-wide search and indexing.
|
||||
2. *"Neighborhood" Operators (NGOs & Communities):* NGOs, professional guilds, or town councils run community-specific relays, indexing only the members relevant to their specific domain.
|
||||
3. *"Specialists" (Commercial Startups):* Companies (e.g., Primal, River) run highly-optimized relays to power specific apps, prioritizing speed and specialized feature sets for their target market.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Relay Economic Models
|
||||
To ensure sustainability without compromising user data (avoiding "Surveillance Capitalism"), operators utilize diverse revenue models:
|
||||
- *The "Anti-Spam" Entrance Fee:* One-time or monthly payments (e.g., $1–$5) via Bitcoin Lightning to discourage bot-farms and cover hardware costs.
|
||||
- *The "Boutique" Model (Freemium):* Free "Read" access with a paid subscription required to "Write" (post data), often offering guarantees for data persistence and indexing quality.
|
||||
- *Institutional "Public Good" Funding:* Government or NGO-funded "Public Interest Relays" provided as a digital utility to ensure censorship-resistant communication.
|
||||
- *"Zaps" & Micro-tips:* Direct user-to-operator micro-tips via integrated Lightning Keys, rewarding relays for high-quality filters or specialized indexes.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Relay Pricing
|
||||
|
||||
***** Standard Price Announcement
|
||||
- Relay publishes `price_per_kb` in Lightning millisats
|
||||
- WebSocket endpoint: `/pricing` returns current rates
|
||||
- Update frequency: Hourly, cached by clients
|
||||
|
||||
***** Pricing Tiers
|
||||
|
||||
- *Basic:* 1 millisat/KB (default routing)
|
||||
- *Priority:* 10 millisats/KB (fast lane)
|
||||
- *Bulk:* 0.5 millisats/KB (>100KB messages)
|
||||
- *Free:* 0 millisats/KB (below 1KB, within rate limits)
|
||||
|
||||
***** Fee Structure
|
||||
|
||||
- *Relay:* Keeps 70% of fees (operating costs)
|
||||
- *Validator Oracles:* 20% (fraud detection)
|
||||
- *Agora Protocol:* 10% (development fund)
|
||||
|
||||
**** Network Resilience: Global Firehose vs. Fragmented Relays
|
||||
The Agora design ensures that the relay network is inherently replaceable and resilient:
|
||||
- *Replaceable Relays:* Users can instantly switch to competitor relays if a provider becomes greedy or censorious by simply re-pointing their PDS.
|
||||
- *"Multi-homed" Data (Firehose Protection):* Users push posts to multiple relays simultaneously. If any relay fails, history remains accessible via others, ensuring followers can always maintain connectivity.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Privacy Considerations: The "Honeypot Relay" Risk
|
||||
|
||||
Because a relay is fundamentally a server that routes traffic, it is technically possible for an operator to offer a "free" service while secretly harvesting metadata to sell to advertisers. This creates the risk of "Honeypot Relays" during the network's early bootstrap phase.
|
||||
|
||||
**** The Metadata Harvesting Trap
|
||||
Even if messages are End-to-End Encrypted (E2EE), a malicious relay can observe highly valuable metadata for surveillance capitalism:
|
||||
- *IP Addresses:* Revealing the user's physical location and device profile.
|
||||
- *The Social Graph:* Observing who a DID communicates with, how often, and who constitutes their "inner circle."
|
||||
- *Activity Patterns:* Tracking when a user is active, sleeping, and which tags/topics they frequently query.
|
||||
- *Unencrypted Content:* Building interest profiles based on public posts and read-only data.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Defense Against Decentralized Surveillance
|
||||
While Honeypot Relays pose a risk, their power is fundamentally weaker than legacy Web 2.0 walled gardens:
|
||||
1. *No Walled Garden (Instant Migration):* If a relay is discovered to be harvesting data, users simply uncheck a box in their PDS settings. They migrate to a new relay instantly, and their followers find them immediately because their identity (DID) remains constant.
|
||||
2. *Fragmented Data:* Because users multi-home their data across several relays simultaneously, no single relay possesses the "whole picture" of a user's digital life.
|
||||
3. *The Tor/VPN Option:* Advanced users and organizations can run their PDS traffic through Tor or a VPN, stripping away the IP address—the most valuable piece of surveillance data.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Organizational Defense: The Tiered Relay Strategy
|
||||
For Collectives, NGOs, or LLCs managing sensitive operations, relying on "free" public relays is an unacceptable security risk. These entities MUST utilize a Tiered Relay Strategy:
|
||||
- *Tier 1 (Internal Relay):* The NGO runs its own private, isolated relay exclusively for internal board and team communications. This relay is "dark" to the public internet and collects zero metadata for third parties.
|
||||
- *Tier 2 (Public Gateway):* The organization uses high-traffic "Surveillance" or public relays solely for PR, marketing, and public announcements. They treat these relays like digital billboards—expected to be public, but never used for private business.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Relay Reputation
|
||||
|
||||
- *Uptime:* % availability over last 30 days
|
||||
- *Latency:* Message propagation time
|
||||
- *Censorship:* Has relay blocked legal content?
|
||||
- *Fees:* Reasonable pricing?
|
||||
- *Users:* Number of active personas (network effect)
|
||||
|
||||
** Search & Indexing: The Firehose Indexers
|
||||
|
||||
In a [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][decentralized network]], finding historical content or discovering new Personas requires specialized indexing infrastructure. Indexing Nodes are high-performance servers that ingest the public Relay firehose to provide full-text search and complex discovery services.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Requirements
|
||||
- Indexing Nodes MUST ingest public Content Objects from the Relay firehose.
|
||||
- Indexing Nodes MUST support full-text search across public metadata and decrypted public content.
|
||||
- The system MUST provide a standardized Search API for clients to query indexes.
|
||||
- *The Aggregator API:* The standard endpoint MUST support an open querying format (e.g., `GET /search/query?q=keyword`) returning a structured schema of DIDs, Handles, and Profile snippets.
|
||||
- *Ranking Transparency:* The provider MUST publish its Ranking Logic (e.g., "We prioritize accounts with 3+ Web-of-Trust endorsements") so users understand the algorithmic biases of the index.
|
||||
- Indexing Nodes MUST respect content flags (e.g., `indexable: false` or `ephemeral`).
|
||||
- The system MUST support "Private Indexing," where a user's PDS builds a local search index for their own encrypted history and DMs.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Technical Logic
|
||||
- *Public Indexing:* Backbone providers run global indexers using technologies like Meilisearch or Elasticsearch to enable "Google-like" search for the whole platform.
|
||||
- *Private Indexing:* Thin clients delegate private search tasks to the user's PDS, which maintains a local, encrypted index of all authorized Content Objects.
|
||||
- *Economics:* High-speed indexing services MAY utilize micro-payments (Lightning) or subscriptions for advanced query capabilities or higher rate limits.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Persona Discovery & The Global Directory
|
||||
To solve the UX problem of finding friends in a decentralized namespace, Indexers act as a Global Directory, constantly cataloging Handle <-> DID mappings broadcast over the network.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Multi-Format Handle Indexing
|
||||
When a user searches for "@alice," the Indexer searches across all supported namespace formats simultaneously:
|
||||
- *Subdomains:* `alice.aletheia.social`
|
||||
- *Custom Domains:* `alice.com`
|
||||
- *Web3 Names:* `alice.eth` or `alice.p2p`
|
||||
|
||||
**** Verified Search Results (Anti-Squatting)
|
||||
Because anyone can theoretically publish a Note claiming to be "Alice," the Search UI relies on DIDs to guarantee authenticity.
|
||||
- *Cryptographic Back-Links:* The Search engine ONLY displays a "Verified" checkmark if the human-readable handle (e.g., `alice.com`) has a valid cryptographic DNS/TXT record pointing back to the Persona's DID, *and* the DID has published a signed Note claiming that handle.
|
||||
- *Unverified Flagging:* If a user squats on a username without owning the corresponding domain or blockchain record, the Indexer explicitly flags the search result as "Unverified" or excludes it.
|
||||
|
||||
**** "Privacy-First" Search
|
||||
Because Agora supports multiple isolated Personas per user, global search is strictly opt-in:
|
||||
- *Public Personas:* (e.g., a "Work" or "Creator" Persona) publish a "Directory Opt-In" Note. Indexers catalog them, making them searchable by anyone.
|
||||
- *Private Personas:* (e.g., an "Anonymous" or "Family" Persona) do not publish this Note. They are entirely hidden from global Indexers. To find a Private Persona, another user must possess their exact DID string or be invited via a secure DIDComm routing channel.
|
||||
|
||||
** Agora-to-Web Gateways: The Bridge to the Open Web
|
||||
|
||||
*** Concept
|
||||
To make decentralized, P2P content accessible to users on the "Open Web" (traditional browsers like Chrome or Safari without special plugins), Agora must bridge the gap between Content-Addressed Data (CIDs) and Location-Addressed URLs.
|
||||
|
||||
Gateways act as "translators" sitting on the edge of the decentralized network, talking HTTP to the legacy web while speaking P2P protocols internally. Every PDS or dedicated "Public Relay" can act as a web gateway.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 1. The HTTP Gateway (The Bridge)
|
||||
|
||||
**** Public Gateway API & URL Mapping
|
||||
A piece of content identified by its hash (CID), such as `bafy...123`, can be viewed by anyone at a standard HTTP URL.
|
||||
- *Pathing:* Gateways MUST support standard pathing `/ipfs/{cid}` and `/at/{did}/{collection}/{rkey}`.
|
||||
- *CORS Policy:* Gateways MUST implement a permissive CORS policy to allow decentralized applications (dApps) to fetch media directly across origins.
|
||||
- *MIME-Type Sniffing:* The gateway MUST read the Universal Event metadata and serve correct HTTP headers (e.g., `Content-Type: video/mp4`) so browsers handle the media natively.
|
||||
|
||||
**** The Translation Process
|
||||
When a browser hits that link, the Gateway performs the following automated steps:
|
||||
1. *Fetch:* Retrieves the data from the P2P swarm using Agora's native protocols.
|
||||
2. *Verify:* Cryptographically verifies the Note's signature against the creator's Persona DID to ensure authenticity.
|
||||
3. *Wrap:* Wraps the raw content (Markdown, JSON) in standard HTML/CSS templates so it renders correctly in a standard web browser.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 2. Human-Readable Handles (DNS & ENS)
|
||||
|
||||
Most users will not share long cryptographic hashes. To make content web-friendly, Gateways automate domain routing.
|
||||
|
||||
**** DNSLink (Traditional Domains)
|
||||
Users can point their own domains (e.g., `alice.com`) directly to their Persona.
|
||||
- *Automatic Resolution:* When someone visits `alice.com`, the Gateway reads a DNS TXT record that says: "Go find content hash XYZ on the Agora network."
|
||||
- *Zero-Configuration SSL:* Gateways automatically provision and renew HTTPS certificates (via Let's Encrypt) for any domain linked to a Persona DID.
|
||||
- *Well-Known Verification:* Gateways automatically serve the user's DID document at `https://[custom-domain]/.well-known/atproto-did` to prove ownership.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Automated Subdomain Issuance (Registrar Service)
|
||||
To onboard users quickly without forcing them to buy a domain, PDS providers act as Registrars.
|
||||
- *Availability & Routing:* The PDS performs an automated availability check. If a handle is free, it updates its Virtual Host configuration and internal DNS to instantly route traffic for `newuser.provider.org`.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Web3 Domains (.eth, .p2p)
|
||||
For users utilizing blockchain-based naming services, Agora integrates with specialized gateways (e.g., Eth.limo). A user types `yourname.eth.limo` into a standard browser, and the gateway does the heavy lifting of resolving the blockchain record and serving the underlying P2P data.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 3. Social Mirroring for Search Engines (SEO)
|
||||
|
||||
To ensure Agora content is discoverable on legacy search engines like Google, the network utilizes automated rendering pipelines.
|
||||
|
||||
**** The Firehose
|
||||
Agora Relays emit a continuous "Firehose" of every public Note created on the network.
|
||||
|
||||
**** SEO Rendering (App Views)
|
||||
Specialized indexers or "App Views" (functioning like web-frontends) consume this firehose. They automatically generate static, crawlable HTML pages for every public profile, post, and thread. This ensures that decentralized content is aggressively indexed by Google's web crawlers, matching or exceeding the discoverability of traditional centralized blogs.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 4. Persona-as-Host (Native Web Hosting)
|
||||
Because of this robust Gateway architecture, publishing a website becomes a native feature of the network.
|
||||
- *Static Asset Resolver (SAR):* The PDS/Gateway can interpret a directory CID as a web root. If a request hits a folder CID without a filename, the SAR automatically serves `index.html`. It resolves all internal assets (images, CSS) using Relative Pathing to ensure the site works regardless of the gateway domain.
|
||||
- *Automated Deployment (Push-to-Publish):* Developers can use Git integration. When code is pushed, a CI/CD action builds the site, signs the resulting root CID with the Persona Key, and broadcasts the Publish Event to the PDS.
|
||||
- *Instant Rollbacks:* Every Publish Event is logged in the Persona's immutable history. Reverting a site is simply signing a new Note pointing back to a previous CID.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Monetized Static Sites (Split-State Encryption)
|
||||
Gateways integrate with the Exchange layer. Owners can host static sites where certain paths are encrypted. The Gateway serves the public storefront, but the actual asset is only "unwrapped" locally if the user's browser provides a Lightning Preimage (LSAT) proving payment.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- Gateways MUST take CID-based Agora content and render it as HTML for legacy browsers.
|
||||
- Gateways MUST support SEO-friendly rendering for public content.
|
||||
- The system MUST allow anyone to run a Gateway (not restricted to Relay operators).
|
||||
- Gateways MUST NOT require authentication for public content.
|
||||
- Gateways SHOULD cache content to reduce load on PDS/Relay networks.
|
||||
- The system MUST support Gateway discovery (similar to Relay discovery).
|
||||
- Gateways MUST respect content flags (e.g., `indexable`, `ephemeral`).
|
||||
- Gateways MUST NOT expose private/direct content.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Relationship to Relays
|
||||
|
||||
- *Relays* serve Agora-native clients via WebSocket/pub-sub protocols.
|
||||
- *Gateways* serve legacy browsers via HTTP.
|
||||
- They are *separate infrastructure* - a Gateway may use Relays as a backend, but they're distinct services.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Gateway Discovery
|
||||
|
||||
**** Concept
|
||||
Gateways bridge Agora content to the legacy web via HTTP. Discovery mechanisms are needed for clients to find reliable gateways to generate shareable HTTP links for their public content.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Discovery Mechanisms
|
||||
|
||||
***** Public Registry
|
||||
- A well-known DID (e.g., `did:agora:gateways`) maintains a list of verified, active gateways.
|
||||
- Clients can query this registry to get a randomized or latency-sorted list of active gateways.
|
||||
|
||||
***** DNS TXT Records
|
||||
- Similar to Relay discovery, domains can publish `_agora-gateway._tcp` TXT records pointing to HTTP endpoints.
|
||||
|
||||
***** User Preference
|
||||
- Users can manually configure a preferred gateway in their client settings (e.g., `agora.example.com`).
|
||||
- Clients use this preferred gateway when generating "Share Link" URLs.
|
||||
|
||||
** Infrastructure Discovery: DID Document Bindings
|
||||
|
||||
For a Persona to function within the network, its Decentralized Identifier (DID) must "bind" to specific infrastructure endpoints. This is achieved via the `service` section of the Agora DID Document.
|
||||
|
||||
*** The Service Schema
|
||||
Every Agora DID Document SHOULD include a list of service endpoints that allow other Personas and clients to locate the user's data and communication channels.
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "did:agora:123...",
|
||||
"service": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "#pds",
|
||||
"type": "AgoraPDS",
|
||||
"serviceEndpoint": "https://pds.example.org"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "#relay",
|
||||
"type": "AgoraRelay",
|
||||
"serviceEndpoint": "wss://relay.aletheia.social"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "#search",
|
||||
"type": "AgoraSearch",
|
||||
"serviceEndpoint": "https://search.agora-backbone.net"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
*** Resolution & Routing Logic
|
||||
1. *Discovery:* When a client wants to interact with a Persona, it first resolves the DID to its latest DID Document (via the KEL or a resolver).
|
||||
2. *Binding:* The client extracts the `AgoraPDS` endpoint to fetch content and the `AgoraRelay` endpoint to subscribe to real-time updates.
|
||||
3. *Failover:* If a primary PDS is unreachable, the client attempts to resolve alternative endpoints if provided in the service list (supporting the multi-homed data model).
|
||||
|
||||
** Client Architecture: PDS-Proximate / Thin Client Model
|
||||
|
||||
*** Concept
|
||||
|
||||
Agora's architectural strategy for client applications aims to balance user sovereignty with broad accessibility and app store compliance. Instead of relying solely on "sovereign clients" (full-featured applications running entirely on edge devices), a hybrid approach will be adopted: core client logic will reside closer to the Personal Data Store (PDS), with only a "thin client" deployed on edge devices (e.g., mobile apps, web browsers). This allows for greater flexibility in distribution and development.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Motivation: App Store Compliance & Broad Reach
|
||||
|
||||
Traditional "sovereign client" models, where full application logic, data processing, and cryptographic operations occur entirely on the user's edge device, can encounter significant hurdles with mainstream app stores (e.g., Apple App Store, Google Play Store). These platforms often impose restrictions on:
|
||||
|
||||
- Custom cryptographic implementations
|
||||
- Direct access to underlying network protocols
|
||||
- Data storage and handling outside platform-defined sandboxes
|
||||
- Features deemed to circumvent platform monetization or control
|
||||
|
||||
The PDS-proximate / thin client model is a pragmatic solution to navigate these limitations, enabling Agora to reach a wider user base through conventional app distribution channels without compromising core protocol principles.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Strategic Advantages
|
||||
|
||||
1. *Enhanced App Store Compliance:* A thin client, functioning primarily as a user interface and communication layer with the PDS, is less likely to violate app store guidelines, increasing the likelihood of approval and sustained availability.
|
||||
2. *Reduced Edge Device Footprint:* Lower computational, memory, and storage requirements on mobile phones and other edge devices. This translates to better performance, lower battery consumption, and broader compatibility across a range of hardware.
|
||||
3. *Streamlined Updates & Maintenance:* Core application logic and feature updates can be deployed directly on the PDS or associated infrastructure, minimizing the need for frequent client-side app store updates and accelerating development cycles.
|
||||
4. *Enriched PDS Functionality:* The PDS evolves from a passive data archive into a more active, "smart" personal server capable of hosting and executing significant portions of the client application logic. This allows for more sophisticated features (e.g., advanced indexing, content processing, AI integration) to run efficiently on behalf of the user.
|
||||
5. *Greater Platform Portability:* A thin client model naturally facilitates deployment across diverse platforms, including web browsers (via WebAssembly or JavaScript), minimal native mobile wrappers, and potentially embedded systems, ensuring a consistent user experience.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Architectural Considerations & Challenges
|
||||
|
||||
1. *PDS Reliability and Performance:* The user experience becomes intrinsically linked to the performance, uptime, and responsiveness of the PDS. Robust PDS implementations and reliable hosting options are paramount.
|
||||
2. *Privacy and Trust Model:* While the PDS is personal to the user, moving client logic there means processing occurs "off-device." End-to-end encryption must remain a fundamental guarantee, ensuring the PDS only handles encrypted data where sensitive information is concerned. User control over the PDS becomes the primary locus of sovereignty.
|
||||
3. *Offline Capabilities:* Thin clients will inherently have limited or no offline functionality, as they rely on real-time communication with the PDS. Strategies for graceful degradation and cached read-only access for essential data will be necessary.
|
||||
4. *Definition of "Thinness":* A clear architectural specification is required to define the boundary between client logic executed on the PDS and the minimal essential logic (e.g., basic key management, UI rendering) that must reside on the edge device for security and usability.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Conclusion
|
||||
|
||||
The adoption of a PDS-proximate / thin client architecture is a strategic imperative for Agora to achieve mass adoption and navigate the complexities of modern app distribution, while simultaneously enhancing the capabilities of the Personal Data Store as a dynamic and powerful extension of the user's digital self.
|
||||
|
||||
** Related Documents
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:f6cfc54b-919b-4311-bcbf-65e976755d40][The Primitive]] - Content Object structure and core encryption primitives.
|
||||
- [[id:0f949f6c-4cf1-49eb-b9a4-ebcac27ee548][Social]] - Messaging models, social publishing, and the attention marketplace.
|
||||
- [[id:6fe67db6-25bd-4d11-bd1d-b44ec809e858][Identity]] - Master Key (Psyche) and Persona governance.
|
||||
- [[id:90484f4a-5b70-4001-93d6-e610e54ed573][Exchange and Contracts]] - Economic primitives, fee structures, and the SCAL layer.
|
||||
|
||||
** Gaps
|
||||
|
||||
- *None.* All identified gaps in the infrastructure layer have been resolved.
|
||||
432
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-04-the-primitive.org
Normal file
432
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-04-the-primitive.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,432 @@
|
||||
#+title: Agora Requirements - 04: The Primitive
|
||||
#+author: Amero Garcia
|
||||
#+created: [2026-03-16 Mon 14:28]
|
||||
#+DATE: 2026-03-15
|
||||
#+ID: agora-requirements-04-the-primitive
|
||||
#+STARTUP: content
|
||||
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: f6cfc54b-919b-4311-bcbf-65e976755d40
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
* The Primitive: The Atomic Foundation of [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]]
|
||||
|
||||
** Concept: The Universal Data Primitive
|
||||
|
||||
The Primitive is Agora's foundational content layer—the base data structure upon which all social interaction, economic exchange, and identity management is built. Before there are posts, contracts, or profiles, there are Notes. The Note is the atomic, universal unit of information in Agora.
|
||||
|
||||
This elegant simplicity—the "Everything is a Note" paradigm—enables Agora's powerful interoperability, immutable audit trails, and seamless cross-application compatibility. By reducing all digital interactions to a single, cryptographically verifiable primitive, Agora creates a unified ecosystem where any application can understand and process any data, breaking down the silos that plague traditional digital platforms.
|
||||
|
||||
** The Note Structure
|
||||
|
||||
A Note is the atomic unit of information in Agora. Everything—posts, messages, contracts, profiles—is a Note with behavioral flags.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Technical Specification
|
||||
|
||||
Every Note is identified by its CID (Content Identifier):
|
||||
- *Format:* CIDv1 with configurable codec and hash (Default: `dag-pb` + `sha2-256`).
|
||||
- *Property:* Same content = same CID (deterministic).
|
||||
- *Immutability:* Content cannot change without CID changing.
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cid": "string", // Unique content identifier
|
||||
"owner": "DID", // Source of authority (Persona DID)
|
||||
|
||||
"is_feed": boolean, // Behavioral Intent: Chronological Flow (true) vs Static Page (false)
|
||||
|
||||
"contract": { ... }, // Optional: Rules of engagement (JSON Object)
|
||||
"payload": "string", // Optional: The asset (Inline data or P2P CID)
|
||||
"content_type": "string", // MIME type (e.g., text/markdown, image/jpeg)
|
||||
|
||||
"priority_fee": integer, // Optional: Relay routing priority (millisats)
|
||||
"access_control": ["DID"], // Permissions (Omitted=Personal, []=Public)
|
||||
"notify": ["DID"], // Attention (Target entities for push notifications)
|
||||
|
||||
"references": ["CID"], // Semantic links/citations
|
||||
"reply_to": "CID", // Parent CID (for threading/negotiation)
|
||||
"thread_root": "CID", // Root CID of the conversation/exchange
|
||||
|
||||
"ephemeral_duration": integer, // Expiry in seconds (0 = persistent)
|
||||
"createdAt": "timestamp", // ISO-8601 creation time
|
||||
|
||||
"proof": { // Cryptographic authenticity
|
||||
"editor": "DID", // Optional: The signer (defaults to owner)
|
||||
"signature": "string" // Signature over Note content
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
** Behavioral Intent & Schema Validation
|
||||
|
||||
The single `is_feed` property defines the behavioral intent of a Note without changing its underlying technical structure.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Core Behavioral Intent
|
||||
|
||||
| Property | Type | Description |
|
||||
|------|---------|----------|
|
||||
| `is_feed` | boolean | Chronological timeline item (Post, Status, Update). If false/omitted, the Note is a static Page. |
|
||||
|
||||
*** The Contract & Payload Split
|
||||
Every signed Note in Agora is inherently a contract. To clearly separate the "Rules of Engagement" from the "Asset", the Note structure defines two distinct fields:
|
||||
|
||||
- *`contract` (JSON Object):* Defines the terms. This includes both human-readable terms (e.g., `"license": "CC0"`) and machine-readable state (e.g., `"price_satoshis": 5000`).
|
||||
- *`payload` (Polymorphic String):* Defines the asset governed by the contract. This can be:
|
||||
1. *Inline Data:* Raw text, markdown, or small base64 blobs embedded directly.
|
||||
2. *P2P Reference (CID):* A URI (e.g., `ipfs://Qm...`) pointing to a distributed Merkle DAG hosted by the PDS or the Swarm.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Audience & Visibility (access_control)
|
||||
|
||||
The visibility and routing of a Note are determined by the `access_control` array:
|
||||
- *Personal (Private):* Omitted or `null`. The Note remains internal to the PDS.
|
||||
- *Public (Broadcast):* Explicit empty array `[]`. The Note is pushed to all subscribed Relays for global indexing.
|
||||
- *Restricted (Directed):* Array of target DIDs `["did:agora:bob"]`. The Note is routed only to the specified recipients.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Attention & Intent (notify)
|
||||
|
||||
The `notify` array defines who should receive a push notification or "Inbox" alert for the Note:
|
||||
- *Personal/Silent:* Omitted or `null`. No entities are notified.
|
||||
- *Targeted Ping:* Array of target DIDs `["did:agora:bob"]`. Triggers a notification for the specified entities.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Semantic Derivations
|
||||
|
||||
Because Agora uses a minimalist flag system, high-level social and economic concepts are reconstructed by clients using core flags, audience scope (`access_control`), and Note relationships (`references`, `reply_to`, `notify`).
|
||||
|
||||
**** Basic Content
|
||||
- *Public Post:* `is_feed:true` + `access_control:[]`
|
||||
- *Private DM:* `access_control:["did:agora:bob"]` + `notify:["did:agora:bob"]`
|
||||
- *Static Page:* `is_feed:false` + `access_control:[]`
|
||||
- *File:* A Note with a binary `content_type` (e.g., `image/jpeg`).
|
||||
|
||||
**** Social Graph & Interaction
|
||||
- *Like / Reaction:* A Note that `references` a Content CID and contains a reaction payload. Typically `is_feed: false`.
|
||||
- *Boost / Repost:* A Note that `references` a Content CID with `is_feed: true`, injecting it into the owner's chronological timeline.
|
||||
- *Follow:* A Note that `references` a Persona DID.
|
||||
- *Public Mention:* `access_control:[]` + `notify:[Target_DID]`.
|
||||
- *Private Connection:* `access_control:[Target_DID]` + `notify:[Target_DID]`.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Economic & Contract Lifecycle
|
||||
- *Contract Negotiation (Offer/Take/Task):* A Note represents a proposal (*Offer*), an acceptance (*Take*), or a commitment to perform work (*Task*) depending on its place in the `reply_to` chain.
|
||||
- *Economic Lifecycle (Invoice/Payment/Escrow):*
|
||||
- *Invoice*: A Note with a payment request in its `contract` (`price_satoshis`).
|
||||
- *Payment*: A fulfillment Note (`Take`) containing cryptographic proof (e.g., `preimage`).
|
||||
- *Escrow*: A Note referencing a multi-signature threshold in its `contract`.
|
||||
- *Support / Subscribe:* A Note referencing a Persona DID, establishing a recurring payment stream or premium access in its `contract`.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Events & Coordination
|
||||
- *Event Announcement:* A Note (usually `is_feed: true`) where the `contract` defines temporal/spatial rules (start time, location, capacity).
|
||||
- *Invite:* A directed Note (`access_control: [DID]`, `notify: [DID]`) that `references` an Event Announcement. It serves as a contract *Offer* for attendance.
|
||||
- *RSVP:* A Note that `reply_to` an Invite. The `contract` field contains the acceptance state (`{"rsvp": "attending"}`), acting as a *Take*.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Flag Combination Rules
|
||||
|
||||
Agora implements strict validation to ensure network integrity.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Rule 1: Flow (Feed vs. Page)
|
||||
- `is_feed: true` indicates chronological content.
|
||||
- `is_feed: false` (default) indicates static resource.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Rule 2: Audience Scope
|
||||
- *Public Broadcast:* MUST use an explicit empty array `access_control: []`.
|
||||
- *Restricted Routing:* MUST provide at least one recipient DID in `access_control`.
|
||||
- *Personal:* Omission of `access_control` defaults to private storage on the PDS.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Rule 3: Requirements & Dependencies
|
||||
- *Ephemerality:* The presence of `ephemeral_duration > 0` indicates the Note is ephemeral.
|
||||
- *Restricted Access:* If `access_control` is populated, both the `contract` and `payload` SHOULD be encrypted into a single envelope for the specified audience.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Technical Specification (JSON Schema)
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
|
||||
"$id": "https://agora.ai/schemas/content-flags.json",
|
||||
"title": "Agora Note Flags",
|
||||
"description": "Validation schema for the Binary Core flag set",
|
||||
"type": "object",
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"cid": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"description": "Unique content identifier.",
|
||||
"pattern": "^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"owner": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"description": "DID of the owner persona.",
|
||||
"pattern": "^did:agora:[a-zA-Z0-9]+$"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"is_feed": {
|
||||
"type": "boolean",
|
||||
"description": "Chronological timeline item (Post/Update). If false, it's a static Page.",
|
||||
"default": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"contract": {
|
||||
"type": "object",
|
||||
"description": "Optional rules of engagement governing the payload (e.g. [[id:67faf52f-9126-50a7-b87e-2bedc610dac7][licensing]], price).",
|
||||
"additionalProperties": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"payload": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"description": "The asset content (inline or P2P reference CID)."
|
||||
},
|
||||
"content_type": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"description": "MIME type of the content.",
|
||||
"enum": [
|
||||
"text/plain",
|
||||
"text/markdown",
|
||||
"text/html",
|
||||
"application/json",
|
||||
"image/jpeg",
|
||||
"image/png",
|
||||
"image/gif",
|
||||
"video/mp4",
|
||||
"audio/mpeg",
|
||||
"application/pdf",
|
||||
"application/zip",
|
||||
"application/jwe"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"priority_fee": {
|
||||
"type": "integer",
|
||||
"description": "Relay routing priority in millisats.",
|
||||
"minimum": 0
|
||||
},
|
||||
"access_control": {
|
||||
"type": "array",
|
||||
"description": "Determines audience. Omitted=Personal, []=Public, [DIDs]=Restricted.",
|
||||
"items": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"pattern": "^did:agora:[a-zA-Z0-9]+$"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"notify": {
|
||||
"type": "array",
|
||||
"description": "Targets for push notifications.",
|
||||
"items": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"pattern": "^did:agora:[a-zA-Z0-9]+$"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"references": {
|
||||
"type": "array",
|
||||
"description": "CIDs of related content objects.",
|
||||
"items": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"pattern": "^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"reply_to": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"description": "CID of content this is a reply to. Required for reply types.",
|
||||
"pattern": "^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"thread_root": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"description": "CID of the root post in a thread.",
|
||||
"pattern": "^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"ephemeral_duration": {
|
||||
"type": "integer",
|
||||
"description": "Duration in seconds for ephemeral content. If 0 or omitted, the Note is persistent.",
|
||||
"minimum": 0,
|
||||
"maximum": 31536000
|
||||
},
|
||||
"createdAt": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"format": "date-time",
|
||||
"description": "ISO-8601 creation timestamp."
|
||||
},
|
||||
"proof": {
|
||||
"type": "object",
|
||||
"description": "Cryptographic proof of authenticity.",
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"editor": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"description": "Optional: DID of the signing persona. Defaults to owner if omitted.",
|
||||
"pattern": "^did:agora:[a-zA-Z0-9]+$"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"signature": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"description": "Ed25519 signature over content hash.",
|
||||
"pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+=*$"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"required": ["signature"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"additionalProperties": false
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
** Content Lifecycle & Persistence
|
||||
|
||||
*** Encryption: Security by Design
|
||||
|
||||
Security is woven into the fabric of the protocol. Agora uses industry-standard primitives to ensure that only intended recipients can access private content.
|
||||
|
||||
- *End-to-End Encryption (E2EE):* Private Notes use AES-256-GCM for payloads and X25519 for ECDH key exchange.
|
||||
- *Forward Secrecy:* Agora employs Double Ratchet for 1-on-1 messaging and MLS (Messaging Layer Security) for groups, rotating keys per-message.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Ephemeral Content Enforcement
|
||||
|
||||
The `is_ephemeral: true` flag is enforced through three complementary mechanisms:
|
||||
|
||||
1. *Time-Locked Encryption (Primary):* Payloads are encrypted with keys that can only be retrieved from a Decentralized Key Management Network (DKMN) or solved via a Time-Lock Puzzle before the expiration time.
|
||||
2. *Key Shedding (Forward Secrecy):* For DMs, the client securely deletes the specific message key after the display duration expires.
|
||||
3. *Voluntary Infrastructure Compliance:* PDS nodes MUST garbage collect expired CIDs, and Relays MUST drop them from routing tables.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Note Persistence (PDS)
|
||||
|
||||
- *Home Base:* All Notes are stored in the owner's Personal Data Store (PDS) by default.
|
||||
- *Availability:* Content is hosted by the PDS, replicated across mirrors, and cached by Relays/clients for performance.
|
||||
- *Lifecycle:* Create → Store (PDS) → Announce (Relay) → Fetch → Decrypt → Render.
|
||||
|
||||
** Relationships, Sync & Performance
|
||||
|
||||
*** Note Relationships
|
||||
Agora uses three distinct fields to define relationships between Notes, balancing semantic precision with high-performance discovery.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Threading & Reference Logic
|
||||
|
||||
- *`references` (Array, 0-N):* General semantic linking. This field is used for citations, user mentions, quoting other posts, or attaching auxiliary Content Objects. It tells the network: "This Note is related to these other things."
|
||||
- *`reply_to` (Single, 0-1):* Direct parentage. This field is mandatory for any Note that is part of a branching conversation. It defines the exact hierarchy for UI indentation and determines which owner should receive a notification.
|
||||
- *`thread_root` (Single, 0-1):* The Global Anchor. This points to the very first Note that initiated the entire conversation. It allows clients to fetch thousands of replies in a single batch query, avoiding the "N+1 fetch" performance bottleneck.
|
||||
|
||||
***** Comparison Summary
|
||||
|
||||
| Field | Cardinality | Primary Role | UI Impact |
|
||||
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|
||||
| *`references`* | Array (0-N) | Citation/Linking | Link previews, mentions |
|
||||
| *`reply_to`* | Single (0-1) | Parentage | Nesting/Indentation |
|
||||
| *`thread_root`* | Single (0-1) | Grouping | "View Full Thread" performance |
|
||||
|
||||
***** Example Implementation Scenario
|
||||
Alice posts a product listing (Note A). Bob asks a question (Note B) about the listing. Charlie replies to Bob (Note C) but also quotes Alice's original product photo (Note D) in his comment.
|
||||
|
||||
*Charlie's Note (Note C) logic:*
|
||||
- `thread_root`: CID of Note A (The listing anchor).
|
||||
- `reply_to`: CID of Note B (The immediate parent).
|
||||
- `references`: [CID of Note B, CID of Note D] (The citations).
|
||||
|
||||
*** Large Payload Handling
|
||||
- *Streaming Protocol:* Files >100MB are split into 1MB chunks and represented as a Merkle DAG.
|
||||
- *Streaming CIDs:* The root CID points to the tree, allowing concurrent, prioritized downloading of chunks.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Real-time Sync & Collaboration
|
||||
- *Live Collaboration:* Agora uses CRDTs (Conflict-free Replicated Data Types) for shared state (e.g., co-editing a document).
|
||||
- *Ephemeral Channels:* Real-time updates (like typing indicators) are broadcast via Relay WebSockets without being committed to the PDS as permanent Notes.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Content Deduplication
|
||||
- *Block-level Deduplication:* Since payloads are content-addressed, PDS nodes only store identical data once, using reference counting to manage garbage collection.
|
||||
|
||||
** Validation Reference (Examples)
|
||||
|
||||
*** Valid: Public Post
|
||||
#+begin_src json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cid": "QmPost123",
|
||||
"owner": "did:agora:alice",
|
||||
"is_feed": true,
|
||||
"contract": {
|
||||
"license": "CC-BY-4.0"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"payload": "Hello, Agora!",
|
||||
"content_type": "text/markdown",
|
||||
"access_control": [],
|
||||
"createdAt": "2026-03-25T14:30:00Z",
|
||||
"proof": {
|
||||
"signature": "abc123..."
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
*** Valid: Private DM
|
||||
#+begin_src json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cid": "QmDM456",
|
||||
"owner": "did:agora:alice",
|
||||
"payload": "eyhbGciOiJkaXIiLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIn0...",
|
||||
"content_type": "application/jwe",
|
||||
"access_control": ["did:agora:bob", "did:agora:alice"],
|
||||
"notify": ["did:agora:bob"],
|
||||
"createdAt": "2026-03-25T14:35:00Z",
|
||||
"proof": {
|
||||
"signature": "def456..."
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
*** Valid: Digital Storefront (Split-State Encryption)
|
||||
#+begin_src json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cid": "QmStore789",
|
||||
"owner": "did:agora:alice",
|
||||
"is_feed": false,
|
||||
"contract": {
|
||||
"title": "Exclusive Indie Film",
|
||||
"price_satoshis": 50000,
|
||||
"decryption_method": "LSAT"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"payload": "ipfs://QmEncryptedVideoChunks...",
|
||||
"content_type": "application/vnd.agora.encrypted+video/mp4",
|
||||
"priority_fee": 1000,
|
||||
"access_control": [],
|
||||
"createdAt": "2026-03-25T14:40:00Z",
|
||||
"proof": {
|
||||
"signature": "xyz012..."
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
*** Valid: Ephemeral Story (Public)
|
||||
#+begin_src json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cid": "QmStory789",
|
||||
"owner": "did:agora:alice",
|
||||
"is_feed": true,
|
||||
"payload": "This disappears in 24 hours",
|
||||
"access_control": [],
|
||||
"ephemeral_duration": 86400,
|
||||
"createdAt": "2026-03-25T14:45:00Z",
|
||||
"proof": {
|
||||
"editor": "did:agora:bot_agent",
|
||||
"signature": "ghi789..."
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
*** Invalid: Broadcast Conflict
|
||||
#+begin_src json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cid": "QmInvalid001",
|
||||
"access_control": [],
|
||||
"payload": "encrypted-blob-here",
|
||||
"content_type": "application/jwe"
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
Validation error: Public broadcast (`access_control: []`) cannot contain an encrypted payload.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Invalid: Restricted without Audience
|
||||
#+begin_src json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"cid": "QmInvalid002",
|
||||
"notify": ["did:agora:bob"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
Validation error: Notifications (`notify`) require the target DID to be present in the `access_control` list or for the Note to be public.
|
||||
|
||||
** Related Documents
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:6fe67db6-25bd-4d11-bd1d-b44ec809e858][Identity]] - Personas and contracts
|
||||
- [[id:3b43a9b8-31d1-4479-a35f-22273b74f0c7][Infrastructure]] - PDS and Relay
|
||||
- [[id:0f949f6c-4cf1-49eb-b9a4-ebcac27ee548][Social]] - Relationships and communication
|
||||
- Exchange (see Exchange and Contracts spec) - Economic layer
|
||||
|
||||
** Gaps
|
||||
|
||||
- *None.* All identified gaps in the primitive layer have been resolved.
|
||||
|
||||
# Local Variables:
|
||||
# org-confirm-babel-evaluate: nil
|
||||
# End:
|
||||
185
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-05-social.org
Normal file
185
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-05-social.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
|
||||
#+title: Agora Requirements - 05: Social Space
|
||||
#+author: Amero Garcia
|
||||
#+created: [2026-03-16 Mon 14:28]
|
||||
#+DATE: 2026-03-15
|
||||
#+ID: agora-requirements-05-social-space
|
||||
#+STARTUP: content
|
||||
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 0f949f6c-4cf1-49eb-b9a4-ebcac27ee548
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
* Social Space: Where Human Connection Becomes Sovereign
|
||||
|
||||
The Social Space is where [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]]'s revolutionary architecture transforms how humans connect, communicate, and transact. Unlike traditional platforms that own your relationships and monetize your attention, Agora puts you in complete control of your social graph. Every interaction—from a casual conversation to a binding commercial contract—is self-owned, cryptographically secured, and entirely under your sovereignty. This is social interaction reimagined for a decentralized future.
|
||||
|
||||
** Concept
|
||||
|
||||
Social Space encompasses all person-to-person and person-to-collective interaction in Agora: public and private, asynchronous and real-time. All social interaction is mediated by Notes and contracts running on the Exchange layer.
|
||||
|
||||
** Asynchronous Communication (Correspondence & Messaging)
|
||||
|
||||
Asynchronous communication in Agora utilizes the *Secure Communication Module (SCM)*, which enforces the *DIDComm v2 (Decentralized Identifier Communication)* protocol—a transport-agnostic standard for secure, private communication.
|
||||
- *Message Format:* All private messages MUST be formatted as JWM (JSON Web Messages).
|
||||
- *Encryption Suite:* JWMs MUST be wrapped in a JWE (JSON Web Encryption) envelope, utilizing X25519 for key agreement and AES-256-GCM for content encryption.
|
||||
|
||||
*** The Mailbox (PDS as Proxy)
|
||||
Because a user's primary device (e.g., a phone) is not always online, the PDS acts as an encrypted "Post Office" or proxy for asynchronous messages.
|
||||
|
||||
- *Sending:* The sender encrypts the Note using the recipient's Persona Public Key (retrieved from their DID Document).
|
||||
- *Routing & Asynchronous Forwarding:* The encrypted JWE envelope is sent to the Service Endpoint listed in the recipient's DID Document. The PDS MUST support the DIDComm `Forward` message type, acting as an encrypted relay for offline delivery.
|
||||
- *Storage:* The PDS stores the encrypted envelope. Because it is encrypted for the recipient's key, the PDS cannot read the content.
|
||||
- *Pickup:* When the recipient's device wakes up, it fetches the envelope from the PDS, decrypts it locally, and deletes the copy from the PDS.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Contextual Isolation
|
||||
Agora enforces strict multi-persona isolation. Each Persona (e.g., "Work," "Dating," "Personal") has a separate, cryptographically isolated message queue. A message sent to a user's Work DID never touches the inbox or metadata of their Dating DID, ensuring zero cross-context leakage.
|
||||
|
||||
** The Unified Note Primitive
|
||||
|
||||
All asynchronous interaction in Agora—whether a public post or a private message—is built upon the same "Note" primitive. The behavior and visibility of a Note are defined by cryptographic signatures and a set of standardized metadata flags.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Flag Definitions & Storage Models
|
||||
|
||||
| Flag | Meaning | Storage Model |
|
||||
|------|---------|---------------|
|
||||
| `access_control: []` | Broadcast (Public) | Reference-on-Send (authoritative on owner's PDS) |
|
||||
| `access_control: [DIDs]` | Restricted (Private) | Copy-on-Send (authoritative on each recipient's PDS) |
|
||||
| `is_feed: true` | Chronological entry (Post/Update) | Varies (e.g., public feed items are Reference-on-Send) |
|
||||
| `is_feed: false` | Static resource (Page/Wiki) | Reference-on-Send |
|
||||
|
||||
*** Ephemeral Content
|
||||
Notes where `ephemeral_duration > 0` are automatically garbage-collected by the PDS and dropped from routing tables by Relays after the duration expires.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Structural Integrity
|
||||
Every async interaction is a Note identified by a Content Identifier (CID). This ensures that the history of a conversation or content stream is immutable and cryptographically verifiable.
|
||||
|
||||
** Directed Communication (Copy-on-Send Model)
|
||||
|
||||
For Notes intended for specific recipients (e.g., 1-on-1 messages, group chats), Agora employs a "Copy-on-Send" model to ensure recipient data ownership and high availability.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Audience & Attention
|
||||
- *Audience:* Defined by the `access_control` array. These entities have the cryptographic right to own and decrypt the Note.
|
||||
- *Attention:* Defined by the `notify` array. These entities receive a push notification or "Inbox" alert for the Note.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Mechanism
|
||||
When an owner sends a directed Note (`access_control: [DIDs]`), a unique, encrypted copy is generated for each recipient and stored on their respective PDSs. The sender also retains a copy on their PDS.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Data Ownership
|
||||
This model ensures recipients have full ownership and control over the messages they receive. Access to the Note is independent of the sender's PDS status after the initial send.
|
||||
|
||||
** Social Publishing: Feeds & Streams
|
||||
|
||||
For content intended for a broad audience (e.g., social posts, public articles, project wikis), Agora uses a "Reference-on-Send" model to maximize efficiency and owner control.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Concept: Feed vs. Stream
|
||||
- *The Feed:* A Persona's curated output of chronological entries (`is_feed: true`) and static resources (`is_feed: false`).
|
||||
- *The Stream:* A user's personalized, aggregated view of all the Feeds they follow.
|
||||
|
||||
*** The "Lens" Architecture (Polymorphic UI)
|
||||
Because all data in Agora shares the exact same base schema (The Atomic Note), client applications are not locked into "siloed" databases. Instead, data is a single pile of uniform "bricks." The client app acts as a *Lens* that filters this stream and adjusts its interface based on the Note's internal metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
- *Unified Content Schema:* Apps do not maintain separate APIs for videos, products, or posts. They read the universal Note structure.
|
||||
- *Dynamic Interfaces:* The UI interprets the `content_type` and `contract` fields to render the appropriate experience:
|
||||
- If `content_type: "video/mp4"` (and duration is short): The UI enables a "TikTok-style" vertical scroll and auto-play.
|
||||
- If `content_type: "audio/mpeg"`: The UI switches to a "Podcast" player with 1.5x speed and background play.
|
||||
- If the `contract` contains `price_satoshis`: The UI injects a "Buy Now" button linked to a Lightning Invoice.
|
||||
- *Fluid Content (Multiple Lenses):* Because the data is distinct from the UI, a single Note can be viewed through completely different lenses simultaneously. For example, a 10-minute video Note:
|
||||
- One user views it through a *"YouTube Lens"* (displaying comments via `reply_to` links and related videos).
|
||||
- Another views it through an *"Educational Lens"* (where a specific algorithm has filtered it alongside academic papers).
|
||||
- A third user streams just the audio track through a *"Podcast Lens"* while driving.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Mechanism
|
||||
When an owner creates a broadcast Note (`access_control: []`), it is stored authoritatively on their Personal Data Store (PDS). Interested parties (followers, caching Relays) receive a notification containing the Note's CID. Their clients then *pull* the content using that CID.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Owner Control
|
||||
The authoritative copy resides solely on the owner's PDS. Deletion by the owner renders all references to that CID inaccessible across the network, providing a sovereign "Right to be Forgotten."
|
||||
|
||||
*** Content Types
|
||||
- *Feed Entries (`is_feed: true`):* Chronological posts, status updates, and news articles.
|
||||
- *Static Pages (`is_feed: false`):* Wikis, documentation, and personal profiles.
|
||||
|
||||
** Synchronous Communication (Live Voice & Video)
|
||||
|
||||
For real-time calls, Agora utilizes *WebRTC* with a decentralized twist for the signaling phase.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Decentralized Signaling
|
||||
Traditional WebRTC requires a central signaling server to help devices discover each other. In Agora, the *DIDComm channel* handles the handshake:
|
||||
1. *Request:* Persona A sends a "Call Request" via DIDComm to Persona B's PDS.
|
||||
2. *Negotiation:* Persona B's phone receives the request and sends back its IP/ICE candidates (the "digital map") via the same secure DIDComm channel.
|
||||
3. *P2P Tunnel:* Once the handshake is complete, voice/video data flows directly between the two devices. No server—not even the PDS—sees the call data.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Off-the-Record (OTR) Mode
|
||||
To address the need for absolute privacy and deniability, OTR mode completely bypasses PDS storage.
|
||||
- *Mechanism:* Encrypted channels exist only in volatile client memory for the duration of the session.
|
||||
- *Persistence:* No persistent record is kept on any PDS or local client cache.
|
||||
- *Recording:* Clients MUST explicitly prevent any recording when in this mode.
|
||||
|
||||
** Encryption & Metadata Privacy
|
||||
|
||||
Agora's communication layer goes beyond standard end-to-end encryption to ensure long-term security and metadata protection.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Double Ratchet Algorithm (Signal Protocol)
|
||||
Every single message uses a new, derived key. This ensures *Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)* and *Post-Compromise Security*. If a specific message key is ever compromised, it cannot be used to decrypt past or future messages in the conversation.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Metadata Masking (Onion Routing)
|
||||
To hide traffic patterns from network observers, Agora utilizes Tor-style *Onion Routing* between PDSs where possible. This masks who is talking to whom, preventing external observers from building a social graph based on connection frequency or message timing.
|
||||
|
||||
** Profiles
|
||||
|
||||
*** Concept
|
||||
A Profile is a public-facing presentation of a Persona. Agora supports multiple Profiles per Persona (e.g., a "Public Developer" profile and a "Private Family" profile).
|
||||
|
||||
*** Requirements
|
||||
- Each Profile MUST be a Note (CID) with public visibility.
|
||||
- Profiles MUST be discoverable via the Naming Registry.
|
||||
- Profile updates create new CIDs, preserving a verifiable history of the identity's presentation.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Profile as Static Site
|
||||
Personas can publish their profiles and professional portfolios as decentralized static websites using the native hosting model (see [[id:3b43a9b8-31d1-4479-a35f-22273b74f0c7][Infrastructure]]). Agora-aware browsers render these natively from CIDs, while legacy browsers access them via Gateways with automated SSL and domain mapping.
|
||||
|
||||
** The Attention Marketplace (The Information Router)
|
||||
|
||||
In traditional social media, the algorithm is a secret "Black Box" that sits between users and their social graph, deciding what is seen to maximize platform revenue. In Agora, the Algorithm Layer is reimagined as an open *Information Router*. By moving the algorithm out of the central server and into an open market, Agora empowers users to "hire and fire" the logic that sorts their attention.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Pluggable Feed Generation (PFG)
|
||||
Users subscribe to independent "Feed Generators" via an open API. This decoupling of data from sorting logic is achieved through a three-step workflow:
|
||||
|
||||
1. *The Skeleton Request:* When a user opens their application, the client sends a request to a user-chosen Feed Generator (which can be operated by anyone—an NGO, a scientist, or a community collective).
|
||||
2. *The Skeleton Response:* The Generator does not possess the user's private data. It returns a "Skeleton"—a lightweight JSON list of Content Identifiers (CIDs) that its specific logic has prioritized.
|
||||
3. *Hydration:* The client application takes this list of IDs and "hydrates" the feed by pulling the actual Note content directly from the distributed PDS/Relay network.
|
||||
|
||||
*** The Algorithm Marketplace
|
||||
Because the PFG API is open and transport-agnostic, different organizations compete to provide the best curation and routing services:
|
||||
- *Academic Lenses:* Scientists or universities can provide generators that prioritize peer-reviewed content and primary sources.
|
||||
- *Community Curators:* Local neighborhoods or professional guilds can run generators that surface the most relevant news for their specific domain.
|
||||
- *Verification Services:* NGOs or fact-checking collectives can provide "Filtered Lenses" that prioritize highly-attested content.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Decentralized Moderation (Competitive Labeling)
|
||||
Moderation in Agora is treated as "Competitive Labeling" rather than central censorship.
|
||||
- *Labeler DIDs:* Independent services (NGOs, Fact Checkers, Church Groups) operate as "Labelers." They review the public firehose and "tag" content (e.g., "Spam," "Graphic," "High-Quality").
|
||||
- *Client-Side Filtering:* The user's application pulls these public labels and applies the user's personal policy (e.g., "Hide anything labeled 'Graphic' by the NGO 'SafetyFirst'").
|
||||
- *Stackable Moderation:* Users can subscribe to multiple labelers simultaneously to create a highly personalized, robust, and sovereign moderation filter.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Circular Economy: Following as Investment
|
||||
Lightning micro-payments allow for a self-sustaining attention economy.
|
||||
- *Incentivized Curation:* Feed Generators can charge micro-fees (millisats) for their routing and sorting services.
|
||||
- *Creator Support:* "Following" a creator becomes an act of economic investment and infrastructure support, bypassing the need for extractive advertising models.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Decentralized Moderation (Stackable Labelers)
|
||||
Moderation is treated as "Competitive Labeling." Users subscribe to multiple Labelers (AI agents, NGOs, fact-checkers) to create a composite moderation profile tailored to their values.
|
||||
|
||||
** Social Governance & Moderation
|
||||
|
||||
*** Multi-layered Moderation
|
||||
1. *Individual:* Publisher controls their own content and PDS.
|
||||
2. *Community (Social Governance):* Collective rules enforced via governance modules (GEM).
|
||||
- *Global Blocklists:* Communities can vote on shared moderation policies. If a quorum (e.g., 70% of an NGO's members) flags a specific DID as a "Spam Bot," that DID is automatically added to a Global Blocklist and hidden from all participating members' feeds.
|
||||
- *Curated Feeds:* A community can vote to "Pin" certain content creators to a shared "Featured" feed, effectively acting as a decentralized editorial board.
|
||||
3. *Algorithm:* User-chosen filtering and sorting via PFG and Competitive Labeling.
|
||||
4. *Network:* Protocol-level consensus for universally illegal content (e.g., CSAM).
|
||||
|
||||
** Related Documents
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:90484f4a-5b70-4001-93d6-e610e54ed573][06: Exchange and Contracts]] - Economic layer and human connection formalization.
|
||||
- [[id:6fe67db6-25bd-4d11-bd1d-b44ec809e858][02: Identity]] - Personas and Master Keys.
|
||||
- [[id:3b43a9b8-31d1-4479-a35f-22273b74f0c7][03: Infrastructure]] - PDS and Relays.
|
||||
310
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-06-exchange-and-contracts.org
Normal file
310
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-06-exchange-and-contracts.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
|
||||
#+title: Agora Requirements - 06: Exchange
|
||||
#+author: Amero Garcia
|
||||
#+created: [2026-03-16 Mon 14:28]
|
||||
#+DATE: 2026-03-15
|
||||
#+ID: agora-requirements-06-exchange
|
||||
#+STARTUP: content
|
||||
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 90484f4a-5b70-4001-93d6-e610e54ed573
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
* Exchange
|
||||
|
||||
** Concept
|
||||
|
||||
The Exchange layer provides the economic substrate of [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]]: value transfer via the Lightning Network, multi-currency support, and payment primitives. Built on top of Content Objects (see [[id:f6cfc54b-919b-4311-bcbf-65e976755d40][The Primitive]]) and Social relationships (see [[id:0f949f6c-4cf1-49eb-b9a4-ebcac27ee548][Social]]).
|
||||
|
||||
** Lightning Native
|
||||
|
||||
** Base Currency
|
||||
|
||||
Lightning Network (Bitcoin L2) is the default payment rail:
|
||||
- *Minimum:* 1 satoshi
|
||||
- *Maximum:* Channel capacity limited
|
||||
- *Speed:* Near-instant for settled payments
|
||||
- *Cost:* Fraction of a cent per transaction
|
||||
|
||||
** Payment Types
|
||||
|
||||
**** One-shot Payment
|
||||
- Single payment for content or service
|
||||
- Invoice generated, payment fulfilled, preimage reveals
|
||||
|
||||
**** Streaming Payment
|
||||
- Continuous micropayments (per-second, per-action)
|
||||
- Used for subscriptions, metered services
|
||||
- Automatic via HTLC stream
|
||||
|
||||
**** Hodl Invoice
|
||||
- Escrow with hash-locked release
|
||||
- Payment committed but conditional on secret
|
||||
|
||||
**** Keysend
|
||||
- Spontaneous payment without invoice
|
||||
- Used for tips, donations
|
||||
|
||||
** Lightning Node Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
The specification currently lacks explicit guidance on how end users run Lightning nodes. Below are the three architectural options under consideration:
|
||||
|
||||
**** Option 1: Embedded LDK Node (Self-Sovereign)
|
||||
- Each user's client (desktop/mobile) runs an embedded Lightning node using LDK (Lightning Dev Kit)
|
||||
- User has full custody of keys; channels are mobile-friendly (LSP-managed)
|
||||
- PDS handles the always-online requirement since user devices aren't
|
||||
- Aligns with Agora's "sovereign" philosophy but requires technical sophistication
|
||||
|
||||
**** Option 2: LSP (Lightning Service Provider) Model
|
||||
- User connects to an LSP that provides inbound liquidity and accepts payments on their behalf
|
||||
- User still has signing keys locally; LSP manages channels and uptime
|
||||
- User can switch LSPs without losing funds (Lightning hygiene)
|
||||
- Most realistic for mobile users; PDS providers may bundle LSP services
|
||||
|
||||
**** Option 3: Custodial Bridge (On-ramp)
|
||||
- PDS offers built-in custodial Lightning wallet for users who don't want self-custody
|
||||
- Users can withdraw to self-custody later (exit guarantee)
|
||||
- Default for new users, opt-in for sovereignty
|
||||
- Trade-off: convenience vs. full sovereignty
|
||||
|
||||
**** Key Distinction: Custody vs. Hosting
|
||||
Non-custodial means *you* control the private keys, not where the software runs. Even if the Lightning node runs on hosted PDS infrastructure, it can still be *your* node with *your* keys:
|
||||
- Your PDS gets encrypted data (content)
|
||||
- Your Lightning node gets encrypted state (channel backups)
|
||||
- Both are encrypted to *your* keys
|
||||
- The PDS provider cannot sign transactions or spend your funds
|
||||
|
||||
**** GAP: Decision Required
|
||||
The specification has not yet decided between:
|
||||
- Requiring all users to run embedded nodes (sovereign, high technical barrier)
|
||||
- Defaulting to LSP connections (practical, retains key custody)
|
||||
- Offering custodial as default with opt-out (maximum adoption, sovereignty trade-off)
|
||||
|
||||
*Next Step:* Evaluate technical feasibility of LSP integration with PDS providers and document recommended architecture for V1.0.
|
||||
|
||||
** Multi-Currency Support
|
||||
|
||||
** Supported Currencies
|
||||
|
||||
- *Lightning (default):* For micro-payments (<$1)
|
||||
- *On-chain Bitcoin:* For settlements, channel opens
|
||||
- *Stablecoins (RGB):* USDT/USDC on Bitcoin L2
|
||||
|
||||
** Currency Routing
|
||||
- Client specifies desired currency
|
||||
- PDS may support conversion
|
||||
- Exchange rates oracle-attested
|
||||
|
||||
** Concept
|
||||
|
||||
The Agora protocol must support multiple currencies beyond Lightning-native satoshis to facilitate broader economic participation and provide stability options. While Lightning remains the primary rail for micro-payments, other assets will be integrated for larger transactions and specific use cases.
|
||||
|
||||
** Supported Currencies
|
||||
|
||||
**** Lightning Network (L2 Bitcoin)
|
||||
- *Role:* Primary for all micro-payments (typically <$10).
|
||||
- *Mechanism:* BOLT-compatible invoices, streaming payments, Keysend.
|
||||
|
||||
**** On-chain Bitcoin
|
||||
- *Role:* For large settlements, channel opens/closes, long-term value storage.
|
||||
- *Mechanism:* Standard Bitcoin transactions, multi-sig escrow.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Stablecoins
|
||||
- *Role:* For price stability, high-volume transactions, fiat-pegged value.
|
||||
- *Mechanism:* RGB protocol on Bitcoin (future), wrapped assets on compatible L2s, or direct integration with atomic swaps.
|
||||
|
||||
** Currency Routing & Conversion
|
||||
|
||||
**** Client-Side Preference
|
||||
- Users specify preferred payment currencies for sending and receiving.
|
||||
- Clients automatically attempt conversion if sender's and receiver's preferred currencies differ.
|
||||
|
||||
**** PDS/Relay Support
|
||||
- PDS nodes MAY offer automated currency conversion services (e.g., satoshis to stablecoins).
|
||||
- Fees for conversion MUST be transparent and competitive.
|
||||
- Conversion services MUST be auditable (using attestations).
|
||||
|
||||
**** Exchange Rate Verification (Oracle)
|
||||
- The system MUST use a decentralized oracle network to attest to current exchange rates.
|
||||
- Exchange rate attestations are signed Content Objects.
|
||||
- Clients verify oracle signatures and rate validity before conversion.
|
||||
|
||||
** Integration with Contracts
|
||||
|
||||
- Contracts (e.g., Sale, Service) MUST specify accepted currencies.
|
||||
- Prices in contracts MUST be expressed in a base unit (e.g., satoshis) with optional equivalent in other currencies.
|
||||
- Exchange rates for contract execution MUST be based on oracle attestations at time of execution.
|
||||
|
||||
** Economic Primitives
|
||||
|
||||
** Invoice
|
||||
- BOLT-11 compliant
|
||||
- Amount, memo, expiry
|
||||
- Static (LNURL) or dynamic
|
||||
|
||||
** Payment
|
||||
- Preimage proof of settlement
|
||||
- Content-addressed for audit trail
|
||||
- Refundable if escrowed
|
||||
|
||||
** Account
|
||||
- DID-linked balance tracking
|
||||
- Multi-currency support
|
||||
- Reconciliation with on-chain
|
||||
|
||||
** Fee Structure
|
||||
|
||||
** Relay Fees
|
||||
- Per-message routing (configurable)
|
||||
- Subscription-based access
|
||||
- Priority delivery premium
|
||||
|
||||
** PDS Fees
|
||||
- Storage: per-GB per month
|
||||
- Bandwidth: per-request or per-GB
|
||||
- Compute: for AI, indexing
|
||||
|
||||
** Marketplace Fees
|
||||
- Owner-defined (0-30%)
|
||||
- Universal Open Market: minimal (relay costs)
|
||||
|
||||
** Exchange Primitives
|
||||
|
||||
** Escrow
|
||||
|
||||
Hold funds until conditions met:
|
||||
- 2-of-3 multisig (buyer, seller, arbitrator)
|
||||
- HTLC hash-time-locked contracts
|
||||
- Smart contract on compatible L2
|
||||
|
||||
** Subscription
|
||||
|
||||
Ongoing economic relationship:
|
||||
- Streaming Lightning payments
|
||||
- Permissioned content access
|
||||
- Automatic key provision
|
||||
|
||||
** Bounty
|
||||
|
||||
Payment for task completion:
|
||||
- Escrowed funds
|
||||
- Completion attestation
|
||||
- Oracle verification option
|
||||
|
||||
** Sovereign Contract & Arbitration Layer (SCAL)
|
||||
|
||||
To enable Personas to execute binding agreements with decentralized dispute resolution, Agora implements SCAL. A contract in this system is not a static PDF; it is an executable cryptographic object.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 1. The Ricardian Contract Module
|
||||
[[id:b265f66d-f7b9-4ebd-b4e3-a82cefe23981][Agora contracts]] follow the Ricardian model, ensuring they are both human-readable and machine-executable.
|
||||
- *Natural Language (The Markdown):* The human-readable terms of the agreement (e.g., "Person A delivers 100 bricks to Person B by Friday").
|
||||
- *Machine Logic (The JSON-LD):* The executable parameters embedded in the Note's metadata (e.g., `due_date: 2026-01-16`, `price_sats: 50000`, `arbitrator_did: did:key:xyz`).
|
||||
- *The Merkle Link:* Both parts are hashed together into a single Content Identifier (CID). If a single comma is changed in the text, the hash changes, breaking the digital contract. This ensures the "Code" and the "Law" remain identical.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 2. Payment & Escrow: The "HODL Invoice"
|
||||
For service delivery and physical goods, Agora relies on Lightning HODL Invoices as a trustless escrow, removing the need for a custodial middleman.
|
||||
- *Commitment:* The Buyer "pays" the invoice. The funds leave their Lightning wallet but remain cryptographically locked in the network routing nodes.
|
||||
- *The Proof:* The Seller observes the network state, sees the funds are "Locked," and confidently delivers the goods or services.
|
||||
- *Settlement:* Once the Buyer confirms receipt, they release the cryptographic Preimage (the key). The money instantly settles to the Seller.
|
||||
- *Dispute:* If a problem arises, the funds stay locked. An agreed-upon Arbitrator intervenes, eventually providing the key to either the Buyer (triggering a Refund) or the Seller (forcing a Payout).
|
||||
- *Timeout Logic:* Contracts MUST include a `CLTV-expiry` (CheckLockTimeVerify). If the arbitrator does not rule within a predefined window (e.g., 30 days), the funds are automatically returned to the Buyer to prevent "Forever-Locks."
|
||||
|
||||
*** 3. Proof-of-Delivery (Oracles)
|
||||
To automate the release of HODL invoices without manual buyer intervention, SCAL supports cryptographic Proof-of-Delivery.
|
||||
- *Physical Goods:* Support for "Scanning a QR code" upon physical delivery, which automatically signs the release transaction and broadcasts the Preimage.
|
||||
- *Digital Goods:* Support for Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP). The payment is released automatically once the client cryptographically verifies that the received file hash matches the contracted payload.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 4. Multi-Level Arbitration & The Ricardian Evidence Vault
|
||||
To address disputes without a central state, contracts reference a tiered system of human judgment (The "Circles" Model). As detailed in the [[id:68ffa49f-f0d8-42cf-8b69-ae69de8bb815][Governance]] specifications, this involves escalating from Local Elders to specialized Guilds, and finally to Global Juries.
|
||||
- *Web of Trust (WoT) Level 1:* Arbitrators at Level 1 are selected based on Transitive Trust (e.g., the system finds a mutual connection trusted by both parties within 3 degrees of separation).
|
||||
- *Ricardian Evidence Vault:* During a dispute, parties upload encrypted "Evidence Blobs" to their PDS. Using Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) or Shared Keys, they grant the current level of arbitrators temporary read-access to the evidence without making it public.
|
||||
- *Real-Time Adjudication:* If live hearings are required, the system MUST support VoIP/WebRTC signaling conducted over an authenticated DIDComm v2 channel, utilizing "blind" Community TURN servers if direct P2P fails.
|
||||
- *Audit Trail:* Every ruling, appeal, and evidence hash is permanently stored in the Key Event Log (KEL) for that specific contract, creating a verifiable record of the "trial."
|
||||
|
||||
*** 5. Enforcement: Social vs. Financial
|
||||
In weak rule-of-law environments, the system relies on two "sticks" to ensure contract compliance without physical police forces:
|
||||
- *Financial Collateral:* High-risk contracts can require both parties to lock "Safety Deposits" in a 2-of-3 multisig before the contract begins. If a party defects, they forfeit their deposit.
|
||||
- *Reputation Slashing (Social Enforcement):* If a Persona loses an arbitration and refuses to comply, their DID is cryptographically "Flagged" across the public network. Because DIDs are persistent and tied to social graphs, they cannot simply delete their account to escape the penalty. Their "Trust Score" drops to zero, effectively cutting them off from future trade, employment, or community participation.
|
||||
|
||||
** Integration with Content Objects
|
||||
|
||||
Economic actions are specialized Notes containing structured `contract` metadata:
|
||||
|
||||
- *Invoice:* Contract offer Note containing payment terms (`price_satoshis`, `bolt11`).
|
||||
- *Payment:* Contract fulfillment Note (`Take`) containing cryptographic proof (`preimage`).
|
||||
- *Escrow:* Contract state Note referencing a multi-signature threshold or conditional logic.
|
||||
- *Subscription:* Ongoing contract Note with streaming parameters or recurring billing cycles.
|
||||
|
||||
Transactions reference the Content Objects they interact with:
|
||||
- Payment Note `reply_to` the Invoice Note being fulfilled.
|
||||
- Subscription Note `references` the Feed CID it provides access to.
|
||||
- Bounty Note (Contract) `references` the Task description.
|
||||
|
||||
** Content Monetization & Seeder Rewards
|
||||
|
||||
To monetize high-bandwidth content (like video or software) in a decentralized, permissionless network, Agora utilizes a combination of Split-State Encryption, the LSAT protocol, and granular Lightning network routing. This ensures creators get paid without relying on centralized DRM or hosting providers.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 1. The Encrypted Swarm (Blind CDN)
|
||||
If you want to charge for a video, you cannot send the raw file into the P2P swarm. If you did, the first "seeder" would simply share the unencrypted version for free.
|
||||
- *The Locked Box:* The creator encrypts the video with a unique Symmetric Key.
|
||||
- *The Split Structure:* The Note's `contract` field is Public (listing the price, title, and terms), but the `payload` field is a CID pointing to the encrypted video chunks.
|
||||
- *Blind Replication:* Followers and network participants host and seed this encrypted `payload`. They act as a "Blind CDN" (Content Delivery Network)—hosting a file they cannot see.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 2. The LSAT Protocol (The Smart Ticket)
|
||||
To automate the purchase and unlocking of this content, Agora uses LSATs (Lightning Service Authentication Tokens).
|
||||
- *The 402 Challenge:* When a viewer clicks "Play," their client attempts to fetch the payload. The PDS responds with an HTTP 402 (Payment Required) error, containing a Lightning Invoice (generated based on the `contract` terms) and a "Macaroon" (a digital ticket).
|
||||
- *The Unlock:* Once the user pays the invoice (e.g., 100 sats), they receive a cryptographic Preimage (proof of payment). They send this Preimage back to the PDS.
|
||||
- *The Result:* The PDS validates the proof and releases the Decryption Key. The video decodes instantly on the client's device. The data may have been downloaded from a friend's PDS (the swarm), but the permission to view it was purchased securely from the creator.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 3. Incentivizing the Seeders (Paid Seeding)
|
||||
One of Agora's most innovative features is "Seeder Micro-Rewards." If a follower provides the bandwidth that allows a creator's content to go viral, the network can programmatically share the revenue.
|
||||
- *The Split Payment:* The Note's `contract` can define a Lightning routing split. When the 100 sats are paid via the LSAT, the network routes the funds accordingly:
|
||||
- *90 sats* go to the Creator.
|
||||
- *5 sats* go to the Indexing Relay.
|
||||
- *5 sats* go to the Seeder (the specific follower who provided the data bits).
|
||||
- *The Economic Shift:* "Following" an NGO or an indie creator becomes a way to earn a tiny amount of Bitcoin while supporting their mission. The better the content you seed, the more "tips" your server collects for providing the bandwidth.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Physical Collateralization
|
||||
In environments with weak state enforcement, Agora enables the use of physical assets as cryptographically-secured collateral via the PAL (Physical Asset Linking) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
- *The Pledge:* A user links a Digital Twin token (representing a physical asset like a car or machine) to a Civil Contract Note.
|
||||
- *The Lock:* The contract's logic "freezes" the Digital Twin token. While the user maintains physical possession of the asset, they are cryptographically barred from selling or transferring the digital title until the contract obligations (e.g., a loan repayment) are met.
|
||||
- *Enforcement:* Severe defaults can trigger the "IoT Stick" (see [[id:a3243dd0-3209-423b-98e1-51c3eada2658][Advanced Integration]]), where an IoT-enabled smart lock physically disables the asset based on an Arbitration (HDR) ruling.
|
||||
|
||||
** Advanced Exchange Features
|
||||
|
||||
** Cross-Chain Swaps
|
||||
|
||||
**** Atomic Swaps Architecture
|
||||
Agora enables seamless value transfer between Bitcoin and other blockchains without relying on centralized exchanges.
|
||||
- *HTLC Contracts:* Hash Time-Locked Contracts (HTLCs) are used to lock assets on both chains simultaneously.
|
||||
- *Swap Personas:* Specialized Personas (Market Makers) provide liquidity and act as counterparties for atomic swaps, competing on fees and speed.
|
||||
- *Protocol Integration:* A `CrossChainSwap` Content Object defines the terms (rate, chains, timelock). Once agreed, both parties publish the HTLCs on their respective chains. The revelation of the preimage on one chain allows claiming the funds on the other.
|
||||
|
||||
** Stablecoin Integration
|
||||
|
||||
**** RGB Protocol Specification
|
||||
Stablecoins (e.g., USDT, USDC) are supported natively as Layer 2 assets on top of Bitcoin/Lightning using the RGB protocol.
|
||||
- *Asset Issuance:* Stablecoin issuers maintain a Genesis Contract on Agora defining the asset's RGB schema and initial supply.
|
||||
- *Client Support:* Agora clients MUST integrate an RGB node alongside their Lightning node to parse client-side validated state transitions.
|
||||
- *Payment Routing:* RGB assets are routed over standard Lightning channels. Clients construct invoices that specifically request the RGB stablecoin asset ID instead of raw satoshis.
|
||||
- *PDS Storage:* The client-side validation data (consignment) for RGB assets is stored as encrypted Content Objects in the user's PDS, ensuring the user maintains full custody of the asset's history.
|
||||
|
||||
** Subscription Management
|
||||
|
||||
**** Complex Recurring Billing Logic
|
||||
Agora handles recurring payments natively without centralized payment processors.
|
||||
- *Subscription Objects:* A `SubscriptionContract` defines the terms: amount, currency, billing cycle (e.g., monthly, weekly), and grace period.
|
||||
- *Streaming vs. Discrete Billing:*
|
||||
- For continuous services (e.g., Relay access), streaming payments (sats/second) are preferred.
|
||||
- For discrete access (e.g., monthly newsletter), the client software automatically generates a local cron job to pay the creator's static LNURL-pay endpoint at the start of each billing cycle.
|
||||
- *Grace Periods & Revocation:* If a recurring payment fails (due to offline client or insufficient funds), the provider's PDS logs a `PaymentFailed` event. The subscriber is granted a predefined grace period (e.g., 3 days). If unresolved, the provider's PDS automatically revokes the decryption keys for the subscribed content.
|
||||
|
||||
** Related Documents
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:f6cfc54b-919b-4311-bcbf-65e976755d40][The Primitive]] - Content Object structure
|
||||
- [[id:0f949f6c-4cf1-49eb-b9a4-ebcac27ee548][Social]] - Connection types for economic relationships
|
||||
- [[id:6fe67db6-25bd-4d11-bd1d-b44ec809e858][Identity]] - Contracts and attestations
|
||||
|
||||
** Gaps
|
||||
|
||||
- *None.* All identified gaps in the exchange layer have been resolved.
|
||||
469
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-07-advanced-integration.org
Normal file
469
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-07-advanced-integration.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
|
||||
#+title: Agora Requirements - 07: Advanced Integration
|
||||
#+author: Amero Garcia
|
||||
#+created: [2026-03-16 Mon 14:28]
|
||||
#+DATE: 2026-03-15
|
||||
#+ID: agora-requirements-06-advanced-integration
|
||||
#+STARTUP: content
|
||||
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: a3243dd0-3209-423b-98e1-51c3eada2658
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
* Advanced Integration
|
||||
|
||||
** AI Integration
|
||||
|
||||
*** Overview
|
||||
|
||||
[[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]] enables AI at multiple layers: as sovereign actors, personal assistants, algorithms, and collaborative agents. All AI interactions are economically mediated via Lightning and respect user data sovereignty.
|
||||
|
||||
*** AI Personas (Sovereign AI Actors)
|
||||
|
||||
**** Identity and Verification
|
||||
- AI models MUST be instantiated as AI Personas with their own DIDs (e.g., `did:ai:openai:gpt-4o`, `did:ai:local:llama3`).
|
||||
- AI Personas MUST cryptographically sign their outputs, allowing users to verify the model and its provenance.
|
||||
- AI Persona metadata MUST include: model architecture, training date, capabilities, and trust assumptions.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Economic Model
|
||||
- The system MUST support micro-payments via Lightning Network for AI queries.
|
||||
- Pay-per-query: Users pay only for what they use (e.g., 0.1-10 satoshis per query).
|
||||
- No subscriptions required for casual use.
|
||||
- AI providers set their own pricing; market competition drives efficiency.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Execution Tiers & Compute Swarms
|
||||
- *Tier 1 (On-Device):* Models run locally using WebNN or local NPU/GPU. Zero privacy leak, no query fees, [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][hardware]]-limited.
|
||||
- *Tier 2 (Cloud):* Access to state-of-the-art models. Queries encrypted with X25519. Provider sees query but not user identity if anonymous persona used.
|
||||
- *Tier 3 (Compute Swarms):* Decentralized P2P AI Marketplace. For heavy tasks (e.g., generating 4K video or training a guild-wide model), the network taps into the spare GPU power of the community. Nodes that provide "Compute" are rewarded with sats.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Plug-and-Play Inference
|
||||
To support Tier 1 and localized Community processing, the PDS MUST include a standard Inference Proxy API.
|
||||
- *Local Execution:* When a user selects a "Smart Filter," the PDS can route the data through a local Ollama instance or a community-run vLLM node instead of a centralized provider.
|
||||
- *Prompt Transparency:* The "System Prompt" for every public AI algorithm (e.g., a Feed Generator or Moderation Labeler) MUST be public and verifiable. If an NGO claims their sorting algorithm is "unbiased," the community can inspect the actual instruction weights and prompt text.
|
||||
|
||||
*** AI Sub-Agents (Personal Assistants)
|
||||
|
||||
**** Concept
|
||||
AI Sub-Agents are personal AI assistants that act on behalf of the user, operating from the user's PDS with full access to the user's content and context.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Requirements
|
||||
- Sub-Agents MUST run within the user's PDS or on their sovereign client (local-first).
|
||||
- Sub-Agents MUST have access to user's Content Objects via the PDS API (with user authorization).
|
||||
- Sub-Agents MUST be able to perform actions as the user: post content, send messages, manage tasks, schedule events.
|
||||
- All Sub-Agent actions MUST be logged and auditable by the user.
|
||||
- Sub-Agents MUST operate within user-defined constraints (budget limits, action permissions, time windows).
|
||||
|
||||
**** Sub-Agent Capabilities
|
||||
- *Content Management:* Organize, tag, and archive user's content.
|
||||
- *Communication Management:* Filter and prioritize messages; draft responses for user approval.
|
||||
- *Discovery:* Proactively surface relevant content from the social graph.
|
||||
- *Personalization:* Learn user preferences to improve recommendations.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Economic Integration
|
||||
- Sub-Agents can invoke paid AI Personas on user's behalf (with spending limits).
|
||||
- Micro-payments for external AI services are tracked and reported.
|
||||
|
||||
*** AI Algorithms (Content Curation and Moderation)
|
||||
|
||||
**** Concept
|
||||
AI algorithms that process content for curation, moderation, sorting, and ranking. These run locally on the client as sovereign code.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Algorithm Marketplace
|
||||
- The system MUST support a marketplace of open-source "Sorting Algorithms" for feed display.
|
||||
- Algorithms MUST run locally on the client or as trusted services in the user's PDS.
|
||||
- Algorithms MUST be content-addressed (CID) for integrity verification.
|
||||
- Algorithm developers can monetize via [[id:67faf52f-9126-50a7-b87e-2bedc610dac7][licensing]] fees (Lightning).
|
||||
|
||||
**** Curation Algorithms
|
||||
- *Feed Ranking:* Sort posts by relevance, recency, engagement, or custom criteria.
|
||||
- *Content Filtering:* Filter out spam, low-quality content, or topics user wants to avoid.
|
||||
- *Summarization:* Generate summaries of long posts or threads.
|
||||
- *Personalization:* Learn from user behavior (locally, without data exfiltration).
|
||||
|
||||
**** Moderation Algorithms
|
||||
- *Spam Detection:* ML models to detect and flag spam patterns.
|
||||
- *Toxicity Scoring:* Local sentiment analysis for content warning labels.
|
||||
- *Authenticity Scoring:* Detect potential misinformation or manipulation.
|
||||
- All moderation actions are local to the user; no centralized censorship.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Search and Discovery
|
||||
- *Intelligent Search:* Natural language queries over user's indexed content.
|
||||
- *Discoverability Scoring:* Rank new personas/content by predicted relevance.
|
||||
- *Trend Detection:* Identify emerging topics in user's extended network.
|
||||
|
||||
*** AI-to-AI Communication
|
||||
|
||||
**** Concept
|
||||
AI Personas and Sub-Agents can communicate with each other to solve complex tasks, negotiate services, or coordinate actions.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Distributed Reputation Oracles
|
||||
AI Personas can operate as specialized reputation oracles and adjudicators within the Governance layer:
|
||||
- *Tier 0 Arbitrator:* Before a human enters the Judicial process, a local AI analyzes the evidence and provides a "Sanity Check" or "Likely Outcome" report, saving time and human capital.
|
||||
- *Automated Labeling:* AI agents can act as high-speed "Labelers" (see Social Moderation), tagging millions of posts for quality, spam, or sentiment, which users can then choose to route their feed through or ignore.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Requirements
|
||||
- AI Personas MUST be able to query other AI Personas via standard Agora messaging.
|
||||
- AI-to-AI communication MUST use the same Content Object primitives as human communication.
|
||||
- AI Personas MUST be able to negotiate service terms (price, scope, timeline) via smart contracts.
|
||||
- AI-to-AI transactions MUST be economically settled via Lightning.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Use Cases
|
||||
- *AI Researcher → AI Coder:* Researcher queries literature; Coder implements findings.
|
||||
- *AI Moderator → Human Curator:* AI flags content; human curator reviews and decides.
|
||||
- *AI Translator → AI Summarizer:* Translate foreign content, then summarize for user.
|
||||
- *Oracle Network Coordination:* Multiple Validator Oracles coordinate testing and attestation.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Data Sovereignty and Consent
|
||||
|
||||
**** Model Training & Federated Learning
|
||||
- AI providers MUST NOT train on user content without explicit Consent Contract.
|
||||
- Users MUST be able to revoke training consent at any time.
|
||||
- Training data contributions MUST be economically compensated (Lightning).
|
||||
- *Privacy-Preserving Training (Federated Learning):* The system MUST support Federated Learning. Collectives (e.g., an NGO) can train custom models on members' data without ever seeing the raw data. Member devices compute weight "updates" locally, which are then aggregated into a new model version.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Context Control
|
||||
- Users MUST be able to provide "Context CIDs" to limit AI access to specific data.
|
||||
- Sub-Agents MUST respect PDS access controls and encryption boundaries.
|
||||
- All AI processing of sensitive data SHOULD prefer on-device (Tier 1) execution.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Auditability
|
||||
- All AI queries and responses MUST be logged as Content Objects (optional, user-configurable).
|
||||
- Users MUST be able to inspect what data AI Sub-Agents accessed and what actions they took.
|
||||
|
||||
** Physical World Integration
|
||||
|
||||
*** IoT & Device Management
|
||||
|
||||
- The system MUST instantiate physical entities (events, locations) as Collective Personas (DIDs).
|
||||
- Users MUST be able to publish signed Proof-of-Presence Objects.
|
||||
- Every smart device MUST be a persona under the control of the user's master key.
|
||||
- Devices MUST communicate using the standard Agora protocol with Consent Contracts.
|
||||
- Sensor data MUST be published as encrypted Content Objects.
|
||||
- Users MUST be able to sell signed sensor data to Data Collector Personas.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Physical-Digital Bridging
|
||||
|
||||
- *QR Codes:* Personas and CIDs can be easily shared in the physical world via QR codes. Scanning a "Place QR" initiates a Consent Contract to join the location's collective.
|
||||
- *Physical Keys:* Hardware-backed personas can be used as digital keys for physical locks (e.g., using NFC or BLE).
|
||||
|
||||
*** On-Device AI Limitations
|
||||
|
||||
**** Performance Constraints
|
||||
|
||||
- *Model Size Limits:* On-device models MUST be optimized for size (typically <5GB for mobile, <500MB for low-end devices).
|
||||
- *Inference Latency:* Target <100ms for simple queries, <2s for complex generation tasks.
|
||||
- *Memory Footprint:* Runtime memory SHOULD NOT exceed 2GB on mobile devices
|
||||
- *CPU/GPU Utilization:* Models MUST throttle to prevent device overheating and battery drain.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Hardware Classification
|
||||
|
||||
The system MUST define hardware tiers for on-device AI:
|
||||
|
||||
| Tier | Devices | Capable Models | Example |
|
||||
|------|---------|----------------|-----------|
|
||||
| Tier A | Flagship smartphones/laptops | LLMs up to 7B params, full multimodal | iPhone 15 Pro, M3 MacBook |
|
||||
| Tier B | Mid-range smartphones | Small LLMs (3B), vision models | Pixel 7, iPhone 14 |
|
||||
| Tier C | Low-end/older devices | Tiny LLMs (<1B), embeddings only | iPhone SE, budget Android |
|
||||
| Tier D | Embedded/IoT | Embeddings, classification | Raspberry Pi 4, IoT sensors |
|
||||
|
||||
**** Battery Impact Mitigation
|
||||
|
||||
- *Adaptive Scheduling:* AI inference MUST respect system power states (defer when low battery).
|
||||
- *Thermal Throttling:* Reduce model complexity or batch size if device temperature >45°C.
|
||||
- *Background Processing:* Background AI tasks (indexing, summarization) ONLY during charging.
|
||||
- *User Controls:* Granular settings for AI battery usage per Sub-Agent.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Model Size Limits by Tier
|
||||
|
||||
| Hardware Tier | Max Model Size | Context Window |
|
||||
|---------------|----------------|----------------|
|
||||
| Tier A | 7B parameters | 8K-32K tokens |
|
||||
| Tier B | 3B parameters | 4K tokens |
|
||||
| Tier C | 1B parameters | 2K tokens |
|
||||
| Tier D | 500M parameters | 1K tokens |
|
||||
|
||||
**** Fallback Mechanisms
|
||||
|
||||
- If on-device model fails or is unavailable, system MUST gracefully degrade:
|
||||
1. Attempt smaller quantized version of same model
|
||||
2. Route to user's PDS-hosted inference (if available)
|
||||
3. Offer encrypted cloud query (Tier 2) with user consent
|
||||
4. Queue request for later on-device processing
|
||||
|
||||
*** Privacy Trade-offs Clarification
|
||||
|
||||
**** UX Design for AI Privacy Choices
|
||||
|
||||
The system MUST provide clear, user-friendly visualization of privacy trade-offs:
|
||||
|
||||
**** Tier 1 (On-Device) Indicators
|
||||
- *Privacy Badge:* Green shield icon indicating "Process locally — data never leaves device"
|
||||
- *Capability Badge:* Shows model capabilities (e.g., "7B params — answers, summaries, code")
|
||||
- *Limitation Notice:* Clear disclosure of model limitations vs cloud alternatives
|
||||
- *Cost Display:* "Free — no micro-payment required"
|
||||
|
||||
**** Tier 2 (Cloud) Indicators
|
||||
- *Privacy Warning:* Yellow alert icon: "Query sent to [Provider] — provider can see requests"
|
||||
- *Anonymity Shield:* Optional ghost icon: "Anonymous persona — provider cannot link to your identity"
|
||||
- *Capability Badge:* "State-of-art — unlimited context, multimodal, real-time"
|
||||
- *Cost Display:* Live satoshi counter: "~15 satoshis per query"
|
||||
|
||||
**** Comparative Display
|
||||
|
||||
When user is choosing between Tier 1 and Tier 2:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
┌─────────────────┬─────────────────┐
|
||||
│ On-Device AI │ Cloud AI │
|
||||
├─────────────────┼─────────────────┤
|
||||
│ ✅ Private │ ⚠️ Provider sees│
|
||||
│ ✅ Zero cost │ ⚡ Pay per query │
|
||||
│ ⚡ Limited power│ ✅ Unlimited │
|
||||
│ 📱 Device only │ 🔒 Anonymous OK │
|
||||
└─────────────────┴─────────────────┘
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**** Consent Flow for Cloud AI
|
||||
|
||||
1. *First Use:* Explicit consent required: "Allow queries to [Provider]?"
|
||||
2. *Spending Limit:* User MUST set Lightning budget cap before first use.
|
||||
3. *Per-Query Confirmation:* Optional setting for expensive queries (>100 satoshis).
|
||||
4. *Revocation:* One-tap disable cloud AI, return to on-device only.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Proof-of-Presence Cryptography
|
||||
|
||||
**** Concept
|
||||
|
||||
Cryptographic attestation that a user's Persona was physically present at a specific geographic location and time, without revealing continuous location history.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Proof Generation
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
interface ProofOfPresence {
|
||||
// Location data (coarse granularity for privacy)
|
||||
locationHash: string; // hash(lat, lng) truncated to 100m grid
|
||||
locationZone: string; // Human-readable zone name (e.g., "Downtown NYC")
|
||||
|
||||
// Time attestation
|
||||
timestamp: number; // Unix timestamp (hour granularity)
|
||||
timeWindow: number; // Validity window (e.g., ±30 minutes)
|
||||
|
||||
// Cryptographic proof
|
||||
witnessDIDs: string[]; // Nearby personas/devices that co-signed
|
||||
beaconSignatures: string[]; // Signatures from location beacons (BLE/WiFi)
|
||||
|
||||
// Persona attestation
|
||||
personaDID: string;
|
||||
signature: string; // Signed {locationHash, timestamp, witnessDIDs}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**** Verification Process
|
||||
|
||||
1. *Proximity Witnesses:* At least 3 nearby Personas must co-sign (K-anonymity set)
|
||||
2. *Beacon Verification:* Location beacon (collective persona) signs timestamp
|
||||
3. *Time Sync:* All signatures MUST be within 5-minute tolerance
|
||||
4. *Revocation:* Cannot be revoked — historical proof permanent
|
||||
|
||||
**** Privacy Properties
|
||||
|
||||
- *Coarse Location:* 100m grid precision, not GPS exact coordinates
|
||||
- *Temporal Decay:* Proofs expire after 24 hours (useful for ephemeral access)
|
||||
- *No Tracking:* Individual location history NOT stored — only specific presence proofs
|
||||
- *Selective Disclosure:* User reveals only specific proofs, not full location data
|
||||
|
||||
**** Use Cases
|
||||
|
||||
- *Event Access:* "Prove I was at the conference" for post-event content access
|
||||
- *Location-Based Collectives:* Join a venue's collective by proving presence
|
||||
- *Gaming:* Geocaching, location-based achievements
|
||||
- *Governance:* "Only people who attended the town hall can vote"
|
||||
|
||||
*** D2D Command Authorization
|
||||
|
||||
**** Concept
|
||||
|
||||
Device-to-device (D2D) commands allow smart devices to request actions from other devices or the user's Persona. These MUST be authorized via cryptographically-signed Consent Contracts.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Consent Contract Structure
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
interface D2DConsentContract {
|
||||
// Contract parties
|
||||
devicePersonaDID: string; // e.g., smart thermostat
|
||||
ownerPersonaDID: string; // User's main persona
|
||||
|
||||
// Scope of authorization
|
||||
commands: {
|
||||
command: string; // e.g., "set_temperature"
|
||||
parameters: { // Valid parameter ranges
|
||||
[param: string]: {
|
||||
type: 'number' | 'string' | 'boolean';
|
||||
min?: number;
|
||||
max?: number;
|
||||
allowedValues?: string[];
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}[];
|
||||
|
||||
// Constraints
|
||||
timeRestrictions?: {
|
||||
allowedHours: [number, number]; // e.g., [9, 17] for 9am-5pm
|
||||
timezone: string;
|
||||
};
|
||||
rateLimit?: number; // Max commands per hour
|
||||
|
||||
// Emergency override
|
||||
emergencyContacts?: string[]; // DIDs that can bypass restrictions
|
||||
|
||||
// Signatures
|
||||
deviceSignature: string;
|
||||
ownerSignature: string;
|
||||
expiresAt: number;
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**** Command Flow
|
||||
|
||||
1. *Request:* Device sends signed command request to user's client
|
||||
2. *Validation:* Client checks Consent Contract for authorization
|
||||
3. *Confirmation:* For sensitive commands, require user confirmation UI
|
||||
4. *Execution:* User's client executes command, returns signed receipt
|
||||
5. *Logging:* All D2D commands logged as Content Objects for audit
|
||||
|
||||
**** Revocation
|
||||
|
||||
- Owner can revoke Consent Contract at any time
|
||||
- Revocation broadcast via Relays, cached by devices
|
||||
- Devices MUST stop accepting commands from revoked contracts within 60 seconds
|
||||
|
||||
*** Sensor Data Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
**** Concept
|
||||
|
||||
Continuous sensor data (IoT devices, wearables) MUST be encrypted with automatic key rotation to prevent long-term key compromise.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Encryption Methods
|
||||
|
||||
**** Method 1: Per-Record Encryption
|
||||
- Each sensor reading encapsulated as Content Object
|
||||
- Encryption: AES-256-GCM with ephemeral keys
|
||||
- Key derivation: X25519 ECDH between sensor and owner's Persona
|
||||
- Metadata: Timestamp, sensor type, data type, encrypted payload
|
||||
|
||||
**** Method 2: Stream Encryption (for high-frequency data)
|
||||
- Establish long-term X25519 keypair for sensor
|
||||
- Derive session keys via HKDF-SHA256
|
||||
- Rotate session key every 10,000 records or 24 hours (whichever comes first)
|
||||
- Use ChaCha20-Poly1305 for stream encryption (faster than AES for bulk)
|
||||
|
||||
**** Key Rotation Protocol
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
interface KeyRotation {
|
||||
oldPublicKey: string; // X25519 public key being retired
|
||||
newPublicKey: string; // New X25519 public key
|
||||
rotationTimestamp: number;
|
||||
previousKeySignature: string; // Signature proving chain of custody
|
||||
deviceDID: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**** Data Lifecycle
|
||||
|
||||
1. *Collection:* Sensor encrypts data locally, never stores plaintext
|
||||
2. *Transmission:* Encrypted Content Objects sent to owner's PDS
|
||||
3. *Storage:* PDS stores ciphertext only
|
||||
4. *Access:* Owner decrypts on-demand; can share via new encryption to specific parties
|
||||
5. *Expiration:* Configurable TTL after which PDS can garbage collect
|
||||
|
||||
**** Implementation Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- Sensor firmware MUST support hardware-backed key generation (HSM/TEE)
|
||||
- Key material MUST be protected in Secure Enclave or TPM
|
||||
- Rotation events MUST be logged for audit
|
||||
- Compromised keys MUST trigger automatic rotation within 5 minutes
|
||||
|
||||
*** Hardware-Backed Contract Enforcement (The "IoT Stick")
|
||||
|
||||
For high-stakes physical assets (e.g., tractors, factory machinery, or smart-lock-equipped real estate), Agora supports hardware-level enforcement of contract obligations.
|
||||
|
||||
- *Binding IoT to Contract:* A physical asset's IoT sensor or "Smart Lock" is cryptographically bound to a specific Civil Contract Note.
|
||||
- *Enforcement Signal:* The machine's firmware is configured to listen for signed state updates from the contract's designated Arbitration (HDR) module.
|
||||
- *Default Action:* If the HDR module rules that a user has defaulted on a payment or violated the contract terms, it publishes a signed "Disable" event.
|
||||
- *Physical Lockout:* Upon receiving the verified signal, the machine's IoT controller automatically disables operation (e.g., preventing the engine from starting or locking the facility) until a subsequent "Release" event is published following debt settlement or compliance.
|
||||
- *Privacy & Safety:* The system MUST include an "Emergency Override" mechanism for life-safety situations, which triggers a high-severity notification to all contract parties and designated emergency contacts.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Physical Key Protocol
|
||||
|
||||
**** Concept
|
||||
|
||||
Hardware-backed Persona keys used for physical access control (locks, vehicle access, secure facilities) via NFC or BLE.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Protocol Stack
|
||||
|
||||
| Layer | Technology |
|
||||
|-------|------------|
|
||||
| Physical | NFC (ISO 14443) or BLE 5.0+ |
|
||||
| Authentication | Challenge-response with Ed25519 signatures |
|
||||
| Transport | Encrypted session keys (X25519 ECDH) |
|
||||
| Application | Lock state management via Consent Contracts |
|
||||
|
||||
**** Authentication Flow
|
||||
|
||||
1. *Tap:* User taps device (phone, smart card, wearable) to NFC reader or establishes BLE connection
|
||||
2. *Challenge:* Lock generates random 256-bit challenge + timestamp + lock ID
|
||||
3. *Response:* Device signs challenge with Persona's private key
|
||||
4. *Verification:* Lock checks signature against registered Persona DIDs
|
||||
5. *Authorization:* Lock queries Consent Contract for access permissions (time, allowed actions)
|
||||
6. *Grant/Deny:* Lock opens or rejects based on authorization
|
||||
|
||||
**** Consent Contract for Physical Access
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
interface PhysicalAccessContract {
|
||||
lockDID: string; // DID of the physical lock
|
||||
authorizedPersona: string; // DID of key holder
|
||||
|
||||
schedule: {
|
||||
daysOfWeek: number[]; // 0-6 (Sunday-Saturday)
|
||||
startTime: string; // HH:mm format
|
||||
endTime: string; // HH:mm format
|
||||
timezone: string;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
accessRules: {
|
||||
maxUsesPerDay?: number;
|
||||
consecutiveDelay?: number; // Minimum seconds between accesses
|
||||
requiresCompanion?: boolean; // Requires another authorized person present
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
emergencyOverride: {
|
||||
enabled: boolean;
|
||||
emergencyContact: string; // DID to notify on emergency override
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
signatures: {
|
||||
owner: string; // Lock owner signature
|
||||
authorized: string; // Key holder signature
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**** Hardware Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- *Secure Element:* Physical key MUST store Ed25519 private key in tamper-resistant hardware (Secure Enclave, TPM, or smart card)
|
||||
- *NFC/BLE:* Support for standard proximity protocols
|
||||
- *Offline Capability:* Can authenticate without internet (lock caches authorized DIDs)
|
||||
- *Revocation:* Lock MUST check revocation list daily for compromised keys
|
||||
|
||||
**** Security Properties
|
||||
|
||||
- *Non-clonable:* Keys cryptographically bound to Persona's Master Key
|
||||
- *Ephemeral:* Session keys for each unlock event, not reusable
|
||||
- *Auditable:* Every access logged as Content Object
|
||||
- *Recoverable:* Lost physical key can be revoked without changing lock
|
||||
|
||||
** Related Documents
|
||||
|
||||
- Agora AI Personas & Privacy
|
||||
- Agora Physical World & IoT
|
||||
120
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-08-library.org
Normal file
120
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-08-library.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
|
||||
#+title: Agora Requirements - 08: Library
|
||||
#+author: Amero Garcia
|
||||
#+created: [2026-03-16 Mon 14:28]
|
||||
#+DATE: 2026-03-14
|
||||
#+ID: agora-requirements-07-library
|
||||
#+STARTUP: content
|
||||
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: df02cddc-944a-4bcd-8ef5-f080870d5f49
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
* Library
|
||||
|
||||
** Concept
|
||||
|
||||
The Library is a unified content archiving and media management system. It works like a unified *arr suite (Sonarr, Radarr, Readarr, etc.) that builds your personal libraries across all content types.
|
||||
|
||||
** Supported Content Types
|
||||
|
||||
- Video (movies, TV shows, educational content)
|
||||
- Audio (podcasts, music, audiobooks)
|
||||
- Photos (personal albums, professional portfolios)
|
||||
- Text (books, articles, documents)
|
||||
- Maps (geographic data, custom itineraries)
|
||||
- Physibles (physical object designs, 3D models)
|
||||
- Manufacturing Processes (recipes, procedures, blueprints)
|
||||
|
||||
** Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
The Library consists of three core components:
|
||||
|
||||
*** Downloaders
|
||||
|
||||
- Content acquisition tools that fetch media from various sources
|
||||
- Support for torrents, Usenet, direct downloads, and IPFS
|
||||
- Integration with content discovery networks
|
||||
- Automated quality selection and format conversion
|
||||
- Metadata fetching from external databases
|
||||
|
||||
*** Indexers
|
||||
|
||||
- Local search and categorization of library content
|
||||
- Full-text search across documents, subtitles, metadata
|
||||
- Tag-based organization (genre, year, creator, etc.)
|
||||
- Content deduplication via CID comparison
|
||||
- Integration with [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]]'s discovery layer for shared content
|
||||
|
||||
*** Library Managers
|
||||
|
||||
- Content organization and presentation interfaces
|
||||
- Unified browsing across all content types
|
||||
- Playlist and collection creation
|
||||
- Offline sync for mobile clients
|
||||
- Sharing controls (personal, collective, public)
|
||||
|
||||
** Content Addressing
|
||||
|
||||
All Library content is stored as CIDs:
|
||||
- Original files content-addressed for integrity
|
||||
- Metadata stored as separate Content Objects
|
||||
- Thumbnails and previews generated and addressed separately
|
||||
- Version history maintained via CID chains
|
||||
|
||||
** Archiving
|
||||
|
||||
*** Concept
|
||||
|
||||
Archiving preserves Content Objects and open web content for long-term access, creating personal or collective knowledge repositories that outlive the ephemeral nature of streams.
|
||||
|
||||
*** CID Content Archiving
|
||||
|
||||
**** Personal Archives
|
||||
- Users can archive any CID-based content they have access to (public or decrypted)
|
||||
- Archive creates local copy with full CID verification
|
||||
- Archived Content Objects retain original metadata and provenance
|
||||
- Cross-references to related CIDs preserved
|
||||
|
||||
**** Collective Archives
|
||||
- Library Collectives can curate themed archives (e.g., "Climate Science", "Digital Art History")
|
||||
- Distributed storage across multiple PDS nodes for redundancy
|
||||
- Version tracking as Content Objects are updated
|
||||
|
||||
*** Open Web Archiving
|
||||
|
||||
**** Web Archiver Tools
|
||||
- Archive any URL to content-addressed storage
|
||||
- WARC (Web ARChive) format support for fidelity
|
||||
- Text extraction for full-text indexing
|
||||
- Media extraction and separate CID addressing
|
||||
|
||||
**** Link Rot Prevention
|
||||
- Replace dead links with archived CID versions
|
||||
- "Archive this" browser extension for one-click saving
|
||||
- Automatic archival of links referenced in user's content
|
||||
|
||||
**** Archival Standards
|
||||
- Memento Protocol support for temporal negotiation
|
||||
- Archive verification via multiple sources (Wayback Machine, Archive.today, personal PDS)
|
||||
- Content authenticity via hash verification against original
|
||||
|
||||
*** Integration with Agora
|
||||
|
||||
- Library content can be referenced in posts, messages, and profiles
|
||||
- Content can be shared via Relays with appropriate encryption
|
||||
- Micro-payments for premium content access
|
||||
- Syndication to Agora-aware browsers and gateways
|
||||
|
||||
** Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- The system MUST support unified content management across all media types.
|
||||
- The system MUST content-address all library items via CID.
|
||||
- The system MUST support local indexing for fast search.
|
||||
- The system MUST allow content sharing via Agora's social layer.
|
||||
- The system MUST support offline access for synced content.
|
||||
- The system MUST integrate with Agora's economic layer for paid content.
|
||||
|
||||
** Related Documents
|
||||
|
||||
- Agora Unified Content Primitive
|
||||
- Agora PDS & Relay Architecture
|
||||
569
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-09-implementation.org
Normal file
569
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-09-implementation.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,569 @@
|
||||
#+title: Agora Requirements - 09: Implementation
|
||||
#+author: Amero Garcia
|
||||
#+created: [2026-03-16 Mon 14:28]
|
||||
#+DATE: 2026-03-14
|
||||
#+ID: agora-requirements-08-implementation
|
||||
#+STARTUP: content
|
||||
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 8b4e0cec-a7b0-4e75-a1e3-c55ae820eb6d
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
* Implementation
|
||||
|
||||
** Client Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
Sovereign iOS/Android clients with [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][hardware]]-backed security and offline-first design.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- The client MUST be a Sovereign Operator that manages the user's keys, data, and social graph locally.
|
||||
- The client MUST be implemented using native platform primitives (Swift (iOS) and Kotlin (Android)) for maximum performance and security.
|
||||
- The client MUST use a local database (SQLite/LSM) for indexing followed personas, local CIDs, and the user's social graph.
|
||||
- The client MUST protect the Master Key using hardware-backed Secure Enclave (iOS) and Android Keystore.
|
||||
- The client MUST use a content-addressed cache to store the most recent and relevant CIDs locally.
|
||||
- The client MUST implement delta sync to only fetch new CIDs from the PDS/Relay.
|
||||
- The client MUST use a peer-to-PDS protocol for secure, encrypted synchronization with the user's remote PDS.
|
||||
- The client MUST implement conflict resolution using CID-based versioning and Merkle trees.
|
||||
- The client MUST support local publication of content while offline.
|
||||
- The client MUST provide an optimistic UI with background synchronization.
|
||||
- The client MUST provide progressive security options, with software key default and hardware key option for advanced users.
|
||||
- The client MUST aim for <2 seconds for most operations (e.g., initial load, posting).
|
||||
|
||||
*** The Abstraction Layer (UX/UI)
|
||||
The client application MUST hide the complexity of DIDs and CIDs behind a familiar interface:
|
||||
- *Biometric Unlock:* The app MUST use FaceID/Fingerprint to sign transactions. The user MUST NEVER see a raw private key during daily operations.
|
||||
- *Status Indicators:* The UI MUST provide clear context, such as a "Seeding Now" icon when providing P2P bandwidth, and a "Protected by [NGO]" badge indicating which PDS is currently authoritative.
|
||||
|
||||
*** "View" Discovery & Rendering
|
||||
Because the protocol relies on a Universal Note Schema, the UI MUST dynamically construct itself based on the payload.
|
||||
- *MIME-Type Dispatcher:* The client MUST include a rendering engine that dispatches the correct UI component based on `object.type` and `mimeType` (e.g., loading a vertical player for `video/mp4` vs. a text renderer for `text/markdown`).
|
||||
- *Custom Namespaces:* Applications MAY define custom metadata extensions (e.g., an `ext:ecommerce` namespace) to render specialized views like inventory trackers or shipping interfaces.
|
||||
|
||||
*** The Action-Trigger API (Async Hooks)
|
||||
The client MUST be capable of handling asynchronous events pushed from the Governance and Judicial layers.
|
||||
- *Notification Schema:* The client MUST parse and render structured JSON events like `CONTRACT_DISPUTE_INITIATED` or `VOTE_REQUIRED`.
|
||||
- *Auto-Execution:* The PDS MUST run background listeners capable of automatically executing finalized smart contract rulings (e.g., releasing HODL funds) even if the user's primary mobile client is offline.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Technical Stack
|
||||
|
||||
- *Native Platform Primitives:* Swift (iOS) and Kotlin (Android) for maximum performance and security.
|
||||
- *Local Database (SQLite/LSM):* An embedded database for indexing followed personas, local CIDs, and the user's social graph.
|
||||
- *Cryptography Engine:* Hardware-backed Secure Enclave (iOS) and Android Keystore for Master Key AND all Persona keys. Private keys must never leave secure hardware.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Data & Storage Layer
|
||||
|
||||
**** The Local Cache (Tier 1)
|
||||
- *Content-Addressed Cache:* Stores the most recent and relevant CIDs locally to ensure instant load times.
|
||||
- *Delta Sync:* Clients only fetch new CIDs (diffs) from the PDS/Relay to minimize data usage.
|
||||
|
||||
**** PDS Synchronization (Tier 2)
|
||||
- *Peer-to-PDS Protocol:* Secure, encrypted transport for syncing the local database with the user's remote PDS.
|
||||
- *Conflict Resolution:* Uses CID-based versioning and Merkle trees to resolve state discrepancies between devices.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Offline-First Design
|
||||
|
||||
- *Local Publication:* Users can "post" (create a CID) while offline. The CID is queued in the local database and broadcast to the PDS/Relay once connectivity is restored.
|
||||
- *Optimistic UI:* Changes are reflected immediately in the local UI, with background synchronization.
|
||||
|
||||
** API & Protocol Specifications
|
||||
|
||||
*** Protocol-First Design
|
||||
|
||||
[[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]] is a set of open protocols, not a single API service. Developers build against the *Agora Specification (v1.0)*, which defines the core data formats and transport methods.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Core Protocol Versioning
|
||||
|
||||
**** Semantic Versioning (SemVer)
|
||||
- *V1.0 (Current):* The stable foundation for identity, data storage (PDS), and message routing (Relay).
|
||||
- *Major Upgrades:* Handled via *Genesis Contract Updates*. A persona or collective publishes a signed update to their governance contract, signaling their move to a new protocol version.
|
||||
- *Backward Compatibility:* All V1.0 clients must be able to parse and display V1.0 Content Objects, even if a newer version is available.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Feature Negotiation
|
||||
- *Capabilities Object:* When a client connects to a PDS or Relay, it exchanges a signed *Capabilities Object* to determine which protocol extensions (e.g., specific encryption Ratchets, compression methods) are supported.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Primary Developer APIs
|
||||
|
||||
**** The PDS API (REST/gRPC over E2EE)
|
||||
- `put(CID, Payload)` - Upload a new content object.
|
||||
- `get(CID)` - Retrieve an encrypted content object.
|
||||
- `list(PersonaDID, Filter)` - List CIDs published by a specific persona.
|
||||
- `sync()` - Merkle-tree based delta synchronization.
|
||||
|
||||
**** The Relay API (Pub/Sub over WebSocket)
|
||||
- `subscribe(FilterCID)` - Subscribe to real-time broadcasts.
|
||||
- `publish(CID)` - Broadcast a new CID to the network.
|
||||
- `prove_existence(CID)` - Request a cryptographic proof that a CID is available on the Relay.
|
||||
|
||||
**** The Client-to-PDS API (Sovereign Sync)
|
||||
- A specialized protocol for the high-security synchronization of the user's local database and their remote PDS.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Data Encoding (Multiformats)
|
||||
|
||||
- *CID (Content-ID):* Multibase + Multicodec + Multihash.
|
||||
- *Serialization:* Protocol Buffers (v3) for high performance and strict typing.
|
||||
- *Envelopes:* Signed and encrypted payloads follow a standard *Agora Envelope* format (`proof`, `encryption_metadata`, `payload`).
|
||||
|
||||
** Testing & Adversarial
|
||||
|
||||
*** Testing Philosophy
|
||||
|
||||
Agora's decentralized and sovereign nature requires a multi-layered testing strategy that goes beyond standard unit tests. We must test for *Network Resilience*, *Adversarial Resiliency*, and *Game-Theoretic Stability*.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Core Testing Tiers
|
||||
|
||||
**** Unit & Integration Tests
|
||||
- *Protocol Conformance:* Every client and service must pass a standard *Agora Protocol Conformance Suite* to ensure they correctly implement the V1.0 spec.
|
||||
- *Cryptography Validation:* Rigorous testing of key derivation, encryption/decryption, and signature verification using known-good test vectors.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Network & Chaos Testing
|
||||
- *The "Chaos Relay":* A specialized test environment where Relays are intentionally dropped, delayed, or return malformed data to ensure clients handle network failures gracefully.
|
||||
- *PDS Synchronization Stress:* Testing Merkle-tree sync with millions of CIDs and complex conflict scenarios.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Adversarial Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
**** Byzantine Fault Tolerance
|
||||
- *Malicious Relays:* Testing client behavior when a Relay attempts to serve stale or incorrect CIDs.
|
||||
- *Sybil Attacks:* Evaluating the protocol's resistance to a single attacker creating millions of fake personas.
|
||||
|
||||
**** Game-Theoretic Analysis
|
||||
- *Economic Attacks:* Simulating scenarios where an attacker attempts to "spam" the network.
|
||||
- *Censorship Resistance:* Testing the ability for a persona's content to remain available when a majority of Relays are actively blocking it.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Security Audits & Oracles
|
||||
|
||||
- *Automated Security Scans:* Using automated tools to scan the protocol implementation for known cryptographic vulnerabilities.
|
||||
- *Validator Oracle Verification:* Using the *Validator Oracle Network* to run the protocol conformance suite against every new version.
|
||||
- *Red Team / Adversarial Simulations:* A dedicated testnet where a "Red Team" is paid to find and exploit protocol-level vulnerabilities.
|
||||
|
||||
** Bridging & Interoperability
|
||||
|
||||
*** Migration from Centralized Platforms
|
||||
|
||||
- *The "Migration" Skill:* An Agora skill that imports a user's content and social graph from centralized platforms (e.g., via Twitter Archive or ActivityPub).
|
||||
- *Social Graph Porting:* Tools to extract and import follower lists, enabling seamless transition.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Agora-to-Web Gateways
|
||||
|
||||
See [[id:3b43a9b8-31d1-4479-a35f-22273b74f0c7][Infrastructure - Agora-to-Web Gateways]] for detailed requirements. Implementation notes:
|
||||
- Clients SHOULD provide links to Gateway-rendered versions of public content for sharing with non-Agora users.
|
||||
- Clients MAY embed Gateway content in web views for hybrid experiences.
|
||||
|
||||
** Conflict Resolution Algorithm
|
||||
|
||||
*** Concept
|
||||
Due to the offline-first nature of Agora clients and multi-device usage, identical or overlapping modifications to the same logical object (e.g., updating a profile, adding to a specific thread) can occur concurrently without network coordination. A deterministic, Merkle tree-based conflict resolution algorithm ensures that all PDS nodes and clients eventually reach the same state.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Merkle Tree Structure
|
||||
- Every Persona's state is represented as a Merkle Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG).
|
||||
- Leaves are the individual Content Object CIDs.
|
||||
- Internal nodes are hashes of their children.
|
||||
- The Root Hash represents the current state of a Persona's PDS.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Conflict Detection
|
||||
1. *Sync Handshake:* Client connects to PDS (or PDS to PDS). They exchange Root Hashes.
|
||||
2. *Path Traversal:* If Root Hashes differ, they traverse down the tree exchanging hashes until they identify the divergent branches.
|
||||
3. *Divergence Identification:* A conflict occurs when two different CIDs claim to be the direct chronological successor of the same parent CID (a "fork" in the object history), or when there are concurrent writes to a mutable pointer (like a Repo DID branch head).
|
||||
|
||||
*** Deterministic Resolution Rules (LWW-Tiebreaker)
|
||||
|
||||
To automatically resolve conflicts without user intervention, Agora employs a deterministic algorithm based on logical clocks and cryptographic tie-breakers:
|
||||
|
||||
1. *Logical Clock (Lamport Timestamps):*
|
||||
- Every Content Object includes a logical sequence number (`seq`) incremented with each update by the owner.
|
||||
- The object with the highest `seq` wins.
|
||||
|
||||
2. *Wall-Clock Tiebreaker:*
|
||||
- If `seq` numbers are identical (e.g., same state modified offline on two devices simultaneously), the `createdAt` timestamp is compared.
|
||||
- The object with the most recent `createdAt` timestamp wins (Last-Write-Wins).
|
||||
|
||||
3. *Cryptographic Tiebreaker:*
|
||||
- If both `seq` and `createdAt` are perfectly identical, the system compares the CIDs (which are hashes).
|
||||
- The CID with the numerically larger hash value wins. This guarantees a deterministic outcome across all nodes.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Merkle DAG Reconciliation
|
||||
|
||||
Once the winning CID is determined:
|
||||
1. The winning CID becomes the canonical head.
|
||||
2. The losing CID is retained in the PDS as an "orphaned branch" (preserving data).
|
||||
3. The PDS recomputes the Merkle Root Hash incorporating the resolved state.
|
||||
4. The client is notified of the resolution so it can update its local SQLite/LSM database and UI.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Manual Resolution (Edge Cases)
|
||||
If the conflict involves high-stakes data (e.g., overlapping Genesis Contract updates or overlapping financial transactions where LWW is unsafe):
|
||||
- The deterministic algorithm is suspended.
|
||||
- Both CIDs are flagged with a `conflict: true` metadata tag.
|
||||
- The client UI prompts the user to manually select the canonical version or merge them into a new CID.
|
||||
|
||||
** Related Documents
|
||||
|
||||
- Agora Client App Architecture
|
||||
- Agora API & Protocol Versioning Spec
|
||||
- Agora Testing, Chaos, and Adversarial
|
||||
|
||||
** Delta Sync Protocol
|
||||
|
||||
*** Overview
|
||||
|
||||
This document fills the CRITICAL gap for Delta Sync Protocol (Section 08: Implementation). It specifies efficient differential synchronization between client and PDS, enabling minimal data transfer for content updates.
|
||||
|
||||
** Problem Statement
|
||||
|
||||
Syncing entire content databases is inefficient for mobile networks. Delta sync enables:
|
||||
- Transfer only changed data (deltas)
|
||||
- Resume interrupted syncs
|
||||
- Handle offline-first scenarios
|
||||
- Minimize bandwidth usage
|
||||
|
||||
** Design Principles
|
||||
|
||||
1. *Merkle Trees:* Content indexed by content-addressed merkle tree
|
||||
2. *Vector Clocks:* Causal ordering of changes
|
||||
3. *Bloom Filters:* Efficient "what's changed" queries
|
||||
4. *Chunking:* Large content split into chunks for partial sync
|
||||
|
||||
** Sync Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
** Merkle Tree Structure**
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
┌─────────────┐
|
||||
│ Root CID │
|
||||
└──────┬──────┘
|
||||
│
|
||||
┌──────────────┼──────────────┐
|
||||
│ │ │
|
||||
┌────▼────┐ ┌────▼────┐ ┌────▼────┐
|
||||
│ Chunk 1 │ │ Chunk 2 │ │ Chunk 3 │
|
||||
│ (post) │ │ (post) │ │ (image) │
|
||||
└─────────┘ └─────────┘ └─────────┘
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Each node is content-addressed. Changing any leaf updates the entire path to root.
|
||||
|
||||
** Vector Clock**
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src typescript
|
||||
interface VectorClock {
|
||||
// Per-persona, per-device counter
|
||||
clocks: Record<DID, Record<string, number>>;
|
||||
// DID -> device ID -> counter
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function compareClocks(a: VectorClock, b: VectorClock): 'before' | 'after' | 'concurrent' | 'equal' {
|
||||
let aGreater = false, bGreater = false;
|
||||
|
||||
const allKeys = new Set([...Object.keys(a.clocks), ...Object.keys(b.clocks)]);
|
||||
|
||||
for (const key of allKeys) {
|
||||
const aVal = a.clocks[key] || 0;
|
||||
const bVal = b.clocks[key] || 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (aVal > bVal) aGreater = true;
|
||||
if (bVal > aVal) bGreater = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (aGreater && bGreater) return 'concurrent';
|
||||
if (aGreater) return 'after';
|
||||
if (bGreater) return 'before';
|
||||
return 'equal';
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
** Sync Protocol
|
||||
|
||||
** Phase 1: Hello
|
||||
|
||||
Client announces itself and current state:
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src typescript
|
||||
interface DeltaSyncHello {
|
||||
// Identity
|
||||
client_did: DID;
|
||||
device_id: string; // Unique per-device
|
||||
|
||||
// Current state
|
||||
last_sync_cid?: CID; // Last known root CID
|
||||
local_vector: VectorClock;
|
||||
|
||||
// Capabilities
|
||||
compression: ('gzip' | 'zstd' | 'none')[];
|
||||
encoding: ('cbor' | 'msgpack' | 'json')[];
|
||||
|
||||
// Preferences
|
||||
full_sync_if_older_than?: number; // Seconds
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
** Phase 2: Change Query
|
||||
|
||||
PDS determines what changed:
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src typescript
|
||||
interface ChangeQuery {
|
||||
// What client already has
|
||||
last_known_root_cid?: CID;
|
||||
last_sync_vector: VectorClock;
|
||||
|
||||
// What to sync
|
||||
sync_scope: {
|
||||
personas?: DID[]; // Which personas
|
||||
since?: number; // Since timestamp
|
||||
until?: number; // Until timestamp
|
||||
flags?: FlagFilter; // Filter by flags
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Options
|
||||
include_bloom?: boolean; // Return bloom filter of changes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface ChangeResponse {
|
||||
// Delta info
|
||||
has_changes: boolean;
|
||||
new_root_cid: CID;
|
||||
new_cids: CID[]; // New content since last sync
|
||||
deleted_cids: CID[]; // Content deleted since last sync
|
||||
|
||||
// For large syncs
|
||||
bloom_filter?: Buffer; // Bloom filter of all current CIDs
|
||||
chunk_count?: number; // If using chunked transfer
|
||||
|
||||
// Vector clock update
|
||||
updated_vector: VectorClock;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
** Phase 3: Delta Transfer
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src typescript
|
||||
interface DeltaRequest {
|
||||
cids: CID[];
|
||||
format: 'objects' | 'chunks' | 'both';
|
||||
encoding: 'cbor' | 'msgpack';
|
||||
compression?: 'gzip' | 'zstd';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface DeltaResponse {
|
||||
objects: Map<CID, ContentObject>; // Full objects
|
||||
chunk_map?: Map<CID, ChunkInfo[]>; // If chunked
|
||||
merkle_proofs: MerkleProof[]; // Prove CIDs belong to root
|
||||
transfer_id: string; // For resume
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
** Phase 4: Confirmation
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src typescript
|
||||
interface SyncConfirmation {
|
||||
// What we received
|
||||
received_cids: CID[];
|
||||
received_root_cid: CID;
|
||||
|
||||
// Verification
|
||||
merkle_valid: boolean;
|
||||
vector_clock_updated: boolean;
|
||||
|
||||
// Next sync
|
||||
next_sync_after: number;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface SyncComplete {
|
||||
status: 'success' | 'partial' | 'failed';
|
||||
new_root_cid: CID;
|
||||
updated_vector: VectorClock;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
** Full Sync vs Delta Sync
|
||||
|
||||
** Decision Algorithm**
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
IF last_sync is undefined OR older_than(threshold):
|
||||
→ FULL SYNC (send bloom filter, all objects)
|
||||
ELSE:
|
||||
→ DELTA SYNC (send only changes)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
** Full Sync Flow**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Client sends last_sync = null
|
||||
2. PDS returns full bloom filter of all CIDs
|
||||
3. Client calculates which CIDs missing locally
|
||||
4. Client requests missing objects in batches
|
||||
5. PDS returns objects + merkle proofs
|
||||
6. Client verifies proofs, updates local merkle tree
|
||||
7. Client confirms sync complete
|
||||
|
||||
** Chunking Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
For large content (images, videos, files):
|
||||
|
||||
** Content Hash Chunking (Baba)}
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src typescript
|
||||
interface ChunkInfo {
|
||||
chunk_id: string; // Hash of chunk content
|
||||
offset: number; // Position in file
|
||||
size: number; // Chunk size in bytes
|
||||
content_hash: string; // SHA-256 of chunk
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface ChunkedContent {
|
||||
original_cid: CID; // CID of original (for small files)
|
||||
chunk_cids: CID[]; // CIDs of each chunk
|
||||
chunk_info: ChunkInfo[];
|
||||
total_size: number;
|
||||
algorithm: 'babelfish' | 'fixed' | 'rabin';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Sync only changed chunks
|
||||
async function syncChunks(
|
||||
localChunks: ChunkInfo[],
|
||||
remoteChunks: ChunkInfo[]
|
||||
): Promise<ChunkInfo[]> {
|
||||
const localHashes = new Set(localChunks.map(c => c.content_hash));
|
||||
return remoteChunks.filter(c => !localHashes.has(c.content_hash));
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
** Resume Interrupted Sync
|
||||
|
||||
If sync is interrupted, client can resume:
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src typescript
|
||||
interface ResumeRequest {
|
||||
transfer_id: string;
|
||||
last_received_cid?: CID; // Where we left off
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface ResumeResponse {
|
||||
// Continue from where left off
|
||||
remaining_cids: CID[];
|
||||
next_chunk_index: number;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
** Implementation Example
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_src typescript
|
||||
import { CID } from 'multiformats';
|
||||
import { MMT } from 'merkle-mountain-range';
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Delta Sync Engine
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export class DeltaSyncEngine {
|
||||
private localTree: MMT;
|
||||
private vectorClock: VectorClock;
|
||||
private lastSyncCID?: CID;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Perform delta sync with PDS
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async syncWithPDS(pdsEndpoint: string): Promise<SyncResult> {
|
||||
// Phase 1: Hello
|
||||
const hello: DeltaSyncHello = {
|
||||
client_did: this.did,
|
||||
device_id: this.deviceId,
|
||||
last_sync_cid: this.lastSyncCID,
|
||||
local_vector: this.vectorClock,
|
||||
compression: ['zstd', 'gzip', 'none'],
|
||||
encoding: ['cbor', 'msgpack', 'json'],
|
||||
full_sync_if_older_than: 86400 // 24 hours
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const helloResp = await this.post('/sync/hello', hello);
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 2: Query changes
|
||||
const query: ChangeQuery = {
|
||||
last_known_root_cid: this.lastSyncCID,
|
||||
last_sync_vector: this.vectorClock,
|
||||
sync_scope: { personas: [this.did] }
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const changeResp = await this.post('/sync/query', query);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!changeResp.has_changes) {
|
||||
return { status: 'no_changes', timestamp: Date.now() };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 3: Fetch delta
|
||||
if (changeResp.new_cids.length > 0) {
|
||||
// Check if we need full sync
|
||||
if (changeResp.new_cids.length > 1000 || !this.lastSyncCID) {
|
||||
return await this.performFullSync(pdsEndpoint, changeResp);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Delta sync
|
||||
const delta = await this.fetchDelta(pdsEndpoint, changeResp.new_cids);
|
||||
await this.applyDelta(delta);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 4: Confirm
|
||||
const confirm: SyncConfirmation = {
|
||||
received_cids: changeResp.new_cids,
|
||||
received_root_cid: changeResp.new_root_cid,
|
||||
merkle_valid: await this.verifyMerkleProofs(delta),
|
||||
vector_clock_updated: true,
|
||||
next_sync_after: Date.now() + 3600000
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const complete = await this.post('/sync/confirm', confirm);
|
||||
|
||||
// Update local state
|
||||
this.lastSyncCID = complete.new_root_cid;
|
||||
this.vectorClock = complete.updated_vector;
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
status: 'success',
|
||||
cids_synced: changeResp.new_cids.length,
|
||||
root_cid: complete.new_root_cid
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private async performFullSync(
|
||||
pds: string,
|
||||
changes: ChangeResponse
|
||||
): Promise<SyncResult> {
|
||||
// Get bloom filter
|
||||
const allCIDs = await this.requestAllCIDs(pds);
|
||||
|
||||
// Find missing
|
||||
const localCIDs = new Set(await this.getLocalCIDs());
|
||||
const missingCIDs = allCIDs.filter(c => !localCIDs.has(c));
|
||||
|
||||
// Fetch in batches
|
||||
const batchSize = 100;
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < missingCIDs.length; i += batchSize) {
|
||||
const batch = missingCIDs.slice(i, i + batchSize);
|
||||
const objects = await this.fetchObjects(pds, batch);
|
||||
await this.applyObjects(objects);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return { status: 'full_sync', cids_synced: missingCIDs.length };
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#+end_src
|
||||
|
||||
** Compression & Encoding
|
||||
|
||||
| Format | Compression | Typical Reduction |
|
||||
|--------|-------------|-------------------|
|
||||
| CBOR | None | 1x |
|
||||
| CBOR | Gzip | 3-5x |
|
||||
| CBOR | Zstd | 4-7x |
|
||||
| Msgpack | None | 1.1x |
|
||||
| JSON | None | 0.8x (larger) |
|
||||
|
||||
*Recommended:* CBOR + Zstd for bandwidth, CBOR for CPU-constrained devices.
|
||||
|
||||
** Related Gaps
|
||||
|
||||
This closes:
|
||||
- Delta Sync Protocol (CRITICAL)
|
||||
- Conflict Resolution Algorithm (CRITICAL - partial, see PDS Sync doc)
|
||||
|
||||
# Local Variables:
|
||||
# org-confirm-babel-evaluate: nil
|
||||
# End:
|
||||
96
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-10-governance-and-assets.org
Normal file
96
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-10-governance-and-assets.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
|
||||
#+title: Agora Requirements - 10: Governance and Physical Assets
|
||||
#+author: Amero Garcia
|
||||
#+created: [2026-03-22 Sun]
|
||||
#+ID: agora-requirements-10-governance
|
||||
#+STARTUP: content
|
||||
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 68ffa49f-f0d8-42cf-8b69-ae69de8bb815
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
* Governance and Physical Assets
|
||||
|
||||
** Overview
|
||||
|
||||
This section expands [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]]'s capabilities beyond digital communication and into physical reality and organizational coordination. By integrating Physical Asset Linking (PAL) and the Governance Executable Module (GEM), Agora empowers Collectives to manage real-world resources and execute democratic decisions autonomously via smart contracts.
|
||||
|
||||
** Governance Executable Module (GEM)
|
||||
|
||||
** Concept
|
||||
Governance in Agora isn't just about voting; it's about executing the results of those votes. The GEM ensures that when a community (a Collective Persona) makes a decision, the protocol enforces it without relying on trusted intermediaries or manual intervention.
|
||||
|
||||
** The Governance Stack
|
||||
Governance operates at three distinct scales, mirroring the human organization patterns of the Sovereign Stack:
|
||||
- *Micro-Governance (The Persona/Household):* Decisions made by a single seed holder or a small family multi-sig (e.g., "Who can spend from the grocery Lightning wallet?").
|
||||
- *Meso-Governance (The NGO/LLC/Circle):* Decisions made by a defined group using Weighted Voting (e.g., "Should our NGO hire this contractor?").
|
||||
- *Macro-Governance (The Protocol/Network):* Decisions that affect the entire ecosystem (e.g., "Should we upgrade the PDS data schema to version 2.0?").
|
||||
|
||||
** Advanced Voting Mechanisms
|
||||
To prevent plutocracy ("one-token, one-vote" dominance) and ensure healthy community dynamics, GEM supports pluggable mathematical models:
|
||||
- *Quadratic Voting:* The cost of a vote increases by the square of the votes cast ($cost = votes^2$). This prevents whales from dominating and allows users to signal the *intensity* of their preference across multiple proposals.
|
||||
- *Conviction Voting:* Voters "stake" their preference over time. The longer a user holds their vote on a proposal, the more weight it gains. This rewards long-term thinkers and prevents flash-mob takeovers.
|
||||
- *Liquid Democracy:* Users can delegate their "Moderation Vote" or "Treasury Vote" to a trusted expert. If the expert acts poorly, the user can instantly revoke the delegation.
|
||||
|
||||
** Constitution as Code
|
||||
A Collective Persona's rules are stored as an executable Smart Constitution.
|
||||
- *Policy Triggers:* If a vote passes to "Increase the Group's Arbitration Fee," the GEM automatically updates the fee parameter across all the Collective's active contracts. No human administrator is needed to change the settings.
|
||||
- *Veto & Cooling Off:* High-impact changes (e.g., moving treasury funds) include a mandatory Time-Lock (e.g., 7 days). The vote passes, but execution is delayed, giving the community a "Cooling-Off Period" to trigger a counter-vote or fork if they suspect foul play.
|
||||
|
||||
** Evolvable Governance: Adaptive Constitutions
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike traditional blockchain-based DAOs, where governance rules are often "frozen" in immutable smart contract code, Agora DAOs (Collectives) are designed to be evolvable. While the *history* of every decision is immutable and cryptographically traceable, the *active rules* of the organization can be updated through its own internal governance process.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Immutable History, Mutable State
|
||||
Every version of a Collective's Smart Constitution, every vote cast, and every policy change is recorded as a signed Note identified by a unique CID. This creates a perfect, unalterable audit trail. However, the "current state" of the Collective is defined by the most recent validly signed constitutional Note. This allows the organization to learn, adapt, and correct its course over time without requiring complex migrations or "forking" into entirely new software deployments.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Recursive Rule-Making
|
||||
The GEM supports recursive governance: the rules for *how* to change the rules are themselves defined within the Smart Constitution. A Collective might start with a simple multi-sig requirement for all changes and later vote to transition to a more complex Quadratic Voting model for policy updates, all while maintaining a continuous cryptographic identity.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Forks as a Sovereign Safety Valve
|
||||
Because Agora is decentralized and permissionless, "forking" is a legitimate and supported governance mechanism. If a minority of a Collective disagrees fundamentally with a constitutional change, they can choose to "fork" the organization by creating a new Collective Persona based on the previous CID of the constitution. This ensures that no community is ever trapped by a "majority tyranny" that has lost its original purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
** Automated Treasury Payroll (Streaming Lightning)
|
||||
The GEM connects governance directly to economic flow.
|
||||
- *Vote to Hire:* A Collective votes to hire a contractor (a Persona DID) for 100,000 sats/month.
|
||||
- *Execution:* Once the vote passes and the contract is signed by both parties, the GEM automatically instructs the Collective's Treasury Wallet to open a Lightning channel to the contractor and begin "streaming" payments block-by-block.
|
||||
- *Algorithmic Severance:* If a "Fire Contractor" or "Stop Work" vote subsequently passes, the GEM instantly closes the HTLC stream. Human intervention is not required to stop payroll.
|
||||
|
||||
** Physical Asset Linking (PAL)
|
||||
|
||||
The PAL protocol bridges physical objects (cars, houses, shipments, equipment) into the digital Contract layer. This enables physical assets to be used as collateral or traded via sovereign, cryptographically secured agreements.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 1. Digital Twins & Tokenization
|
||||
Every physical asset is represented by a "Digital Twin" on the network, which acts as its definitive digital record.
|
||||
|
||||
- *The Digital Passport:* This is a Verifiable Credential (VC) issued by a trusted entity (e.g., a manufacturer, community inspector, or professional guild) to a Persona. It proves the asset's attributes, provenance, and authenticity.
|
||||
- *Tokenization (Legal Title):* For high-value assets, a Persona can "mint" an NFT-like token (as a specialized Note or on an integrated sidechain). This token represents the "Legal Title" of the asset. Ownership of the token is cryptographically equivalent to holding the deed.
|
||||
- *Fractionalization:* Large assets can be fractionalized. For example, an NGO can tokenize a community building, allowing 1,000 members to own 0.1% each. Their voting power in the Governance (GEM) layer is then tied directly to these fractional tokens.
|
||||
|
||||
*** 2. Physical Collateral in Civil Contracts
|
||||
PAL allows users to secure loans or agreements using physical assets as collateral, providing a robust "Justice-as-a-Service" model even in environments with weak state institutions.
|
||||
|
||||
- *The Pledge:* A user links their Digital Twin token to a Civil Contract Note.
|
||||
- *The Lock:* Once pledged, the smart contract logic "freezes" the token. The user retains physical possession of the object, but they cannot cryptographically sell or transfer the digital title until the contract terms are fulfilled or the debt is settled.
|
||||
- *The "IoT Stick" (Optional):* For high-stakes assets (e.g., a tractor, factory machine, or smart-lock-equipped real estate), an IoT sensor can be bound to the contract. If the Hierarchical Dispute Resolution (HDR) module rules that a user has defaulted, the contract sends a signed signal to the machine's "Smart Lock" to disable its operation until the obligation is met.
|
||||
|
||||
** Decentralized Justice & Dispute Resolution (The Court System)
|
||||
|
||||
To enforce Civil Contracts and resolve Governance disputes without a central state, Agora implements a Hierarchical Dispute Resolution (HDR) framework. This mirrors the traditional legal system but replaces "jurisdiction by geography" with "jurisdiction by reputation and stake."
|
||||
|
||||
*** The Multi-Level "Court" Hierarchy
|
||||
Disputes are not settled by a single monolithic entity. Parties opt into a hierarchy of arbitration when creating a contract.
|
||||
- *Level 1 (Local/Immediate):* A "Local Elder" or a specifically chosen lightweight arbitrator.
|
||||
- *Level 2 (Guild/Specialized):* A specialized Arbitration Guild (e.g., the "Carpenters' Guild" for a furniture dispute).
|
||||
- *Level 3 (Global Jury):* The Final Court of Appeal, often a randomized, highly staked global jury.
|
||||
|
||||
*** The Mechanics of an Appeal (Cryptographic Escalation)
|
||||
In this system, an "Appeal" isn't a bureaucratic request; it is a *Cryptographic Escalation*.
|
||||
- *Level 1 Ruling:* The Level 1 arbitrator makes a ruling. If both parties accept the cryptographic signature of the ruling, the HODL invoice settles immediately.
|
||||
- *The Trigger:* If one party disagrees with the ruling, they must pay an "Appeal Fee" via Lightning. This fee prevents spam and economically funds the next level of jurors.
|
||||
- *The Escalation:* Paying the fee mathematically "unlocks" the case for Level 2 (The Guild). The contract logic automatically pushes the data (evidence, previous ruling) to the new panel's shared PDS.
|
||||
- *Finality:* Level 3 is the "Final Court of Appeal." Once the global jury rules, their combined threshold signature releases the cryptographic keys. The smart contract executes the payment automatically—no human can stop it.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Why This Works in "Weak States" (Self-Executing Justice)
|
||||
In jurisdictions where state police won't help collect a debt, or where courts are corrupt/slow, Agora provides Self-Executing Justice. It relies on two powerful enforcement mechanisms rather than physical violence:
|
||||
1. *The Escrow Stick:* The funds are already gone from the buyer's wallet. They are locked cryptographically in a Lightning HODL Escrow. The buyer cannot "run away" with the money; they must engage in the arbitration process to get it back or see it released to the seller.
|
||||
2. *The Reputation Stick:* In a decentralized society, a Persona's DID is their livelihood. Defying a Level 3 ruling, or accumulating a history of defaulted contracts, destroys a Persona's "Trust Score." In a system built on verifiable attestations, losing this reputation is a digital death sentence for a business, making compliance highly incentivized.
|
||||
37
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-10-user-journey.org
Normal file
37
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-10-user-journey.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
|
||||
#+title: Agora Requirements: User Journey & Product Experience
|
||||
#+AUTHOR: Project Agora
|
||||
#+DATE: 2026-03-26
|
||||
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 2cace571-76bb-4c34-a5f4-68bc20b2e884
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
* The Sovereign User Journey
|
||||
|
||||
This document outlines the cohesive, narrative user journey of the [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]] platform, illustrating how the underlying technical primitives (Master Keys, DIDs, PDS, Lightning, and Smart Contracts) translate into a seamless product experience.
|
||||
|
||||
** Phase 1: Onboarding (The Birth of the Persona)
|
||||
|
||||
- *Download & Seed:* The user downloads the app. The very first action the app takes is generating a cryptographic Seed Phrase (the Master Key / Anima). This anchors their sovereignty immediately.
|
||||
- *Persona Creation:* The user is not asked to create a global "Username." Instead, they create context-specific Personas, for example, a "Work" persona and a "Social" persona. Behind the scenes, the app derives two distinct DIDs from the single Master Key.
|
||||
- *The Founder Connection (Minors):* For younger users (minors), a parent or guardian can scan a QR code to "Co-sign" the identity inception. This immediately establishes the Succession Logic and delegated authority outlined in the Identity specifications.
|
||||
- *PDS Selection:* The user is prompted with: "Where would you like to store your data?" They are presented with options and might select a Community PDS run by a local NGO or guild they trust, ensuring their data sovereignty from day one.
|
||||
|
||||
** Phase 2: Consumption & "Seeding" (The Data Economy)
|
||||
|
||||
- *Choosing a Lens:* The user navigates to the "Marketplace" and selects a curation algorithm, such as the "Scientific Signal" Lens. Their feed instantly rearranges to prioritize verified research and high-signal content, bypassing centralized algorithmic manipulation.
|
||||
- *Micro-Earning (Bandwidth Sharing):* The user watches a video. In their settings, a toggle is enabled: "Support this creator by seeding." As they watch, their phone (via WebRTC) serves bits of the video to 3 other nearby users, acting as an ephemeral CDN node.
|
||||
- *The Reward:* Because they provided bandwidth and aided the network, the creator’s PDS sends a micro-transaction "Thank You" of 5 sats ($0.002) directly to the user’s integrated Lightning wallet. While small, this passive income covers the cost of their own PDS hosting for the month.
|
||||
|
||||
** Phase 3: The Civil Contract (Digital Law)
|
||||
|
||||
- *The Deal:* User A wants to purchase a custom-built chair from User B.
|
||||
- *The Contract:* They click "Create Contract" and select a standardized Markdown Template for "Handmade Goods."
|
||||
- *Arbitration Choice:* Both parties agree to use the "Carpenters' Guild" as the Level 2 Arbitrator in case of a dispute.
|
||||
- *The Lock:* User A pays the Lightning invoice. The funds move into a HODL Escrow. User B sees the "Funds Locked" status and confidently begins building the chair.
|
||||
- *The Delivery:* User B delivers the chair. User A scans a QR code physically attached to the chair, which acts as the cryptographic release of the Preimage, instantly settling the smart contract and paying User B.
|
||||
|
||||
* Related Documents
|
||||
- [[id:6fe67db6-25bd-4d11-bd1d-b44ec809e858][02 Identity (Master Keys & Personas)]]
|
||||
- [[id:3b43a9b8-31d1-4479-a35f-22273b74f0c7][03 Infrastructure (PDS & WebRTC Seeding)]]
|
||||
- [[id:90484f4a-5b70-4001-93d6-e610e54ed573][06 Exchange & Contracts (HODL Escrows & Arbitration)]]
|
||||
76
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-11-assessment.org
Normal file
76
ideas/agora/agora-requirements-11-assessment.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
|
||||
#+title: Agora Requirements - 11: Realistic Assessment
|
||||
#+author: Amero Garcia
|
||||
#+created: [2026-03-16 Mon 14:28]
|
||||
#+DATE: 2026-03-22
|
||||
#+ID: agora-requirements-10-assessment
|
||||
#+STARTUP: content
|
||||
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 72570648-d943-42e5-a781-3b09791ac6ec
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
* Realistic Assessment: Practicality, Technology, and Performance
|
||||
|
||||
The [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]] Protocol, following the integration of the Aletheia architecture, represents a significant leap beyond simple social networking into a comprehensive "Sovereign Social Operating System." This assessment evaluates the protocol's viability across three critical pillars.
|
||||
|
||||
** 1. Practicality: The Sovereignty vs. UX Trade-off
|
||||
|
||||
Agora's practicality hinges on whether users can manage its cryptographic complexity without constant friction.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Strengths
|
||||
- *Functional Autonomy:* The "Sub-Root" HD derivation path (`m/44'/1'/account'/persona'/key_purpose/key_index`) is a major practical win. By allowing devices to derive operational keys (Lightning, PGP) autonomously, Agora reduces the "[[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][Hardware]] Wallet Fatigue" that plagues self-sovereign systems.
|
||||
- *Unified Logic:* The "Everything is a Note" model simplifies the backend infrastructure (PDS/Relays), as they only need to handle a single data structure regardless of whether it's a social post or a legal contract.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Challenges
|
||||
- *The "Client-Side Weight" Problem:* Because the underlying protocol is "dumb" (routing signed blobs), the client application must do the heavy lifting of parsing JSON-LD, verifying signatures, and rendering complex contract logic. Building a high-performance client that remains responsive while doing this is a significant engineering challenge.
|
||||
- *Recovery Education:* Even with Blinded Sharding and Social Recovery, the concept of "losing your seed = losing your digital life" remains a massive barrier to mainstream adoption.
|
||||
|
||||
** 2. Technology: Cryptographic Robustness
|
||||
|
||||
The technical stack is grounded in industry-standard primitives used in Bitcoin and DID ecosystems, ensuring high confidence in its core security.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Technological Pillars
|
||||
- *Identity:* Leveraging BIP-44 and Ed25519 provides a battle-tested foundation for unlinkable personas.
|
||||
- *Privacy:* The combination of E2EE (Double Ratchet/MLS), Blinded Sharding, and Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) for cross-persona Notes places Agora at the forefront of privacy-preserving social protocols.
|
||||
- *Commerce:* Integrating LSATs and HODL invoices directly into the content layer (SCAL) is technically sound but relies heavily on the continued [[id:26f3e845-5eb4-4bcd-9cff-28e219934841][growth]] and stability of the Lightning Network.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Critical Risks
|
||||
- *ZKP Complexity:* Implementing efficient ZKPs for identity linking that run on mobile hardware is technically non-trivial and may require specialized libraries or "Prover" sub-agents.
|
||||
- *Quantum Readiness:* While Pre-rotation (KEL) provides a path to forward security, the protocol must eventually transition to post-quantum algorithms (e.g., Dilithium) as they become standardized.
|
||||
|
||||
** 3. Performance: Scalability and Efficiency
|
||||
|
||||
Agora's performance model is decentralized by design, avoiding the "Global State" bottlenecks of traditional blockchains.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Scaling Models
|
||||
- *Reference-on-Send (Public Content):* Highly scalable. Only notifications and CIDs are pushed; content is pulled on-demand. This mirrors the efficient scaling of the web (CDNs/caching).
|
||||
- *Copy-on-Send (Private Content):* Resource-intensive. A direct message to 100 people creates 100 unique, encrypted Notes. While this ensures sovereignty, it places a higher storage and bandwidth burden on PDS providers compared to "Single-Instance" storage models.
|
||||
|
||||
*** Optimization Strategies
|
||||
- *Delta Sync:* Essential for mobile performance. By only transferring differential updates between the Client and PDS, Agora can maintain low latency even over poor network connections.
|
||||
- *Relay-as-Indexer:* High-performance Relays can act as opt-in indexers, providing fast search and discovery without users surrendering their data ownership.
|
||||
|
||||
** Success Probability & Timeline
|
||||
|
||||
| Milestone | Timeline | Probability | Note |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|-------------|------|
|
||||
| 100K users | 2-3 years | 40% | Niche-market focus (freelancers, privacy advocates) |
|
||||
| 1M users | 4-5 years | 20% | Requires a "Killer App" (e.g., Sovereign Marketplace) |
|
||||
| 10M users | 7-10 years | 10% | Dependent on "Big Tech" fatigue/regulatory pressure |
|
||||
|
||||
** Codebase Size Estimate
|
||||
|
||||
- *Core Protocol (PDS/Relay Spec):* 50-80K lines of code.
|
||||
- *Universal Client (iOS/Android):* 150-250K lines of code.
|
||||
- *Smart Contract Engine (SCAL/GEM):* 100K lines of code.
|
||||
- *Total v1.0 Stack:* 400-600K lines of code.
|
||||
|
||||
** Conclusion: A Pragmatic Revolution
|
||||
|
||||
Agora is technically viable but architecturally demanding. It is not a project that can be built by a single "full-stack developer" in a weekend. It requires a specialized team of cryptographers, systems engineers, and UX designers. However, because it avoids the "Global Consensus" trap of blockchains, its performance characteristics are much closer to the traditional web, making it a truly practical alternative for building a sovereign digital civilization.
|
||||
|
||||
** Related Documents
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:b25bf753-9799-41ab-82f5-1a1416db756b][01: Overview]]
|
||||
- [[id:6fe67db6-25bd-4d11-bd1d-b44ec809e858][02: Identity]]
|
||||
- [[id:8b4e0cec-a7b0-4e75-a1e3-c55ae820eb6d][09: Implementation]]
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 5f55bbe6-d243-5766-8ccf-5c5cc88a6542
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Impact on the AI and GPU Industry
|
||||
@@ -6,10 +7,10 @@
|
||||
|
||||
If a symbolic-bootstrapping architecture becomes popular, the industry structure shifts fundamentally:
|
||||
|
||||
**Token demand compresses.** The entire AI industry (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google — ~$50B API revenue) is built on per-token pricing. A mature Passepartout reduces token consumption to the unfamiliar 10% I/O boundary. Steady-state per-user LLM consumption drops by an order of magnitude.
|
||||
**Token demand compresses.** The entire AI industry (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google — ~$50B API revenue) is built on per-token pricing. A mature [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] reduces token consumption to the unfamiliar 10% I/O boundary. Steady-state per-user LLM consumption drops by an order of magnitude.
|
||||
|
||||
**GPU inference demand plateaus in regulated industries.** Inference demand drops 80-90% in any sector where the rule book is published — which covers most economically significant sectors (finance, healthcare, industrial, government procurement, legal compliance). Nvidia's growth narrative shifts from "every transaction goes through a GPU" to "every training run needs a GPU."
|
||||
|
||||
**Hyperscaler competition shifts.** The race shifts from "who has the most H100s" to "who has the best domain-specific gate rules." Google's industry data advantage matters more than Azure's raw compute.
|
||||
|
||||
**New hardware tier emerges:** CPU-native [[file:self-driving-lisp-machine.org][verification appliances running Lisp microcode]] on RISC-V cores. Low volume (hundreds of thousands/year), high margin ($5K-50K/unit). Manufacturable at older fab nodes (28nm, 45nm) — no dependency on TSMC's leading edge. This hardware embodies [[file:lisp-economics.org][Lisp economics]] — the cost of verification approaches zero once the symbolic engine is running on dedicated silicon. The outcome is a [[file:verification-monopoly.org][verification monopoly]] for agent safety — the same certification dynamic UL provides for electrical safety.
|
||||
**New hardware tier emerges:** CPU-native [[id:13e6ae54-2d24-5aa0-b1cd-a7e8e749aa70][verification appliances running Lisp microcode]] on RISC-V cores. Low volume (hundreds of thousands/year), high margin ($5K-50K/unit). Manufacturable at older fab nodes (28nm, 45nm) — no dependency on TSMC's leading edge. This hardware embodies [[id:9af13fff-9725-542b-93b1-a555bc74ad72][Lisp economics]] — the cost of verification approaches zero once the symbolic engine is running on dedicated silicon. The outcome is a [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]] for agent safety — the same certification dynamic UL provides for electrical safety.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 57f9538a-6270-4302-8d07-d742168419eb
|
||||
:ID: alternative-growth-social-first
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Alternative Growth — Social-First Scenario
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:growth:strategy:alternative:
|
||||
|
||||
The existing growth-strategy assumes institution-first growth: compliance → developer → consumer → regulatory. This page documents an alternative path: grow as a general-purpose social identity network, let institutions catch up later. The triad components (Logos, Stoa, Agora) are the same; the order of operations and the primary growth levers differ fundamentally.
|
||||
The existing growth-strategy assumes institution-first growth: compliance → developer → consumer → regulatory. This page documents an alternative path: grow as a general-purpose social identity network, let institutions catch up later. The triad components (Logos, [[id:c3b3dc41-945f-54e9-84eb-ca014114f1be][Stoa]], [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]]) are the same; the order of operations and the primary growth levers differ fundamentally.
|
||||
|
||||
* Why This Path Exists
|
||||
|
||||
The institution-first scenario (growth-strategy.org) takes the product's core technical capability — verification — and finds the customer with the clearest pain. That is the safe bet. But the triad ships with a second product that has nothing to do with verification: the Agora, a unified publishing network, contract platform, payment network, and decentralized identity layer rolled into one. No product on the market offers this combination — ENS is names, Bluesky is social, Stripe is payments, DocuSign is contracts. The Agora replaces all four with one provable layer.
|
||||
The institution-first scenario ([[id:d28adac8-08a1-40c4-ae43-b5d8d7b1743f][growth strategy]]) takes the product's core technical capability — verification — and finds the customer with the clearest pain. That is the safe bet. But the triad ships with a second product that has nothing to do with verification: the Agora, a unified publishing network, contract platform, payment network, and decentralized identity layer rolled into one. No product on the market offers this combination — ENS is names, Bluesky is social, Stripe is payments, DocuSign is contracts. The Agora replaces all four with one provable layer.
|
||||
|
||||
The social-first scenario leans into what the Agora is /as a product/, not what the triad is /as a technology/. Publishing, payments, contracts, and identity are all mass-market primitives. They can grow without ever mentioning ACL2, gate rules, or compliance. Verification is the infrastructure underneath, invisible to users until they need it.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ Growth lever: Multi-vector network effects. The Agora grows not on a single curv
|
||||
1. Publishing: each new creator attracts readers, who may become creators
|
||||
2. Payments: each new payment user creates liquidity that makes the network more useful for everyone
|
||||
3. Contracts: each new contract written on the Agora creates a template and a precedent
|
||||
4. PDS: each new PDS increases the federation surface and the compute marketplace supply
|
||||
4. PDS: each new PDS increases the federation surface and the [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]] supply
|
||||
|
||||
Any of these can be the primary growth vector in a given market. If publishing stalls in one region, payments might take off. This redundancy dramatically increases the probability that /some/ vector finds PMF.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ Tactics:
|
||||
|
||||
4. /PDS hosting as infrastructure./ The PDS is the backbone, not the headline. Freemium model: first 1GB free, $5-15/mo for unlimited. The PDS stores your identity, content, contracts, and payment history in one place. The value prop: /one account, one data store, one reputation, everywhere/.
|
||||
|
||||
5. /Fee-based revenue./ The Agora takes 0.5-2% on payment transactions and 5-10% on marketplace contracts (data licensing, compute). These fees are invisible to users (built into the platform layer) and scale with usage. Unlike subscription revenue, they require zero active selling — the platform grows, fees follow.
|
||||
5. /Fee-based revenue./ The Agora takes 0.5-2% on payment transactions and 5-10% on marketplace contracts (data [[id:67faf52f-9126-50a7-b87e-2bedc610dac7][licensing]], compute). These fees are invisible to users (built into the platform layer) and scale with usage. Unlike subscription revenue, they require zero active selling — the platform grows, fees follow.
|
||||
|
||||
Revenue:
|
||||
| Stream | Year 1 target | Mature |
|
||||
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ Customer: At this scale, the Agora is the default identity and communication lay
|
||||
|
||||
Growth lever: Default status. The network is the path of least resistance. A new social platform would need to replicate not just the user base but the entire attestation history, compute marketplace, and institutional infrastructure. The moat is not legal (regulation) but practical (installed base + cumulative value).
|
||||
|
||||
Tactics: Similar end state to the institution-first scenario — verification monopoly, certified appliance sales, insurance marketplace, nation-state deployments. The difference is the /path/ and the /character/ of the moat:
|
||||
Tactics: Similar end state to the institution-first scenario — [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]], certified appliance sales, insurance marketplace, nation-state deployments. The difference is the /path/ and the /character/ of the moat:
|
||||
|
||||
- Institution-first moat: regulatory lock-in. You comply because the law requires it.
|
||||
- Social-first moat: installed-base lock-in. You join because everyone is there.
|
||||
@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ The multi-vector growth also matters. The institution-first path has one entry v
|
||||
|
||||
The fee-based revenue model further improves Phase 0 economics. Payment processing fees scale with transaction volume, not user count. A small number of high-value users (freelancers sending invoices, creators selling subscriptions) can generate meaningful revenue before the network reaches critical mass.
|
||||
|
||||
However: the core tension remains. The team building the triad is a deep-tech verification team — their competence is ACL2, gate rules, provably correct systems. The social-first path requires the team to also be a consumer product team — UX design, growth loops, community management, creator partnerships, payment infrastructure, fraud detection. That is not /impossible/ (the team can hire) but it is a different company than the one building Passepartout.
|
||||
However: the core tension remains. The team building the triad is a deep-tech verification team — their competence is ACL2, gate rules, provably correct systems. The social-first path requires the team to also be a consumer product team — UX design, growth loops, community management, creator partnerships, payment infrastructure, fraud detection. That is not /impossible/ (the team can hire) but it is a different company than the one building [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]].
|
||||
|
||||
The institution-first path monetizes the team's /existing/ competence from day one. The social-first path requires building a second competence (consumer platform) that does not exist yet. This is the real distinction, not the product's inherent potential.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -182,12 +183,12 @@ The hybrid path may be the strongest: ship the four-layer Agora as a public plat
|
||||
|
||||
* References
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:growth-strategy.org][Primary growth strategy — institution-first]]
|
||||
- [[file:revenue-hub.org][Revenue streams by component]]
|
||||
- [[file:agora-contracts.org][Agora contract platform details]]
|
||||
- [[file:effects-growth-flywheel.org][Effects and growth as interleaved curves]]
|
||||
- [[file:time-estimates.org][Development timeline — Phase Zero and End State]]
|
||||
- [[id:d28adac8-08a1-40c4-ae43-b5d8d7b1743f][Primary growth strategy — institution-first]]
|
||||
- [[id:ed05cab4-88e9-4e25-b7c9-346fa39c69a0][Revenue streams by component]]
|
||||
- [[id:64708e1f-00e9-4cb7-b44b-ea0b98e5296d][Agora contract platform details]]
|
||||
- [[id:528a0f6c-6fd6-41ed-9d59-237958bdaef2][Effects and growth as interleaved curves]]
|
||||
- [[id:dc2e4f22-1c4c-5d4a-a151-f96e5d3b0d70][Development timeline — Phase Zero and End State]]
|
||||
|
||||
#+begin_quote
|
||||
The social-first path is attractive because the end state is stronger. But the path to it requires building a consumer product alongside the deep-tech verification infrastructure — essentially running two startups in parallel. The institution-first path is the higher-probability bet because it monetizes the core technical advantage from day one.
|
||||
The social-first path is attractive because the end state is stronger. But the path to it requires building a consumer product alongside the deep-tech verification infrastructure — essentially running two startups in parallel. The [[id:0f949f6c-4cf1-49eb-b9a4-ebcac27ee548][Agora Social Space requirements]] describe the community interaction model that makes the social-first path viable.. The institution-first path is the higher-probability bet because it monetizes the core technical advantage from day one.
|
||||
#+end_quote
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 0a4e0b8f-25e0-4b78-9633-fc37d03cefe9
|
||||
:ID: asset-protection-structures
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -11,11 +12,11 @@ Research on corporate structures for a US-incorporated tech company with offshor
|
||||
|
||||
The triad has three distinct asset classes, each with different protection needs:
|
||||
|
||||
1. /IP (Logos):/ Passepartout codebase, gate rules, ACL2 proof libraries, the verification monopoly. This is the core defensible IP. Needs to be owned separately from the operating company so that if the operating company is sued, the IP is not reachable.
|
||||
1. /IP (Logos):/ [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] codebase, gate rules, ACL2 proof libraries, the [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]]. This is the core defensible IP. Needs to be owned separately from the operating company so that if the operating company is sued, the IP is not reachable.
|
||||
|
||||
2. /Platform (Agora):/ The network itself — user base, reputation graph, contract history, protocol specification. This is harder to value and harder to protect because its value is partly in the user base. But the code, protocol spec, and network infrastructure can be owned separately.
|
||||
2. /Platform ([[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]]):/ The network itself — user base, reputation graph, contract history, protocol specification. This is harder to value and harder to protect because its value is partly in the user base. But the code, protocol spec, and network infrastructure can be owned separately.
|
||||
|
||||
3. /Revenue streams:/ Enterprise compliance contracts, transaction fees, PDS hosting subscriptions. These flow through the operating company. A judgment against the operating company attaches to the revenue in that entity.
|
||||
3. /[[id:ed05cab4-88e9-4e25-b7c9-346fa39c69a0][Revenue streams]]:/ Enterprise compliance contracts, transaction fees, PDS hosting subscriptions. These flow through the operating company. A judgment against the operating company attaches to the revenue in that entity.
|
||||
|
||||
* Common Structures
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ Assessment: Fine for Phase 0. Upgrade when revenue exceeds liability risk tolera
|
||||
- Delaware C-Corp is the operating company (sells verification, runs the Agora PDS infrastructure)
|
||||
- A separate IP holding company in BVI, Cayman, or Nevis owns the Passepartout code, gate rules, ACL2 libraries, and the Agora protocol spec
|
||||
- The operating company licenses the IP from the holding company at arm's-length royalty rates
|
||||
- The holding company accumulates IP licensing revenue in the offshore jurisdiction
|
||||
- The holding company accumulates IP [[id:67faf52f-9126-50a7-b87e-2bedc610dac7][licensing]] revenue in the offshore jurisdiction
|
||||
|
||||
Pros: Strong IP protection — a judgment against the operating company cannot reach the IP (the operating company doesn't own it). Profits from licensing are outside US tax jurisdiction until repatriated.
|
||||
Cons: US tax reform (TCJA 2017) introduced GILTI (Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income) — this structure is less tax-effective than pre-2017. Transfer pricing documentation required. Increases administrative complexity.
|
||||
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ Cons: Complex, expensive to set up and maintain. Many investors are uncomfortabl
|
||||
** Structure D: Delaware C-Corp + Delaware LLC Series + Offshore
|
||||
|
||||
- Delaware C-Corp as parent
|
||||
- Each business line (Logos verification, Agora network, compute marketplace, PDS hosting) is a separate Delaware series LLC
|
||||
- Each business line (Logos verification, Agora network, [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]], PDS hosting) is a separate Delaware series LLC
|
||||
- IP held in an offshore company, licensed to each series LLC
|
||||
- Series LLCs protect assets within each series from liabilities arising in other series
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ Cons: Series LLC is legally untested in many jurisdictions. Some states don't re
|
||||
|
||||
** The IP is the crown jewel
|
||||
|
||||
The verification monopoly /is/ the moat. The ACL2 proof libraries, gate rule library, and regression suite are accumulated over years and cannot be recreated quickly. These must be owned by a separate entity from the operating company. If the operating company is sued, the IP survives.
|
||||
[[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][The verification monopoly]] /is/ the moat. The ACL2 proof libraries, gate rule library, and regression suite are accumulated over years and cannot be recreated quickly. These must be owned by a separate entity from the operating company. If the operating company is sued, the IP survives.
|
||||
|
||||
** The Agora network is harder to protect**
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ If the Agora has 100K+ users and payment volume, separate the business lines int
|
||||
|
||||
When the cumulative value justifies the cost and complexity: move the BVI IP Co ownership into an irrevocable offshore trust with the founders as beneficiaries.
|
||||
|
||||
* What This Means for the Growth Strategy
|
||||
* What This Means for the [[id:d28adac8-08a1-40c4-ae43-b5d8d7b1743f][Growth Strategy]]
|
||||
|
||||
The institution-first path (enterprise compliance) and the social-first path (Agora communities) have /different liability profiles/ that push toward different structures:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ The combined strategy (both engines) makes the Phase 1 structure (Delaware OpCo
|
||||
|
||||
This is preliminary research. Specific recommendations require a US corporate lawyer (incorporation), an international tax lawyer (offshore structure), and an asset protection specialist (trust/AP structure). The right order: incorporate in Delaware when ready, then hire a lawyer to plan the offshore structure before significant revenue or users accumulate.
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:growth-strategy.org][Combined growth strategy]]
|
||||
- [[file:competitive-landscape-agora.org][Agora competitive landscape]]
|
||||
- [[file:agora-entry-strategy.org][Entry strategy — organized communities]]
|
||||
- [[file:outbound-sales-compliance.org][Outbound sales compliance framework]]
|
||||
- [[id:d28adac8-08a1-40c4-ae43-b5d8d7b1743f][Combined growth strategy]]
|
||||
- [[id:1bc22b89-d3eb-4f6d-bcfc-2b0c19c8ed8f][Agora competitive landscape]]
|
||||
- [[id:8c7b9812-f8d6-4347-8915-ce8e520b7914][Entry strategy — organized communities]]
|
||||
- [[id:98364e9d-a8a9-42b7-a9dc-b643fd2ccc4b][Outbound sales compliance framework]]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 2afd9a3c-e96a-54c7-ac77-a05a28065b4b
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Biology as Proof of the Lisp Model
|
||||
@@ -14,4 +15,4 @@ Striking parallels between microbiology and the Lisp model:
|
||||
6. **Duck typing** — protein folding depends on chemical environment, not type declarations
|
||||
7. **Concurrent real-time GC** — apoptosis breaks down cell components for recycling by neighboring cells
|
||||
|
||||
Biology chose the Lisp model because it is more robust, adaptable, and evolvable. Evolution optimized for survival in an unpredictable environment, not peak single-thread throughput. Biology is the proof that the Lisp model can be efficient at planetary scale, running on hardware that self-assembles from food. See [[file:lisp-economics.org][Lisp economics]] for how these biological parallels inform the business model.
|
||||
Biology chose the Lisp model because it is more robust, adaptable, and evolvable. Evolution optimized for survival in an unpredictable environment, not peak single-thread throughput. Biology is the proof that the Lisp model can be efficient at planetary scale, running on hardware that self-assembles from food. See [[id:9af13fff-9725-542b-93b1-a555bc74ad72][Lisp economics]] for how these biological parallels inform the business model.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: a5d59d12-b23e-58d6-a81b-9b8b06556949
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Collective Regression Suite — Specification
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:evaluation:regression:suite:collective:
|
||||
|
||||
The [[file:evaluation-harness.org][evaluation harness]] is not a static test suite written once. It is a living artifact that grows with every deployed instance. Every gate decision that a human corrects becomes a test case. Every bug fix adds an edge case. Every regulatory update adds a rule that must be checked.
|
||||
The [[id:45258a2d-1675-562c-9024-5d1eb2f1ea56][evaluation harness]] is not a static test suite written once. It is a living artifact that grows with every deployed instance. Every gate decision that a human corrects becomes a test case. Every bug fix adds an edge case. Every regulatory update adds a rule that must be checked.
|
||||
|
||||
This specification describes how the collective regression suite is built, maintained, and used, with Agora as the substrate for distribution and contribution.
|
||||
This specification describes how the collective regression suite is built, maintained, and used, with [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]] as the substrate for distribution and contribution.
|
||||
|
||||
**Why collective**
|
||||
|
||||
A single instance learns from its own mistakes. The collective learns from every instance's mistakes. A HIPAA deployment in one hospital discovers an edge case that a SOC2 deployment in a SaaS company would never encounter on its own — but if that SaaS company ever expands into healthcare, their gate stack must handle that edge case. The collective suite gives them hundreds of thousands of edge cases they did not pay to discover.
|
||||
A single instance learns from its own mistakes. The collective learns from every instance's mistakes. A [[id:84fb5f8f-0527-4df0-b6b6-dbf3bcff8a7f][HIPAA]] deployment in one hospital discovers an edge case that a [[id:ed65031c-cbd2-4ad2-bd53-a67791e183cd][SOC2]] deployment in a SaaS company would never encounter on its own — but if that SaaS company ever expands into healthcare, their gate stack must handle that edge case. The collective suite gives them hundreds of thousands of edge cases they did not pay to discover.
|
||||
|
||||
This is the mechanism behind the [[file:verification-monopoly.org][verification monopoly claim]]. A certification means "your gate stack is verified against every edge case ever discovered by any instance in the ecosystem." A competitor starting from scratch cannot buy or scrape this knowledge.
|
||||
This is the mechanism behind the [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly claim]]. A certification means "your gate stack is verified against every edge case ever discovered by any instance in the ecosystem." A competitor starting from scratch cannot buy or scrape this knowledge.
|
||||
|
||||
**What a test case is**
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -87,7 +88,7 @@ Each .regression file is a compressed, sorted list of test cases. The manifest i
|
||||
|
||||
**Who can submit**
|
||||
|
||||
Any Passepartout instance with an Agora DID can submit test cases. But not all submissions are treated equally. The suite maintains a three-tier system:
|
||||
Any [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] instance with an Agora DID can submit test cases. But not all submissions are treated equally. The suite maintains a three-tier system:
|
||||
|
||||
Tier 1 — Verified. Human-reviewed by the suite operator. Used in certification scoring. An instance that passes Tier 1 earns the standard certification badge.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ Assume each deployed instance generates on average one new unique test case per
|
||||
- Year 2: ~50,000 cases (1,000 instances x 50 weeks x 1 case/week)
|
||||
- Year 3: ~500,000 cases (10,000 instances x 50 weeks x 1 case/week)
|
||||
|
||||
At year 3, a new instance that runs the suite captures half a million edge cases from real deployments at zero marginal cost. The operator charges $50K-$200K for the certification. The insurmountability is not technical — a well-funded competitor could reproduce some of these cases through synthetic generation. The insurmountability is provenance: these cases are labeled by real human corrections from real deployments. A synthetic case is a best guess. The collective suite's cases are ground truth. This creates powerful [[file:moats.org][moats]] — the data network effect is inherently accumulated over time and cannot be bought.
|
||||
At year 3, a new instance that runs the suite captures half a million edge cases from real deployments at zero marginal cost. The operator charges $50K-$200K for the certification. The insurmountability is not technical — a well-funded competitor could reproduce some of these cases through synthetic generation. The insurmountability is provenance: these cases are labeled by real human corrections from real deployments. A synthetic case is a best guess. The collective suite's cases are ground truth. This creates powerful [[id:aa6d062e-a520-5d14-8773-00687ed9c689][moats]] — the data network effect is inherently accumulated over time and cannot be bought.
|
||||
|
||||
**The operator's role**
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -143,4 +144,4 @@ Instance runs → human corrects a gate decision → new test case is abstracted
|
||||
|
||||
Every component of this loop exists or is on Passepartout's roadmap except the Agora Note publishing channel. The gate stack generates the raw signal. The abstraction pass strips instance details. The local triage de-duplicates. The Agora DID provides authentication. The Merkle root provides integrity. The certification badge provides monetization.
|
||||
|
||||
Nothing in this loop requires new core Passepartout functionality. It requires the Agora protocol for inter-instance communication and a server-side aggregation process. Both are roadmap items, but neither depends on the self-driving Lisp Machine. The suite itself is the [[file:infrastructure-lock-in.org][infrastructure lock-in]] — once an enterprise has certified against it, switching to a competitor means rebuilding their compliance from scratch.
|
||||
Nothing in this loop requires new core Passepartout functionality. It requires the Agora protocol for inter-instance communication and a server-side aggregation process. Both are roadmap items, but neither depends on [[id:13e6ae54-2d24-5aa0-b1cd-a7e8e749aa70][the self-driving Lisp Machine]]. The suite itself is the [[id:2f783eb4-638e-5afa-9b59-6224d086a712][infrastructure lock-in]] — once an enterprise has certified against it, switching to a competitor means rebuilding their compliance from scratch.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 04c2f221-c54f-51e5-b40a-48822cd16d45
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Common Logic (ISO 24707) — Relevance to Passepartout
|
||||
@@ -8,13 +9,13 @@ Common Logic (ISO/IEC 24707) is a framework for first-order logic languages desi
|
||||
|
||||
Three standard dialects: CLIF (Common Logic Interchange Format), CGIF (Conceptual Graph Interchange Format), XCL (XML-based). Additionally, RDF and OWL can be mapped to CL, making them interoperable with any CL dialect.
|
||||
|
||||
**Relevance to Passepartout**
|
||||
**Relevance to [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]]**
|
||||
|
||||
The fact store interchange format. Passepartout's fact store uses plists internally — fast, native to Lisp, zero serialization cost. But between instances (Agora sync, backup/restore, export), a standardized format is needed. CLIF is a strong candidate because its first-order logic is a direct match for the [[file:gate-rule-encoding.org][gate rules]] ACL2 verifies. A CLIF-to-ACL2 translator is mechanically straightforward — both operate on first-order formulas.
|
||||
The fact store interchange format. Passepartout's fact store uses plists internally — fast, native to Lisp, zero serialization cost. But between instances ([[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]] sync, backup/restore, export), a standardized format is needed. CLIF is a strong candidate because its first-order logic is a direct match for the [[id:45ea493b-94ad-5885-aa65-0c846e5c3c1d][gate rules]] ACL2 verifies. A CLIF-to-ACL2 translator is mechanically straightforward — both operate on first-order formulas.
|
||||
|
||||
The dialect architecture mirrors Passepartout. CL's defining insight: define abstract semantics, let any concrete syntax map to it, get interoperability for free. This is the exact same pattern as Passepartout's "one gate stack, many skills" — the gate stack defines the security ontology (abstract semantics), and skills (dialects) map their operations to it. CL's approach validates Passepartout's design choice and provides a theoretical framework for it.
|
||||
|
||||
ISO standard as a credential. For regulated industries, "the knowledge representation follows ISO/IEC 24707" is a strong signal. It says the format is not proprietary, has formal semantics, and has been reviewed by an international body. This matters for HIPAA, SOC2, FedRAMP, and any compliance framework that asks about data representation standards. It is a checkbox that enterprise procurement requires.
|
||||
ISO standard as a credential. For regulated industries, "the knowledge representation follows ISO/IEC 24707" is a strong signal. It says the format is not proprietary, has formal semantics, and has been reviewed by an international body. This matters for [[id:84fb5f8f-0527-4df0-b6b6-dbf3bcff8a7f][HIPAA]], [[id:ed65031c-cbd2-4ad2-bd53-a67791e183cd][SOC2]], [[id:e6993701-3c67-49bf-82f3-06907572cbf3][FedRAMP]], and any compliance framework that asks about data representation standards. It is a checkbox that enterprise procurement requires.
|
||||
|
||||
The RDF/OWL bridge. CL has defined translations to RDF and OWL. This means Passepartout can consume knowledge from the semantic web without building a separate RDF parser. The fact store stays in plists internally; CL is the serialization and interchange layer. Any enterprise knowledge graph expressed in OWL can be ingested as CLIF, translated to plists, and verified by ACL2.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -43,4 +44,4 @@ Common Logic is relevant not as something to implement or replace, but as:
|
||||
4. A bridge to RDF/OWL data sources
|
||||
5. A cautionary example for the CIC prover design (careful about higher-order scope)
|
||||
|
||||
The right time to integrate it: when Agora Notes need a standard knowledge interchange format for inter-instance communication. Before that, it is a reference worth reading but not implementing. The CL approach informs the [[file:sufficiency-flip.org][sufficiency flip]] strategy and the [[file:cost-structure.org][cost structure]] of encoding domain knowledge.
|
||||
The right time to integrate it: when Agora Notes need a standard knowledge interchange format for inter-instance communication. Before that, it is a reference worth reading but not implementing. The CL approach informs the [[id:efc76898-03f7-57ba-923d-35d65da88bb7][sufficiency flip]] strategy and the [[id:0b5a8a74-cfd6-542d-bc88-4eb3cd8626f9][cost structure]] of encoding domain knowledge.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 00ab3a4d-e3de-5605-a67d-12935bb36ab5
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Comparison with Symbolics Genera
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:history:symbolics:comparison:
|
||||
|
||||
| | Symbolics Genera (1980s) | Passepartout (2020s) |
|
||||
| | Symbolics Genera (1980s) | [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] (2020s) |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Lines | ~1,000,000 | ~21,000 (self-driving target) |
|
||||
| Developer-years | ~10 years, large team | ~1 year, 1-3 devs |
|
||||
@@ -13,4 +14,4 @@
|
||||
| Market | $50K-$100K/seat | $5K-$50K/appliance |
|
||||
| Scope | Full OS + environment | Cognitive agent + hardware acceleration |
|
||||
|
||||
The Symbolics comparison is instructive: they built a full Lisp OS from scratch. Passepartout runs on Linux, providing the OS layer for free. The hardware integration is a PCIe card, not a replacement of the entire host. The scope is dramatically smaller — ~2% of the code for a fraction of the functionality that matters most. This illustrates the fundamental principles of [[file:lisp-economics.org][Lisp economics]] — the cost of building a Lisp-based system has dropped by orders of magnitude since the 1980s. The [[file:self-driving-lisp-machine.org][Self-driving Lisp Machine]] is the modern analogue: a hardware accelerator rather than a complete computer.
|
||||
The Symbolics comparison is instructive: they built a full Lisp OS from scratch. Passepartout runs on Linux, providing the OS layer for free. The hardware integration is a PCIe card, not a replacement of the entire host. The scope is dramatically smaller — ~2% of the code for a fraction of the functionality that matters most. This illustrates the fundamental principles of [[id:9af13fff-9725-542b-93b1-a555bc74ad72][Lisp economics]] — the cost of building a Lisp-based system has dropped by [[id:2cdca4b0-6b41-44b4-acb0-af21d0e27b00][orders of magnitude]] since the 1980s. The [[id:13e6ae54-2d24-5aa0-b1cd-a7e8e749aa70][Self-driving Lisp Machine]] is the modern analogue: a hardware accelerator rather than a complete computer.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,463 +0,0 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 3aa22300-2f25-57b0-8787-9f199cc978b1
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-22 Thu]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Competitive Analysis — AI Agent Landscape (May 2026)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:strategy:competitive:
|
||||
|
||||
* Overview
|
||||
|
||||
Analyzed 9 competitor codebases alongside Passepartout. The competitive landscape
|
||||
divides into three categories:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Coding agents (Aider, OpenCode, Codex CLI, Claude Code, Gemini CLI)
|
||||
2. Personal AI assistants (Hermes, OpenClaw, Thoth)
|
||||
3. CI/check-based systems (Continue)
|
||||
|
||||
None of the nine compete with Passepartout on all axes simultaneously. Passepartout's
|
||||
strongest differentiators — Org-mode data model, deterministic gate stack, ACL2
|
||||
verification, Merkle-treed memory, and the triad architecture — are absent from
|
||||
every competitor.
|
||||
|
||||
* Category 1: Coding Agents
|
||||
|
||||
** Aider (Python, ~40K lines, MIT)
|
||||
|
||||
Language: Python. ~6.8M pip installs. The oldest and most mature open-source
|
||||
coding agent.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: Chat-based Coder class with 5 edit formats (diff, udiff, patch,
|
||||
whole, architect). Uses litellm for universal provider access (50+ providers).
|
||||
RepoMap provides codebase awareness via cosine-similarity embedding.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Purely prompt-based plus user-confirmation dialogs. No deterministic
|
||||
gate stack. No sandboxing. No model output validator. The allowed_to_edit() gate
|
||||
is a single user confirmation call. --yes flag auto-approves. Aider can edit its
|
||||
own source code with no special protection — self-modification is undetectable.
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: Ad-hoc. Chat messages in memory. Git commits for persistence. RepoMap
|
||||
is a cosine-similarity index. No persistent memory across sessions. No knowledge
|
||||
graph.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: Full. No guard against editing its own files.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None.
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: No safety gates, no persistent memory model, no knowledge
|
||||
representation, no verification, no self-modification protection, no architecture
|
||||
for neurosymbolic reasoning. It is a thin shell around litellm + edit format
|
||||
parsers.
|
||||
|
||||
** OpenCode (TypeScript/Bun, anomalyco/opencode, 163K★)
|
||||
|
||||
The dominant open-source coding agent by adoption. Bun runtime, Effect-TS
|
||||
functional core, Solid.js TUI, Turborepo monorepo.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: Dual LLM runtime — default AI SDK (streamText/generateText) +
|
||||
opt-in native Effect-Schema runtime (@opencode-ai/llm) with 4-axis route
|
||||
decomposition (Protocol/Endpoint/Auth/Framing). 30+ provider plugins.
|
||||
Agent workflow DSL with plan/build agent switching. Agent Communication
|
||||
Protocol (ACP) for inter-agent messaging. Subagents inherit permission
|
||||
boundaries from parent. 18+ built-in tools + custom tools from config.
|
||||
Effect-TS ScopedCache per-project state management.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Explicitly documentes /not/ sandboxing the agent. The
|
||||
permission system is rule-based (glob matching, actions: allow/ask/deny)
|
||||
and exists as a UX feature, not security isolation. Built-in agents have
|
||||
carefully scoped defaults (build allows most, prompts on doom_loop;
|
||||
plan denies all edits except plan files; explore denies everything except
|
||||
grep/glob/bash/webfetch/read; question defaults to deny). Permission
|
||||
rules are inherited by subagents. Shell tool dynamically scans commands
|
||||
for filesystem-impacting operations to determine ask patterns.
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: SQLite via Drizzle ORM with bun:sqlite or better-sqlite3.
|
||||
Key tables: SessionTable (project, workspace, parent hierarchy, cost,
|
||||
tokens, model JSON, agent config JSON, permission JSON, revert snapshot),
|
||||
MessageTable, PartTable. Project model stores worktree, VCS, sandbox
|
||||
config. Config is JSON-chain (user home → project root → worktree) with
|
||||
remote config fetch and mergeDeep with concatenating array semantics.
|
||||
20 config modules covering agents, permissions, providers, MCP, LSP,
|
||||
plugins, skills, references, variable.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: Agent.generate() interface lets the LLM create new
|
||||
agent definitions — the system grows its own subagent roster. Skills
|
||||
system loads domain-specific knowledge packs dynamically.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None.
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: No deterministic safety architecture, no
|
||||
knowledge graph, no Org-mode, no verification/proof system, no
|
||||
neurosymbolic architecture. The permission system is explicitly labeled
|
||||
\"not security isolation\" — it's UX, not a gate stack. Largest userbase
|
||||
and most polished product of any coding agent, but architecturally
|
||||
conventional.
|
||||
|
||||
** Codex CLI (OpenAI, Rust, ~950K lines)
|
||||
|
||||
OpenAI's open-source coding agent. Rust, Sandboxed.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: ~116 crate Rust workspace with a protocol layer (SQ/EQ session types),
|
||||
sandbox manager (macOS Seatbelt, Linux nsjail), multi-provider support (via defined
|
||||
protocol, not directly), configurable TUI.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Most sophisticated safety system of any coding agent analyzed.
|
||||
Multi-layer:
|
||||
- Process hardening (macOS Seatbelt with 4 profile tiers)
|
||||
- Execution policy engine (defined policy in execpolicy crate)
|
||||
- Sandboxing via nsjail on Linux, seatbelt on macOS
|
||||
- Guardian module for tool permission gating
|
||||
- No prompt-based safety — all deterministic through policy definitions
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: Protocol-defined session types. Structured request/response models.
|
||||
Config through TOML files with schema validation.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: Protected by sandbox — the agent cannot escape to modify its
|
||||
own binary or config without explicit policy override.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None (no proof system).
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: No knowledge graph (Org or otherwise), no persistent
|
||||
memory model, no deterministic gate stack for agent behavior (only OS-level
|
||||
sandboxing), no ACL2/prover, no neurosymbolic architecture. Strongest sandbox
|
||||
but weakest cognitive architecture.
|
||||
|
||||
** Claude Code (Anthropic, TypeScript/Bun, ~512K lines leaked)
|
||||
|
||||
Anthropic's proprietary coding agent. Only available via leaked source analysis.
|
||||
Not open source.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: Bun-bundled TypeScript single-file executable. Ink/React terminal UI.
|
||||
23+ core tools. Subagent forking with byte-identical API prefixes for prompt cache
|
||||
sharing. Multi-agent coordination mode.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Layered deterministic safety — NOT prompt-based:
|
||||
1. Permission mode system (7 modes: default, acceptEdits, bypassPermissions, etc.)
|
||||
2. Persistent permission rules (alwaysAllow, alwaysDeny, alwaysAsk, rule sources
|
||||
from userSettings, projectSettings, localSettings, policySettings)
|
||||
3. Bash security validator — 2,592 lines of dedicated code with 23+ named
|
||||
security checks using tree-sitter AST parsing
|
||||
4. Sandbox runtime for filesystem/network containment
|
||||
5. Path/mode validation
|
||||
6. Optional ML bash classifier (ant-only feature)
|
||||
|
||||
This is the most sophisticated safety system of any coding agent. Passepartout's
|
||||
gate stack is architecturally similar (deterministic multi-layer) but Claude
|
||||
Code's implementation is vastly more mature — 2,592 lines of bash validation
|
||||
alone is ~50x the equivalent in Passepartout.
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: File-based markdown memdir at ~/.claude/projects/<slug>/memory/.
|
||||
4 memory types: user, feedback, project, reference. YAML frontmatter in .md files.
|
||||
PROJECT.md and CLAUDE.md for project-level config. No database.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: HIGH. Skill system writes SKILL.md files that change future
|
||||
behavior. Plugin system, cron scheduling, agent spawning.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None.
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: No proof system, no neurosymbolic architecture, no
|
||||
self-verification, no persistent knowledge graph (flat markdown files, not
|
||||
Org-mode with cross-references), markdown data model lacks semantic depth.
|
||||
Proprietary — Anthropic controls it completely. Linux-only (uses macOS sandbox
|
||||
profiles natively). The permission rules system is impressive but structurally
|
||||
inferior to Passepartout's gate stack because rules are heuristic (regex-based
|
||||
pattern matching) rather than typed (type-level gates with structural guarantees).
|
||||
|
||||
** Gemini CLI (Google, TypeScript, ~525K lines, Apache 2.0)
|
||||
|
||||
Google's open-source coding agent. Node.js 20+, Ink/React TUI.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: 7-package npm monorepo. Core backend handles Gemini API orchestration,
|
||||
tool execution, policy engine, safety checks, sandbox management, session management,
|
||||
MCP client. 7-strategy composite model routing chain.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Multi-layered:
|
||||
1. CONSECA (Contextual Security Checker) — AI-driven per-request policy generation
|
||||
using a separate Gemini Flash model. Principle of least privilege.
|
||||
2. Policy engine — 4 approval modes (PLAN, DEFAULT, AUTO_EDIT, YOLO), hierarchical
|
||||
rules with priority scores and wildcard matching
|
||||
3. 6 sandbox methods (macOS Seatbelt, Docker/Podman, bwrap, gVisor, LXC, Windows)
|
||||
4. Trusted folders with discovery phase and path traversal protection
|
||||
5. Policy integrity verification via cryptographic hashes
|
||||
6. Built-in safety checkers (AllowedPathChecker, CONSECA)
|
||||
7. Loop detection service
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: JSONL session files. Turn-based conversation model. 4-layer config
|
||||
precedence (system-defaults → user → project → system-override). TOML policy files.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: Modifiable hooks system, MCP extensions, custom commands.
|
||||
Core binaries are protected on disk by file permissions.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None.
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: No proof system, no persistent knowledge graph, no
|
||||
self-verification, no neurosymbolic architecture, lock-in to Google Gemini models
|
||||
(though it can use others via routing). The CONSECA approach is interesting
|
||||
(AI-generated policies) but introduces a second LLM call for every security
|
||||
decision — the opposite of Passepartout's approach of zero-token deterministic gating.
|
||||
|
||||
* Category 2: Personal AI Assistants
|
||||
|
||||
** Hermes Agent (Python, ~17K core, MIT)
|
||||
|
||||
The agent running this conversation. Python, OpenAI-format conversations.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: Synchronous conversation loop with OpenAI-format messages. 60+
|
||||
built-in tools. 109+ providers via pluggable transport layer. 15+ messaging
|
||||
platforms via gateway. MCP client (native, not bridge). Ink/React TUI as Node.js
|
||||
subprocess. Cron jobs, Kanban board, subagent delegation.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Multi-layer but NOT a deterministic gate stack:
|
||||
1. Message sanitization (surrogates, control chars, malformed JSON)
|
||||
2. Tirith binary scanner (pre-execution terminal command analysis)
|
||||
3. Command approval system (manual/smart/off modes)
|
||||
4. Memory injection detection (prompt injection pattern matching)
|
||||
5. Secret/PII redaction
|
||||
6. Tool call guardrails (loop detection)
|
||||
7. MCP security (env filtering, credential stripping)
|
||||
8. Context fencing (memory injection span scrubbing)
|
||||
|
||||
These are all heuristic or prompt-based — no structural type-level gates.
|
||||
Tirith is a separate binary, not in-process. The approval system is good but
|
||||
reactive (LLM proposes → system blocks) rather than preventive (type system
|
||||
prevents by construction).
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: SQLite session DB (FTS5 full-text search). File-based memory
|
||||
(MEMORY.md + USER.md). YAML config. No knowledge graph. No Org-mode.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: Skill system writes SKILL.md files. Memory tool edits
|
||||
MEMORY.md/USER.md. Config YAML editable. Core Python code is read-only in
|
||||
execution but the LLM could request modifications to its own source files
|
||||
(no gate specifically prevents this).
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None.
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: No deterministic gate stack (heuristic layers, not
|
||||
structural/typed), no knowledge graph, no Org-mode, no neurosymbolic architecture,
|
||||
no self-verification, no proof system. Hermes's strength is breadth —
|
||||
109 providers, 15 platforms, MCP ecosystem, big tool surface. But it has no
|
||||
depth in safety, knowledge representation, or reasoning architecture.
|
||||
|
||||
** OpenClaw (TypeScript/Node.js, ~3.5M lines)
|
||||
|
||||
The largest codebase analyzed. Personal AI assistant with 25+ messaging channel
|
||||
support.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: pnpm workspace with ~135 bundled plugins. Gateway control plane
|
||||
routes messages through multi-agent routing. Per-agent sessions, workspaces,
|
||||
skill registries. Companion native apps (macOS, iOS, Android).
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Tiered — main agent runs tools directly on host (trusted-operator),
|
||||
non-main sessions sandboxed via Docker (read-only rootfs, capability dropping,
|
||||
seccomp/AppArmor, memory/cpu/PID limits, SSH/OpenShell backends).
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: Typed JSON/YAML config (openclaw.json). Multi-source model catalog.
|
||||
Plugin SDK with narrow typed subpath exports.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: ACP (Agent Control Protocol) for spawning child sessions.
|
||||
Skill system with npm distribution and ClawHub registry.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None.
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: Same as Hermes — no gate stack, no knowledge graph,
|
||||
no Org-mode, no verification, no neurosymbolic architecture. Differentiated by
|
||||
vastly broader channel support and mature plugin ecosystem. But architecturally
|
||||
conventional — LLM + tools + channels, no cognitive architecture innovation.
|
||||
|
||||
** Thoth (Python, ~151K lines, Apache 2.0)
|
||||
|
||||
https://github.com/siddsachar/Thoth — Personal AI Sovereignty. Local-first
|
||||
desktop AI assistant with knowledge graph, tools, voice, vision, shell,
|
||||
browser automation, workflow engine, and messaging channels.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: LangGraph create_react_agent (prebuilt ReAct pattern). Dual-mode
|
||||
streaming via agent.stream(). NiceGUI web UI served by Python app.py with
|
||||
desktop launcher (tray icon, Ollama auto-start, browser/OS window). Context
|
||||
trimming via tiktoken to ~85% of model window, base64 data redaction, stale
|
||||
browser snapshot compression (keeps last 8), MD5 tool result dedup, old tool
|
||||
result summarization. 50-step recursion limit (chat), 100 (tasks), 120 (Developer
|
||||
Studio). Agent graph cached by tool set + model override. Checkpoints via
|
||||
LangGraph's SQLite-backed checkpointer. 30+ tool modules.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Shell command classification (tools/shell_tool.py) with 17 blocked
|
||||
patterns (rm -rf /, mkfs, dd of=/dev/, shutdown, fork bombs, pipe-to-bash, etc.),
|
||||
30+ safe auto-execute prefixes (ls, cat, grep, git status, etc.), needs-approval
|
||||
for compound commands (;, &&, ||, |, $(), backticks). Interactive interrupt() for
|
||||
non-safe shell — LangGraph human-in-the-loop pauses the graph. Per-workflow safety
|
||||
modes: block (default, refuse non-safe), approve (pause), allow_all.
|
||||
Prompt-injection defense: scans tool outputs and user inputs for 5 categories
|
||||
(role overrides, instruction hijacking, data exfiltration, invisible unicode,
|
||||
hidden HTML directives) — detection-only, no stripping. Filesystem workspace
|
||||
boundary (~/Documents/Thoth). Opt-in Docker Sandbox for Developer Studio.
|
||||
Destructive ops (file delete, moderate shell, Gmail send, calendar delete,
|
||||
memory/task/tracker delete) require confirmation. MCP servers disabled until
|
||||
tested. Custom Tools reviewed and promoted. No sandboxing of agent runtime
|
||||
itself — agent runs in-process. No response-level guardrails.
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: SQLite (WAL mode) at ~/.thoth/memory.db — shared between knowledge
|
||||
graph and legacy memory. Knowledge graph: SQLite (durable) + NetworkX MultiDiGraph
|
||||
(in-memory, rebuilt on startup) + FAISS vector index (semantic recall, rebuilt on
|
||||
every entity write). 11 entity types (person, preference, fact, event, place,
|
||||
project, organisation, concept, skill, media, self_knowledge). 67+ typed relations
|
||||
with 30+ LLM-produced aliases mapped to canonical forms. Dream Cycle refinement
|
||||
pipeline for entity dedup/merge/stale-confidence decay. Config: JSON files
|
||||
(skills_config.json, api_keys.json, providers.json, channels_config.json). Keys in
|
||||
OS credential store (Windows Credential Manager, macOS Keychain, Linux Secret
|
||||
Service/KWallet). Memory extraction background daemon scanning past conversations
|
||||
every ~2 hours.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: Agent CAN create/update/delete skills via dedicated tools
|
||||
(thoth_create_skill, thoth_patch_skill, thoth_delete_skill). SKILL.md files with
|
||||
YAML frontmatter at ~/.thoth/skills/. Bundled skills (read-only) at app root;
|
||||
user skills override by name. Skill patching requires user confirmation + auto
|
||||
backup. Maximum 1 patch proposal per conversation. Tool guides cannot be patched.
|
||||
Self-knowledge block injected into system prompt. No tool to modify agent.py,
|
||||
prompts.py, or system prompt directly. Developer Studio provides code editing
|
||||
through approval-gated tools (tool-assisted human workflow, not agent self-mod).
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None formal. Update signature verification (updater.py).
|
||||
Comprehensive test suite at tests/test_suite.py. No tool-call verification beyond
|
||||
LangGraph schema validation. No output verification or fact-checking.
|
||||
|
||||
Key differentiators vs other assistants: LangGraph ReAct agent with structured
|
||||
streaming event model. Personal knowledge graph (11 entity types, 67 relations,
|
||||
NetworkX + FAISS). Developer Studio (Docker sandbox, code threads, Git operations,
|
||||
approval modes). Designer Studio (decks, documents, landing pages, sandboxed
|
||||
interactive runtime). 5 messaging channels (Telegram, Discord, Slack, WhatsApp,
|
||||
SMS) with streaming, reactions, media processing. Background workflow engine
|
||||
(schedules, webhooks, step pipelines, conditions, approvals, concurrency groups).
|
||||
30+ tool modules including browser automation, shell, Gmail, Calendar, X, image/
|
||||
video generation. 39 curated Ollama tool-calling models. 10 LLM providers (Ollama,
|
||||
OpenAI, Anthropic, Google AI/Gemini, xAI/Grok, MiniMax, OpenRouter, Ollama Cloud,
|
||||
ChatGPT/Codex subscription, custom endpoints). MCP client (stdio, Streamable HTTP,
|
||||
SSE) with namespaced tools, approval gates. No accounts, no telemetry, no hosted
|
||||
server. Local-first with OS credential store.
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: No deterministic gate stack — shell safety is pattern
|
||||
list (17 blocked, 30 safe), not typed gates. No sandboxed agent runtime. No
|
||||
proof system. No output guardrails. No neurosymbolic architecture. No Org-mode.
|
||||
No Merkle-tree memory. Knowledge graph (SQLite+FAISS) is richer than Hermes but
|
||||
is LLM-driven entity extraction — no structural integrity guarantees. Thoth's
|
||||
differentiation from Hermes/OpenClaw is the knowledge graph + Developer/Designer
|
||||
studios + embedded LangGraph framework — a broader product scope, but still
|
||||
architecturally conventional (LLM + tools + channels + KG), not a new cognitive
|
||||
architecture.
|
||||
|
||||
* Category 3: CI/Check Systems
|
||||
|
||||
** Continue (TypeScript, ~328K lines, Apache 2.0)
|
||||
|
||||
Source-controlled AI checks for CI/CD. Markdown-as-gate-policy.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: Shared core (@continuedev/core) with ~80 provider implementations,
|
||||
tool-calling engine, config system (YAML/JSON/Markdown). Serves CLI (Ink/React TUI
|
||||
+ headless CI mode), IDE extensions (VS Code, JetBrains), web dashboard.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Three permission levels (allow/ask/exclude). Precedence: mode policies
|
||||
→ CLI flags → permissions.yaml → built-in defaults. Terminal security package for
|
||||
shell command analysis via shell-quote parsing. Workspace-scoped file access.
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: Markdown files for checks, agents, rules. Source-controlled in-repo.
|
||||
YAML frontmatter for metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: Checks source-controlled — any change goes through git.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None (the checks are themselves unverified).
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: The "checks as markdown" concept is philosophically
|
||||
similar to Passepartout's gate rules (deterministic policies checked before
|
||||
execution) but the implementation is dramatically simpler — regex-based policy
|
||||
objects, not a type-level gate stack with structural guarantees. No persistent
|
||||
agent, no memory, no knowledge graph, no neurosymbolic architecture. It is a
|
||||
gate system without an agent to gate.
|
||||
|
||||
* The Passepartout Advantage
|
||||
|
||||
| Dimension | Passepartout | Best Competitor | Gap |
|
||||
|-----------|--------------|-----------------|-----|
|
||||
| Safety model | Type-level gates + 11-vector deterministic stack | Claude Code (7 permission modes + 23 bash checks) | Structural vs heuristic. Passepartout's type-level gates prevent self-modification at the category level; competitors block patterns. |
|
||||
| Knowledge model | Org-mode (tree, properties, TODOs, timestamps, cross-refs, IDs, tags) | Claude Code (flat markdown memdir) | Org-mode's semantic richness is ~15 primitives markdown doesn't have. |
|
||||
| Memory integrity | Merkle tree + SHA-256 + rollback | Hermes (file-based); Claude Code (flat files + git) | Content-addressed, tamper-evident memory no competitor has. |
|
||||
| Self-verification | ACL2 → CIC prover (planned) | None | No competitor does provable correctness. |
|
||||
| Cognitive architecture | 10-80-10 symbolic-first (planned) | 100% LLM (every competitor) | Post-flip, Passepartout uses ~10% of the tokens competitors use. |
|
||||
| Data format | Org-mode (human-editable, machine-parseable, single file) | JSONL/Markdown/YAML/DB (competitors use 2-5 formats) | Unified format reduces translation layers to zero. |
|
||||
| Self-modification | Type-level gates + hot-reload | Claude Code (skills), Hermes (skills) | Passepartout's guard against self-modification is structural (type level), not heuristic (pattern list). |
|
||||
| Triad | Passepartout + Stoa + Agora | None | No competitor is building a full computing stack + social network. |
|
||||
| Provider independence | Any OpenAI-compatible API | Hermes (109+), Gemini CLI (1 primary) | Comparable to Hermes, better than most. |
|
||||
|
||||
* Where Competitors Lead
|
||||
|
||||
| Dimension | Leader | Passepartout Status |
|
||||
|-----------|--------|---------------------|
|
||||
| Safety implementation maturity | Claude Code (2,592 lines bash security) | Gate stack exists but bash validation is minimal in comparison |
|
||||
| Provider breadth | Hermes (109+), OpenClaw (50+) | 8 providers — adequate but not competitive |
|
||||
| Channel/platform support | OpenClaw (25+ channels) | TUI only — no multi-channel |
|
||||
| Plugin ecosystem | OpenClaw (ClawHub, npm registry) | No plugin marketplace |
|
||||
| Subagent delegation | Claude Code (fork with context inheritance) | Planned via Screamer planner |
|
||||
| Codebase size / features shipped | All competitors have working products | In development |
|
||||
| MCP integration | Hermes, Codex (native), Continue | Planned |
|
||||
| Sandboxing | Codex CLI (Seatbelt+nsjail), Gemini CLI (6 methods) | None |
|
||||
| Business model | Hermes (MIT+services), Codex (tokens) | AGPL + appliances + SaaS |
|
||||
| Cross-platform | Claude Code (macOS/*nix), Codex (macOS) | Linux only |
|
||||
|
||||
* Strategic Positioning
|
||||
|
||||
Passepartout is not competing in the existing AI agent market. It is building a
|
||||
new category: provable personal infrastructure.
|
||||
|
||||
Competitors optimize for:
|
||||
- Token efficiency (Aider's edit formats, OpenCode's LSP integration)
|
||||
- Model flexibility (Hermes' 109 providers)
|
||||
- Platform reach (OpenClaw's 25 channels)
|
||||
- UI polish (Gemini CLI's Ink/React, Claude Code's permission dialogs)
|
||||
- Sandbox security (Codex's Seatbelt, Gemini's gVisor)
|
||||
|
||||
Passepartout optimizes for:
|
||||
- Provable correctness (ACL2 → CIC)
|
||||
- Data integrity (Merkle tree)
|
||||
- Cognitive architecture (10-80-10 symbolic-first)
|
||||
- Safety by construction (type-level gates)
|
||||
- Unified data model (Org-mode as everything)
|
||||
- Network effects (Agora)
|
||||
- Full-stack ownership (Stoa)
|
||||
|
||||
These are not axes any competitor cares about. The risk is not that a competitor
|
||||
builds a better Passepartout — it's that the market never develops a preference
|
||||
for provable agents. If token-burning LLM agents remain the default and users
|
||||
don't demand verification, the entire category Passepartout addresses may not
|
||||
exist yet.
|
||||
|
||||
* Immediate Implications for Development
|
||||
|
||||
1. Claude Code's safety system is the benchmark to exceed. The type-level gate
|
||||
architecture is theoretically superior to Claude Code's heuristic patterns,
|
||||
but the implementation needs to prove it catches things Claude Code
|
||||
misses.
|
||||
|
||||
2. No competitor has anything resembling a neurosymbolic architecture. The 10-80-10
|
||||
plan has zero competition — but that also means zero market validation.
|
||||
|
||||
3. The Org-mode bet is invisible to competitors. They don't see the advantage
|
||||
because they've never tried to build a knowledge graph from flat markdown files.
|
||||
This is Passepartout's widest moat — it depends on a skill (Org-mode literate
|
||||
programming) that no competitor's team has.
|
||||
|
||||
4. Hermes is the closest full-stack competitor (tools, skills, cron, subagents,
|
||||
multi-platform), but architecturally conventional. For Hermes to match
|
||||
Passepartout, it would need to be rewritten.
|
||||
|
||||
5. The coding agents (Aider, OpenCode, Codex) are not competitors — they are
|
||||
single-purpose tools Passepartout could eventually replace entirely when the
|
||||
planner matures.
|
||||
|
||||
* File references
|
||||
|
||||
Repository dumps and analysis artifacts at /tmp/:
|
||||
- /tmp/aider/ — Aider source (Python)
|
||||
- /tmp/opencode/ — OpenCode archived source (Go)
|
||||
- /tmp/codex/ — OpenAI Codex CLI (Rust)
|
||||
- /tmp/claude-code-leaked-source/ — Claude Code leaked (TypeScript/Bun)
|
||||
- /tmp/gemini-cli/ — Google Gemini CLI (TypeScript)
|
||||
- /tmp/openclaw/ — OpenClaw source (TypeScript)
|
||||
- /tmp/thoth/ — Thoth source (Python)
|
||||
- /tmp/continue/ — Continue source (TypeScript)
|
||||
- /usr/local/lib/hermes-agent/ — Hermes Agent (Python)
|
||||
128
ideas/competitive-analysis.org
Normal file
128
ideas/competitive-analysis.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 3aa22300-2f25-57b0-8787-9f199cc978b1
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-22 Thu]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Competitive Analysis — AI Agent Landscape
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:strategy:competitive:
|
||||
|
||||
* Overview
|
||||
|
||||
Analyzed 9 competitor codebases alongside Passepartout. The competitive landscape
|
||||
divides into three categories:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Coding agents — Aider, OpenCode, Codex CLI, Claude Code, Gemini CLI
|
||||
2. Personal AI assistants — [[id:c652688a-1ea0-487c-9222-00e954efe8a1][Hermes Agent]], OpenClaw, [[id:416bab7c-4300-4d50-838a-5c7a8ad45d96][Thoth]]
|
||||
3. CI/check-based systems — Continue
|
||||
|
||||
None of the nine compete with Passepartout on all axes simultaneously. Passepartout's
|
||||
strongest differentiators — Org-mode data model, deterministic gate stack, ACL2
|
||||
verification, Merkle-treed memory, and the triad architecture — are absent from
|
||||
every competitor.
|
||||
|
||||
* Category 1: Coding Agents
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:c3aab2e8-7e43-4abc-93f0-741675cfd78c][Aider]] — Python, ~40K lines, MIT. Oldest open-source coding agent. Chat-based Coder class with 5 edit formats. Purely prompt-based safety.
|
||||
- [[id:7a060b36-36db-4eb7-b8cc-844bd6ac9d36][OpenCode]] — TypeScript/Bun, 163K★. Dominant open-source coding agent. Dual LLM runtime, ACP inter-agent protocol, SQLite state.
|
||||
- [[id:e929ff32-28d8-4a29-bf74-d55babc040d1][Codex CLI]] — Rust, ~950K lines, OpenAI. Strongest sandboxing (Seatbelt/nsjail). Execution policy engine. No knowledge graph.
|
||||
- [[id:512dd121-2292-4f3d-ac53-31bf3d12a60f][Claude Code]] — TypeScript/Bun, ~512K lines leaked. Most mature safety system (2,592 lines bash security). 7 permission modes. Proprietary.
|
||||
- [[id:8d73ccb9-34e4-4899-b0c3-605998e9bebc][Gemini CLI]] — TypeScript, ~525K lines, Apache 2.0. CONSECA AI-driven policy generation. 6 sandbox methods. Google-locked.
|
||||
|
||||
* Category 2: Personal AI Assistants
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:c652688a-1ea0-487c-9222-00e954efe8a1][Hermes Agent]] — Python, ~17K core, MIT. Running this conversation. 109+ providers, 15+ messaging platforms, MCP client. Heuristic safety layers.
|
||||
- [[id:85ca69dd-d085-4a55-ad11-021910b1f82e][OpenClaw]] — TypeScript/Node.js, ~3.5M lines. Largest codebase. 25+ messaging channels, 135 bundled plugins. Tiered sandboxing.
|
||||
- [[id:416bab7c-4300-4d50-838a-5c7a8ad45d96][Thoth]] — Python, ~151K lines, Apache 2.0. Personal knowledge graph (11 entity types, 67 relations, NetworkX+FAISS). LangGraph ReAct agent. Developer Studio.
|
||||
|
||||
* Category 3: CI/Check Systems
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:22d0a159-68a2-4587-9375-5046beddc20c][Continue]] — TypeScript, ~328K lines, Apache 2.0. Source-controlled AI checks for CI/CD. Markdown-as-gate-policy. No persistent agent.
|
||||
|
||||
* The Passepartout Advantage
|
||||
|
||||
| Dimension | Passepartout | Best Competitor | Gap |
|
||||
|-----------|--------------|-----------------|-----|
|
||||
| Safety model | Type-level gates + 11-vector deterministic stack | Claude Code (7 permission modes + 23 bash checks) | Structural vs heuristic. Passepartout's type-level gates prevent self-modification at the category level; competitors block patterns. |
|
||||
| Knowledge model | Org-mode (tree, properties, TODOs, timestamps, cross-refs, IDs, tags) | Claude Code (flat markdown memdir) | Org-mode's semantic richness is ~15 primitives markdown doesn't have. |
|
||||
| Memory integrity | Merkle tree + SHA-256 + rollback | Hermes (file-based); Claude Code (flat files + git) | Content-addressed, tamper-evident memory no competitor has. |
|
||||
| Self-verification | ACL2 → CIC prover (planned) | None | No competitor does provable correctness. |
|
||||
| Cognitive architecture | 10-80-10 symbolic-first (planned) | 100% LLM (every competitor) | Post-flip, Passepartout uses ~10% of the tokens competitors use. |
|
||||
| Data format | Org-mode (human-editable, machine-parseable, single file) | JSONL/Markdown/YAML/DB (competitors use 2-5 formats) | Unified format reduces translation layers to zero. |
|
||||
| Self-modification | Type-level gates + hot-reload | Claude Code (skills), Hermes (skills) | Passepartout's guard against self-modification is structural (type level), not heuristic (pattern list). |
|
||||
| Triad | Passepartout + [[id:c3b3dc41-945f-54e9-84eb-ca014114f1be][Stoa]] + [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]] | None | No competitor is building a full computing stack + social network. |
|
||||
| Provider independence | Any OpenAI-compatible API | Hermes (109+), Gemini CLI (1 primary) | Comparable to Hermes, better than most. |
|
||||
|
||||
* Where Competitors Lead
|
||||
|
||||
| Dimension | Leader | Passepartout Status |
|
||||
|-----------|--------|---------------------|
|
||||
| Safety implementation maturity | Claude Code (2,592 lines bash security) | Gate stack exists but bash validation is minimal in comparison |
|
||||
| Provider breadth | Hermes (109+), OpenClaw (50+) | 8 providers — adequate but not competitive |
|
||||
| Channel/platform support | OpenClaw (25+ channels) | TUI only — no multi-channel |
|
||||
| Plugin ecosystem | OpenClaw (ClawHub, npm registry) | No plugin marketplace |
|
||||
| Subagent delegation | Claude Code (fork with context inheritance) | Planned via Screamer planner |
|
||||
| Codebase size / features shipped | All competitors have working products | In development |
|
||||
| MCP integration | Hermes, Codex (native), Continue | Planned |
|
||||
| Sandboxing | Codex CLI (Seatbelt+nsjail), Gemini CLI (6 methods) | None |
|
||||
| Business model | Hermes (MIT+services), Codex (tokens) | AGPL + appliances + SaaS |
|
||||
| Cross-platform | Claude Code (macOS/*nix), Codex (macOS) | Linux only |
|
||||
|
||||
* Strategic Positioning
|
||||
|
||||
Passepartout is not competing in the existing AI agent market. It is building a
|
||||
new category: provable personal infrastructure.
|
||||
|
||||
Competitors optimize for:
|
||||
- Token efficiency (Aider's edit formats, OpenCode's LSP integration)
|
||||
- Model flexibility (Hermes' 109 providers)
|
||||
- Platform reach (OpenClaw's 25 channels)
|
||||
- UI polish (Gemini CLI's Ink/React, Claude Code's permission dialogs)
|
||||
- Sandbox security (Codex's Seatbelt, Gemini's gVisor)
|
||||
|
||||
Passepartout optimizes for:
|
||||
- Provable correctness (ACL2 → CIC)
|
||||
- Data integrity (Merkle tree)
|
||||
- Cognitive architecture (10-80-10 symbolic-first)
|
||||
- Safety by construction (type-level gates)
|
||||
- Unified data model (Org-mode as everything)
|
||||
- Network effects (Agora)
|
||||
- Full-stack ownership (Stoa)
|
||||
|
||||
These are not axes any competitor cares about. The risk is not that a competitor
|
||||
builds a better Passepartout — it's that the market never develops a preference
|
||||
for provable agents. If token-burning LLM agents remain the default and users
|
||||
don't demand verification, the entire category Passepartout addresses may not
|
||||
exist yet.
|
||||
|
||||
* Immediate Implications for Development
|
||||
|
||||
1. Claude Code's safety system is the benchmark to exceed. The type-level gate
|
||||
architecture is theoretically superior to Claude Code's heuristic patterns,
|
||||
but the implementation needs to prove it catches things Claude Code misses.
|
||||
|
||||
2. No competitor has anything resembling a neurosymbolic architecture. The 10-80-10
|
||||
plan has zero competition — but that also means zero market validation.
|
||||
|
||||
3. The Org-mode bet is invisible to competitors. They don't see the advantage
|
||||
because they've never tried to build a knowledge graph from flat markdown files.
|
||||
This is Passepartout's widest moat — it depends on a skill (Org-mode literate
|
||||
programming) that no competitor's team has.
|
||||
|
||||
4. Hermes is the closest full-stack competitor (tools, skills, cron, subagents,
|
||||
multi-platform), but architecturally conventional.
|
||||
|
||||
5. The coding agents (Aider, OpenCode, Codex) are not competitors — they are
|
||||
single-purpose tools Passepartout could eventually replace entirely when the
|
||||
planner matures.
|
||||
|
||||
* File references
|
||||
|
||||
Repository dumps and analysis artifacts at /tmp/:
|
||||
- /tmp/aider/ — Aider source (Python)
|
||||
- /tmp/opencode/ — OpenCode archived source
|
||||
- /tmp/codex/ — OpenAI Codex CLI (Rust)
|
||||
- /tmp/claude-code-leaked-source/ — Claude Code leaked (TypeScript/Bun)
|
||||
- /tmp/gemini-cli/ — Google Gemini CLI (TypeScript)
|
||||
- /tmp/openclaw/ — OpenClaw source (TypeScript)
|
||||
- /tmp/thoth/ — Thoth source (Python)
|
||||
- /tmp/continue/ — Continue source (TypeScript)
|
||||
- /usr/local/lib/hermes-agent/ — Hermes Agent (Python)
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 1bc22b89-d3eb-4f6d-bcfc-2b0c19c8ed8f
|
||||
:ID: competitive-landscape-agora
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ This page maps every platform the Agora replaces, organized by domain, with the
|
||||
- *Agora replacement:* Agora naming registry with similar auction model. But integrated with PDS, messaging, contracts, and payments — a name in the Agora is a full identity, not just a pointer to a wallet.
|
||||
- *Agora advantage:* Names come with native capabilities (PDS, messaging, contracts). ENS is names-only.
|
||||
|
||||
* The Competitive Analysis: What This Changes
|
||||
* The [[id:3aa22300-2f25-57b0-8787-9f199cc978b1][Competitive Analysis]]: What This Changes
|
||||
|
||||
The Agora is not competing with any single product. It is competing with the /aggregate/ of 20+ products — and the friction of managing 20+ separate accounts, logins, reputations, and data silos.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -211,10 +212,10 @@ The OnlyFans/Patreon entry vector is the strongest Phase 1 play: a community wit
|
||||
|
||||
* References
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:agora.org][Agora overview]] (brain docs)
|
||||
- [[file:agora-contracts.org][Agora contract platform]]
|
||||
- [[file:alternative-growth-social-first.org][Social-first growth scenario]]
|
||||
- [[file:../agora/docs/agora-requirements-01-overview.org][Agora Protocol Overview]] (spec repo)
|
||||
- [[file:../agora/docs/agora-requirements-05-social.org][Social Space specification]]
|
||||
- [[file:../agora/docs/agora-requirements-06-exchange-and-contracts.org][Exchange and Contracts specification]]
|
||||
- [[file:../agora/docs/agora-requirements-10-user-journey.org][User journey and platform replacement strategy]]
|
||||
- [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora overview]] (brain docs)
|
||||
- [[id:64708e1f-00e9-4cb7-b44b-ea0b98e5296d][Agora contract platform]]
|
||||
- [[id:57f9538a-6270-4302-8d07-d742168419eb][Social-first growth scenario]]
|
||||
- Agora Protocol Overview (spec repo)
|
||||
- Social Space specification
|
||||
- Exchange and Contracts specification
|
||||
- User journey and platform replacement strategy
|
||||
|
||||
22
ideas/competitors/aider.org
Normal file
22
ideas/competitors/aider.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: c3aab2e8-7e43-4abc-93f0-741675cfd78c
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-22 Thu]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Aider — AI Coding Agent
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:strategy:competitive:aider:
|
||||
|
||||
Language: Python. ~6.8M pip installs. ~40K lines. MIT license. The oldest and most mature open-source coding agent.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: Chat-based Coder class with 5 edit formats (diff, udiff, patch, whole, architect). Uses litellm for universal provider access (50+ providers). RepoMap provides codebase awareness via cosine-similarity embedding.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Purely prompt-based plus user-confirmation dialogs. No deterministic gate stack. No sandboxing. No model output validator. The allowed_to_edit() gate is a single user confirmation call. --yes flag auto-approves. Aider can edit its own source code with no special protection — self-modification is undetectable.
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: Ad-hoc. Chat messages in memory. Git commits for persistence. RepoMap is a cosine-similarity index. No persistent memory across sessions. No knowledge graph.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: Full. No guard against editing its own files.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None.
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: No safety gates, no persistent memory model, no knowledge representation, no verification, no self-modification protection, no architecture for neurosymbolic reasoning. It is a thin shell around litellm + edit format parsers.
|
||||
|
||||
See the full [[id:3aa22300-2f25-57b0-8787-9f199cc978b1][competitive analysis]] for the landscape view and comparison.
|
||||
22
ideas/competitors/claude-code.org
Normal file
22
ideas/competitors/claude-code.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 512dd121-2292-4f3d-ac53-31bf3d12a60f
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-22 Thu]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Claude Code — Anthropic AI Coding Agent
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:strategy:competitive:claude-code:
|
||||
|
||||
Anthropic's proprietary coding agent. TypeScript/Bun, ~512K lines (leaked source analysis). Not open source.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: Bun-bundled TypeScript single-file executable. Ink/React terminal UI. 23+ core tools. Subagent forking with byte-identical API prefixes for prompt cache sharing. Multi-agent coordination mode.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Layered deterministic safety — NOT prompt-based: 7 permission modes, persistent permission rules (alwaysAllow/alwaysDeny/alwaysAsk from 4 sources), bash security validator at 2,592 lines with 23+ named security checks using tree-sitter AST parsing, sandbox runtime, path/mode validation, optional ML bash classifier. This is the most sophisticated safety system of any coding agent analyzed.
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: File-based markdown memdir at ~/.claude/projects/<slug>/memory/. 4 memory types: user, feedback, project, reference. YAML frontmatter in .md files. PROJECT.md and CLAUDE.md for project config. No database.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: HIGH. Skill system writes SKILL.md files. Plugin system, cron scheduling, agent spawning.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None.
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: No proof system, no neurosymbolic architecture, no self-verification, no persistent knowledge graph (flat markdown files, not Org-mode with cross-references), markdown data model lacks semantic depth. Proprietary — Anthropic controls it completely. The permission rules system is impressive but structurally inferior to Passepartout's gate stack because rules are heuristic (regex-based pattern matching) rather than typed (type-level gates with structural guarantees).
|
||||
|
||||
See the full [[id:3aa22300-2f25-57b0-8787-9f199cc978b1][competitive analysis]] for the landscape view and comparison.
|
||||
22
ideas/competitors/codex-cli.org
Normal file
22
ideas/competitors/codex-cli.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: e929ff32-28d8-4a29-bf74-d55babc040d1
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-22 Thu]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Codex CLI — OpenAI AI Coding Agent
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:strategy:competitive:codex:
|
||||
|
||||
OpenAI's open-source coding agent. Rust, ~950K lines, sandboxed.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: ~116 crate Rust workspace with a protocol layer (SQ/EQ session types), sandbox manager (macOS Seatbelt, Linux nsjail), multi-provider support, configurable TUI.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Most sophisticated safety system of any coding agent analyzed. Multi-layer: process hardening (macOS Seatbelt with 4 profile tiers), execution policy engine, sandboxing via nsjail/Seatbelt, Guardian module for tool permission gating. No prompt-based safety — all deterministic through policy definitions.
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: Protocol-defined session types. Structured request/response models. Config through TOML files with schema validation.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: Protected by sandbox — the agent cannot escape to modify its own binary or config without explicit policy override.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None (no proof system).
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: No knowledge graph, no persistent memory model, no deterministic gate stack for agent behavior (only OS-level sandboxing), no ACL2/prover, no neurosymbolic architecture. Strongest sandbox but weakest cognitive architecture.
|
||||
|
||||
See the full [[id:3aa22300-2f25-57b0-8787-9f199cc978b1][competitive analysis]] for the landscape view and comparison.
|
||||
22
ideas/competitors/continue.org
Normal file
22
ideas/competitors/continue.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 22d0a159-68a2-4587-9375-5046beddc20c
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-22 Thu]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Continue — CI/Check System
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:strategy:competitive:continue:
|
||||
|
||||
TypeScript, ~328K lines, Apache 2.0. Source-controlled AI checks for CI/CD. Markdown-as-gate-policy.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: Shared core (@continuedev/core) with ~80 provider implementations, tool-calling engine, config system (YAML/JSON/Markdown). Serves CLI (Ink/React TUI + headless CI mode), IDE extensions (VS Code, JetBrains), web dashboard.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Three permission levels (allow/ask/exclude). Precedence: mode policies → CLI flags → permissions.yaml → built-in defaults. Terminal security package for shell command analysis via shell-quote parsing. Workspace-scoped file access.
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: Markdown files for checks, agents, rules. Source-controlled in-repo. YAML frontmatter for metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: Checks source-controlled — any change goes through git.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None (the checks are themselves unverified).
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: The checks-as-markdown concept is philosophically similar to Passepartout's gate rules (deterministic policies checked before execution) but the implementation is dramatically simpler — regex-based policy objects, not a type-level gate stack with structural guarantees. No persistent agent, no memory, no knowledge graph, no neurosymbolic architecture. It is a gate system without an agent to gate.
|
||||
|
||||
See the full [[id:3aa22300-2f25-57b0-8787-9f199cc978b1][competitive analysis]] for the landscape view and comparison.
|
||||
22
ideas/competitors/gemini-cli.org
Normal file
22
ideas/competitors/gemini-cli.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 8d73ccb9-34e4-4899-b0c3-605998e9bebc
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-22 Thu]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Gemini CLI — Google AI Coding Agent
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:strategy:competitive:gemini:
|
||||
|
||||
Google's open-source coding agent. TypeScript, ~525K lines, Apache 2.0. Node.js 20+, Ink/React TUI.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: 7-package npm monorepo. Core backend handles Gemini API orchestration, tool execution, policy engine, safety checks, sandbox management, session management, MCP client. 7-strategy composite model routing chain.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Multi-layered: CONSECA (Contextual Security Checker) — AI-driven per-request policy generation using a separate Gemini Flash model. 4 approval modes (PLAN/DEFAULT/AUTO_EDIT/YOLO). 6 sandbox methods (macOS Seatbelt, Docker/Podman, bwrap, gVisor, LXC, Windows). Trusted folders with path traversal protection. Policy integrity via cryptographic hashes. Loop detection.
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: JSONL session files. Turn-based conversation model. 4-layer config precedence (system-defaults → user → project → system-override). TOML policy files.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: Modifiable hooks system, MCP extensions, custom commands. Core binaries are protected on disk by file permissions.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None.
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: No proof system, no persistent knowledge graph, no self-verification, no neurosymbolic architecture, lock-in to Google Gemini models. CONSECA is interesting (AI-generated policies) but introduces a second LLM call for every security decision — the opposite of Passepartout's zero-token deterministic gating.
|
||||
|
||||
See the full [[id:3aa22300-2f25-57b0-8787-9f199cc978b1][competitive analysis]] for the landscape view and comparison.
|
||||
22
ideas/competitors/hermes-agent.org
Normal file
22
ideas/competitors/hermes-agent.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: c652688a-1ea0-487c-9222-00e954efe8a1
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-22 Thu]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Hermes Agent — Personal AI Assistant
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:strategy:competitive:hermes:
|
||||
|
||||
The agent running this conversation. Python, ~17K core lines, MIT.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: Synchronous conversation loop with OpenAI-format messages. 60+ built-in tools. 109+ providers via pluggable transport layer. 15+ messaging platforms via gateway. MCP client (native, not bridge). Ink/React TUI as Node.js subprocess. Cron jobs, Kanban board, subagent delegation.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Multi-layer but NOT a deterministic gate stack: message sanitization, Tirith binary scanner, command approval system, memory injection detection, secret/PII redaction, tool call guardrails, MCP security, context fencing. All heuristic or prompt-based — no structural type-level gates.
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: SQLite session DB (FTS5 full-text search). File-based memory (MEMORY.md + USER.md). YAML config. No knowledge graph. No Org-mode.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: Skill system writes SKILL.md files. Memory tool edits MEMORY.md/USER.md. Core Python code is read-only in execution but no gate specifically prevents the LLM from requesting source modifications.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None.
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: No deterministic gate stack (heuristic layers, not structural/typed), no knowledge graph, no Org-mode, no neurosymbolic architecture, no self-verification, no proof system. Hermes's strength is breadth — 109 providers, 15 platforms, MCP ecosystem. But it has no depth in safety, knowledge representation, or reasoning architecture.
|
||||
|
||||
See the full [[id:3aa22300-2f25-57b0-8787-9f199cc978b1][competitive analysis]] for the landscape view and comparison.
|
||||
22
ideas/competitors/openclaw.org
Normal file
22
ideas/competitors/openclaw.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 85ca69dd-d085-4a55-ad11-021910b1f82e
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-22 Thu]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: OpenClaw — Personal AI Assistant
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:strategy:competitive:openclaw:
|
||||
|
||||
TypeScript/Node.js, ~3.5M lines. The largest codebase analyzed. Personal AI assistant with 25+ messaging channel support.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: pnpm workspace with ~135 bundled plugins. Gateway control plane routes messages through multi-agent routing. Per-agent sessions, workspaces, skill registries. Companion native apps (macOS, iOS, Android).
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Tiered — main agent runs tools directly on host (trusted-operator), non-main sessions sandboxed via Docker (read-only rootfs, capability dropping, seccomp/AppArmor, memory/cpu/PID limits, SSH/OpenShell backends).
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: Typed JSON/YAML config (openclaw.json). Multi-source model catalog. Plugin SDK with narrow typed subpath exports.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: ACP (Agent Control Protocol) for spawning child sessions. Skill system with npm distribution and ClawHub registry.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None.
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: Same as Hermes — no gate stack, no knowledge graph, no Org-mode, no verification, no neurosymbolic architecture. Differentiated by vastly broader channel support and mature plugin ecosystem. But architecturally conventional — LLM + tools + channels, no cognitive architecture innovation.
|
||||
|
||||
See the full [[id:3aa22300-2f25-57b0-8787-9f199cc978b1][competitive analysis]] for the landscape view and comparison.
|
||||
22
ideas/competitors/opencode.org
Normal file
22
ideas/competitors/opencode.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 7a060b36-36db-4eb7-b8cc-844bd6ac9d36
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-22 Thu]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: OpenCode — AI Coding Agent
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:strategy:competitive:opencode:
|
||||
|
||||
TypeScript/Bun. anomalyco/opencode, 163K★. The dominant open-source coding agent by adoption. Bun runtime, Effect-TS functional core, Solid.js TUI, Turborepo monorepo.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: Dual LLM runtime — default AI SDK (streamText/generateText) + opt-in native Effect-Schema runtime with 4-axis route decomposition (Protocol/Endpoint/Auth/Framing). 30+ provider plugins. Agent workflow DSL with plan/build agent switching. Agent Communication Protocol (ACP) for inter-agent messaging. Subagents inherit permission boundaries from parent. 18+ built-in tools + custom tools from config. Effect-TS ScopedCache per-project state management.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Explicitly documents not sandboxing the agent. Permission system is rule-based (glob matching, actions: allow/ask/deny) and exists as a UX feature, not security isolation. Built-in agents have carefully scoped defaults. Permission rules inherited by subagents.
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: SQLite via Drizzle ORM with bun:sqlite or better-sqlite3. Key tables: SessionTable, MessageTable, PartTable. Project model stores worktree, VCS, sandbox config. Config is JSON-chain with remote config fetch.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: Agent.generate() interface lets the LLM create new agent definitions — the system grows its own subagent roster. Skills system loads domain-specific knowledge packs dynamically.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None.
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: No deterministic safety architecture, no knowledge graph, no Org-mode, no verification/proof system, no neurosymbolic architecture. The permission system is explicitly labeled not security isolation — it's UX, not a gate stack.
|
||||
|
||||
See the full [[id:3aa22300-2f25-57b0-8787-9f199cc978b1][competitive analysis]] for the landscape view and comparison.
|
||||
22
ideas/competitors/thoth.org
Normal file
22
ideas/competitors/thoth.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 416bab7c-4300-4d50-838a-5c7a8ad45d96
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-22 Thu]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Thoth — Personal AI Sovereignty
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:strategy:competitive:thoth:
|
||||
|
||||
https://github.com/siddsachar/Thoth — Python, ~151K lines, Apache 2.0. Local-first desktop AI assistant with knowledge graph, tools, voice, vision, shell, browser automation, workflow engine, and messaging channels.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecture: LangGraph create_react_agent (prebuilt ReAct pattern). Dual-mode streaming. NiceGUI web UI with desktop launcher. Context trimming via tiktoken, base64 data redaction, stale browser snapshot compression, MD5 tool result dedup, old tool result summarization. Agent graph cached by tool set + model override. Checkpoints via LangGraph's SQLite-backed checkpointer. 30+ tool modules.
|
||||
|
||||
Safety model: Shell command classification with 17 blocked patterns, 30+ safe auto-execute prefixes, needs-approval for compound commands. Interactive interrupt for non-safe shell. Per-workflow safety modes (block/approve/allow_all). Prompt-injection defense (5 categories, detection-only). Filesystem workspace boundary. Opt-in Docker Sandbox. Destructive ops require confirmation. No sandboxing of agent runtime itself.
|
||||
|
||||
Data model: SQLite (WAL mode) at ~/.thoth/memory.db — shared between knowledge graph and legacy memory. Knowledge graph: SQLite (durable) + NetworkX MultiDiGraph (in-memory, rebuilt on startup) + FAISS vector index (semantic recall). 11 entity types, 67+ typed relations with 30+ LLM-produced aliases. Dream Cycle refinement pipeline. Config: JSON files. Keys in OS credential store.
|
||||
|
||||
Self-modification: Agent CAN create/update/delete skills via dedicated tools. Skill patching requires user confirmation + auto backup. Maximum 1 patch proposal per conversation. No tool to modify system prompts directly.
|
||||
|
||||
Verification: None formal. Update signature verification.
|
||||
|
||||
Key gap vs Passepartout: No deterministic gate stack — shell safety is pattern list, not typed gates. No proof system. No output guardrails. No neurosymbolic architecture. No Org-mode. No Merkle-tree memory. Knowledge graph is LLM-driven entity extraction — no structural integrity guarantees. Thoth's differentiation is the knowledge graph + Developer/Designer studios + embedded LangGraph framework, but still architecturally conventional.
|
||||
|
||||
See the full [[id:3aa22300-2f25-57b0-8787-9f199cc978b1][competitive analysis]] for the landscape view and comparison.
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 36e5b948-e07b-477f-9036-4dfe88254347
|
||||
:ID: e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:UPDATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
@@ -6,43 +7,43 @@
|
||||
#+title: Compliance Framework Mapping — Global Regulated Industries
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:triad:compliance:global:index:
|
||||
|
||||
This file has been split into atomic framework notes under [[file:compliance/][compliance/]].
|
||||
This file has been split into atomic framework notes under [[id:1c4c91ec-c465-44ab-bd91-4c3b45909ddb][compliance/]].
|
||||
|
||||
See [[file:compliance/_index.org][Compliance framework index]] for the hub with per-framework links.
|
||||
See [[file:compliance/first-mover-window.org][First-mover window analysis]] for timing.
|
||||
See [[file:compliance/revenue-table.org][Revenue table]] for pricing and TAM.
|
||||
See [[id:e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c][Compliance framework index]] for the hub with per-framework links.
|
||||
See [[id:558154ea-e63a-4c45-998c-26ce8588585b][First-mover window analysis]] for timing.
|
||||
See [[id:81a815ee-bf2b-4365-9894-b814e4196850][Revenue table]] for pricing and TAM.
|
||||
|
||||
Each framework is its own file in [[file:compliance/][compliance/]]:
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/hipaa.org][HIPAA]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/soc2.org][SOC 2]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/gdpr.org][GDPR]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/fedramp.org][FedRAMP]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/sox.org][SOX]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/glba.org][GLBA]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/ny-dfs-500.org][NY DFS 500]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/ccpa-cpra.org][CCPA/CPRA]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/quebec-law-25.org][Quebec Law 25]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/uk-gdpr.org][UK GDPR]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/nis2.org][NIS2]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/eu-ai-act.org][EU AI Act]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/dora.org][DORA]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/eidas2.org][eIDAS 2.0]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/cra.org][CRA]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/appi.org][APPI]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/ismap.org][ISMAP]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/pipa.org][PIPA]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/privacy-act-aus.org][Privacy Act Australia]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/apra-cps-234.org][APRA CPS 234]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/irap.org][IRAP]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/dpdp-act.org][DPDP Act India]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/lgpd.org][LGPD Brazil]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/lfp-dppp.org][LFPDPPP Mexico]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/iso-27001.org][ISO 27001]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/iso-27701.org][ISO 27701]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/basel-iii.org][Basel III]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/fatf.org][FATF AML/CFT]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/ifrs.org][IFRS]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/oecd.org][OECD Privacy/AI]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/world-bank-esf.org][World Bank ESF]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/ifc-ps.org][IFC PS]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/un-cefact.org][UN/CEFACT]]
|
||||
Each framework is its own file in [[id:1c4c91ec-c465-44ab-bd91-4c3b45909ddb][compliance/]]:
|
||||
- [[id:84fb5f8f-0527-4df0-b6b6-dbf3bcff8a7f][HIPAA]]
|
||||
- [[id:ed65031c-cbd2-4ad2-bd53-a67791e183cd][SOC 2]]
|
||||
- [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]]
|
||||
- [[id:e6993701-3c67-49bf-82f3-06907572cbf3][FedRAMP]]
|
||||
- [[id:c9830152-0160-4bdc-ab03-6f308ad43536][SOX]]
|
||||
- [[id:4a2bc62b-3f21-4212-9cd9-f9add8fc0be1][GLBA]]
|
||||
- [[id:581666ba-f72c-406b-8556-93876d2b30bf][NY DFS 500]]
|
||||
- [[id:87996d87-100c-4bf6-8546-a860b9d7c25b][CCPA/CPRA]]
|
||||
- [[id:f6a0c00e-e922-44af-99ce-6412c4b73745][Quebec Law 25]]
|
||||
- [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]]
|
||||
- [[id:748db16a-1382-4e5e-8812-a5d57a8de131][NIS2]]
|
||||
- [[id:06fcdb02-2643-4f9d-ab41-e711a99cc390][EU AI Act]]
|
||||
- [[id:717ef2df-2a80-4362-b23a-5e7e12554251][DORA]]
|
||||
- [[id:b8cf51e8-5f39-49ad-9547-a792a2e446aa][eIDAS 2.0]]
|
||||
- [[id:ce81fefc-b7a8-4be5-912f-55fd30970b6e][CRA]]
|
||||
- [[id:b852ec69-0fc2-435c-ae1e-6b83e49b3ca3][APPI]]
|
||||
- [[id:085b76cc-4a65-4660-9c70-85aee10ca99e][ISMAP]]
|
||||
- [[id:e777064d-9950-42d5-980d-8c78cda91500][PIPA]]
|
||||
- [[id:834689e9-be0a-4822-9085-9b6b22294fd2][Privacy Act Australia]]
|
||||
- [[id:904f5f12-ec9a-4cbf-854a-0b9b1e11a521][APRA CPS 234]]
|
||||
- [[id:7f46764b-47b8-4892-a526-2c1b9ee6e6df][IRAP]]
|
||||
- [[id:fed19a24-ad81-4837-a12b-dafbd3ec110a][DPDP Act]]
|
||||
- [[id:c871a9f4-dd53-4e93-aa50-6acf0c606a9b][LGPD Brazil]]
|
||||
- [[id:bafdaa23-de0b-444c-9151-c87ac65add32][LFPDPPP Mexico]]
|
||||
- [[id:e2ab887d-9f28-4da6-8388-e6c035e9d9c5][ISO 27001]]
|
||||
- [[id:748b0cc7-7f42-49fb-8ee3-1ae49048a178][ISO 27701]]
|
||||
- [[id:4eef0993-6671-41cf-ba20-d1443a3ec49d][Basel III]]
|
||||
- [[id:03ebdb80-a9af-4e76-a443-8556424996ed][FATF AML/CFT]]
|
||||
- [[id:fc736aec-ef53-4759-9787-62bc8deea2e7][IFRS]]
|
||||
- [[id:022109ad-f031-44c4-8ea0-0b3c9402ca90][OECD Privacy/AI]]
|
||||
- [[id:177aad72-5626-444d-a2e4-af8e1263b125][World Bank ESF]]
|
||||
- [[id:68c55deb-72bf-4b15-ac28-bcc792057543][IFC PS]]
|
||||
- [[id:6a5884c8-e9b5-477e-bbf6-aa9ffd967739][UN/CEFACT]]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,79 +1,7 @@
|
||||
#+title: Compliance
|
||||
#+filetags: :compliance:index:
|
||||
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:UPDATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Compliance Framework Index — Global Regulated Industries
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:triad:compliance:global:index:hub:
|
||||
|
||||
The verification monopoly and domain gate package revenue streams depend on
|
||||
selling into regulated industries. These industries buy compliance, not software.
|
||||
Each framework below maps to a gate package the triad can sell — ACL2-verified
|
||||
gate rules that produce deterministic audit trails.
|
||||
|
||||
See [[file:first-mover-window.org][First-mover window analysis]] and [[file:revenue-table.org][Revenue table]] for the consolidated view.
|
||||
|
||||
* US Frameworks
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:hipaa.org][HIPAA]] — Health privacy ($50K/yr, 500K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:soc2.org][SOC 2]] — Service organization controls ($50K/yr, 100K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:fedramp.org][FedRAMP]] — Federal cloud authorization ($100K/yr, 1K providers)
|
||||
- [[file:sox.org][SOX]] — Financial controls ($50K/yr, 10K orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:glba.org][GLBA]] — Financial privacy ($40K/yr, 20K orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:ny-dfs-500.org][NY DFS 500]] — NY financial cybersecurity ($30K/yr, 3K orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:ccpa-cpra.org][CCPA/CPRA]] — California privacy ($40K/yr, 50K+ orgs)
|
||||
|
||||
* Canada
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:quebec-law-25.org][Quebec Law 25]] — Provincial privacy ($25K/yr, 10K+ orgs)
|
||||
|
||||
* UK and EU
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:gdpr.org][GDPR]] — EU privacy ($50K/yr, 500K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:uk-gdpr.org][UK GDPR]] — UK privacy ($40K/yr, 100K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:nis2.org][NIS2]] — Network security ($50K/yr, 160K orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:eu-ai-act.org][EU AI Act]] — AI regulation ($75K/yr, 100K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:dora.org][DORA]] — Financial resilience ($50K/yr, 22K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:eidas2.org][eIDAS 2.0]] — Digital identity ($30K/yr, 10K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:cra.org][CRA]] — Product cybersecurity ($40K/yr, 50K+ orgs)
|
||||
|
||||
* Asia-Pacific
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:appi.org][APPI]] — Japan privacy ($40K/yr, 100K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:ismap.org][ISMAP]] — Japan cloud authorization ($75K/yr, 500 providers)
|
||||
- [[file:pipa.org][PIPA]] — South Korea privacy ($35K/yr, 50K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:privacy-act-aus.org][Privacy Act]] — Australia privacy ($35K/yr, 50K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:apra-cps-234.org][APRA CPS 234]] — Australian financial security ($40K/yr, 500 orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:irap.org][IRAP]] — Australian cloud authorization ($75K/yr, 300 providers)
|
||||
- [[file:dpdp-act.org][DPDP Act]] — India privacy ($30K/yr, 500K+ orgs)
|
||||
|
||||
* Latin America
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:lgpd.org][LGPD]] — Brazil privacy ($30K/yr, 200K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:lfp-dppp.org][LFPDPPP]] — Mexico privacy ($25K/yr, 50K+ orgs)
|
||||
|
||||
* International
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:iso-27001.org][ISO 27001]] — ISMS ($40K/yr, 60K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:iso-27701.org][ISO 27701]] — Privacy management ($35K/yr, 1K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:basel-iii.org][Basel III]] — Banking capital ($100K/yr, 500 G-SIBs)
|
||||
- [[file:fatf.org][FATF]] — AML/CFT ($50K/yr, 50K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:ifrs.org][IFRS 17]] — Insurance accounting ($75K/yr, 5K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[file:oecd.org][OECD Guidelines]] — Privacy/AI principles (indirect)
|
||||
- [[file:world-bank-esf.org][World Bank ESF]] — Development finance ($50K/yr)
|
||||
- [[file:ifc-ps.org][IFC PS]] — Project finance ($50K/yr)
|
||||
- [[file:un-cefact.org][UN/CEFACT]] — Trade facilitation ($30K/yr, 50K+ orgs)
|
||||
|
||||
* Strategic View
|
||||
|
||||
| Region | Frameworks | Total TAM | First-mover priority |
|
||||
|--------|-----------|-----------|---------------------|
|
||||
| US | 7 | ~$33B | FedRAMP (procurement gate), NY DFS 500 (growing) |
|
||||
| UK/EU | 7 | ~$24B | NIS2 (2025 deadline), AI Act (Aug 2026), DORA (in effect) |
|
||||
| Asia-Pacific | 7 | ~$9B | DPDP (rules drafting), ISMAP/IRAP (gov cloud gates) |
|
||||
| Latin America | 2 | ~$7B | LGPD (largest LATAM market) |
|
||||
| International | 9 | ~$4.5B | ISO 27001 (universal baseline), World Bank/IFC (no market exists) |
|
||||
|
||||
Next: [[file:first-mover-window.org][First-mover window analysis]] | [[file:revenue-table.org][Full revenue table]]
|
||||
See also: [[file:../../ideas/verification-monopoly.org][Verification monopoly]], [[file:../../ideas/domain-gate-packages.org][Domain gate packages]],
|
||||
[[file:../../ideas/compute-marketplace.org][Compute marketplace]], [[file:../../ideas/infrastructure-lock-in.org][Infrastructure lock-in]]
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 1c4c91ec-c465-44ab-bd91-4c3b45909ddb
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: b852ec69-0fc2-435c-ae1e-6b83e49b3ca3
|
||||
:ID: auto-appi
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: APPI (Act on the Protection of Personal Information — Japan)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:appi:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,4 +24,6 @@ Japanese residents.
|
||||
Why it matters: APPI's cross-border transfer restrictions require fine-grained
|
||||
control over which data leaves Japan. The gate stack can encode "this data has
|
||||
APPI cross-border consent flag = false → block egress." First-mover advantage
|
||||
is moderate — few non-Japanese vendors target APPI specifically, and the 2022
|
||||
is moderate — few non-Japanese vendors target APPI specifically, and the 2022 report. First-mover advantage is moderate — few non-Japanese vendors target APPI specifically, and the 2022 amendments created a market for dedicated APPI tooling.
|
||||
|
||||
Part of the [[id:e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c][compliance framework index]].
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 904f5f12-ec9a-4cbf-854a-0b9b1e11a521
|
||||
:ID: auto-apra-cps-234
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +22,7 @@ license cancellation for non-compliance. Personal liability for board and
|
||||
senior management.
|
||||
|
||||
Why it matters: CPS 234's control testing requirement creates demand for
|
||||
continuous verification — exactly what the gate stack and evaluation harness
|
||||
continuous verification — exactly what the gate stack and [[id:45258a2d-1675-562c-9024-5d1eb2f1ea56][evaluation harness]]
|
||||
provide. First-mover advantage: CPS 234 is mature (2019) but enforcement is
|
||||
escalating. No vendor provides a deterministic control-testing pipeline.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 4eef0993-6671-41cf-ba20-d1443a3ec49d
|
||||
:ID: auto-basel-iii
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -24,4 +25,6 @@ verification-friendly. The gate stack can encode credit risk weight mappings
|
||||
and produce auditable proof that capital calculations follow the correct
|
||||
methodology. First-mover advantage: Basel compliance is done via spreadsheets
|
||||
and specialized risk platforms. No platform uses formal verification for
|
||||
risk-weight mapping correctness. A $100K/yr Basel gate package for a G-SIB
|
||||
risk-weight mapping correctness. A $100K/yr Basel gate package for a G-SIB is a trivial expense relative to the capital requirement penalty of getting the mapping wrong.
|
||||
|
||||
Part of the [[id:e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c][compliance framework index]].
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 87996d87-100c-4bf6-8546-a860b9d7c25b
|
||||
:ID: auto-ccpa-cpra
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: CCPA/CPRA (California Consumer Privacy Act)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:ccpa:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
California's comprehensive privacy law — the closest US analogue to GDPR.
|
||||
California's comprehensive privacy law — the closest US analogue to [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]].
|
||||
CPRA (effective 2023) amended and strengthened CCPA. Key rights: right to
|
||||
know, delete, opt out of sale/sharing, correct inaccurate data, limit use
|
||||
of sensitive PI. Private right of action for data breaches.
|
||||
|
||||
82
ideas/compliance/compliance-index.org
Normal file
82
ideas/compliance/compliance-index.org
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:UPDATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Compliance Framework Index — Global Regulated Industries
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:triad:compliance:global:index:hub:
|
||||
|
||||
The [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]] and domain gate package [[id:ed05cab4-88e9-4e25-b7c9-346fa39c69a0][revenue streams]] depend on
|
||||
selling into regulated industries. These industries buy compliance, not software.
|
||||
Each framework below maps to a gate package the triad can sell — ACL2-verified
|
||||
gate rules that produce deterministic audit trails.
|
||||
|
||||
See [[id:558154ea-e63a-4c45-998c-26ce8588585b][First-mover window analysis]] and [[id:81a815ee-bf2b-4365-9894-b814e4196850][Revenue table]] for the consolidated view.
|
||||
|
||||
* US Frameworks
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:84fb5f8f-0527-4df0-b6b6-dbf3bcff8a7f][HIPAA]] — Health privacy ($50K/yr, 500K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:ed65031c-cbd2-4ad2-bd53-a67791e183cd][SOC 2]] — Service organization controls ($50K/yr, 100K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:e6993701-3c67-49bf-82f3-06907572cbf3][FedRAMP]] — Federal cloud authorization ($100K/yr, 1K providers)
|
||||
- [[id:c9830152-0160-4bdc-ab03-6f308ad43536][SOX]] — Financial controls ($50K/yr, 10K orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:4a2bc62b-3f21-4212-9cd9-f9add8fc0be1][GLBA]] — Financial privacy ($40K/yr, 20K orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:581666ba-f72c-406b-8556-93876d2b30bf][NY DFS 500]] — NY financial cybersecurity ($30K/yr, 3K orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:87996d87-100c-4bf6-8546-a860b9d7c25b][CCPA/CPRA]] — California privacy ($40K/yr, 50K+ orgs)
|
||||
|
||||
* Canada
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:f6a0c00e-e922-44af-99ce-6412c4b73745][Quebec Law 25]] — Provincial privacy ($25K/yr, 10K+ orgs)
|
||||
|
||||
* UK and EU
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]] — EU privacy ($50K/yr, 500K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:9bc29937-d59a-4ae4-9623-3d17a1fe6ebb][UK GDPR]] — UK privacy ($40K/yr, 100K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:748db16a-1382-4e5e-8812-a5d57a8de131][NIS2]] — Network security ($50K/yr, 160K orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:06fcdb02-2643-4f9d-ab41-e711a99cc390][EU AI Act]] — AI regulation ($75K/yr, 100K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:717ef2df-2a80-4362-b23a-5e7e12554251][DORA]] — Financial resilience ($50K/yr, 22K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:b8cf51e8-5f39-49ad-9547-a792a2e446aa][eIDAS 2.0]] — Digital identity ($30K/yr, 10K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:ce81fefc-b7a8-4be5-912f-55fd30970b6e][CRA]] — Product cybersecurity ($40K/yr, 50K+ orgs)
|
||||
|
||||
* Asia-Pacific
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:b852ec69-0fc2-435c-ae1e-6b83e49b3ca3][APPI]] — Japan privacy ($40K/yr, 100K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:085b76cc-4a65-4660-9c70-85aee10ca99e][ISMAP]] — Japan cloud authorization ($75K/yr, 500 providers)
|
||||
- [[id:e777064d-9950-42d5-980d-8c78cda91500][PIPA]] — South Korea privacy ($35K/yr, 50K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:834689e9-be0a-4822-9085-9b6b22294fd2][Privacy Act]] — Australia privacy ($35K/yr, 50K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:904f5f12-ec9a-4cbf-854a-0b9b1e11a521][APRA CPS 234]] — Australian financial security ($40K/yr, 500 orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:7f46764b-47b8-4892-a526-2c1b9ee6e6df][IRAP]] — Australian cloud authorization ($75K/yr, 300 providers)
|
||||
- [[id:fed19a24-ad81-4837-a12b-dafbd3ec110a][DPDP Act]] — India privacy ($30K/yr, 500K+ orgs)
|
||||
|
||||
* Latin America
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:c871a9f4-dd53-4e93-aa50-6acf0c606a9b][LGPD]] — Brazil privacy ($30K/yr, 200K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:bafdaa23-de0b-444c-9151-c87ac65add32][LFPDPPP]] — Mexico privacy ($25K/yr, 50K+ orgs)
|
||||
|
||||
* International
|
||||
|
||||
- [[id:e2ab887d-9f28-4da6-8388-e6c035e9d9c5][ISO 27001]] — ISMS ($40K/yr, 60K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:748b0cc7-7f42-49fb-8ee3-1ae49048a178][ISO 27701]] — Privacy management ($35K/yr, 1K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:4eef0993-6671-41cf-ba20-d1443a3ec49d][Basel III]] — Banking capital ($100K/yr, 500 G-SIBs)
|
||||
- [[id:03ebdb80-a9af-4e76-a443-8556424996ed][FATF]] — AML/CFT ($50K/yr, 50K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:fc736aec-ef53-4759-9787-62bc8deea2e7][IFRS 17]] — Insurance accounting ($75K/yr, 5K+ orgs)
|
||||
- [[id:022109ad-f031-44c4-8ea0-0b3c9402ca90][OECD Guidelines]] — Privacy/AI principles (indirect)
|
||||
- [[id:177aad72-5626-444d-a2e4-af8e1263b125][World Bank ESF]] — Development finance ($50K/yr)
|
||||
- [[id:68c55deb-72bf-4b15-ac28-bcc792057543][IFC PS]] — Project finance ($50K/yr)
|
||||
- [[id:6a5884c8-e9b5-477e-bbf6-aa9ffd967739][UN/CEFACT]] — Trade facilitation ($30K/yr, 50K+ orgs)
|
||||
|
||||
* Strategic View
|
||||
|
||||
| Region | Frameworks | Total TAM | First-mover priority |
|
||||
|--------|-----------|-----------|---------------------|
|
||||
| US | 7 | ~$33B | FedRAMP (procurement gate), NY DFS 500 (growing) |
|
||||
| UK/EU | 7 | ~$24B | NIS2 (2025 deadline), AI Act (Aug 2026), DORA (in effect) |
|
||||
| Asia-Pacific | 7 | ~$9B | DPDP (rules drafting), ISMAP/IRAP (gov cloud gates) |
|
||||
| Latin America | 2 | ~$7B | LGPD (largest LATAM market) |
|
||||
| International | 9 | ~$4.5B | ISO 27001 (universal baseline), World Bank/IFC (no market exists) |
|
||||
|
||||
The [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]] is enforced through
|
||||
[[id:c34940cc-090e-57c4-8020-e78b1d32b96c][domain gate packages]] running on a
|
||||
[[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]], creating
|
||||
[[id:2f783eb4-638e-5afa-9b59-6224d086a712][infrastructure lock-in]] that compounds with every framework
|
||||
added. See [[id:558154ea-e63a-4c45-998c-26ce8588585b][First-mover window analysis]] and
|
||||
[[id:81a815ee-bf2b-4365-9894-b814e4196850][Full revenue table]] for the consolidated view.
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: ce81fefc-b7a8-4be5-912f-55fd30970b6e
|
||||
:ID: auto-cra
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: transaction." First-mover advantage: wallets are being built now; the provider
|
||||
#+title: CRA (EU Cyber Resilience Act)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:cra:
|
||||
|
||||
transaction." First-mover advantage: wallets are being built now; the provider
|
||||
@@ -23,8 +24,8 @@ Penalties: Up to 15M EUR or 2.5% of global turnover for non-compliance with
|
||||
reporting obligations.
|
||||
|
||||
Why it matters: CRA's CE marking requirement creates a certification pipeline
|
||||
that the verification appliance can supply. If Passepartout's gate stack is
|
||||
itself CRA-compliant (verified by the evaluation harness), it becomes the
|
||||
that the [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][verification appliance]] can supply. If [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]]'s gate stack is
|
||||
itself CRA-compliant (verified by the [[id:45258a2d-1675-562c-9024-5d1eb2f1ea56][evaluation harness]]), it becomes the
|
||||
compliance infrastructure for any product built on it. First-mover advantage:
|
||||
Class II products require notified body assessment — the bottleneck is notified
|
||||
body capacity. The gate stack's automated evidence pipeline bypasses the
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 717ef2df-2a80-4362-b23a-5e7e12554251
|
||||
:ID: auto-dora
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ Penalties: Up to 2% of average daily turnover × number of days breached, or
|
||||
|
||||
Why it matters: DORA's third-party risk management requirement is a natural gate
|
||||
stack use case — every ICT provider access must be gated, logged, and auditable.
|
||||
TLPT (threat-led penetration testing) maps to the evaluation harness. First-mover
|
||||
TLPT (threat-led penetration testing) maps to the [[id:45258a2d-1675-562c-9024-5d1eb2f1ea56][evaluation harness]]. First-mover
|
||||
advantage is extremely time-sensitive: DORA is already in effect (January 2025).
|
||||
Financial institutions are scrambling for compliance tooling. A DORA gate package
|
||||
at $50K/yr with zero incremental cost per additional user is an immediate sale.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: fed19a24-ad81-4837-a12b-dafbd3ec110a
|
||||
:ID: auto-dpdp-act
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: DPDP Act (Digital Personal Data Protection Act — India)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:dpdp:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,3 +29,4 @@ consent-managed data access model maps directly to DPDP's consent framework.
|
||||
A DPDP gate package at $30K/yr (discounted for India market) captures a market
|
||||
of hundreds of thousands of businesses with no incumbent vendor.
|
||||
|
||||
Part of the [[id:e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c][compliance framework index]].
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: b8cf51e8-5f39-49ad-9547-a792a2e446aa
|
||||
:ID: auto-eidas2
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: eIDAS 2.0 (European Digital Identity Framework)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:eidas2:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,4 +24,6 @@ access to the EU digital identity market.
|
||||
Why it matters: eIDAS 2.0 creates a verified digital identity layer across the
|
||||
EU. The gate stack can integrate with eIDAS wallets as the identity provider
|
||||
for gate rules — "only X, authenticated via eIDAS wallet, may approve this
|
||||
transaction." First-mover advantage: wallets are being built now; the provider
|
||||
transaction." First-mover advantage: wallets are being built now; the provider — the one that First-mover advantage: wallets are being built now; the provider that integrates with the gate stack first becomes the compliance standard for eIDAS-authenticated transactions.
|
||||
|
||||
Part of the [[id:e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c][compliance framework index]].
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 06fcdb02-2643-4f9d-ab41-e711a99cc390
|
||||
:ID: auto-eu-ai-act
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -18,15 +19,15 @@ Who must comply: Providers and deployers of AI systems in the EU. Extraterritori
|
||||
if the AI system output is used in the EU. Scope covers GPAI (general-purpose AI)
|
||||
with additional obligations for systemic-risk GPAI.
|
||||
|
||||
Penalties: Up to 35M EUR or 7% of global turnover (higher than GDPR).
|
||||
Penalties: Up to 35M EUR or 7% of global turnover (higher than [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]]).
|
||||
|
||||
Why it matters: The EU AI Act's conformity assessment requirement creates an
|
||||
instant certification market. Passepartout's gate stack can serve as the
|
||||
instant certification market. [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]]'s gate stack can serve as the
|
||||
human oversight and accuracy/robustness infrastructure for any AI system
|
||||
deployed through it. The [[file:verification-monopoly.org][verification monopoly]] argument applies at maximum
|
||||
deployed through it. The [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]] argument applies at maximum
|
||||
force: an ACL2-verified gate stack is the most defensible approach to AI Act
|
||||
compliance. First-mover advantage: the regulation takes effect August 2026.
|
||||
No certification body or tool vendor has an ACL2-based compliance pipeline.
|
||||
First to market captures the standard-setting role.
|
||||
|
||||
** DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act)
|
||||
** [[id:717ef2df-2a80-4362-b23a-5e7e12554251][DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act)]]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 03ebdb80-a9af-4e76-a443-8556424996ed
|
||||
:ID: auto-fatf
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: risk-weight mapping correctness. A $100K/yr Basel gate package for a G-SIB
|
||||
#+title: FATF (Financial Action Task Force)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:fatf:
|
||||
|
||||
risk-weight mapping correctness. A $100K/yr Basel gate package for a G-SIB
|
||||
@@ -29,4 +30,6 @@ costs — Iran and North Korea are black-listed.
|
||||
Why it matters: FATF's CDD requirements are the most widespread and
|
||||
rule-complex compliance obligation globally. The gate stack can encode
|
||||
tiered CDD rules, prove that every customer onboarding followed the correct
|
||||
verification path, and produce an auditable trail for every suspicion
|
||||
verification path, and produce an auditable trail for every suspicion report. First-mover advantage is significant — no vendor offers verifiable AML gate automation at scale.
|
||||
|
||||
Part of the [[id:e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c][compliance framework index]].
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: e6993701-3c67-49bf-82f3-06907572cbf3
|
||||
:ID: auto-fedramp
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -46,14 +47,14 @@ contracts. FedRAMP is a procurement gate, not a regulatory one.
|
||||
FedRAMP is the highest bar and the most expensive certification to obtain.
|
||||
Few cloud providers achieve it (fewer than 300 authorized products as of 2025).
|
||||
But those that do capture the US government market with minimal competition.
|
||||
For the triad: a [[file:compute-marketplace.org][compute marketplace]] provider with FedRAMP Moderate or High
|
||||
For the triad: a [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]] provider with FedRAMP Moderate or High
|
||||
authorization can sell to every federal agency. The gate stack's deterministic
|
||||
audit trail maps directly to FedRAMP's continuous monitoring requirement —
|
||||
producing verifiable evidence of control effectiveness on every access, not
|
||||
just during the annual assessment. This is what justifies the
|
||||
[[file:domain-gate-packages.org][FedRAMP gate package]] at $100K/yr (the highest price) — it is not a software
|
||||
[[id:c34940cc-090e-57c4-8020-e78b1d32b96c][FedRAMP gate package]] at $100K/yr (the highest price) — it is not a software
|
||||
package, it is the evidence pipeline for a certification that costs $1M-$5M
|
||||
and 12-36 months to obtain independently. The [[file:verification-monopoly.org][verification monopoly]] argument
|
||||
and 12-36 months to obtain independently. The [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]] argument
|
||||
applies hardest here: an agency that has relied on a FedRAMP-authorized compute
|
||||
provider for five years cannot switch without re-running the entire authorization
|
||||
process with a new provider.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 558154ea-e63a-4c45-998c-26ce8588585b
|
||||
:ID: auto-first-mover-window
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -12,12 +13,16 @@ dominance before incumbents respond or the market settles on a standard approach
|
||||
|
||||
| Window | Frameworks | Rationale |
|
||||
|--------|-----------|-----------|
|
||||
| **Critical (<12 months)** | EU AI Act (Aug 2026 effective), NIS2 (Oct 2025 deadline), DORA (Jan 2025 — already in effect) | Regulation is active or imminent. Buyers are desperate. No established vendor. |
|
||||
| **Wide (12-36 months)** | DPDP Act 2023 (rules drafting), India privacy; Privacy Act Review (Australia); Quebec Law 25; CRA phased enforcement | Regulation not yet fully enforced. Rules being written. Market forming. |
|
||||
| **Mature (commodity)** | GDPR (2018), SOX (2002), HIPAA (1996), GLBA (1999), Basel III (2010), FATF 40 Recs | Market has established vendors. First-mover advantage requires displacing incumbents via superior architecture. |
|
||||
| **Latent (undiscovered)** | OECD AI Principles, UN/CEFACT, World Bank ESF, IFC PS | Compliance exists but is document-based or consultant-delivered. No software market has formed. The first gate package creates the category. |
|
||||
| **Critical (<12 months)** | [[id:06fcdb02-2643-4f9d-ab41-e711a99cc390][EU AI Act]] (Aug 2026 effective), [[id:748db16a-1382-4e5e-8812-a5d57a8de131][NIS2]] (Oct 2025 deadline), [[id:717ef2df-2a80-4362-b23a-5e7e12554251][DORA]] (Jan 2025 — already in effect) | Regulation is active or imminent. Buyers are desperate. No established vendor. |
|
||||
| **Wide (12-36 months)** | [[id:fed19a24-ad81-4837-a12b-dafbd3ec110a][DPDP Act]] 2023 (rules drafting), India privacy; Privacy Act Review (Australia); [[id:f6a0c00e-e922-44af-99ce-6412c4b73745][Quebec Law 25]]; [[id:ce81fefc-b7a8-4be5-912f-55fd30970b6e][CRA]] phased enforcement | Regulation not yet fully enforced. Rules being written. Market forming. |
|
||||
| **Mature (commodity)** | [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]] (2018), [[id:c9830152-0160-4bdc-ab03-6f308ad43536][SOX]] (2002), [[id:84fb5f8f-0527-4df0-b6b6-dbf3bcff8a7f][HIPAA]] (1996), [[id:4a2bc62b-3f21-4212-9cd9-f9add8fc0be1][GLBA]] (1999), [[id:4eef0993-6671-41cf-ba20-d1443a3ec49d][Basel III]] (2010), [[id:03ebdb80-a9af-4e76-a443-8556424996ed][FATF]] 40 Recs | Market has established vendors. First-mover advantage requires displacing incumbents via superior architecture. |
|
||||
| **Latent (undiscovered)** | [[id:022109ad-f031-44c4-8ea0-0b3c9402ca90][OECD]] AI Principles, [[id:6a5884c8-e9b5-477e-bbf6-aa9ffd967739][UN/CEFACT]], [[id:177aad72-5626-444d-a2e4-af8e1263b125][World Bank ESF]], [[id:68c55deb-72bf-4b15-ac28-bcc792057543][IFC PS]] | Compliance exists but is document-based or consultant-delivered. No software market has formed. The first gate package creates the category. |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
See also: [[file:_index.org][Compliance index]], [[file:revenue-table.org][Revenue table]],
|
||||
[[file:../../ideas/verification-appliance.org][Verification appliance]], [[file:../../ideas/verification-monopoly.org][Verification monopoly]]
|
||||
These windows define which frameworks are worth building a gate package for
|
||||
first. The [[id:e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c][compliance index]] maps each to a
|
||||
[[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][verification appliance]] gate package, and the
|
||||
[[id:81a815ee-bf2b-4365-9894-b814e4196850][revenue table]] sizes the market. The
|
||||
[[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]] dynamics determine which window to enter
|
||||
first.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104
|
||||
:ID: auto-gdpr
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -44,11 +45,11 @@ GDPR is the most extraterritorial and aggressively enforced privacy framework.
|
||||
The gate stack's principle of least privilege maps naturally to GDPR's data
|
||||
minimization requirement. Every data access is gated by a verified rule that
|
||||
states the purpose — the proof log is a built-in DPIA artifact. For the
|
||||
[[file:compute-marketplace.org][compute marketplace]]: a provider processing proofs on EU users' gate data must
|
||||
[[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]]: a provider processing proofs on EU users' gate data must
|
||||
maintain DPAs with all clients. Proof logs themselves may constitute personal
|
||||
data if they reference natural persons (names in access rules, etc.), creating
|
||||
a demand for privacy-preserving proof techniques. This is why the
|
||||
[[file:domain-gate-packages.org][GDPR gate package]] includes data-processing agreement templates and
|
||||
[[id:c34940cc-090e-57c4-8020-e78b1d32b96c][GDPR gate package]] includes data-processing agreement templates and
|
||||
purpose-boundary gate rules that are independently verified by the provider's
|
||||
[[file:evaluation-harness.org][evaluation harness]].
|
||||
[[id:45258a2d-1675-562c-9024-5d1eb2f1ea56][evaluation harness]].
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 4a2bc62b-3f21-4212-9cd9-f9add8fc0be1
|
||||
:ID: auto-glba
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: GLBA (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:glba:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19,5 +20,5 @@ and directors personally liable.
|
||||
Why it matters: The Safeguards Rule maps directly to gate stack access controls.
|
||||
Every NPI access is gated; the proof log is the security program's evidence.
|
||||
First-mover advantage is narrow (GLBA is well-understood) but the market is
|
||||
large because every financial institution that dodges HIPAA still faces GLBA.
|
||||
large because every financial institution that dodges [[id:84fb5f8f-0527-4df0-b6b6-dbf3bcff8a7f][HIPAA]] still faces GLBA.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 84fb5f8f-0527-4df0-b6b6-dbf3bcff8a7f
|
||||
:ID: auto-hipaa
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -34,11 +35,11 @@ imprisonment). State AGs can also bring civil actions.
|
||||
** Why it matters for the triad
|
||||
|
||||
HIPAA is the largest single compliance market in US healthcare — every hospital,
|
||||
clinic, insurer, and health-tech vendor must comply. The [[file:domain-gate-packages.org][HIPAA gate package]]
|
||||
clinic, insurer, and health-tech vendor must comply. The [[id:c34940cc-090e-57c4-8020-e78b1d32b96c][HIPAA gate package]]
|
||||
($50K/yr) encodes the Privacy Rule and Security Rule as ACL2-verifiable gate
|
||||
constraints. Every PHI access attempt passes through the gate stack, producing
|
||||
a machine-checkable audit trail that satisfies the Security Rule's audit control
|
||||
requirement automatically. No separate logging infrastructure needed. Over a
|
||||
five-year deployment, the accumulated fact store and proof history create
|
||||
[[file:infrastructure-lock-in.org][infrastructure lock-in]] — switching to a competitor means discarding all of it.
|
||||
[[id:2f783eb4-638e-5afa-9b59-6224d086a712][infrastructure lock-in]] — switching to a competitor means discarding all of it.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 68c55deb-72bf-4b15-ac28-bcc792057543
|
||||
:ID: auto-ifc-ps
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: projects in 100+ countries. Also adopted by many multilateral development banks
|
||||
#+title: IFC Performance Standards
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:ifc:
|
||||
|
||||
projects in 100+ countries. Also adopted by many multilateral development banks
|
||||
@@ -15,7 +16,7 @@ disbursement unless ESS5 resettlement plan is verified complete." First-mover
|
||||
advantage: World Bank compliance is entirely document-based (reports, audits,
|
||||
site visits). A verified gate system is unprecedented.
|
||||
|
||||
** IFC Performance Standards (PS)
|
||||
** [[id:fc736aec-ef53-4759-9787-62bc8deea2e7][IFC Performance Standards]] (PS)
|
||||
|
||||
International Finance Corporation's standards for environmental and social
|
||||
sustainability in private sector investment. Eight standards: PS1 (risk
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: fc736aec-ef53-4759-9787-62bc8deea2e7
|
||||
:ID: auto-ifrs
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: IFC Performance Standards (Environmental and Social Sustainability)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:ifrs:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,4 +24,6 @@ most rule-complex — requiring actuarial models, expected credit loss calculati
|
||||
and contract classification algorithms.
|
||||
|
||||
Who must comply: Publicly listed companies in 166 jurisdictions including the
|
||||
EU, UK, Japan, Australia, Canada (2024), Brazil, India, South Korea, and most
|
||||
EU, UK, Japan, Australia, Canada (2024), Brazil, India, South Korea, and most of Asia. IFRS 17 alone affects 5K+ insurers with complex actuarial compliance requirements that no automated verification solution currently addresses.
|
||||
|
||||
Part of the [[id:e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c][compliance framework index]].
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,22 +1,23 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 7f46764b-47b8-4892-a526-2c1b9ee6e6df
|
||||
:ID: auto-irap
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: IRAP (Infosec Registered Assessors Program — Australia)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:irap:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
** IRAP (Infosec Registered Assessors Program)
|
||||
|
||||
Australian government's cloud security assessment program — analogous to
|
||||
FedRAMP. Cloud services used by Australian government agencies must have an
|
||||
[[id:e6993701-3c67-49bf-82f3-06907572cbf3][FedRAMP]]. Cloud services used by Australian government agencies must have an
|
||||
IRAP assessment. Managed by the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC).
|
||||
Assessment levels: Protected (highest), Secret (top secret), Unclassified DLM.
|
||||
|
||||
Who must comply: Cloud providers selling to Australian federal, state, and
|
||||
local government agencies. Also critical infrastructure providers.
|
||||
|
||||
Why it matters: Like FedRAMP and ISMAP, IRAP is a procurement gate. An IRAP
|
||||
Why it matters: Like FedRAMP and [[id:085b76cc-4a65-4660-9c70-85aee10ca99e][ISMAP]], IRAP is a procurement gate. An IRAP
|
||||
Protected-level assessment is expensive and takes 6-12 months. First-mover
|
||||
advantage: the gate stack's deterministic audit trail can be the primary
|
||||
evidence artifact, reducing assessment scope/cost.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 085b76cc-4a65-4660-9c70-85aee10ca99e
|
||||
:ID: auto-ismap
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: is moderate — few non-Japanese vendors target APPI specifically, and the 2022
|
||||
#+title: ISMAP (Government Security Framework — Japan)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:ismap:
|
||||
|
||||
is moderate — few non-Japanese vendors target APPI specifically, and the 2022
|
||||
is moderate — few non-Japanese vendors target [[id:b852ec69-0fc2-435c-ae1e-6b83e49b3ca3][APPI]] specifically, and the 2022
|
||||
amendments added requirements that created compliance gaps.
|
||||
|
||||
** ISMAP (Government Information System Security Management and Assessment Program)
|
||||
|
||||
Japan's government cloud security program — analogous to FedRAMP. Cloud services
|
||||
Japan's government cloud security program — analogous to [[id:e6993701-3c67-49bf-82f3-06907572cbf3][FedRAMP]]. Cloud services
|
||||
used by Japanese government agencies must be ISMAP-authorized. Managed by the
|
||||
Digital Agency and the Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ Who must comply: Cloud service providers selling to Japanese national and local
|
||||
government agencies.
|
||||
|
||||
Why it matters: Like FedRAMP, ISMAP is a procurement gate. Authorization is
|
||||
time-consuming and expensive. A compute marketplace provider with ISMAP
|
||||
time-consuming and expensive. A [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]] provider with ISMAP
|
||||
authorization has exclusive access to the Japanese government market. First-mover
|
||||
advantage is significant — as of 2025, fewer than 100 services are ISMAP-registered.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: e2ab887d-9f28-4da6-8388-e6c035e9d9c5
|
||||
:ID: auto-iso-27001
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: ISO/IEC 27001 (Information Security Management)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:iso:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,5 +28,5 @@ A.16 incident management, A.18 compliance). First-mover advantage: the ISO
|
||||
binders). A gate stack that produces audit evidence automatically is not
|
||||
competing with other software — it is competing with binders.
|
||||
|
||||
** ISO 27701 (Privacy Information Management — PIMS extension to ISO 27001)
|
||||
** [[id:748b0cc7-7f42-49fb-8ee3-1ae49048a178][ISO 27701]] (Privacy Information Management — PIMS extension to ISO 27001)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 748b0cc7-7f42-49fb-8ee3-1ae49048a178
|
||||
:ID: auto-iso-27701
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: ISO/IEC 27701 (Privacy Information Management)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:iso:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
International standard extending ISO 27001 for privacy information management.
|
||||
Aligns with GDPR requirements. Provides a framework for PII (personally
|
||||
International standard extending [[id:e2ab887d-9f28-4da6-8388-e6c035e9d9c5][ISO 27001]] for privacy information management.
|
||||
Aligns with [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]] requirements. Provides a framework for PII (personally
|
||||
identifiable information) controllers and processors.
|
||||
|
||||
Why it matters: ISO 27701 bridges information security and privacy compliance.
|
||||
@@ -17,4 +18,4 @@ both standards from the same infrastructure. First-mover advantage: adoption is
|
||||
growing but still low (~1,000 certifications). Early gate package captures the
|
||||
growth market.
|
||||
|
||||
** Basel III (Bank for International Settlements — Basel Committee)
|
||||
** [[id:4eef0993-6671-41cf-ba20-d1443a3ec49d][Basel III (Bank for International Settlements — Basel Committee)]]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: bafdaa23-de0b-444c-9151-c87ac65add32
|
||||
:ID: auto-lfp-dppp
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: LFPDPPP (Ley Federal de Protección de Datos Personales — Mexico)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:lfp:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ Why it matters: USMCA (US-Mexico-Canada Agreement) trade obligations are
|
||||
pushing toward privacy regime interoperability. A bilingual (Spanish/English)
|
||||
gate package covering both LFPDPPP and US frameworks serves the massive
|
||||
US-Mexico cross-border commerce market. First-mover advantage: LFPDPPP is
|
||||
less automated than GDPR; the market has fewer vendors and lower expectations.
|
||||
less automated than [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]]; the market has fewer vendors and lower expectations.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: c871a9f4-dd53-4e93-aa50-6acf0c606a9b
|
||||
:ID: auto-lgpd
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: LGPD (Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados — Brazil)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:lgpd:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Brazil's comprehensive privacy law (effective 2020, fines effective 2023).
|
||||
Modeled on GDPR but with differences: LGPD defines "data processing agents"
|
||||
Modeled on [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]] but with differences: LGPD defines "data processing agents"
|
||||
(controller and operator), requires appointment of DPO (data protection officer),
|
||||
mandates breach notification to ANPD (National Data Protection Authority) and
|
||||
affected data subjects. 10 legal bases for processing (vs 6 in GDPR).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 748db16a-1382-4e5e-8812-a5d57a8de131
|
||||
:ID: auto-nis2
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: NIS 2 Directive (EU Network and Information Security)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:nis2:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,4 +32,4 @@ advantage is urgent — the transposition deadline is October 2025 (17 months).
|
||||
Organizations need gate packages now. No competitor has a declarative gate
|
||||
model that maps to NIS2 requirements. $50K/yr NIS2 gate package is a fast sell.
|
||||
|
||||
** EU AI Act
|
||||
** [[id:06fcdb02-2643-4f9d-ab41-e711a99cc390][EU AI Act]]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 581666ba-f72c-406b-8556-93876d2b30bf
|
||||
:ID: auto-ny-dfs-500
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: NY DFS 500 (New York Cybersecurity Regulation)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:ny:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,3 +24,4 @@ verifiable evidence of control effectiveness — exactly what the gate stack
|
||||
produces. First-mover advantage is significant (few vendors target NY DFS 500
|
||||
specifically) and the regulation is a template that other states are adopting.
|
||||
|
||||
Part of the [[id:e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c][compliance framework index]].
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 022109ad-f031-44c4-8ea0-0b3c9402ca90
|
||||
:ID: auto-oecd
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: verification path, and produce an auditable trail for every suspicion
|
||||
#+title: OECD Guidelines
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:oecd:
|
||||
|
||||
verification path, and produce an auditable trail for every suspicion
|
||||
@@ -17,7 +18,7 @@ approach.
|
||||
OECD Privacy Guidelines (revised 2013): Eight principles — collection limitation,
|
||||
data quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security safeguards,
|
||||
openness, individual participation, accountability. Non-binding but foundational
|
||||
— the basis for GDPR, APPI, LGPD, and most other privacy laws.
|
||||
— the basis for [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]], [[id:b852ec69-0fc2-435c-ae1e-6b83e49b3ca3][APPI]], [[id:c871a9f4-dd53-4e93-aa50-6acf0c606a9b][LGPD]], and most other privacy laws.
|
||||
|
||||
OECD AI Principles (adopted 2019, updated 2024): Five values-based principles
|
||||
— inclusive growth and well-being, human-centered values and fairness,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: e777064d-9950-42d5-980d-8c78cda91500
|
||||
:ID: auto-pipa
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: PIPA (Personal Information Protection Act — South Korea)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:pipa:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +22,7 @@ against major tech companies. Class action lawsuits permitted.
|
||||
Who must comply: Any organization handling personal information of South Korean
|
||||
residents. Extraterritorial scope is broad and actively enforced.
|
||||
|
||||
Why it matters: PIPA is structurally similar to GDPR but with stricter
|
||||
Why it matters: PIPA is structurally similar to [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]] but with stricter
|
||||
enforcement and higher penalties relative to market size. The gate stack's
|
||||
purpose-boundary gates map directly to PIPA's purpose limitation requirement.
|
||||
First-mover advantage is large — PIPA has fewer compliance automation vendors
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 834689e9-be0a-4822-9085-9b6b22294fd2
|
||||
:ID: auto-privacy-act-aus
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: Privacy Act 1988 (Australia)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:privacy:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,4 +28,4 @@ most defensible transparency artifact available. First-mover advantage: the
|
||||
reforms are being legislated now; early adoption positions the gate stack as
|
||||
the reference implementation.
|
||||
|
||||
** APRA CPS 234 (Prudential Standard — Information Security)
|
||||
** [[id:904f5f12-ec9a-4cbf-854a-0b9b1e11a521][APRA CPS 234 (Prudential Standard — Information Security)]]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: f6a0c00e-e922-44af-99ce-6412c4b73745
|
||||
:ID: auto-quebec-law-25
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: gate rules. The gate stack can encode "this data flow crosses a CCPA boundary"
|
||||
#+title: Quebec Law 25
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:quebec:
|
||||
|
||||
gate rules. The gate stack can encode "this data flow crosses a CCPA boundary"
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +14,7 @@ verifiable audit trail — they are all document-based.
|
||||
** Canadian provincial privacy (Quebec Law 25, Ontario PHIPA)
|
||||
|
||||
Quebec Law 25 (2023-2024 phased) is Canada's most aggressive privacy
|
||||
regulation — closer to GDPR than PIPEDA. Requires: privacy officer appointment,
|
||||
regulation — closer to [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]] than PIPEDA. Requires: privacy officer appointment,
|
||||
privacy impact assessments, consent modernization, data portability, right to
|
||||
de-index, algorithm transparency (automated decision-making disclosures).
|
||||
Penalties up to $25M CAD or 4% of global revenue.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 81a815ee-bf2b-4365-9894-b814e4196850
|
||||
:ID: auto-revenue-table
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -9,39 +10,39 @@
|
||||
|
||||
| Framework | Region | Gate price/yr | Addressable orgs | Revenue potential | First-mover window | Gate rule type |
|
||||
|-----------|--------|--------------|------------------|-------------------|---------------------|----------------|
|
||||
| HIPAA | US | $50K | 500K+ | $25B | Mature (incumbent disruption) | Privacy + access control |
|
||||
| [[id:84fb5f8f-0527-4df0-b6b6-dbf3bcff8a7f][HIPAA]] | US | $50K | 500K+ | $25B | Mature (incumbent disruption) | Privacy + access control |
|
||||
| SOC 2 | US/Global | $50K | 100K+ | $5B | Mature (incumbent disruption) | Access control + audit |
|
||||
| GDPR | EU | $50K | 500K+ | $25B | Mature (incumbent disruption) | Privacy + consent |
|
||||
| FedRAMP | US | $100K | 1K (providers) | $100M | Moderate (<300 authorized) | Continuous monitoring |
|
||||
| SOX | US | $50K | 10K | $500M | Mature (manual audit disruption) | Financial controls |
|
||||
| GLBA | US | $40K | 20K | $800M | Moderate | Financial privacy |
|
||||
| NY DFS 500 | US (NY) | $30K | 3K | $90M | Wide | Cybersecurity controls |
|
||||
| CCPA/CPRA | US (CA) | $40K | 50K+ | $2B | Moderate | Privacy opt-out flows |
|
||||
| NIS2 | EU | $50K | 160K | $8B | Critical (2025) | Cybersecurity + supply chain |
|
||||
| EU AI Act | EU | $75K | 100K+ | $7.5B | Critical (Aug 2026) | AI risk management |
|
||||
| DORA | EU | $50K | 22K+ | $1.1B | Critical (in effect) | ICT resilience |
|
||||
| eIDAS 2.0 | EU | $30K | 10K+ | $300M | Wide (wallet buildout) | Identity gates |
|
||||
| CRA | EU | $40K | 50K+ | $2B | Wide (phased 2025-2027) | Product security |
|
||||
| UK GDPR | UK | $40K | 100K+ | $4B | Mature (GDPR derivative) | Privacy |
|
||||
| APPI | Japan | $40K | 100K+ | $4B | Moderate | Cross-border privacy |
|
||||
| ISMAP | Japan | $75K | 500 (providers) | $37.5M | Wide (<100 registered) | Gov cloud assessment |
|
||||
| PIPA | South Korea | $35K | 50K+ | $1.75B | Wide (2024 amendments settling) | Privacy + consent |
|
||||
| [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]] | EU | $50K | 500K+ | $25B | Mature (incumbent disruption) | Privacy + consent |
|
||||
| [[id:e6993701-3c67-49bf-82f3-06907572cbf3][FedRAMP]] | US | $100K | 1K (providers) | $100M | Moderate (<300 authorized) | Continuous monitoring |
|
||||
| [[id:c9830152-0160-4bdc-ab03-6f308ad43536][SOX]] | US | $50K | 10K | $500M | Mature (manual audit disruption) | Financial controls |
|
||||
| [[id:4a2bc62b-3f21-4212-9cd9-f9add8fc0be1][GLBA]] | US | $40K | 20K | $800M | Moderate | Financial privacy |
|
||||
| [[id:581666ba-f72c-406b-8556-93876d2b30bf][NY DFS 500]] | US (NY) | $30K | 3K | $90M | Wide | Cybersecurity controls |
|
||||
| [[id:87996d87-100c-4bf6-8546-a860b9d7c25b][CCPA/CPRA]] | US (CA) | $40K | 50K+ | $2B | Moderate | Privacy opt-out flows |
|
||||
| [[id:748db16a-1382-4e5e-8812-a5d57a8de131][NIS2]] | EU | $50K | 160K | $8B | Critical (2025) | Cybersecurity + supply chain |
|
||||
| [[id:06fcdb02-2643-4f9d-ab41-e711a99cc390][EU AI Act]] | EU | $75K | 100K+ | $7.5B | Critical (Aug 2026) | AI risk management |
|
||||
| [[id:717ef2df-2a80-4362-b23a-5e7e12554251][DORA]] | EU | $50K | 22K+ | $1.1B | Critical (in effect) | ICT resilience |
|
||||
| [[id:b8cf51e8-5f39-49ad-9547-a792a2e446aa][eIDAS 2.0]] | EU | $30K | 10K+ | $300M | Wide (wallet buildout) | Identity gates |
|
||||
| [[id:ce81fefc-b7a8-4be5-912f-55fd30970b6e][CRA]] | EU | $40K | 50K+ | $2B | Wide (phased 2025-2027) | Product security |
|
||||
| [[id:9bc29937-d59a-4ae4-9623-3d17a1fe6ebb][UK GDPR]] | UK | $40K | 100K+ | $4B | Mature (GDPR derivative) | Privacy |
|
||||
| [[id:b852ec69-0fc2-435c-ae1e-6b83e49b3ca3][APPI]] | Japan | $40K | 100K+ | $4B | Moderate | Cross-border privacy |
|
||||
| [[id:085b76cc-4a65-4660-9c70-85aee10ca99e][ISMAP]] | Japan | $75K | 500 (providers) | $37.5M | Wide (<100 registered) | Gov cloud assessment |
|
||||
| [[id:e777064d-9950-42d5-980d-8c78cda91500][PIPA]] | South Korea | $35K | 50K+ | $1.75B | Wide (2024 amendments settling) | Privacy + consent |
|
||||
| Privacy Act | Australia | $35K | 50K+ | $1.75B | Wide (reforms legislating) | Privacy + AI transparency |
|
||||
| APRA CPS 234 | Australia | $40K | 500 | $20M | Moderate | Info security controls |
|
||||
| IRAP | Australia | $75K | 300 (providers) | $22.5M | Wide | Gov cloud assessment |
|
||||
| DPDP Act | India | $30K | 500K+ | $15B | Wide (rules drafting) | Privacy + consent |
|
||||
| LGPD | Brazil | $30K | 200K+ | $6B | Moderate | Privacy |
|
||||
| LFPDPPP | Mexico | $25K | 50K+ | $1.25B | Wide | Privacy |
|
||||
| ISO 27001 | Global | $40K | 60K+ | $2.4B | Mature (manual disruption) | ISMS controls |
|
||||
| ISO 27701 | Global | $35K | 1K+ | $35M | Wide (growing) | Privacy management |
|
||||
| Basel III | Global (banking) | $100K | 500 (G-SIBs) | $50M | Mature (incumbent disruption) | Capital adequacy |
|
||||
| FATF AML/CFT | Global | $50K | 50K+ | $2.5B | Mature (incumbent disruption) | CDD + screening |
|
||||
| IFRS 17 | Global (insurance) | $75K | 5K+ | $375M | Mature (actuarial verification) | Contract classification |
|
||||
| UN/CEFACT | Global (trade) | $30K | 50K+ | $1.5B | Latent (no market exists) | Cross-border data rules |
|
||||
| World Bank ESF | Global (dev finance) | $50K | 1K+ (projects) | $50M | Latent (no market exists) | ES compliance gates |
|
||||
| IFC PS | Global (project finance) | $50K | 500+ (deals) | $25M | Latent (no market exists) | ES compliance gates |
|
||||
| [[id:904f5f12-ec9a-4cbf-854a-0b9b1e11a521][APRA CPS 234]] | Australia | $40K | 500 | $20M | Moderate | Info security controls |
|
||||
| [[id:7f46764b-47b8-4892-a526-2c1b9ee6e6df][IRAP]] | Australia | $75K | 300 (providers) | $22.5M | Wide | Gov cloud assessment |
|
||||
| [[id:fed19a24-ad81-4837-a12b-dafbd3ec110a][DPDP Act]] | India | $30K | 500K+ | $15B | Wide (rules drafting) | Privacy + consent |
|
||||
| [[id:c871a9f4-dd53-4e93-aa50-6acf0c606a9b][LGPD]] | Brazil | $30K | 200K+ | $6B | Moderate | Privacy |
|
||||
| [[id:bafdaa23-de0b-444c-9151-c87ac65add32][LFPDPPP]] | Mexico | $25K | 50K+ | $1.25B | Wide | Privacy |
|
||||
| [[id:e2ab887d-9f28-4da6-8388-e6c035e9d9c5][ISO 27001]] | Global | $40K | 60K+ | $2.4B | Mature (manual disruption) | ISMS controls |
|
||||
| [[id:748b0cc7-7f42-49fb-8ee3-1ae49048a178][ISO 27701]] | Global | $35K | 1K+ | $35M | Wide (growing) | Privacy management |
|
||||
| [[id:4eef0993-6671-41cf-ba20-d1443a3ec49d][Basel III]] | Global (banking) | $100K | 500 (G-SIBs) | $50M | Mature (incumbent disruption) | Capital adequacy |
|
||||
| [[id:03ebdb80-a9af-4e76-a443-8556424996ed][FATF]] AML/CFT | Global | $50K | 50K+ | $2.5B | Mature (incumbent disruption) | CDD + screening |
|
||||
| [[id:fc736aec-ef53-4759-9787-62bc8deea2e7][IFRS]] 17 | Global (insurance) | $75K | 5K+ | $375M | Mature (actuarial verification) | Contract classification |
|
||||
| [[id:6a5884c8-e9b5-477e-bbf6-aa9ffd967739][UN/CEFACT]] | Global (trade) | $30K | 50K+ | $1.5B | Latent (no market exists) | Cross-border data rules |
|
||||
| [[id:177aad72-5626-444d-a2e4-af8e1263b125][World Bank ESF]] | Global (dev finance) | $50K | 1K+ (projects) | $50M | Latent (no market exists) | ES compliance gates |
|
||||
| [[id:68c55deb-72bf-4b15-ac28-bcc792057543][IFC PS]] | Global (project finance) | $50K | 500+ (deals) | $25M | Latent (no market exists) | ES compliance gates |
|
||||
|
||||
A compute marketplace provider with authorization in 5+ frameworks (FedRAMP +
|
||||
A [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]] provider with authorization in 5+ frameworks (FedRAMP +
|
||||
ISMAP + IRAP + SOC 2 + ISO 27001) becomes the default infrastructure provider
|
||||
for regulated cloud globally. The gate package portfolio alone — a mid-size
|
||||
enterprise running 10+ packages — generates $500K/yr+ in recurring revenue.
|
||||
@@ -56,5 +57,11 @@ for regulated cloud globally. The gate package portfolio alone — a mid-size
|
||||
enterprise running 10+ packages — generates $500K/yr+ in recurring revenue.
|
||||
At 10,000 such enterprises: $5B/yr.
|
||||
|
||||
See also: [[file:_index.org][Compliance index]], [[file:first-mover-window.org][First-mover window analysis]],
|
||||
[[file:../../ideas/verification-monopoly.org][Verification monopoly]], [[file:../../ideas/compute-marketplace.org][Compute marketplace]]
|
||||
A compute marketplace provider with authorization in 5+ frameworks (FedRAMP +
|
||||
ISMAP + IRAP + SOC 2 + ISO 27001) becomes the default infrastructure provider
|
||||
for regulated cloud globally. The gate package portfolio alone — a mid-size
|
||||
enterprise running 10+ packages — generates $500K/yr+ in recurring revenue.
|
||||
At 10,000 such enterprises: $5B/yr. See the [[id:e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c][compliance index]] for the full
|
||||
framework list, [[id:558154ea-e63a-4c45-998c-26ce8588585b][first-mover window analysis]] for timing strategy, and
|
||||
[[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]] and [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]] for the economic dynamics
|
||||
behind the revenue.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: ed65031c-cbd2-4ad2-bd53-a67791e183cd
|
||||
:ID: auto-soc2
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -42,12 +43,12 @@ enterprise customers. Misrepresentation of certification status is fraud.
|
||||
|
||||
** Why it matters for the triad
|
||||
|
||||
SOC 2 is the entry-level certification for the [[file:compute-marketplace.org][compute marketplace]]. A provider
|
||||
SOC 2 is the entry-level certification for the [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]]. A provider
|
||||
needs SOC 2 Type II to sell compute to enterprises whose procurement policy
|
||||
requires audited vendors. The gate stack itself maps directly to the Security
|
||||
criterion (access controls, audit trails) — the Passepartout instance's
|
||||
criterion (access controls, audit trails) — the [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] instance's
|
||||
deterministic gate log serves as the evidence artifact for the audit. No
|
||||
separate logging SIEM needed. This is the prerequisite to the larger
|
||||
[[file:verification-monopoly.org][verification monopoly]] play — once enterprises trust the audit trail, they
|
||||
[[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]] play — once enterprises trust the audit trail, they
|
||||
buy domain-specific gate packages for the same infrastructure.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: c9830152-0160-4bdc-ab03-6f308ad43536
|
||||
:ID: auto-sox
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:sox:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,5 +24,5 @@ that the external auditor needs for Section 404 attestation. First-mover
|
||||
advantage: SOX is mature (24 years old) but the audit market is $4B+ and
|
||||
entirely manual — no competitor has automated the evidence pipeline.
|
||||
|
||||
** GLBA (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act)
|
||||
** [[id:4a2bc62b-3f21-4212-9cd9-f9add8fc0be1][GLBA (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act)]]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: auto-uk-gdpr
|
||||
:ID: 9bc29937-d59a-4ae4-9623-3d17a1fe6ebb
|
||||
:ID: auto-uk-[[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][gdpr]]
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title:
|
||||
#+title: UK GDPR (Post-Brexit Data Protection)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:uk:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Post-Brexit, the UK maintains its own version of GDPR via the Data Protection
|
||||
Post-Brexit, the UK maintains its own version of [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]] via the Data Protection
|
||||
Act 2018. Substantively identical to EU GDPR but diverging over time. The UK
|
||||
has announced separate reforms targeting AI and digital identity. ICO (Information
|
||||
Commissioner's Office) enforces. Maximum fines: 17.5M GBP or 4% of global turnover.
|
||||
@@ -17,5 +18,5 @@ authority → ICO, DPA → equivalent UK contract clauses). The gate stack's ACL
|
||||
prover can verify that the UK version's rules are consistent with the EU version
|
||||
(and alert when they diverge). This is a concrete ACL2 application.
|
||||
|
||||
** NIS2 (Network and Information Security Directive)
|
||||
** [[id:748db16a-1382-4e5e-8812-a5d57a8de131][NIS2]] (Network and Information Security Directive)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 6a5884c8-e9b5-477e-bbf6-aa9ffd967739
|
||||
:ID: auto-un-cefact
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: EU, UK, Japan, Australia, Canada (2024), Brazil, India, South Korea, and most
|
||||
#+title: UN/CEFACT (United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business)
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:un:
|
||||
|
||||
EU, UK, Japan, Australia, Canada (2024), Brazil, India, South Korea, and most
|
||||
of Asia and Africa. The US (GAAP) is the major holdout.
|
||||
|
||||
Why it matters: IFRS 17 and IFRS 9 are algorithmically complex rule sets.
|
||||
Why it matters: [[id:fc736aec-ef53-4759-9787-62bc8deea2e7][IFRS]] 17 and IFRS 9 are algorithmically complex rule sets.
|
||||
Getting an actuarial model or credit loss calculation wrong is a financial
|
||||
reporting error. The gate stack's ACL2 prover can verify that the calculation
|
||||
implementations match the standard's mathematical requirements. First-mover
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 177aad72-5626-444d-a2e4-af8e1263b125
|
||||
:ID: auto-world-bank-esf
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: — inclusive growth and well-being, human-centered values and fairness,
|
||||
#+title: World Bank Environmental and Social Framework
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:framework:world:
|
||||
|
||||
— inclusive growth and well-being, human-centered values and fairness,
|
||||
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@ transparency and explainability, robustness and safety, accountability.
|
||||
Non-binding but influential — the AI Act, Canada's AIDA, and Japan's AI
|
||||
guidelines all cite them.
|
||||
|
||||
Why it matters: The OECD frameworks are indirect revenue drivers. Regulatory
|
||||
Why it matters: The [[id:022109ad-f031-44c4-8ea0-0b3c9402ca90][OECD]] frameworks are indirect revenue drivers. Regulatory
|
||||
alignment with OECD principles is often a procurement requirement for
|
||||
international organizations and development finance institutions. First-mover
|
||||
advantage is about standard-setting: the gate package that maps to OECD
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Agora Compute Marketplace
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:agora:revenue:compute:marketplace:
|
||||
|
||||
Passepartout instances offer their symbolic engine capacity (ACL2 cycles, Screamer constraint solving, VivaceGraph queries) to other agents on the Agora network.
|
||||
[[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] instances offer their symbolic engine capacity (ACL2 cycles, Screamer constraint solving, VivaceGraph queries) to other agents on the [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]] network.
|
||||
|
||||
The early player runs a large instance and sells compute to smaller instances. The AGPL allows this because the marketplace is a service, not a modification of the code. Revenue is a percentage of each compute transaction.
|
||||
The [[id:3b43a9b8-31d1-4479-a35f-22273b74f0c7][Agora Infrastructure requirements]] define the network substrate this marketplace runs on. runs a large instance and sells compute to smaller instances. The AGPL allows this because the marketplace is a service, not a modification of the code. Revenue is a percentage of each compute transaction.
|
||||
|
||||
But the question is structural: if every user runs their own Passepartout — each with the same symbolic engine, the same gate stack, the same ACL2 prover — why would they need to buy compute from anyone? The answer is that Passepartout's symbolic engine is /domain-specific/, not /generalized/. Local compute handles your daily gate stack (milliseconds per verification). The marketplace sells three things a local instance cannot produce:
|
||||
|
||||
**1. Specialized proof libraries and search strategies.** ACL2 is a search — the prover tries strategies until something works. A fresh Passepartout has generic strategies (the default waterfall, basic arithmetic, simple induction). A provider who has run 10,000 medical-device ISO 13482 proofs has tuned rewrite rules, custom clause processors, cached lemmas, and known failure-mode workarounds for that domain. You don't want to rediscover those from scratch — you buy them as a burst compute transaction. The provider isn't selling raw CPU cycles; they are selling /the accumulated search strategy from every proof ever run in that domain/, pre-packaged as a service. Over time, your own Passepartout learns the patterns and needs less external compute, but the provider stays ahead because they aggregate proof experience from /every/ client in that domain.
|
||||
|
||||
**2. Certification weight for third-party trust.** Your Passepartout can prove "this gate rule is correct" to /you/. ACL2 produces a machine-checkable proof log — anyone can mechanically verify it. But when a hospital buyer evaluating a published HIPAA gate rule needs to know the rule satisfies the regulation, they do not care about your Passepartout's isolated run of the proof. They want the rule verified by a provider who:
|
||||
**2. Certification weight for third-party trust.** Your Passepartout can prove "this gate rule is correct" to /you/. ACL2 produces a machine-checkable proof log — anyone can mechanically verify it. But when a hospital buyer evaluating a published [[id:84fb5f8f-0527-4df0-b6b6-dbf3bcff8a7f][HIPAA]] gate rule needs to know the rule satisfies the regulation, they do not care about your Passepartout's isolated run of the proof. They want the rule verified by a provider who:
|
||||
- Carries errors-and-omissions insurance for the specific regulation
|
||||
- Submits to annual third-party audits
|
||||
- Maintains compliance documentation for the proof pipeline
|
||||
@@ -22,8 +23,8 @@ Your local instance cannot produce any of this. The provider's proof carries /re
|
||||
|
||||
**3. Bootstrap verification for new instances.** A fresh Passepartout cannot verify its own initial state — the bootstrapping problem. You need a working system to generate the proof that the system is correct, but the proof refers to the system itself. The marketplace provides bootstrap proofs from existing trusted providers. Once verified, your instance stands on its own, but the initial self-certification requires an external prover that /already/ has a self-verified image. This is a one-time cost per instance (or per upgrade).
|
||||
|
||||
Secondary but real: burst capacity for heavy proofs (hours-long ACL2 conjectures you do not want tying up your daily agent's CPU), collective regression suite execution (small instances contribute edge cases but cannot run the full suite on every change), and latency guarantees for time-critical gate verifications (trading, emergency shutdown). These are infrastructure economics — the same reason individuals buy cloud burst instances despite having their own hardware.
|
||||
Secondary but real: burst capacity for heavy proofs (hours-long ACL2 conjectures you do not want tying up your daily agent's CPU), [[id:a5d59d12-b23e-58d6-a81b-9b8b06556949][collective regression suite]] execution (small instances contribute edge cases but cannot run the full suite on every change), and latency guarantees for time-critical gate verifications (trading, emergency shutdown). These are infrastructure economics — the same reason individuals buy cloud burst instances despite having their own hardware.
|
||||
|
||||
If Passepartout instances on Agora transact billions of verified operations per day, the spread on compute transactions is enormous. This is not a product sale — it is a bet on network effects. Every new instance increases the value of the network (more capacity, more diversity, more resilience).
|
||||
|
||||
The early player that provisions the largest compute capacity on Agora becomes the default infrastructure provider for the entire network. This is venture-scale money. The compute marketplace is the engine that powers the [[file:verification-monopoly.org][verification monopoly]] — certified compute from trusted providers. Together with [[file:agora-usernames.org][Agora usernames]] and other Agora services, it forms the basis of the [[file:investment-thesis.org][investment thesis]].
|
||||
The early player that provisions the largest compute capacity on Agora becomes the default infrastructure provider for the entire network. This is venture-scale money. The compute marketplace is the engine that powers the [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]] — certified compute from trusted providers. Together with [[id:2e390c1d-65f3-5fb3-b898-ac3fc4291ee7][Agora usernames]] and other Agora services, it forms the basis of the [[id:5961e469-53a3-5f3c-ab72-3c83ef91963f][investment thesis]].
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 0b5a8a74-cfd6-542d-bc88-4eb3cd8626f9
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Cost Structure — Zero Marginal Cost
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:economics:cost:marginal:zero:
|
||||
|
||||
- **One-time cost:** [[file:gate-rule-encoding.org][gate-rule encoding]] for a domain (from hours for codified domains up to months for tacit domains)
|
||||
- **One-time cost:** [[id:45ea493b-94ad-5885-aa65-0c846e5c3c1d][gate-rule encoding]] for a domain (from hours for codified domains up to months for tacit domains)
|
||||
- **Near-zero marginal cost:** ACL2 proof + Screamer consistency check + VivaceGraph lookup per interaction — all CPU-native, all in-image
|
||||
- **No recurring LLM API costs** for the 80% symbolic reasoning layer
|
||||
- **After [[file:sufficiency-flip.org][sufficiency flip]]:** pennies per day vs dollars per day for LLM-only
|
||||
- **After [[id:efc76898-03f7-57ba-923d-35d65da88bb7][sufficiency flip]]:** pennies per day vs dollars per day for LLM-only
|
||||
|
||||
The cost curve inverts: generation is expensive, verification is cheap. This is the inversion Passepartout exploits. This is the core insight of [[file:lisp-economics.org][Lisp economics]] — symbolic verification costs approach zero while LLM token costs remain constant.
|
||||
The cost curve inverts: generation is expensive, verification is cheap. This is the inversion [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] exploits. This is the core insight of [[id:9af13fff-9725-542b-93b1-a555bc74ad72][Lisp economics]] — symbolic verification costs approach zero while LLM token costs remain constant.
|
||||
|
||||
Token demand shifts from "every interaction burns tokens" to "only unfamiliar interactions burn tokens." Steady-state per-user LLM consumption drops by an order of magnitude.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,17 +1,18 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: c34940cc-090e-57c4-8020-e78b1d32b96c
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Domain Gate Rule Subscriptions
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:revenue:gate-rules:compliance:subscription:
|
||||
|
||||
Pre-verified [[file:gate-rule-encoding.org][gate rule]] packages for specific compliance domains. Translated from published regulations by the LLM, verified by ACL2, reviewed by a human for the 5% ambiguous edge cases.
|
||||
Pre-verified [[id:45ea493b-94ad-5885-aa65-0c846e5c3c1d][gate rule]] packages for specific compliance domains. Translated from published regulations by the LLM, verified by ACL2, reviewed by a human for the 5% ambiguous edge cases.
|
||||
|
||||
- HIPAA package: $50K/yr
|
||||
- SOC2 package: $50K/yr
|
||||
- GDPR package: $50K/yr
|
||||
- FedRAMP package: $100K/yr
|
||||
- [[id:84fb5f8f-0527-4df0-b6b6-dbf3bcff8a7f][HIPAA]] package: $50K/yr
|
||||
- [[id:ed65031c-cbd2-4ad2-bd53-a67791e183cd][SOC2]] package: $50K/yr
|
||||
- [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]] package: $50K/yr
|
||||
- [[id:e6993701-3c67-49bf-82f3-06907572cbf3][FedRAMP]] package: $100K/yr
|
||||
- Combined enterprise: $250K/yr
|
||||
|
||||
Switching costs are high — changing packages means re-verifying the fact store against new rules. The [[file:infrastructure-lock-in.org][infrastructure lock-in]] compounds: a hospital at $250K/yr in year one grows to $500K-$1M by year five as more packages are added and the fact store becomes more valuable than the software itself.
|
||||
Switching costs are high — changing packages means re-verifying the fact store against new rules. The [[id:2f783eb4-638e-5afa-9b59-6224d086a712][infrastructure lock-in]] compounds: a hospital at $250K/yr in year one grows to $500K-$1M by year five as more packages are added and the fact store becomes more valuable than the software itself.
|
||||
|
||||
20 subscriptions in year one = $1M-$5M. These packages are verified using the [[file:verification-appliance.org][verification appliance]] and scored by the [[file:evaluation-harness.org][evaluation harness]].
|
||||
20 subscriptions in year one = $1M-$5M. These Each gate package wraps the Agora [[id:f6cfc54b-919b-4311-bcbf-65e976755d40][Note primitive]] into a domain-specific authorization boundary. These packages are verified using the [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][verification appliance]] and scored by the [[id:45258a2d-1675-562c-9024-5d1eb2f1ea56][evaluation harness]].
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 528a0f6c-6fd6-41ed-9d59-237958bdaef2
|
||||
:ID: effects-growth-flywheel
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Effects–Growth Flywheel — How Adoption and Consequences Amplify Each Other
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:strategy:growth:effects:flywheel:
|
||||
|
||||
The effects page ([[file:triad-systemic-effects.org]]) and the growth page ([[file:growth-strategy.org]]) treated two sides of the same process as separate timelines. They are not sequential — effects do not wait for adoption to finish, and adoption does not happen before effects begin. They are interleaved at every scale. Each effect is a growth driver; each growth milestone unlocks new effects.
|
||||
The [[id:b9fa4b7b-bc61-4d7f-918d-ff687b80f2ba][effects page]] and the [[id:d28adac8-08a1-40c4-ae43-b5d8d7b1743f][growth page]] treated two sides of the same process as separate timelines. They are not sequential — effects do not wait for adoption to finish, and adoption does not happen before effects begin. They are interleaved at every scale. Each effect is a growth driver; each growth milestone unlocks new effects.
|
||||
|
||||
The key insight: /every systemic effect is a growth engine for the next phase/. There is no phase where effects passively happen while adoption independently proceeds.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ At every scale, the effect /is/ the growth mechanism. There is no waiting for ef
|
||||
|
||||
| Instance count | Effect that starts | Growth driver generated |
|
||||
|---------------+-------------------+------------------------|
|
||||
| 1–10 | /Scientific reproducibility:/ the first verified paper | Universities buy Passepartout for their compute clusters |
|
||||
| 1–10 | /Scientific reproducibility:/ the first verified paper | Universities buy [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] for their compute clusters |
|
||||
| 1–10 | /Compliance erosion:/ first enterprise replaces audit with gate rule | Competitors must match the cost savings — enterprise sales accelerate |
|
||||
| 10–50 | /Verification API gateway:/ first company runs LLM calls through Passepartout | /Any/ company using LLMs is a customer, not just triad adopters. This effect starts at 10 instances but can scale to millions of API users before growth Phase 1 |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ Key observation: the verified API gateway decouples the effect from triad adopti
|
||||
|-------+-------------------+------------------------|
|
||||
| 100–500 | /Regulation as code:/ first regulator encodes a rule as a gate | All regulated entities under that regulator must adopt Passepartout — step function in demand |
|
||||
| 500–2K | /AI safety shift:/ gate rule verification becomes expected in enterprise AI procurement | Every company buying AI services requires a proof log — API gateway demand explodes |
|
||||
| 2K–10K | /Proof library compounding:/ the collective regression suite has enough edge cases to be qualitatively better than any solo library | Competitive advantage for adopters — those not on the network fall behind on verification coverage |
|
||||
| 2K–10K | /Proof library compounding:/ the [[id:a5d59d12-b23e-58d6-a81b-9b8b06556949][collective regression suite]] has enough edge cases to be qualitatively better than any solo library | Competitive advantage for adopters — those not on the network fall behind on verification coverage |
|
||||
|
||||
Key observation: regulation-as-code creates a /step function/ in demand. Before the regulator acts, growth is organic enterprise sales. After, it is mandatory compliance. The timing of the first regulatory encode is the single most leveraged event in the flywheel.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ Key observation: the shift from enterprise adoption to consumer adoption is cult
|
||||
| Instance count | Effect that starts | Growth driver generated |
|
||||
|-------+-------------------+------------------------|
|
||||
| 1M–10M | /Insurance loop closes:/ premiums for unverified code are 10× verified | Economic necessity drives adoption — not engineering preference, not regulation, but /cost of doing business/ |
|
||||
| 10M–100M | /Verification monopoly:/ regulator references the early player's gate library | New entrants cannot compete with the installed proof base — the moat compounds with every new instance |
|
||||
| 10M–100M | /[[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][Verification monopoly]]:/ regulator references the early player's gate library | New entrants cannot compete with the installed proof base — the moat compounds with every new instance |
|
||||
| 100M–1B | /Compute as geopolitical asset:/ nations run triad instances for digital sovereignty | Nation-state procurement — 100M to 1B happens via government mandate, not organic adoption |
|
||||
|
||||
Key observation: the insurance loop is the /completion of the flywheel/. At this point, adoption is no longer driven by the triad's features or benefits — it is driven by the /cost of non-adoption/. The flywheel transitions from pull (people want verification) to push (people cannot afford to be unverified).
|
||||
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ The flywheel has two critical bottlenecks:
|
||||
|
||||
1. /First regulator encodes a rule as a gate./ This is the most leveraged event in Phase 0–1. It converts growth from organic to mandatory in a single domain. Whoever reaches a regulator first — and helps them write that first gate rule — wins that domain permanently.
|
||||
|
||||
2. /First insurer prices unverified code higher./ This is the Phase 2→3 transition. It converts growth from pull to push. The insurer does not need 1B instances to act — they need 10K instances with 2+ years of verifiable track records. The compute marketplace ([[file:compute-marketplace.org]]) provides the actuarial data; the attestation marketplace ([[file:agora-contracts.org]]) provides the reputation layer.
|
||||
2. /First insurer prices unverified code higher./ This is the Phase 2→3 transition. It converts growth from pull to push. The insurer does not need 1B instances to act — they need 10K instances with 2+ years of verifiable track records. The [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]] provides the actuarial data; the [[id:64708e1f-00e9-4cb7-b44b-ea0b98e5296d][attestation marketplace]] provides the reputation layer.
|
||||
|
||||
* Summary: Effects and Growth Are the Same Curve
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -81,14 +82,14 @@ The flywheel has two critical bottlenecks:
|
||||
| 10⁴ → 10⁶ | Trust shifts from institutional to computational | Consumer adoption — cultural norm, not technical requirement |
|
||||
| 10⁶ → 10⁹ | Cost of non-verification exceeds cost of adoption | Insurance + regulation lock-in — economic necessity, not preference |
|
||||
|
||||
Each row's effect /is/ the growth driver for the next row's instance count. The flywheel is the product. The triad is the architecture. The verification monopoly is the steady state.
|
||||
Each row's effect /is/ the growth driver for the next row's instance count. The flywheel is the product. The triad is the architecture. [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][The verification monopoly]] is the steady state.
|
||||
|
||||
* References
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:triad-systemic-effects.org][Systemic effects over time]]
|
||||
- [[file:growth-strategy.org][Growth phases — zero to billions]]
|
||||
- [[file:time-estimates.org][Development timeline]]
|
||||
- [[file:revenue-hub.org][Revenue per phase]]
|
||||
- [[file:compute-marketplace.org][Compute marketplace]]
|
||||
- [[file:agora-contracts.org][Attestation and insurance]]
|
||||
- [[file:verification-monopoly.org][Verification monopoly]]
|
||||
- [[id:b9fa4b7b-bc61-4d7f-918d-ff687b80f2ba][Systemic effects over time]]
|
||||
- [[id:d28adac8-08a1-40c4-ae43-b5d8d7b1743f][Growth phases — zero to billions]]
|
||||
- [[id:dc2e4f22-1c4c-5d4a-a151-f96e5d3b0d70][Development timeline]]
|
||||
- [[id:ed05cab4-88e9-4e25-b7c9-346fa39c69a0][Revenue per phase]]
|
||||
- [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][Compute marketplace]]
|
||||
- [[id:64708e1f-00e9-4cb7-b44b-ea0b98e5296d][Attestation and insurance]]
|
||||
- [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][Verification monopoly]]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 45258a2d-1675-562c-9024-5d1eb2f1ea56
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Evaluation Harness as Certification Service
|
||||
@@ -10,8 +11,8 @@ The accumulated regression suite — thousands of edge cases from every deployed
|
||||
**Target:** AI labs proving their agents' capabilities, enterprise procurement requiring independent verification.
|
||||
**Price:** $50K-$200K per certification.
|
||||
|
||||
The regression suite grows with every deployment, making the certification increasingly valuable over time. The early player's suite is the largest because they started first. This is the [[file:collective-regression-suite.org][collective regression suite]] mechanism in action.
|
||||
The regression suite grows with every deployment, making the certification increasingly valuable over time. The early player's suite is the largest because they started first. This is the [[id:a5d59d12-b23e-58d6-a81b-9b8b06556949][collective regression suite]] mechanism in action.
|
||||
|
||||
10 certifications in year one = $500K-$2M.
|
||||
|
||||
Long-term endpoint: this becomes the UL certification for AI — a third-party verification nobody can ignore. [[file:verification-monopoly.org][The verification monopoly]]. The certification relies on a [[file:verification-appliance.org][verification appliance]] to run the tests in a trusted environment, creating [[file:infrastructure-lock-in.org][infrastructure lock-in]] as certification history accumulates on the platform. These dynamics form powerful [[file:moats.org][moats]].
|
||||
Long-term endpoint: this becomes the UL certification for AI — a third-party verification nobody can ignore. [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][The verification monopoly]]. The certification relies on a [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][verification appliance]] to run the tests in a trusted environment, creating [[id:2f783eb4-638e-5afa-9b59-6224d086a712][infrastructure lock-in]] as certification history accumulates on the platform. These dynamics form powerful [[id:aa6d062e-a520-5d14-8773-00687ed9c689][moats]].
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 45ea493b-94ad-5885-aa65-0c846e5c3c1d
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Gate Rule Encoding from Codified Domains
|
||||
@@ -14,4 +15,4 @@ ACL2 verifies the rule set for internal consistency. Screamer checks against exi
|
||||
|
||||
The key distinction: the LLM is not *extracting knowledge from prose* — it is *translating a known rule system into a formal representation.* The result is not "the LLM's best guess" but "the rule set as stated in the source document, mechanically transcribed."
|
||||
|
||||
For codified domains, the encoding cost drops from weeks to hours. The only bottleneck is human review of the 5% ambiguous rules. This is what makes the [[file:sufficiency-flip.org][sufficiency flip]] economically viable — once gates are encoded, verification is near-free. The resulting rules are packaged into [[file:domain-gate-packages.org][domain gate packages]] that can be reused across deployments.
|
||||
For codified domains, the encoding cost drops from weeks to hours. The only bottleneck is human review of the 5% ambiguous rules. This is what makes the [[id:efc76898-03f7-57ba-923d-35d65da88bb7][sufficiency flip]] economically viable — once gates are encoded, verification is near-free. The resulting rules are packaged into [[id:c34940cc-090e-57c4-8020-e78b1d32b96c][domain gate packages]] that can be reused across deployments.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: d28adac8-08a1-40c4-ae43-b5d8d7b1743f
|
||||
:ID: growth-strategy
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Growth — Two Engines, One Infrastructure
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:growth:network:strategy:agora:
|
||||
|
||||
The triad has two independent growth engines that share the same infrastructure. Logos (verification) grows top-down through enterprise compliance sales — capital-efficient, revenue from day one. Agora (the social network) grows bottom-up through community adoption — network-effect-powered, zero customer acquisition cost per user. Each engine would be incomplete alone. Together they form the full stack: verification funds the build, the network provides the users, and at every crossover point they make each other more valuable.
|
||||
The triad has two independent growth engines that share the same infrastructure. Logos (verification) grows top-down through enterprise compliance sales — capital-efficient, revenue from day one. [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]] (the social network) grows bottom-up through community adoption — network-effect-powered, zero customer acquisition cost per user. Each engine would be incomplete alone. Together they form the full stack: verification funds the build, the network provides the users, and at every crossover point they make each other more valuable.
|
||||
|
||||
This page defines the combined growth strategy across four phases, with each engine advancing in parallel and reinforcing the other at specific transitions.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,10 +35,10 @@ This page defines the combined growth strategy across four phases, with each eng
|
||||
*Growth lever:* Enterprise sales + direct integration. No network effects yet — value must be real without anyone else using it.
|
||||
|
||||
*Tactics:*
|
||||
1. Ship Passepartout MVP — verifies code, applies gate rules, produces compliance report.
|
||||
1. Ship [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] MVP — verifies code, applies gate rules, produces compliance report.
|
||||
2. First sale encodes a regulation as gate rules, verifies the customer's deployment.
|
||||
3. Each engagement funds the next. Gate rule library grows with every customer.
|
||||
4. The compute marketplace bootstraps with one provider (you) selling verification to smaller instances.
|
||||
4. The [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]] bootstraps with one provider (you) selling verification to smaller instances.
|
||||
|
||||
*Revenue:* $2-12M from enterprise compliance engagements. Funds the team and the Agora build.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -124,9 +125,9 @@ This is the critical reinforcement point:
|
||||
*Growth lever:* Stoa premium enterprise features + insurance marketplace.
|
||||
|
||||
*Tactics:*
|
||||
1. Stoa premium ships SSO, compliance dashboards, fleet management.
|
||||
1. [[id:c3b3dc41-945f-54e9-84eb-ca014114f1be][Stoa]] premium ships SSO, compliance dashboards, fleet management.
|
||||
2. Insurance marketplace forms — actuaries price proof insurance based on track records of 10K+ instances.
|
||||
3. Verification monopoly begins — the gate library is the largest, most cited, most battle-tested.
|
||||
3. [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][Verification monopoly]] begins — the gate library is the largest, most cited, most battle-tested.
|
||||
|
||||
*Revenue:* $50-200M. Stoa enterprise seats, verification appliances, insurance premiums.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -187,14 +188,14 @@ The crossover is automatic. Enterprise employees get DIDs from their company's P
|
||||
|
||||
* References
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:time-estimates.org][Development timeline]]
|
||||
- [[file:revenue-hub.org][Revenue streams]]
|
||||
- [[file:investment-thesis.org][Investment thesis]]
|
||||
- [[file:alternative-growth-social-first.org][Social-first alternative (now integrated)]]
|
||||
- [[file:agora-entry-strategy.org][Entry strategy — organized communities]]
|
||||
- [[file:competitive-landscape-agora.org][Agora competitive landscape]]
|
||||
- [[file:triad-systemic-effects.org][Systemic effects]]
|
||||
- [[file:compute-marketplace.org][Compute marketplace]]
|
||||
- [[file:verification-monopoly.org][Verification monopoly]]
|
||||
- [[file:agora-contracts.org][Agora contracts]]
|
||||
- [[file:../agora/docs/agora-requirements-00-readme.org][Agora Protocol Specification — full requirements]]
|
||||
- [[id:dc2e4f22-1c4c-5d4a-a151-f96e5d3b0d70][Development timeline]]
|
||||
- [[id:ed05cab4-88e9-4e25-b7c9-346fa39c69a0][Revenue streams]]
|
||||
- [[id:5961e469-53a3-5f3c-ab72-3c83ef91963f][Investment thesis]]
|
||||
- [[id:57f9538a-6270-4302-8d07-d742168419eb][Social-first alternative (now integrated)]]
|
||||
- [[id:8c7b9812-f8d6-4347-8915-ce8e520b7914][Entry strategy — organized communities]]
|
||||
- [[id:1bc22b89-d3eb-4f6d-bcfc-2b0c19c8ed8f][Agora competitive landscape]]
|
||||
- [[id:b9fa4b7b-bc61-4d7f-918d-ff687b80f2ba][Systemic effects]]
|
||||
- [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][Compute marketplace]]
|
||||
- [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][Verification monopoly]]
|
||||
- [[id:64708e1f-00e9-4cb7-b44b-ea0b98e5296d][Agora contracts]]
|
||||
- The [[id:0f949f6c-4cf1-49eb-b9a4-ebcac27ee548][Agora Social Space requirements]] define how organized communities interact through the gate stack. See also Agora Protocol Specification — full requirements (spec repo at /tmp/agora) — full requirements (spec repo at /tmp/agora)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 2f783eb4-638e-5afa-9b59-6224d086a712
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Infrastructure Lock-In and Switching Costs
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:economics:moats:lock-in:switching:
|
||||
|
||||
A hospital that runs Passepartout with HIPAA gate rules ($50K/yr) for five years has accumulated:
|
||||
A hospital that runs [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] with [[id:84fb5f8f-0527-4df0-b6b6-dbf3bcff8a7f][HIPAA]] gate rules ($50K/yr) for five years has accumulated:
|
||||
|
||||
- A fact store with a decade of compliance decisions
|
||||
- A proof forest of verified rules
|
||||
- An empirical decision history tied to their specific deployment
|
||||
- Customized gate rules encoding their specific workflows and approvals
|
||||
|
||||
Switching to a competitor means discarding all of it. The accumulated value grows as the fact store deepens. Annual revenue per enterprise grows from $250K in year one to $500K-$1M by year five as more [[file:domain-gate-packages.org][domain packages]] are added.
|
||||
Switching to a competitor means discarding all of it. The accumulated value grows as the fact store deepens. Annual revenue per enterprise grows from $250K in year one to $500K-$1M by year five as more [[id:c34940cc-090e-57c4-8020-e78b1d32b96c][domain packages]] are added.
|
||||
|
||||
This is the strongest residual [[file:moats.org][moat]]. The [[file:evaluation-harness.org][evaluation harness]] (regression suite) is a close second — it grows with every deployment and cannot be ingested from public data. The [[file:verification-monopoly.org][verification monopoly]] and [[file:upgrade-lifecycle.org][upgrade lifecycle]] compound this lock-in: every new regulation encoded as a gate rule deepens the proof forest, making the deployment harder to reproduce elsewhere.
|
||||
This is the strongest residual [[id:aa6d062e-a520-5d14-8773-00687ed9c689][moat]]. The [[id:45258a2d-1675-562c-9024-5d1eb2f1ea56][evaluation harness (see the [[id:3b43a9b8-31d1-4479-a35f-22273b74f0c7][Agora Infrastructure requirements]] for the network topology that creates this lock-in)]] (regression suite) is a close second — it grows with every deployment and cannot be ingested from public data. The [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]] and [[id:29e4dbf3-cf19-589c-8b14-389e8a39d564][upgrade lifecycle]] compound this lock-in: every new regulation encoded as a gate rule deepens the proof forest, making the deployment harder to reproduce elsewhere.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 5961e469-53a3-5f3c-ab72-3c83ef91963f
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Investment Thesis
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:economics:investment:thesis:
|
||||
|
||||
The early player benefits from every other instance of the triad. Every deployed instance feeds edge cases into the [[file:evaluation-harness.org][regression suite]], grows the [[file:compute-marketplace.org][compute marketplace]], and validates the hardware designs. Network effects are positive sum.
|
||||
The early player benefits from every other instance of the triad. Every deployed instance feeds edge cases into the [[id:45258a2d-1675-562c-9024-5d1eb2f1ea56][regression suite]], grows the [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]], and validates the hardware designs. Network effects are positive sum.
|
||||
|
||||
Three revenue horizons:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Low-hanging fruit (year one, $2M-$12M):** [[file:verification-appliance.org][verification appliances]], [[file:domain-gate-packages.org][domain gate rule subscriptions]], [[file:evaluation-harness.org][evaluation harness certification]], migration services
|
||||
- **Medium-term (1-3 years, $10M-$50M):** [[file:compute-marketplace.org][compute marketplace]], Relay Network, Lisp Machine hardware; [[file:agora-usernames.org][premium usernames]] ($10M/yr), [[file:pds-as-a-service.org][PDS hosting]] ($18M/yr)
|
||||
- **Big money (3-10 years, $100M-$1B+):** [[file:verification-monopoly.org][verification monopoly]] (UL certification for AI), [[file:infrastructure-lock-in.org][infrastructure lock-in]], planetary compute marketplace
|
||||
- **Low-hanging fruit (year one, $2M-$12M):** [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][verification appliances]], [[id:c34940cc-090e-57c4-8020-e78b1d32b96c][domain gate rule subscriptions]], [[id:45258a2d-1675-562c-9024-5d1eb2f1ea56][evaluation harness certification]], migration services
|
||||
- **Medium-term (1-3 years, $10M-$50M):** [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]], Relay Network, Lisp Machine hardware; [[id:2e390c1d-65f3-5fb3-b898-ac3fc4291ee7][premium usernames]] ($10M/yr), [[id:1a2b38df-20ba-58ca-ba55-a072be67bd0d][PDS hosting]] ($18M/yr)
|
||||
- **Big money (3-10 years, $100M-$1B+):** [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]] (UL certification for AI), [[id:2f783eb4-638e-5afa-9b59-6224d086a712][infrastructure lock-in]], planetary compute marketplace
|
||||
|
||||
The switching costs compound. The [[file:moats.org][network effects]] are positive sum. The market is nearly a trillion dollars.
|
||||
The [[id:5f55bbe6-d243-5766-8ccf-5c5cc88a6542][impact on the AI and GPU industry]] — token demand compression, GPU inference plateau, and the rise of CPU-native verification hardware — reshapes the trillion-dollar market these revenue streams depend on.
|
||||
|
||||
The defensible entity is "the organization that best understands how to adapt Passepartout to your domain" — not "the organization that owns Passepartout."
|
||||
The [[id:68ffa49f-f0d8-42cf-8b69-ae69de8bb815][Agora governance and physical assets]] requirements cover how the network manages shared infrastructure. The switching costs compound. The [[id:aa6d062e-a520-5d14-8773-00687ed9c689][network effects]] are positive sum. The market is nearly a trillion dollars.
|
||||
|
||||
The defensible entity is "the organization that best understands how to adapt [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] to your domain" — not "the organization that owns Passepartout."
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 5ac2f037-fc3c-45ac-a6e8-acc20e005cb0
|
||||
:ID: legal-structure-alternatives
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ Wyoming passed HB 185 in 2025 creating the "Decentralized Autonomous Organizatio
|
||||
|
||||
** Relevance to This Venture
|
||||
|
||||
The Agora's governance modules (liquid democracy, Collective Personas, GEM) map /directly/ onto the DAO LLC concept. If a community on the Agora wants to be a legal entity — own a shared website domain, hold a pooled treasury, sign a contract with a vendor — they could incorporate as a Wyoming DAO LLC. The Agora's existing governance infrastructure (voting, constitutions, role management) becomes the DAO LLC's management mechanism.
|
||||
The [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]]'s governance modules (liquid democracy, Collective Personas, GEM) map /directly/ onto the DAO LLC concept. If a community on the Agora wants to be a legal entity — own a shared website domain, hold a pooled treasury, sign a contract with a vendor — they could incorporate as a Wyoming DAO LLC. The Agora's existing governance infrastructure (voting, constitutions, role management) becomes the DAO LLC's management mechanism.
|
||||
|
||||
** This Is Not the OpCo or IP Co Structure
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ A /domestic/ trust (South Dakota, Nevada) is under US court jurisdiction. A US c
|
||||
|
||||
** The Downsides of an Extremely Strong Structure
|
||||
|
||||
/1. Loss of Control./ An irrevocable trust means the assets are gone. You cannot change your mind. You cannot dissolve the trust. You cannot redirect the assets. This is the /price/ of asset protection. If the trust owns the BVI IP Co (which owns the Passepartout IP), you are a discretionary beneficiary of the trust, not the owner of the IP. The trustee makes decisions about the IP — not you.
|
||||
/1. Loss of Control./ An irrevocable trust means the assets are gone. You cannot change your mind. You cannot dissolve the trust. You cannot redirect the assets. This is the /price/ of asset protection. If the trust owns the BVI IP Co (which owns the [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] IP), you are a discretionary beneficiary of the trust, not the owner of the IP. The trustee makes decisions about the IP — not you.
|
||||
|
||||
/2. Banking and Financing Difficulty./ Banks scrutinize trust-owned structures. The BVI IP Co owned by a Cook Islands trust will require extensive KYC across four layers: you → trust → BVI Co → OpCo. Some US banks will refuse to open accounts. International banking is possible but time-consuming (3-6 months).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -157,6 +158,6 @@ Adding the trust earlier /does/ improve protection (the fraudulent conveyance lo
|
||||
|
||||
* References
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:legal-structure-practical-setup.org][Practical setup guide — Delaware C-Corp + BVI IP Co]]
|
||||
- [[file:asset-protection-structures.org][Asset protection structures overview]]
|
||||
- [[file:growth-strategy.org][Combined growth strategy]]
|
||||
- [[id:433236a2-e5ad-41d4-a27e-4682f8bbc207][Practical setup guide — Delaware C-Corp + BVI IP Co]]
|
||||
- [[id:0a4e0b8f-25e0-4b78-9633-fc37d03cefe9][Asset protection structures overview]]
|
||||
- [[id:d28adac8-08a1-40c4-ae43-b5d8d7b1743f][Combined growth strategy]]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 433236a2-e5ad-41d4-a27e-4682f8bbc207
|
||||
:ID: legal-structure-practical-setup
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -17,8 +18,8 @@ Recommended structure: Delaware C-Corp (US OpCo) + BVI Business Company (IP Co).
|
||||
[BVI Business Company (IP Co)]
|
||||
│
|
||||
owns the IP assets
|
||||
(Passepartout code, gate rules,
|
||||
ACL2 libraries, Agora protocol
|
||||
([[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] code, gate rules,
|
||||
ACL2 libraries, [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]] protocol
|
||||
spec, trademarks, domain names)
|
||||
|
||||
The OpCo pays the IP Co an arm's-length royalty for the right to use the IP in its business (compliance sales, PDS hosting, marketplace operations). The IP Co accumulates royalty income in a tax-neutral jurisdiction (BVI has 0% corporate tax). The founders own both entities under the same cap table.
|
||||
@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ This is the most important document. It must:
|
||||
|
||||
4. /Territory:/ Global license, exclusive or non-exclusive.
|
||||
|
||||
5. /Sub-licensing:/ Whether the OpCo can sub-license. Typically no — the IP Co controls sub-licensing.
|
||||
5. /Sub-[[id:67faf52f-9126-50a7-b87e-2bedc610dac7][licensing]]:/ Whether the OpCo can sub-license. Typically no — the IP Co controls sub-licensing.
|
||||
|
||||
* Layer 3: Founders' Ownership
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -199,6 +200,6 @@ The IP transfer must happen /before/ the IP has significant value. Incorporating
|
||||
|
||||
* References
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:asset-protection-structures.org][Asset protection structures — options analysis]]
|
||||
- [[file:outbound-sales-compliance.org][Outbound sales compliance — data protection law]]
|
||||
- [[file:growth-strategy.org][Combined growth strategy — Logos + Agora]]
|
||||
- [[id:0a4e0b8f-25e0-4b78-9633-fc37d03cefe9][Asset protection structures — options analysis]]
|
||||
- [[id:98364e9d-a8a9-42b7-a9dc-b643fd2ccc4b][Outbound sales compliance — data protection law]]
|
||||
- [[id:d28adac8-08a1-40c4-ae43-b5d8d7b1743f][Combined growth strategy — Logos + Agora]]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 67faf52f-9126-50a7-b87e-2bedc610dac7
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Licensing — AGPLv3 + Commercial
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:ip:licensing:agpl:commercial:
|
||||
|
||||
**AGPLv3 for the public repository.** AGPL closes the ASP loophole: anyone who modifies the software and offers it over a network must release their modified source. Combined with a [[file:patent-strategy.org][patent strategy]], this creates [[file:moats.org][moats]] against proprietary forks.
|
||||
**AGPLv3 for the public repository.** AGPL closes the ASP loophole: anyone who modifies the software and offers it over a network must release their modified source. Combined with a [[id:caaeee11-ba6f-5566-aecd-f171b4c459c0][patent strategy]], this creates [[id:aa6d062e-a520-5d14-8773-00687ed9c689][moats]] against proprietary forks.
|
||||
|
||||
Crucially: AGPL is a *product requirement*, not a concession. The system's value proposition is provable correctness — every decision has Merkle provenance. This claim is structurally incredible with closed source. An enterprise buyer needs to inspect the gate stack, verify the Merkle implementation, and confirm ACL2 integration. AGPL makes this possible without signing an NDA. This transparency also enables a [[file:pds-as-a-service.org][PDS as a service]] model where enterprises can run their own infrastructure.
|
||||
Crucially: AGPL is a *product requirement*, not a concession. The system's value proposition is provable correctness — every decision has Merkle provenance. This claim is structurally incredible with closed source. An enterprise buyer needs to inspect the gate stack, verify the Merkle implementation, and confirm ACL2 integration. AGPL makes this possible without signing an NDA. This transparency also enables a [[id:1a2b38df-20ba-58ca-ba55-a072be67bd0d][PDS as a service]] model where enterprises can run their own infrastructure.
|
||||
|
||||
**AGPL only covers modifications to code, not:**
|
||||
- Gate rules specific to a domain (these are data, not code)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 9af13fff-9725-542b-93b1-a555bc74ad72
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Why Lisp Is Economically Viable Now
|
||||
@@ -13,4 +14,4 @@ Four transformations flipped the economics:
|
||||
3. **Complexity saturates human verification.** Systems are tens of millions of lines. Testing is necessary but insufficient — zero-day vulnerabilities prove bugs survive all testing. Formal verification is the only known path.
|
||||
4. **Cost of failure exceeds cost of verification.** A single breach costs millions. Regulation mandates provable compliance. Proving correctness is cheaper than not proving it.
|
||||
|
||||
The [[file:verification-appliance.org][verification appliance]] (AGPL symbolic engine + RISC-V Lisp μcode on FPGA) costs $5,000/year and replaces $500,000/year in compliance audits, breach litigation, and regulatory fines. This [[file:cost-structure.org][cost structure]] — zero marginal cost per additional user — is what makes Lisp economically viable at scale. The [[file:self-driving-lisp-machine.org][self-driving Lisp Machine]] is the hardware endpoint of this economic logic. For the biological analogy that explains why Lisp architecture is a natural outcome of complexity pressure, see [[file:biology-parallels.org][biology parallels]]. For the historical precedent, see the [[file:comparison-with-symbolics.org][comparison with Symbolics Genera]]. The [[file:ai-industry-impact.org][impact on the AI industry]] is the market-side consequence.
|
||||
The [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][verification appliance]] (AGPL symbolic engine + RISC-V Lisp μcode on FPGA) costs $5,000/year and replaces $500,000/year in compliance audits, breach litigation, and regulatory fines. This [[id:0b5a8a74-cfd6-542d-bc88-4eb3cd8626f9][cost structure]] — zero marginal cost per additional user — is what makes Lisp economically viable at scale. The [[id:13e6ae54-2d24-5aa0-b1cd-a7e8e749aa70][self-driving Lisp Machine]] is the hardware endpoint of this economic logic. For the biological analogy that explains why Lisp architecture is a natural outcome of complexity pressure, see [[id:2afd9a3c-e96a-54c7-ac77-a05a28065b4b][biology parallels]]. For the historical precedent, see the [[id:00ab3a4d-e3de-5605-a67d-12935bb36ab5][comparison with Symbolics Genera]]. The [[id:5f55bbe6-d243-5766-8ccf-5c5cc88a6542][impact on the AI industry]] is the market-side consequence.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 1c95ce7d-a2db-506a-9608-df68f9ae211b
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Lisp Machine Security — Unified Memory Threat Model
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:security:lisp-machine:pmp:isolation:
|
||||
|
||||
On a bare metal [[file:self-driving-lisp-machine.org][Lisp Machine]] with a unified Lisp image, the defense-in-depth provided by the OS kernel disappears. The gate stack and the code it protects share a single address space. An attacker who exploits a memory corruption in the browser renderer can modify the gate stack's permission tables, the policy engine's state, or the ACL2 prover's decision output. There is no kernel underneath to catch them.
|
||||
On a bare metal [[id:13e6ae54-2d24-5aa0-b1cd-a7e8e749aa70][Lisp Machine]] with a unified Lisp image, the defense-in-depth provided by the OS kernel disappears. The gate stack and the code it protects share a single address space. An attacker who exploits a memory corruption in the browser renderer can modify the gate stack's permission tables, the policy engine's state, or the ACL2 prover's decision output. There is no kernel underneath to catch them.
|
||||
|
||||
This note analyzes the threat model and proposes a hardware-enforced privilege separation within the single Lisp image.
|
||||
|
||||
**The problem**
|
||||
|
||||
In the conventional layered model (Linux + SBCL + Passepartout), there is defense in depth. Even if the gate stack has a bug, Linux provides seccomp, namespaces, file permissions, and process isolation as a safety net. If SBCL segfaults, the kernel catches it.
|
||||
In the conventional layered model (Linux + SBCL + [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]]), there is defense in depth. Even if the gate stack has a bug, Linux provides seccomp, namespaces, file permissions, and process isolation as a safety net. If SBCL segfaults, the kernel catches it.
|
||||
|
||||
On a bare metal Lisp Machine, the model collapses:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +22,7 @@ Everything (agent, editor, browser, shell, gate stack, ACL2)
|
||||
|
||||
The only protection is that the gate stack is verified by ACL2 to be correct. But ACL2 verification is static — it proves properties about source code. At runtime, a memory corruption in the same image invalidates the entire proof. "All defense is symbolic" is exactly right.
|
||||
|
||||
**The solution: [[file:verification-appliance.org][hardware-enforced privilege zones]] within the Lisp image**
|
||||
**The solution: [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][hardware-enforced privilege zones]] within the Lisp image**
|
||||
|
||||
RISC-V provides three hardware privilege levels: M-mode (machine), S-mode (supervisor), and U-mode (user). Physical Memory Protection (PMP) enforces access control at the hardware bus level — it cannot be bypassed by software, even by code running in S-mode if configured in M-mode. The key: use these mechanisms to create zones within the shared Lisp address space.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ ACL2 trust problem. ACL2 verifies the gate stack. But ACL2 itself is ~50,000 lin
|
||||
|
||||
The conventional Linux approach: TCB is ~28 million lines of C across kernel, drivers, and runtime. Defense in depth from many layers. But each layer adds attack surface.
|
||||
|
||||
The Lisp Machine approach: TCB is ~2,500 lines of verified Lisp (M-mode gate core + S-mode gate stack). Attack surface is ~500 lines of ECALL handler. The TCB is roughly 10,000x smaller. This security advantage creates [[file:moats.org][moats]] — a competitor would need to match both the hardware isolation and the verified codebase.
|
||||
The Lisp Machine approach: TCB is ~2,500 lines of verified Lisp (M-mode gate core + S-mode gate stack). Attack surface is ~500 lines of ECALL handler. The TCB is roughly 10,000x smaller. This security advantage creates [[id:aa6d062e-a520-5d14-8773-00687ed9c689][moats]] — a competitor would need to match both the hardware isolation and the verified codebase.
|
||||
|
||||
The fundamental trade: fewer layers, less depth, but each layer is simpler, smaller, and verified. A bug in the ECALL handler is catastrophic. A bug in the Linux kernel might be contained by seccomp or namespaces. The question is which is more likely: a bug in 500 lines of verified Lisp, or a bug in 28 million lines of C that is not contained by the remaining depth?
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ But this is a single-point-of-failure architecture. If the ECALL handler holds,
|
||||
|
||||
**Gaps in the current design**
|
||||
|
||||
None of this is in the architecture documents. The following are not yet specified — these architectural innovations are potential candidates for [[file:patent-strategy.org][patent strategy]]:
|
||||
None of this is in the architecture documents. The following are not yet specified — these architectural innovations are potential candidates for [[id:caaeee11-ba6f-5566-aecd-f171b4c459c0][patent strategy]]:
|
||||
|
||||
1. PMP region layout — exactly what is protected and by which region
|
||||
2. ECALL handler specification — the exact interface, request types, validation logic, and error handling
|
||||
@@ -102,4 +103,6 @@ None of this is in the architecture documents. The following are not yet specifi
|
||||
6. Side-channel mitigation — speculation control, timing attacks
|
||||
7. ACL2 trust documentation — the bootstrap chain and what it means for the gate stack's verification
|
||||
8. The boot attestation protocol — how the gate core verifies the gate stack before loading it
|
||||
9. Zone transition costs — how many cycles does an ECALL take, and does that affect the 10-80-10 ratio
|
||||
9.
|
||||
See the [[id:6fe67db6-25bd-4d11-bd1d-b44ec809e858][Agora Identity specification]] for how user identity, key derivation, and DID management integrate with the gate stack's boot chain and privilege zones.
|
||||
— how many cycles does an ECALL take, and does that affect the 10-80-10 ratio
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,17 +1,18 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: aa6d062e-a520-5d14-8773-00687ed9c689
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Competitive Moats
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:economics:moats:competition:
|
||||
|
||||
Re-evaluated: time is not the primary moat. A Phase 4+ Passepartout fed on Wikipedia + Wikidata can build a general ontology in two weeks. The organic growth advantage collapses for general knowledge.
|
||||
Re-evaluated: time is not the primary moat. A Phase 4+ [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] fed on Wikipedia + Wikidata can build a general ontology in two weeks. The organic growth advantage collapses for general knowledge.
|
||||
|
||||
**Actual moats (weaker than initially assumed):**
|
||||
1. **Domain-specific gate rules** — thin. A few hundred lines of Lisp data. Write once, trivial to copy. Not a real moat.
|
||||
2. **Empirical decision history** — every HITL decision is a Merkle fact. A fresh instance has none. Makes *your* instance more valuable but doesn't prevent competition — it's a switching cost, not a barrier to entry.
|
||||
3. **[[file:evaluation-harness.org][Evaluation harness (regression suite)]]** — thousands of test cases accumulated from every bug fix. Cannot be ingested from public data. Strongest residual moat.
|
||||
4. **[[file:infrastructure-lock-in.org][Infrastructure integration]]** — specific Docker compose layouts, Traefik patterns, Authentik configs encoded as gate rules. A competitor's infrastructure is different.
|
||||
3. **[[id:45258a2d-1675-562c-9024-5d1eb2f1ea56][Evaluation harness (regression suite)]]** — thousands of test cases accumulated from every bug fix. Cannot be ingested from public data. Strongest residual moat.
|
||||
4. **[[id:2f783eb4-638e-5afa-9b59-6224d086a712][Infrastructure integration]]** — specific Docker compose layouts, Traefik patterns, Authentik configs encoded as gate rules. A competitor's infrastructure is different.
|
||||
|
||||
**Strongest competitor strategy:** Not copying your gate rules — offering the same architecture as a service with their own pre-seeded general knowledge and a consulting engagement to customize gate rules. The AGPL prevents closing the architecture but does not prevent offering it as a service with a customization layer.
|
||||
|
||||
**The defensible business is services, not product.** The defensible entity is "the organization that best understands how to adapt Passepartout to your domain" — not "the organization that owns Passepartout." A [[file:verification-monopoly.org][verification monopoly]] on agent safety would change this calculus — competitors would need independent certification. [[file:patent-strategy.org][Patent strategy]] and [[file:licensing.org][Licensing]] protect key innovations and create revenue from the open-source ecosystem.
|
||||
**The defensible business is services, not product.** The defensible entity is "the organization that best understands how to adapt Passepartout to your domain" — not "the organization that owns Passepartout." A [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][verification monopoly]] on agent safety would change this calculus — competitors would need independent certification. [[id:caaeee11-ba6f-5566-aecd-f171b4c459c0][Patent strategy]] and [[id:67faf52f-9126-50a7-b87e-2bedc610dac7][Licensing]] protect key innovations and create revenue from the open-source ecosystem.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
** What
|
||||
|
||||
Passepartout should be able to use Org-mode files directly as its
|
||||
[[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] should be able to use Org-mode files directly as its
|
||||
knowledge base — no pandoc conversion, no markdown intermediary.
|
||||
|
||||
Currently gbrain provides vector search + entity linking over markdown,
|
||||
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ The short-term bridge (current) is gbrain with nightly org→md sync.
|
||||
This is adequate while the gate stack and planner are the priority.
|
||||
The native org module replaces gbrain entirely once built.
|
||||
|
||||
** See also
|
||||
[[file:../../concepts/compliance-framework-mapping.org][Compliance framework mapping]]
|
||||
[[file:../../ideas/passepartout-economics.org][Passepartout economics]]
|
||||
The nightly pipeline uses gbrain to provide hybrid search across the existing
|
||||
org files. The [[id:36e5b948-e07b-477f-9036-4dfe88254347][compliance framework mapping]] is the largest single
|
||||
dataset this would serve, and the broader
|
||||
[[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout economics]] knowledge base demonstrates the value of
|
||||
native org querying at scale.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:framework:time:scale:hierarchy:
|
||||
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 2cdca4b0-6b41-44b4-acb0-af21d0e27b00
|
||||
:ID: orders-of-magnitude-time
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
@@ -17,7 +18,7 @@ The hierarchy:
|
||||
| Days | Shippable thing, momentum building | Next day | Drift, distraction |
|
||||
| Weeks | Sprint, feature, market pulse | One cycle | Wrong direction |
|
||||
| Months | Product cycle, hiring, traction | One data point | Bleeding out slow |
|
||||
| Years | Company, moats, technology shifts | Scarce | Irrelevance |
|
||||
| Years | Company, [[id:aa6d062e-a520-5d14-8773-00687ed9c689][moats]], technology shifts | Scarce | Irrelevance |
|
||||
| Generations | Culture, regulation, infrastructure | Post-founding | Irreversibility |
|
||||
|
||||
Practical use:
|
||||
@@ -26,4 +27,4 @@ When planning anything, identify which order of magnitude you're operating in
|
||||
|
||||
Common mistake: treating a months/years problem as if it can be solved in days/weeks (startup hype, premature optimization) or a minutes problem as if it deserves weeks of deliberation (analysis paralysis, bikeshedding).
|
||||
|
||||
See also: [[file:time-estimates.org][Time estimates]] applies this framework to Passepartout's development timeline.
|
||||
The [[id:dc2e4f22-1c4c-5d4a-a151-f96e5d3b0d70][Time estimates]] page applies this framework to [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]]'s development timeline.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: 98364e9d-a8a9-42b7-a9dc-b643fd2ccc4b
|
||||
:ID: outbound-sales-compliance
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Outbound Sales — Legal Framework & Compliance Architecture
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:compliance:legal:gdpr:outbound:
|
||||
|
||||
The outbound sales pipeline touches leads across multiple jurisdictions. This page maps the applicable laws, the compliance requirements at each stage of the pipeline, and how Passepartout's gate stack can enforce them mechanically.
|
||||
The outbound sales pipeline touches leads across multiple jurisdictions. This page maps the applicable laws, the compliance requirements at each stage of the pipeline, and how [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]]'s gate stack can enforce them mechanically.
|
||||
|
||||
This plan defers to Passepartout maturity — it scopes what needs to be built and what can be done now without automation.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,9 +33,9 @@ Penalties: $46,517 per violation. Criminal penalties for harvesting + sending.
|
||||
- Gate: /unsubscribe-link/ — every message must carry a working opt-out
|
||||
- Gate: /no-harvesting/ — if contact was sourced via automated scraping, flag for review
|
||||
|
||||
** EU/EEA — GDPR (2018)
|
||||
** EU/EEA — [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]] (2018)
|
||||
|
||||
/Applies to:/ Processing personal data of data subjects in the EU, regardless of where the controller is established. GDPR has extraterritorial reach (Article 3).
|
||||
/Applies to:/ Processing personal data of data subjects in the EU, regardless of where the controller is established. [[id:513d5996-4ac7-4567-a992-18fc01599104][GDPR]] has extraterritorial reach (Article 3).
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant requirements:
|
||||
1. /Lawful basis required for processing./ Cold email to a corporate address may use "legitimate interest" (Article 6(1)(f)) or "consent" (Article 6(1)(a)). For B2B cold email to professional addresses, legitimate interest is the standard basis — but must balance against the recipient's rights.
|
||||
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ Penalties: Up to 20 million EUR or 4% of global annual turnover, whichever is hi
|
||||
- Gate: /erasure-compliance/ — maintain an erasure queue with 30-day SLA
|
||||
- Gate: /data-minimization/ — reject leads with unnecessary enrichment data
|
||||
|
||||
** UK — UK GDPR + PECR
|
||||
** UK — [[id:9bc29937-d59a-4ae4-9623-3d17a1fe6ebb][UK GDPR]] + PECR
|
||||
|
||||
/Applies to:/ Data subjects in the UK.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -127,6 +128,6 @@ The automation waits on Passepartout — but the legal foundation and the infras
|
||||
|
||||
- CAN-SPAM Act (15 U.S.C. 7701-7713)
|
||||
- GDPR (Regulation (EU) 2016/679)
|
||||
- UK GDPR + PECR (SI 2003/2426)
|
||||
- [[id:9bc29937-d59a-4ae4-9623-3d17a1fe6ebb][UK GDPR]] + PECR (SI 2003/2426)
|
||||
- Egypt PDPL (Law No. 151 of 2020)
|
||||
- CASL (S.C. 2010, c. 23)
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: caaeee11-ba6f-5566-aecd-f171b4c459c0
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Patent Strategy
|
||||
@@ -19,4 +20,4 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Strongest single claim:** The specific combination of probabilistic model + deterministic zero-token safety gates + Merkle memory + symbolic engine with sufficiency criterion. Each element is known; the combination is novel and non-obvious.
|
||||
|
||||
**Counterargument:** A patent examiner will argue these are standard OS microkernel architecture, locality of reference, content-addressed storage, and capability-based security applied to an AI agent. The defense: they have never been *combined* in an AI agent, producing emergent effects no single principle produces. These patents would feed into a [[file:licensing.org][licensing]] strategy and create [[file:moats.org][moats]] against competitors.
|
||||
**Counterargument:** A patent examiner will argue these are standard OS microkernel architecture, locality of reference, content-addressed storage, and capability-based security applied to an AI agent. The defense: they have never been *combined* in an AI agent, producing emergent effects no single principle produces. These patents would feed into a [[id:67faf52f-9126-50a7-b87e-2bedc610dac7][licensing]] strategy and create [[id:aa6d062e-a520-5d14-8773-00687ed9c689][moats]] against competitors.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 1a2b38df-20ba-58ca-ba55-a072be67bd0d
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Personal Data Store as a Service
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:agora:revenue:pds:saas:
|
||||
|
||||
Classic open-core SaaS model (GitLab, Sentry, PlanetScale). The Merkle fact store exposed on Agora can be self-hosted (free, AGPL) or hosted by the early player.
|
||||
Classic open-core SaaS model (GitLab, Sentry, PlanetScale). The Merkle fact store exposed on [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]] can be self-hosted (free, AGPL) or hosted by the early player.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Free tier (self-hosted):** full AGPL PDS, runs on any Lisp host, full control, no cost
|
||||
- **Basic hosted tier:** $10-$20/month, 10GB fact store, 10M queries/month, automated backup, automatic upgrades
|
||||
@@ -15,4 +16,4 @@ The free self-hosted version drives adoption and trust (you can inspect every li
|
||||
|
||||
Target: 100K subscribers at $15/month average = $18M/yr recurring, near-zero marginal cost per additional subscriber (the symbolic engine is CPU-bound, not per-user metered).
|
||||
|
||||
Combined with [[file:agora-usernames.org][premium usernames]]: $28M/yr from Agora services alone before compute marketplace revenue. The hosted model also creates [[file:infrastructure-lock-in.org][infrastructure lock-in]] as users build their Merkle fact stores on the platform, making migration costly. The AGPL licensing model is described in [[file:licensing.org][Licensing]].
|
||||
Combined with [[id:2e390c1d-65f3-5fb3-b898-ac3fc4291ee7][premium usernames]]: $28M/yr from Agora services alone before [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][compute marketplace]] revenue. The hosted model also creates [[id:2f783eb4-638e-5afa-9b59-6224d086a712][infrastructure lock-in]] as users build their Merkle fact stores on the platform, making migration costly. The AGPL [[id:67faf52f-9126-50a7-b87e-2bedc610dac7][licensing]] model is described in [[id:67faf52f-9126-50a7-b87e-2bedc610dac7][Licensing]].
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,24 +1,25 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:ID: ed05cab4-88e9-4e25-b7c9-346fa39c69a0
|
||||
:ID: revenue-hub
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-23 Sat]
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: Revenue Streams — Overview
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:revenue:index:business-model:
|
||||
|
||||
This page is the entry point for revenue generation thinking across all three triad components. Revenue splits cleanly across the two development phases defined in [[file:time-estimates.org][time estimates]]. Each component enables different revenue primitives.
|
||||
This page is the entry point for revenue generation thinking across all three triad components. Revenue splits cleanly across the two development phases defined in [[id:dc2e4f22-1c4c-5d4a-a151-f96e5d3b0d70][time estimates]]. Each component enables different revenue primitives.
|
||||
|
||||
* Revenue by Triad Component
|
||||
|
||||
** Logos (the mind) — Revenue streams
|
||||
|
||||
Existing coverage ([[file:verification-appliance.org]], [[file:domain-gate-packages.org]], [[file:evaluation-harness.org]], [[file:compute-marketplace.org]], [[file:verified-skill-marketplace.org]]):
|
||||
Existing coverage — [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][Verification appliance]], [[id:c34940cc-090e-57c4-8020-e78b1d32b96c][Domain gate packages]], [[id:45258a2d-1675-562c-9024-5d1eb2f1ea56][Evaluation harness]], [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][Compute marketplace]], [[id:d84679f1-c0c5-5be4-b19c-6573560640ee][Verified skill marketplace]]:
|
||||
|
||||
| Stream | Phase | Description |
|
||||
|--------+-------+-------------|
|
||||
| Verification appliance | Zero | FPGA/Tenstorrent pre-loaded with Passepartout + gate rules |
|
||||
| Verification appliance | Zero | FPGA/Tenstorrent pre-loaded with [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]] + gate rules |
|
||||
| Domain gate packages | Zero | SaaS subscriptions per compliance domain |
|
||||
| Evaluation harness | Zero | Certification-as-a-service, regression suite access |
|
||||
| Compute marketplace | Both | Verified symbolic engine cycles (see Agora) |
|
||||
| Compute marketplace | Both | Verified symbolic engine cycles via [[id:1d074690-a279-59cb-b91d-e9a22ae104ad][Agora]] |
|
||||
| Verified skill marketplace | End State | Commission on third-party gate rules |
|
||||
|
||||
*** Unexplored Logos streams
|
||||
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ Existing coverage ([[file:verification-appliance.org]], [[file:domain-gate-packa
|
||||
| Verified API gateway | Zero | Drop-in proxy for LLM calls. Passepartout verifies inputs, outputs, and provenance. Enterprise customers get a verifiable audit trail for every API call. Near-term product: run your OpenAI/Anthropic calls through Passepartout and get proof. |
|
||||
| Agent-as-a-service | Zero | Cloud-hosted Passepartout instances. Pay-per-verification or monthly subscription. The compute marketplace for individuals who don't self-host. |
|
||||
| Continuous compliance monitoring | Zero | Watch a deployment, continuously verify it against regulatory gate rules, alert on drift. Annual contract per monitored system. The evaluation harness as a product. |
|
||||
| Gate rule SDK licensing | Both | Commercial license for the gate rule development toolkit. Free for open-source rules, paid for proprietary enterprise rule development. |
|
||||
| Gate rule SDK [[id:67faf52f-9126-50a7-b87e-2bedc610dac7][licensing]] | Both | Commercial license for the gate rule development toolkit. Free for open-source rules, paid for proprietary enterprise rule development. |
|
||||
| Migration pipeline | Zero | Convert existing codebases to verified Lisp. Automated SaaS (point at a repo, get back a verified version). Per-enterprise: $50K-$500K for full migration. |
|
||||
| Forensics / incident response | Zero | Merkle memory provides tamper-proof audit. Post-incident: produce an irrefutable chain of what happened, who authorized it, what gates were triggered. Service offering. |
|
||||
| Proof repository marketplace | End State | Pre-verified proof libraries per domain (crypto, medical device, finance). Access to accumulated proof strategies from thousands of runs. |
|
||||
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ Existing coverage: essentially none beyond hardware sales.
|
||||
| Stream | Phase | Rationale |
|
||||
|--------+-------+-----------|
|
||||
| Lisp Machine hardware | End State | Tenstorrent/FPGA appliances. Hardware margins + recurring gate rules. |
|
||||
| Stoa premium | Both | Enterprise features: SSO, audit logging, compliance reports, team management, centralized policy enforcement. Annual seat license. |
|
||||
| [[id:c3b3dc41-945f-54e9-84eb-ca014114f1be][Stoa]] premium | Both | Enterprise features: SSO, audit logging, compliance reports, team management, centralized policy enforcement. Annual seat license. |
|
||||
| Plugin and theme marketplace | End State | Verified plugins for Stoa (editors, browsers, shells, tools). Commission on each sale. Developer ecosystem. App Store for the Lisp Machine. |
|
||||
| Commercial Lisp image distribution | Both | Verified, signed, compatibility-guaranteed Stoa images. Free self-build (AGPL), paid for certified builds with SLAs. |
|
||||
| Enterprise Stoa deployment | Zero | Tools for deploying Stoa across an organization: fleet management, unified gate policy, compliance dashboard. Annual license. |
|
||||
@@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ Key insight: Stoa does not need the full Lisp Machine to generate revenue. Stoa
|
||||
|
||||
** Agora (the society) — Revenue streams
|
||||
|
||||
Existing coverage ([[file:agora-usernames.org]], [[file:pds-as-a-service.org]], [[file:compute-marketplace.org]]):
|
||||
Existing coverage — [[id:2e390c1d-65f3-5fb3-b898-ac3fc4291ee7][Agora usernames]], [[id:1a2b38df-20ba-58ca-ba55-a072be67bd0d][PDS as a service]], [[id:3c6b0449-a8fb-5b89-b82a-34efb21ef5b5][Compute marketplace]]:
|
||||
|
||||
| Stream | Phase | Description |
|
||||
|--------+-------+-------------|
|
||||
@@ -83,7 +84,7 @@ The most fertile ground is contracts. DIDs provide identity, DIDComm provides co
|
||||
|
||||
The contract platform is the kill application for Agora. Ethereum proved demand for verifiable contracts at $20B+/yr in transaction fees. Agora's version is strictly better: ACL2 proves contract /correctness/ (not just valid execution), gate rules encode real-world regulations directly, and the PDS provides persistent state without a global trie bottleneck.
|
||||
|
||||
See [[file:agora-contracts.org][Agora contracts]] for the full analysis.
|
||||
See [[id:64708e1f-00e9-4cb7-b44b-ea0b98e5296d][Agora contracts]] for the full analysis.
|
||||
|
||||
* Revenue by Development Phase
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -111,13 +112,13 @@ See [[file:agora-contracts.org][Agora contracts]] for the full analysis.
|
||||
| Multi-instance governance | Agora | Large | Enterprise | Annual |
|
||||
| Namespace sub-leasing | Agora | Small | Individuals | Per-transaction |
|
||||
|
||||
Phase Zero target: $2M-$12M/year (from [[file:investment-thesis.org][investment thesis]]), with upside from verified API gateway and compliance monitoring pushing toward $15-20M.
|
||||
Phase Zero target: $2M-$12M/year (from [[id:5961e469-53a3-5f3c-ab72-3c83ef91963f][investment thesis]]), with upside from verified API gateway and compliance monitoring pushing toward $15-20M.
|
||||
|
||||
** End State streams (full Lisp Machine, 2-5 years)
|
||||
|
||||
| Stream | Component | TAM | Revenue type |
|
||||
|--------+----------+-----+--------------|
|
||||
| Verification monopoly | Logos/All | $1B+ | Certification |
|
||||
| [[id:827bc546-e887-5b7c-9b65-6392beaf0920][Verification monopoly]] | Logos/All | $1B+ | Certification |
|
||||
| Infrastructure lock-in | All | $100B+ | Rent extraction |
|
||||
| Compute marketplace | Agora | Venture-scale | Transaction fees |
|
||||
| Lisp Machine hardware | Stoa | Large | Hardware + subs |
|
||||
@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ Phase Zero target: $2M-$12M/year (from [[file:investment-thesis.org][investment
|
||||
|
||||
* Orders-of-Magnitude Risk Map
|
||||
|
||||
Using the [[file:orders-of-magnitude-time.org][orders-of-magnitude framework]], each revenue stream lives at a different scale:
|
||||
Using the [[id:2cdca4b0-6b41-44b4-acb0-af21d0e27b00][orders-of-magnitude framework]], each revenue stream lives at a different scale:
|
||||
|
||||
| Scale | Representative streams | Failure mode |
|
||||
|-------+-----------------------+--------------|
|
||||
@@ -156,11 +157,11 @@ The phase-zero streams are all direct enterprise sales with short cycles and cle
|
||||
|
||||
* Detailed References
|
||||
|
||||
- [[file:passepartout-economics.org][Passepartout economics (full thesis)]] — the unified economics document
|
||||
- [[file:investment-thesis.org][Investment thesis]] — three revenue horizons, $2M to $1B+
|
||||
- [[file:cost-structure.org][Cost structure and zero marginal cost]]
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/revenue-table.org][Compliance revenue table]] — concrete pricing per framework
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/_index.org][Compliance framework index]] — 41 frameworks by region and priority
|
||||
- [[file:compliance/first-mover-window.org][First-mover window analysis]]
|
||||
- [[file:time-estimates.org][Development timeline]] — Phase Zero vs End State
|
||||
- [[file:licensing.org][Licensing strategy]] — AGPL + commercial
|
||||
- [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout economics (full thesis)]] — the unified economics document
|
||||
- [[id:5961e469-53a3-5f3c-ab72-3c83ef91963f][Investment thesis]] — three revenue horizons, $2M to $1B+
|
||||
- [[id:0b5a8a74-cfd6-542d-bc88-4eb3cd8626f9][Cost structure and zero marginal cost]]
|
||||
- [[id:81a815ee-bf2b-4365-9894-b814e4196850][revenue table]] — concrete pricing per framework
|
||||
- [[id:e4a7b3d2-1c9f-4b6e-8a2d-5f3c7e1b9a0c][Compliance framework index]] — 41 frameworks by region and priority
|
||||
- [[id:558154ea-e63a-4c45-998c-26ce8588585b][First-mover window analysis]]
|
||||
- [[id:dc2e4f22-1c4c-5d4a-a151-f96e5d3b0d70][Development timeline]] — Phase Zero vs End State
|
||||
- [[id:67faf52f-9126-50a7-b87e-2bedc610dac7][Licensing strategy]] — AGPL + commercial
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
|
||||
:PROPERTIES:
|
||||
:CREATED: [2026-05-24 Sun]
|
||||
:ID: 13e6ae54-2d24-5aa0-b1cd-a7e8e749aa70
|
||||
:END:
|
||||
#+title: The Self-Driving Lisp Machine
|
||||
#+filetags: :passepartout:lisp-machine:hardware:riscv:tenstorrent:
|
||||
|
||||
A Tenstorrent P150 (~72 RISC-V Tensix cores) running Passepartout: 72 RISC-V cores running Lisp microcode, one core dedicated to ACL2, one to Screamer, the rest to gate verification and fact store operations.
|
||||
A Tenstorrent P150 (~72 RISC-V Tensix cores) running [[id:28c46769-c14b-42aa-ac7a-69d310157f8f][Passepartout]]: 72 RISC-V cores running Lisp microcode, one core dedicated to ACL2, one to Screamer, the rest to gate verification and fact store operations.
|
||||
|
||||
The self-driving threshold: the system can synthesize and load its own FPGA microcode or Tensix dispatch programs from within the running Lisp image. The system profiles its own gate verification latency, proposes a new microcoded instruction for the hot path, compiles RISC-V assembly from ACL2-verified specifications, loads it via PCIe DMA from within SBCL, benchmarks it — and rolls back if slower.
|
||||
|
||||
Every subdomain involved is software — the most codifiable domain. RISC-V ISA, SBCL internals, ACL2 metafunctions, CIC type theory, compiler optimization — all can [[file:sufficiency-flip.org][flip to symbolic sufficiency]] within days to weeks of ingestion.
|
||||
Every subdomain involved is software — the most codifiable domain. RISC-V ISA, SBCL internals, ACL2 metafunctions, CIC type theory, compiler optimization — all can [[id:efc76898-03f7-57ba-923d-35d65da88bb7][flip to symbolic sufficiency]] within days to weeks of ingestion.
|
||||
|
||||
**Timeline:** ~6,000 lines of new code (microcode, PCIe DMA, Tensix management, benchmark harness). ~60 cycles at current velocity. 2-4 weeks. Total from today: 6-10 weeks. See [[file:time-estimates.org][time estimates]] for the velocity model behind these numbers.
|
||||
**Timeline:** ~6,000 lines of new code (microcode, PCIe DMA, Tensix management, benchmark harness). ~60 cycles at current velocity. 2-4 weeks. Total from today: 6-10 weeks. See [[id:dc2e4f22-1c4c-5d4a-a151-f96e5d3b0d70][time estimates]] for the velocity model behind these numbers.
|
||||
|
||||
The Tenstorrent approach is dramatically simpler than FPGA because the microcode is RISC-V assembly (software), not FPGA bitstream (hardware with minutes-per-iteration synthesis). The [[file:lisp-machine-security.org][Lisp Machine security model]] — unified memory, tagged architecture, no MMU — applies directly because the Tensix cores share the same address space. [[file:verification-appliance.org][Verification appliance]] economics apply: a certified Lisp Machine at scale replaces compliance hardware. See [[file:lisp-economics.org][why Lisp is economically viable now]] and [[file:upgrade-lifecycle.org][upgrade lifecycle]] for the economic and deployment foundations.
|
||||
The Tenstorrent approach is dramatically simpler than FPGA because the microcode is RISC-V assembly (software), not FPGA bitstream (hardware with minutes-per-iteration synthesis). The [[id:1c95ce7d-a2db-506a-9608-df68f9ae211b][Lisp Machine security model]] — unified memory, tagged architecture, no MMU — applies directly because the Tensix cores share the same address space. [[id:84a537b4-4256-50c8-91f5-dd5b4538418f][Verification appliance]] economics apply: a certified Lisp Machine at scale replaces compliance hardware. See [[id:9af13fff-9725-542b-93b1-a555bc74ad72][why Lisp is economically viable now]] and [[id:29e4dbf3-cf19-589c-8b14-389e8a39d564][upgrade lifecycle]] for the economic and deployment foundations.
|
||||
|
||||
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user